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John F. Kennedy
History, Memory, Legacy:
An Interdisciplinary Inquiry
Introduction
Gregory S. Gordon
On September 25, 1963, President John F. Kennedy traveled to Grand Forks,
North Dakota, greeted its citizens while touring the city, and delivered a speech at the
University of North Dakota Field House, which addressed important issues still vital
today: environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, economic
development, the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, and the importance of
education and public service. The University conferred on the President an honorary
Doctor of Laws degree. Over 20,000 people assembled on campus that day to see JFK -the largest campus gathering in UND history. Tragically, less than two months later, the
thirty-fifth President of the United States was assassinated in Dallas.
To commemorate the forty-fifth anniversary of the President's Grand Forks visit,
and in tandem with the University's one hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary, UND
organized a September 25-27, 2008 conference to foster interdisciplinary discussion and
analysis of the issues addressed in JFK's UND speech, as well as other significant issues
of the Kennedy era, including civil rights, space exploration, the nuclear threat, and the
influence of the media on presidential politics. The Conference also explored issues
related to the President's assassination within weeks of his UND visit. With one of the
finest aerospace schools in the country, a nationally renowned Energy & Environmental
Research Center, an innovative Peace Studies Program and faculty expertise in areas as
diverse as international law, Beat poetry, voting rights, supply-side economics, and
forensic anthropology, the University of North Dakota was an ideal venue for this
interdisciplinary exploration of the Kennedy era.
Moreover, scholars from institutions as varied as Grinnell College and the
University of Maryland joined UND faculty in examining Kennedy-era themes through
various academic lenses, including literature, political science, film, economics,
philosophy, law, history and the sciences. Critical contributions were also made by a
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil

Rights Division, a United States District Court Judge, and academics from other
countries, such as Britain and Germany.
Anchoring the Conference were keynote addresses by President Kennedy's
Special Counsel, Ted Sorensen, the last living member of JFK's inner-circle, and Richard
Reeves, his biographer and award-winning author of what is considered by many to be
the authoritative work on JFK's administration – President Kennedy: Profile of Power.
Finally, the UND Eternal Flame, at the heart of campus, provided a fitting locale for a
JFK memorial service.
From all the scholarship and discussion of those three scintillating days, we
present this publication of Conference proceedings, which includes the papers presented
and transcripts of significant addresses and discussions. We are very pleased to make
this scholarship easily accessible to the public through this on-line format.
The materials presented here represent a fascinating mix of eyewitness personal
accounts of the Kennedy years and scholarly analysis of perhaps the era's most critical
issues. Some of the papers offer ground-breaking research into such topics as East
German intelligence gathering in connection with JFK's Berlin visit, the impetus behind
development of a consular relations treaty, and the Kennedy administration's policy on
civilian use of nuclear power. Other papers suggest compelling revisions of conventional
wisdom on familiar topics such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. And,
when viewed in their entirety, the papers have great breadth.
That breadth is apparent from the beginning. Part II of the compilation covers the
topic "JFK, Literature, and the 1960s." This section features works on the poetry of the
early portion of the decade, including Dr. Heidi Czerwiec's insightful look at the period's
Confessional and Beat poets ("The Long Shadow of the Confessional and Beat Poets")
and Katie Stephenson's brilliant exposé on the relationship between Allen Ginsberg and
the music of the era ("'A Revival of Poetry and Song:' Allen Ginsberg, Rock and Roll,
and the Return to the Bardic Tradition"). Other papers in the section touch on the JFK
assassination, including Lucia Cimpean's trenchant analysis of Don DeLillo's Lee Harvey
Oswald roman à clef, Libra ("Living and Writing on the Edge in Don DeLillo's Libra"),
and Michael Snyder's fascinating examination of alleged assassination conspirator Clay
Shaw's work as a playwright and its connection to Shaw's possible involvement in the
conspiracy.
Part III of the compilation, "JFK and the World," considers President Kennedy's
impact on foreign policy and space exploration. Some of the topics covered here one
would expect to find, such as the Peace Corps, Vietnam, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and
the Space Program. "Experiencing the Peace Corps" captures an interdisciplinary panel
discussion moderated by UND Professor Robin David. The interlocutors were UND
2

Professors and Peace Corps volunteers Kathy Gershman (Bolivia, 1967-69, healthcare),
Michael Beard (Iran, 1968-70, English education), Joe Vacek (Georgia, 2006, judicial
reform and English education), and Cory Enger (Niger, 2006-08 sustainable agriculture).
Each described his or her individual Peace Corps experiences, which provide great
perspective as they took place during the bookend decades of the program in the 1960s
and the 2000s.
Many wonder if the United States would have descended into the bloody abyss of
the Vietnam War if President Kennedy had been reelected in 1964. In "JFK and
Vietnam: An Unanswered Legacy in Film and History," Scott Racek focuses on the CIAsponsored November 1963 assassination of Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in
trying to disabuse readers of the notion, accepted in the popular imagination and in the
cinema, that JFK would have withdrawn all American troops from Vietnam had he lived.
This analysis is rounded out by Albert Berger in his paper "The Indochina Bind: John
Kennedy and Vietnam." Dr. Berger explains that the Vietnam quagmire was the
unfortunate byproduct of Democrats' worst fears about the potential of a new
McCarthyism that might have turned them out of office had they abandoned Indochina to
the Communists.
Dr. Berger also demythologizes the thirteen most dramatic days of the Kennedy
presidency in his paper "The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Narratives of the Cold War."
The paper reveals that, far from the omnipotent nuclear menace portrayed by the
American press and politicians in the period leading up to and during the Crisis, the
U.S.S.R. was in a vastly inferior military position to the United States. Dr. Berger
establishes that Khrushchev used bluff and bluster to compensate for the inferiority but
after his ouster -- due in large part to the Crisis -- the Soviets invested in closing the vast
military gap and inaugurating the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
Finally, there has always been much speculation about President Kennedy's
motives in ramping up the American space program for a 1960s moon launch. In "'We
Choose to Go to the Moon': JFK and the Race for the Moon," Richard Collin details and
analyzes the Cold War strategic thinking behind President Kennedy's push to land a man
on the moon by decade's end. Given the decline of NASA in recent years and its fight to
remain relevant, this is a valuable and timely contribution.
The balance of Part III occupies ground less trodden. Much scholarship on JFK's
Cold War foreign policy has centered on the administration's dealings with the Soviet
Union. But President Kennedy never lost sight of the era's other Communist behemoth,
China. In his paper "There Are Bigger Issues at Stake": The Administration of John F.
Kennedy and United States-Republic of China Relations, 1961-63," Dr. Charles Pellegrin
explores the evolution of JFK's China policy. His is a well researched examination of
how that policy began to veer away from total support of Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of
3

China and position itself to improving relations with Mao Tse-tung's People's Republic of
China.
Similarly, foreign policy experts have shed relatively little light on the Kennedy
administration's achievements in the area of consular relations. Cindy Buys helps fill this
void by offering fascinating insights on the Kennedy State Department's pivotal role in
codifying the international law of consular relations. "JFK's Legacy Regarding Consular
Relations Law," explores the JKF-orchestrated negotiation of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, the bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention, and the continued
importance of consular treaties today.
Finally, Dr. Robert Waite's ground-breaking scholarship in his paper "JFK, Berlin
and the Berlin Crises: 1961-1963" rounds out this Part of the compilation. Based on his
original primary-source research of East German Secret Police ("Stasi") archives, as well
as reviews of East German newspapers from the period, Dr. Waite shows that East
German officials and the media considered President Kennedy's summer 1963 "Ich bin
ein Berliner" visit to Berlin quite provocative. He also demonstrates the surprising level
of grief East Germans experienced shortly thereafter in the wake of JFK's assassination.
Part IV of this compilation, "JFK and the United States," turns the focus inward
and examines some of JFK's domestic policies. It begins with perhaps the most
important domestic issue JFK faced -- civil rights. From the Freedom Riders to the
March on Washington, with its famous "I Have a Dream" speech, there are many
powerful associations between the Kennedy years and the Civil Rights Movement. This
section benefits from the scholarship of Brian Landsberg, a former Deputy Assistant
Attorney General of the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division. As a Division
line-attorney in the 1960s, Professor Landsberg operated on the Movement's front lines
and provides his insights about it in his paper "The Kennedy Justice Department's
Enforcement of Civil Rights: A View from the Trenches."
Professor Landsberg's paper calls into question the notion that, despite some of
the powerful symbolism of its era, the Kennedy administration was ultimately ineffectual
with respect to promoting and securing equal rights for America's black citizens. He
demonstrates that, without Congressional authorization, and in addition to its Herculean
efforts to secure voting rights and equal access to interstate transportation for AfricanAmericans, the Division was active in devising ways to combat racial segregation of
public schools. To place all that in context, Professor Landsberg has also contributed to
Part IV a "Civil Rights Chronology: January 1961-November 1963."
This section concludes by analyzing a topic little explored until now: JFK's
energy policy. In "Atomic Power, Fossil Fuels, and the Environment: Lessons Learned
and the Lasting Impact of the Kennedy Energy Policies," Joshua Fershee contributes
4

innovative research and analysis regarding the complexity of President Kennedy's energy
policy and its visionary global approach. Professor Fershee demonstrates that JFK
sought to promote conservation while appropriating nuclear steam generation for civilian
energy use and expanding American infrastructure for coal and electricity. He concludes
that, from a strategic perspective, JFK's bold and expansive vision should still serve as a
model for modern policymakers.
Many commentators have noted that, for politically strategic purposes and unlike
any president before him, John F. Kennedy used the media to establish a glamorous
image and style, posthumously embodied in the term "Camelot." Part V of the
compilation, "JFK – Media, Image and Legacy," considers the implications of this trendsetting presidential phenomenon. It begins by chronicling early opposition views of
Camelot in Laura Jane Gifford's paper "Kennedy's Loyal Opposition: National Review
and the Development of a Conservative Alternative -- January-August 1961." Next, Dr.
Richard M. Filipink examines the evolution of JFK's image over time in "Primarily a
Political Problem": Constructing the Image of the Kennedy Presidency, 1961-Present."
Using the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam as analytic prisms, Dr. Filipink traces the
development of JFK's public persona from Cold Warrior-icon, as crafted by Kennedy
biographers and historians in the 1960s and 1970s, through a 1980s transition period, to a
new statesman-figure created for the 1990s and 21st century.
In the Section's third paper "JFK: The Exceptional Idea," Dr. James Boys explains
how the term "Kennedyesque" entered into our political and cultural lexicon and how it
continues to exert considerable influence on the American national psyche. Dr. Boys
demonstrates how all office seekers and statesmen try, to one degree or another, to
partake of or co-opt the Kennedy style but ultimately come up short because their efforts
are measured against what Boys describes as the "sentimental constructs of the Kennedy
golden age." Finally, Mary Stromme concludes Part V by specifying the Kennedy impact
on the most recent presidential contest. In her paper "Rhetoric in the Campaign Website
of Barack Obama," Stromme recalls the central role of television in JFK's political
fortunes and compares it to the comparable role played by the internet in the political rise
of our most recent president, Barack Obama.
Part of the Kennedy mystique is inextricably bound up in his assassination – the
poignancy of a vibrant leader violently and graphically cut down in the prime of life amid
an adoring public. Part VI, "The Death of the President," attempts to measure what
happened that day in Dallas, both in terms of emotional impact and forensic
investigation. With regard to the former, Eleanor Williams connects her personal anguish
of that day to the iconography of the Kennedy presidency and to larger national themes in
her paper "That Day in Dallas." Similarly, Dr. Steve Andrews's paper "'I Looked Up and
I Looked Down': JFK, Mrs. D, and the Space of Citizenship," explains how November
22, 1963's collective grief brought the first glimmerings of an American identity to a
5

young adopted boy taken from his foreign birthplace and brought to an unwelcoming
rural America. Finally, in "The Day Kennedy Was Assassinated," David Marshall
describes the moment that time and all of humanity seemed to stand still in Grand Central
Station when it was announced that President Kennedy had been killed.
The balance of Part VI deals with the evidentiary and forensic aspects of the
assassination. Many Americans reject the conclusion of the Warren Report that Lee
Harvey Oswald acted alone and believe there was a conspiracy behind President
Kennedy's assassination. Gary Severson and John Williams point to possible North
Dakota conspiracy links in their scholarship. In his piece "Three Gunshots at Life,"
Severson tells the story of Life magazine Managing Editor Edward K. Thompson, a
native North Dakotan who was closely connected to the infamous "Zapruder film" – the
most complete visual recording of JFK's murder. Does Thompson's connection to the
Zapruder film leave possible clues about an assassination conspiracy? In a separate
paper, "Lee Harvey Oswald: North Dakota and Beyond," Severson teams up with John
Williams to demonstrate that there may have been a Lee Harvey Oswald double living in
Stanley, North Dakota during the 1950s. They contend this doppelganger might have
been controlled by the United States government for eventual use in the alleged
assassination cabal. Looking at the bigger picture, James Fetzer presents a treasure trove
of photographic and diagrammatic material that he believes points to a conspiracy to
assassinate President Kennedy in "Dealey Plaza Revisited: What Happened to JFK?"
Finally, the Conference was honored and enriched by the presentation of U.S.
District Judge John R. Tunheim, who had previously served as the Chair of the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board. In "Workings of the Assassination Records
Review Board," Judge Tunheim traces the Board's origins and explains how it pursued
the painstaking work that led to the release of thousands of new assassination-related
documents to the public.
Although it appears first in the compilation, I have reserved Part I for last here to
highlight its moving and meaningful impact. Titled simply "The Presidency," it includes
the timeless words of President Kennedy himself in the transcript of his address to the
University of North Dakota on September 25, 1963. And it provides the insights of the
man who wrote that speech for JFK, Special Counsel to the President Ted Sorensen. I
felt privileged to have a discussion with Mr. Sorensen on the stage of the Chester Fritz
Auditorium forty-five years to the day after President Kennedy's historic appearance on
the UND campus. In that conversation, whose transcript is titled "I Was Chief of Staff
for Ideas," Mr. Sorensen shared fascinating personal insights about his relationship with
the president, his work at the White House, and his participation in some of the most
significant events of the twentieth century, including the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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Part I also includes the moving words of UND President Robert Kelley at the
memorial to President Kennedy held at the campus's Eternal Flame. Finally, it concludes
with the remarks of perhaps the finest chronicler of the Kennedy administration – awardwinning author and journalist Richard Reeves. His remarks, titled "President Kennedy:
Profile of Power," dig deeply into the territory covered by Reeves's acclaimed 1992 book
of the same title. Focusing chronologically on one 48-hour period in June 1963, Reeves
demonstrates that, unlike conventional presidential histories that handle themes
individually in serial fashion, the actual experience of the presidency, in real time,
consists of several themes intersecting simultaneously. In this case, he considers JFK's
drafting and delivering the epochal "peace speech," the stand-off at the schoolhouse door
with George Wallace as the University of Alabama was being desegregated, the drafting
and delivering of JFK's great civil rights address immediately after the stand-off, the
iconic self-immolation of the South Vietnamese monk, and the assassination of NAACP
leader Medgar Evers. It is a fascinating exposition.
I would like to thank Drs. John Delane Williams and Robert G. Waite for their
devotion and hard work on this project. Without them, and their fine organizational and
editing skills, this publication would never have seen the light of day. I would also like
to thank UND Conference Service's Robyn von Ruden, who was instrumental in helping
us organize and conduct the conference, and Doris Boernhoft, UND Computer Services,
who helped us integrate this material into the online format. I must also express my
gratitude to those who worked with us on the JFK Conference Committee and to the
University for its tremendous support. It has been a team effort from the beginning.
The University of North Dakota sesquicentennial celebration seemed a fitting
framework in which to commemorate JFK's historic UND visit. We believe this
publication beautifully captures the creative and interdisciplinary spirit of that
commemoration. Americans in 1963 no doubt understood that President Kennedy chose
UND for his North Dakota visit because it was the flagship university of a great state.
More than four decades on, our national gathering to discuss JFK's life and legacy served
as a welcome reminder that UND remains one of the premier higher learning and
research institutions on the Great Plains. We are grateful and proud to be a part of this
intellectually vibrant campus at the country's center and from this unique vantage point
we are thrilled to reach out to the world at large and give it this publication about our
nation's thirty-fifth president. We hope you will enjoy it.
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PART I
THE PRESIDENCY

8

Chapter 1
Address at the University of North Dakota
September 25, 19631
President John F. Kennedy
Mr. President, Governor Guy, Senator Burdick, Secretary Udall, Senator
Mansfield, Senator Metcalf, other Members of the Senate who may be here, ladies and
gentlemen:
Politics is a somewhat abused profession in the United States. Artemus Ward
once said, “I am not a politician and my other habits are good also.” But I would like to
say it has some advantages. It permitted me to go from being a somewhat indifferent
lieutenant in the United States Navy to becoming Commander in Chief in the short space
of 15 years, and it has also permitted me to become a graduate of this university in 30
seconds, when it takes you 4 years. So in determining what career you should follow,
you might consider this lowly profession.
I am glad to be here at this college. Prince Bismarck, who was named after
Bismarck, North Dakota, once said that one-third of the students of German universities
broke down from overwork, another third broke down from dissipation, and the other
third ruled Germany. I do not know which third of the student body from this school is
here today, but I am confident that I am talking to the future rulers of not only North
Dakota, but the United States, in the sense that all educated citizens bear the burden of
governing, as active participants in the democratic process.
I have come on a journey of 5 days across the United States, beginning in
Pennsylvania and ending in California, to talk about the conservation of our resources,
and I think that it is appropriate that we should come here to North Dakota where the
whole struggle for the maintenance of the natural resources of this country, for the
development of the natural resources of this country, in a sense, began. I do not argue
whether it was Harvard University or North Dakota that made Theodore Roosevelt such a
man and such a conservationist, but I am sure that his years here in North Dakota helped
make him realize how expensive, how wasteful was indifference to this great resource
“Address at the University of North Dakota. September 25, 1963,” Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1964), 715-719.
1

9

and how valuable it could become. He put it on much more than the material plane. He
said it was the moral obligation of a society, in order to preserve that society, to maintain
its natural endowment.
In 1963 we face entirely different problems than we faced at the time of Theodore
Roosevelt. The fact of the matter is that because we have so much in surplus in the
United States, there is some feeling in many parts of the country, and I am sure not here,
that we can afford to waste what we have. I don’t believe that at all. I think what we
have to decide is how we can put it to best use, how we can provide in 1963, and in the
whole decade of the 1960’s, a use of our natural and scientific and technological
advances, so that in the years to come the 350 million people living in the United States
in the year 2000 can enjoy a much richer and happier life than we do today. And unless
we make the proper decisions today on how we will use our water and our air, and our
land, and our oceans, unless we make the comparable effort, an effort comparable to what
Theodore Roosevelt and others made fifty years ago, we are going to waste it.
The fact of the matter is that, in the field of conservation, every day that is lost is a
valuable opportunity wasted. Every time, particularly in the East where they have such a
massive concentration of population—every time an acre of land disappears into private
development or exploitation, an acre of land that could be used for the people, we have
lost a chance. We will never get it back. The fact of the matter is that land will rise in
value, and unless we set it aside and use it wisely today, in 1970 or ’75 we won’t have the
chance. As you know, along the Atlantic coast, nearly all the sea, the beach, is owned by
comparatively few people. We were able to set aside, a year ago, Cape Cod Park, which
is near to all the people of New England. We are talking about doing the same on the
Delaware River. We are talking about doing the same in northern Indiana, near Gary. We
have to seize these opportunities--we are now talking about doing the same in northern
Wisconsin--we have to seize these opportunities to set aside these wilderness areas, these
primitive areas, these fresh water areas, these lakes. We have to set them aside for the
people who are going to come after us.
Now we have to not only to set them aside, but we have to develop them. We
have to purify our water. We have to make this a richer country in which to live, and it
can be done. This State of North Dakota should know it better than any. This state had,
30 years ago, three out of every hundred farms lit by electricity, and now, nearly all are.
What was 30 years ago a life of affluence, in a sense today is a life of poverty. This
country moves ahead. This is a much richer country than it was 15 years ago, but it is so
because decisions were made in those days which made it possible for us to live much
better today. You cannot live in North Dakota, you cannot fly over this State, without
realizing how wise were those who went before us and how necessary it is that we make
the proper decision.
10

Theodore Roosevelt once said that the White House is a great pulpit, from which
to preach, and I would like to preach not only for the vigorous life which he preached for
us physically, but also for us in our time, facing entirely different problems, to make the
same wise, vigorous decisions which he made for the conservation of our natural
resources so that you and your children can enjoy this great and rich country. Nature has
been so generous to us that we have mistreated her. Now, when our country is becoming
increasingly crowded, when science and technology waste so much of what we have, we
have to realize that time is running out for us.
So we come on this trip to remind the American people of what they have, and to
remind the people what they must do to maintain it. Here, only a few minutes from here,
is the Garrison Dam. Just to show you what decisions made by us today can do for the
people in North Dakota in the 1970’s, that one dam alone will have a water area, man
made, as great as the total water area in North Dakota when this project was begun in
1946. Nature put the lakes there fifty years ago. Now, man makes them. And man
improves what nature has done. I have strongly supported the Garrison reclamation
project, which will use water stored behind the Garrison Dam, and I am confident it will
make a major contribution to the development of America.
This is a matter of concern to all Americans. I think sometimes we read too much
about the problems of particular areas, and maybe North Dakota may not be so interested
in the beaches along the Atlantic coast or along the Gulf, or along the West Coast, and
people in the East not so much interested in the Garrison project in North Dakota, which
is far away, but this country is not far away. It is closer than it has ever been before.
When you can fly across it in 5 hours, when more importantly than transportation is the
fact that we are one people, living in 50 States and living in hundreds of communities,
what happens on the East Coast where your children may some day live, what happens in
the Middle West, where the children of the people in New England may some day live,
and what happens on the West Coast, are of concern to of all of us.
Therefore, this impressive chain of dams, which includes Garrison, has been
called with some accuracy the Great Lakes of the Missouri, which belongs to all of the
people. Behind these dams, the Big Muddy is turning blue, and soil is being saved, crops
are being irrigated, recreation opportunities are growing. And this whole problem of
recreation is going to be one of one of our most promising and important areas of human
activity in the next 10 or 15 years.
Automation, which is a technical word, and which brings grief, can also bring a
good deal of pleasure. If you realize that we are moving more on the railroads of the
United States with half as many people working on them as worked 15 years ago, the
question is, what has happened to those 50 percent of the people and what are they doing,
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and how are they spending their time? And what is true on the railroads is true on the
farms, where with a steadily diminishing population, we farm more and more.
How are we going to find work for those people? Those of you who are studying
here and are concerned with the social sciences, which you must be, must wonder how
you are going to find work for the millions of people who are coming into the market
every year seeking jobs. I said, in speaking on our tax bill the other night, that we are
going to have to find 10 million jobs in 2 ½ years. How are we going to find them? What
individual actions must be taken and what national actions must be taken to find 10
million jobs for your sons and daughters in the short space of 2 ½ years? What are you
going to do with 8 million people coming into the labor market in the rest of this decade
who haven’t graduated from high school? How are they going to find work? Fifty years
ago, 30 years ago, they might have worked on a farm, or could have done heavy labor.
But today what is needed are skills and the uneducated man or woman is left behind. It is
as inevitable as nature.
These are the problems which face the great democracy of ours. They cannot be
solved by turning away, but can be solved, I believe, by the united intelligent effort of us
all. And what is true of people is true of animals. We have only about half as many cows
as we had 30 years ago, and they are producing about 25 percent more milk. What is
going to happen to all of the people who once did all of the jobs which are no longer
needed? By wise national policy, involving monetary and fiscal policy, I believe that we
can stimulate this economy of ours to absorb these people. And also we should make life
in this country so beautiful that, as the hours of work lessen, and they are now 40 hours
and some day there will be less, people will have some place to go and some place to find
close to nature to enrich their lives.
So what I am saying now, in a sense, is that we are the heirs of Theodore
Roosevelt, and what we must do today is prepare for those who are our heirs. The steps
we take in conservation and reclamation will have very little effect upon all of us here
immediately and in this decade. What we are doing in the real sense is preparing for those
who come after us.
We are gradually narrowing the differences between the standards of living of our
city and our rural populations. Parity of farm income is important. But beyond that, we
are gradually, too slowly but gradually, achieving a parity between urban and rural
people in other aspects of life, in their ability to obtain electrical service, in their power
and resources available for economic development, in their facilities and opportunities for
recreation. We are seeking, in short, a true parity of opportunity for all of our people,
north and south, east and west. It will not come overnight, but the example of what has
been done to light the farms of this state in 30 years shows what can be done when the
government and the people, working closely together, work for the common interest.
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When I think what REA has done for this state and all of the fight against it when
it was first put into effect, isn’t it astonishing to you that this country, after the end of
World War I, in many ways, a much more virgin country, passed through a recession in
1921, 1922, and 1923, a depression, in fact, and a panic, passed through a period of low
farm income and depression on the farm through the rest of the twenties, and then moved
through a depression of such staggering dimensions that it existed from 1929 to the
outbreak of World War II, and yet from 1945, while we have moved through periods of
recession, we have almost tripled our wealth in the short space of 18 years. And we have
not passed through a period in any way comparable to the early twenties, or the desperate
days of the thirties. And a lot of that is because the decisions which the Government and
the people made in the thirties, which makes it possible for us, moving on that base, to
determine wise policies in the sixties.
There is an old saying that things don’t happen, they are made to happen. And we
in our years have to make the same wise judgments about what policies will ensure us a
growing prosperity as were made in the years before. The whole experience between two
world wars, which was so tragic for this country, should tell us we cannot leave it to mere
chance and accident. It requires the long range judgment of all of us, the public judgment,
not only the pursuit of our private interests but the public judgment of what it takes to
keep 180 million people gradually rising. And anyone who thinks it can be done by
accident and chance should look back in history of 1919 to 1939 to know what can
happen when we let natural forces operate completely freely.
Five billion dollars were advanced under REA to 1,000 borrowers. More than
1,500,000 miles of power lines have been built serving 20 million American people. This
has been a sound investment. Out of roughly 1,000 borrowers, co-ops, only one is
delinquent in payment, and the total losses on the $5 billion advanced is less than
$50,000. Here in North Dakota, REA-financed rural co-ops serve on the average, barely
more than one electric meter per mile of line, compared to an average in urban based
utility systems of 33 meters to each mile of line.
There are the things which can make the great difference. What I urge upon those
of you who are students here is to make determinations based on life as it is, on facts as
they are, not merely here in this community, not merely in North Dakota, not merely in
the United States, but in this dangerous and varied world of hours in which we play such
a leading and responsible part. Unless the United States can demonstrate a sound and
vigorous democratic life, a society which is not torn apart by friction and faction, an
economy which is steadily growing- unless it can do all those things we cannot continue
to bear the responsibilities of leadership which I think almost alone have prevented this
world of ours from being overrun. The fact of the matter is that there are many things
happening in the world which should serve to encourage us, as well as discourage us.
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If 5 or 6 years ago anyone had ever visualized what has happened behind the Iron
Curtain and the Bamboo Curtain they would have been regarded as completely
unrealistic. All of the pressures which have been brought to bear on life in the
Communist world have been brought to bear in part not only because of the inner
contradictions of the Communist system itself, but also because the United States chose
in 1945 to assume the burdens of maintaining a watch at the gate of freedom when so
many other countries who so long had carried a heavy responsibility around the world
were prostrate and defeated. So this country has done a good deal.
I come here today to say it can do a good deal more. And I urge those of you who
are students here to recognize the obligation which any educated man or woman must
bear to society as a whole. This school was not developed merely to give its graduates an
economic advantage in the life struggle. We do not seek merely, I am sure, at this school
to graduate lawyers, or farmers, or doctors who may lead their communities in income.
What we seek to advance, what we seek to develop in all of our colleges and universities,
are educated men and women who can bear the burdens of responsible citizenship, who
can make judgments about life as it is, and as it must be, and encourage the people to
make those decisions which can bring not only prosperity and security, but happiness to
the people of the United States and those who depend upon it.
So in that great effort, I urge you to participate. Nothing will give you more
satisfaction. No need is greater. And I hope that all of us, not only in our field of
immediate interest, but in the field of our resources, will also make the necessary and
immediate decisions.
Marshal Lyautey, who was the great French Marshal in North Africa, was once
talking to his gardener and he suggested that he plant a tree, and the gardener said, “Well
why plant it? It won’t flower for 100 years.” And Marshal Lyautey said, “In that case,
plant it this afternoon.”
I think this is good advice for all of us.
Thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke in the University field house at Grand Forks after receiving an
honorary degree of doctor of laws. In his opening words he referred to the University’s President,
Dr. George W. Starcher; governor William L. Guy and U.S. Senator Quentin N. Burdick of North
Dakota; Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall; and U.S. Senators Mike Mansfield and Lee
Metcalf of Montana.
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Chapter 2
Presentation of Robert Kelley, President of the
University of North Dakota, at the Eternal Flame
Memorial Ceremony, JFK Conference,
September 23, 2008 [1]
On November 22nd in 1963, I was leaving my college cafeteria when a friend
approached me and breathlessly told me that President Kennedy had just been shot just
down the road from where I was in Dallas. I did not learn until later that evening the
details of that moment and that the country had lost its President and young leader to an
assassin’s bullet. As all Americans of that generation, I have never forgotten it. Through
the remainder of my student years at the University California at Berkeley, and through
the remainder of the decade of the 60’s, I felt acutely the loss of JFK and his leadership.
Some few weeks before his death, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy visited the
University of North Dakota and the city of Grand Forks. The visit was part of a five day
tour of the United States addressing a variety of domestic projects, managing the nation’s
natural resources, among these projects was the Garrison Dam on the Missouri River,
which created Lake Sakakawea. During his address to the campus he remembered Teddy
Roosevelt and his love for North Dakota. In his speech, JFK looked ahead to the year
2000, when he estimated that some 350 million people would rely on the country’s
natural resources.
Kennedy said at that time, quote, “Unless we make the proper decisions today on
how we shall use our water, and our air, and our land, and our oceans, unless we make
the comparable effort, an effort comparable to what Theodore Roosevelt and others made
50 years ago, we are going to waste it.” Kennedy concluded his address that morning
with the following thought: I urge those of you who are students here to recognize the
obligation which any educated man or woman must bear to society as a whole. This
school was not developed merely to give its graduates an economic advantage in the life
struggle. We do not seek merely, I’m sure, at this school, to graduate lawyers, farmers,
doctors, who may lead their communities in income. What we seek to advance, what we
seek to develop in all of our colleges and universities are educated men and women who
can bear the burdens of responsible scholarship, and citizenship, who can make
judgments about life as it is, and as it must be, and encourage the people to make those
decisions which could bring not only prosperity and security, but happiness to the people
of the United States and those who depend upon it.”
These words were true in 1963 and they are true in 2008. It’s an honor to
remember the life and contributions of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
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1. The presentation by Dr. Kelley was recorded by Sean Windingland, and along with
many of the other presentations at the JFK Conference, placed on Youtube. Using the
recording preserved by Windingland on Youtube, John Delane Williams transcribed Dr.
Kelley’s presentation.
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Chapter 3
“I Was the Chief of Staff for Ideas.” A Conversation
with Ted Sorensen
Theodore Sorensen and Gregory S.Gordon

Theodore Sorensen, speech-writer and senior policy adviser to JFK from his days
in the Senate to his service in the Oval Office, sat down with Gregory Gordon, Assistant
Professor of Law, for an unusually candid and informative conversation. Dr. Robert
Kelley, President of the University of North Dakota, provided the introduction. Here is
what each had to say:
President Kelley: Theodore Sorensen was born in Lincoln, Nebraska, went to the
University of Nebraska and attended law school at the University of Nebraska. After law
school, he went to Washington D.C. where he would ultimately work with JFK. This
experience would grow not only into a partnership with the President, but also into a
friendship that would last until the President’s death in 1963. Ted met with JFK on a
daily basis as the President’s speech writer and special counsel. As a result of this
relationship, Ted Sorensen is a prominent figure in the history of our country. He
composed JFK’s soaring rhetoric and exerted great influence on his policies. We see
Ted’s influence present at great moments in American history, moments which included
the face-down with the Soviets over the Berlin Wall, the Cuban missile crisis, the civil
rights marches on Washington, domestic energy policies, conservation of natural
resources, and with our US policy in Asia and the founding of the Peace Corps. Leaving
the White House following JFK’s assassination, Ted joined a New York City law firm
where he has been engaged in international law, advising governments, multi-national
organizations and major corporations around the world. He is the author of a best-selling
biography on JFK and remains active in political and international issues. I’ll digress
from my prepared comments for just a moment and say that after dinner with Ted I know
him to be a man of humor, great warmth, and an abiding affection for everyone who
comes into contact with him. Ted - it is a wonderful pleasure to have met you. Ted lives
in New York City with his wife Gillian. I found out at dinner that she is also an assistant
for Kofi Anan. She too has a very distinguished background. Hosting Ted Sorensen this
evening will be Professor Gregory Gordon, Assistant Professor in our School of Law.
Greg is the Director of the Center for Human Rights and Genocide Studies and teaches in
the areas of criminal procedure, international law, and international human rights law.
Prior to joining the faculty of law at the UND, Greg was Senior Trial Attorney in the
Office of Special Investigations in the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division. He
also has served as Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia and worked as
Legal Officer and Deputy Team Leader on the International Criminal Tribunal for
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Rwanda in Kigali. Please join me in welcoming Mr. Ted Sorensen and Professor Greg
Gordon to this great conversation.
GG: Thank you Dr. Kelley for that warm and generous introduction. Good
evening Mr. Sorensen and thank you for being with us tonight. This is a unique and
fascinating opportunity for us to hear the thoughts and recollections of President
Kennedy’s closing living adviser. I’m going to ask some questions and then we are going
to open it up to the audience to ask you some questions. I know you have an excerpt
from your recent book, Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History, which came out, I
believe, in May. We have a copy of it here with us and we will finish with you reading a
selection from your book. Let me start with the beginning of your relationship with JFK.
I think we would all like to know how you originally met President Kennedy and what
were your first impressions of him?
TS: After law school I went to Washington because I thought I might find the
kind of legal work there - public policy, national, international matters - that I probably
would not find in my home city of Lincoln, Nebraska. After two early jobs, one for a
federal agency, one for a temporary congressional committee, and that temporary
committee expired, I had to start looking for a job all over again because in 1952
President Eisenhower had been elected - the first Republican in 20 years - he requested a
freeze on the executive branch employment so I could not return to my old job. The
chairman of that committee I was serving said “Don’t worry. There are some new
Senators. Some of them come from the House and I’ve worked with them. I’ll
recommend to them that they take a look at your availability.” He and his chief of staff
sent letters to three new Senators who had formerly worked with Senator Douglas of
Illinois, the Chairman. Of those three, one was Mike Mansfield from nearby Montana.
One was Scoop Jackson, or Henry Jackson, of Washington, also of the Northwest. And
the other was John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts. I don’t think to my knowledge that I
ever heard back from Mansfield, but both Jackson and Kennedy said, yes, they would be
glad to interview me. I had interviews with both. In Kennedy’s case he had been a
Congressman and he had invited me to meet with him in his old House office building
but the newly elected Congressman assigned to that office was moving in that same day.
All was chaos and confusion inside. So he took two chairs and placed them in the
doorway. We perched on those chairs and had about a five minute interview. There
wasn’t time for a serious investigation of my credentials, but I was impressed.
Impressed, first of all, that he did not try to impress me. Here he was a millionaire, a war
hero, a Harvard graduate. He had everything. And he was a newly elected member of
the Senate. He didn’t try to talk about that or impress me about how important he was.
He didn’t act in a pompous, self-important way as so many politicians do. He was just a
good guy. I liked that. As it turned out, for the next 11 years he was a good guy.
GG: He took you all the way ultimately to the White House. When you went to
the White House with JFK you described your role there as Special Counsel to the
President and you indicated in your book that your role encompassed advising the
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President on policy and serving as a speech writer. I was wondering, what was the
relationship between speech writing and policy making when it came to domestic affairs?
TS: In a way, I had been doing that during his eight years as United States
Senator. In the White House it was even easier, except I had a lot more to do. But I was
a policy adviser and I would take part in the meetings on domestic policy where decisions
were made. It was easy to watch the President make a decision. I could see what
evidence impressed him. I could see what arguments meant the most to him. I could see
what his responses were and then walk a few steps down to my office, not far from his,
and put all that into a draft speech. Other presidents have had speech writing departments
and the departments are usually not even in the White House. They are in the Old
Executive Office Building across the street. They have seven or nine word-smiths sitting
there, waiting for the phone to ring. The chief of staff calls up and says the President
would like a speech on Haiti. Who knows about Haiti? Who will write a speech for the
President on Haiti? And someone will say, I will, and that someone might never have
met or seen the President, much less have the slightest idea what his position is on Haiti.
I couldn’t do that and I certainly wouldn’t enjoy it compared to the relationship I had
with John Kennedy.
GG: You knew the President’s thoughts, probably, as well as anyone.
TS. Yes. When I went into the White House I had been with him for eight years.
GG: One last question related to this. Were there some times when there was an
inconsistency between writing and policy making?
TS: No.
GG: That must have made the job easier.
TS: Well, I think I say in the book, being very immodest, but comparing myself
with others and I have known many presidential speech writers, they have to submit their
draft to the head of the communications department. I was the head of the
communications department. Then they had to submit it to the chief of staff for ideas. I
was the chief of staff for ideas. I only had to submit my draft to one person, John F.
Kennedy.
GG: And you had two assistants, as I recall, when you were in the White House.
TS: I had two deputies. It was called the Office of Special Counsel. They were
actually lawyers, practicing law while I was working on policy matters, and for the most
part they did not get involved with speech writing. Of course, John F. Kennedy did.
Once in a while we drew on the wonderful historian Arthur Schlesinger who was gifted.
During the first years, Richard Goodwin, who had worked with me during the campaign,
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was in the White House and assisted me. But he then transferred over to the State
Department and then the Peace Corps. So, basically, my two assistants worked on
appeals from independent boards and agencies and those sort of legal questions. Much as
I tried to get rid of the speech writing job, the President kept piling more and more
responsibilities on me, but he wouldn’t let me give it up.
GG: As a result, you have this incredible opportunity to work with the President
on a daily basis and to know what he was thinking and as well to be his adviser and
special counsel. During this time with President Kennedy in the White House what
actions that you took or decisions that you made do you believe have had the greatest
impact on the course of history?
TS: I didn’t make decisions. If you’re a speech writer you always have to keep in
mind that you’re just a speech writer. You’re not the president. You don’t make
decisions. You don’t decide policy. The President does that. I had a background in civil
rights that he did not, and perhaps my advice on that policy and the speeches I drafted
regarding that policy helped to influence him as his brother Bobby, the Attorney General,
was also influencing him. But influencing him even more was what was going on in our
country - civil rights became a burning issue, north, south, east, west, it became a moral
issue. It became a legal issue. It was an issue that the President of the United States
could not ignore. So I don’t even take the credit for pushing him over that line. Events
pushed him over that line.
GG: The book points out that you were active early in your life with civil rights.
It is something that you believed in deeply and cared about. When you started at the
White House, I get the impression from your book that civil rights was not at the top of
the agenda at the very beginning of the administration.
TS: No. It was not for two reasons. One, it had not been one of Kennedy’s chief
interests. He was more focused on foreign policy and to some extent making certain that
the economy remained strong because he had not had an exposure to civil rights issues,
although he began talking about it in his campaign. When he got to the White House the
congressional leaders said that 20, or was it 23, Democratic Congressmen had lost their
seats in 1960. It may have been Kennedy’s fault because his religion turned a lot of
people against the Democratic Party. And they said in the previous session of Congress
there had been attempts to have a civil rights bill and it failed. If it failed in the previous
Congress it certainly wasn’t going to pass with 23 fewer House Democrats and for
Kennedy to go through the motions of symbolically sending up a civil rights bill would
only antagonize the so-called ‘Dixiecrats’, those southern Democrats, to vote against the
rest of his program. Well, the rest of his program, that he wanted passed that first year
included a lot of provisions to help people at the bottom of the economic ladder,
including blacks. Minimal wage, better public housing programs, aid for economically
distressed areas, and why jeopardize the prospects of that legislation which would
actually help black Americans just to go through the political symbolism of sending up
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legislation that had no chance of passing.
GG: It must have been gratifying, as time progressed, when you got to the point
when it was politically viable to work on civil rights legislation directly.
TS: Truth of the matter is it was never politically viable because JFK knew that it
was going to cost the Democratic Party the South and Lyndon Johnson particularly
weighed in with that point. It turns out that they were right. The Democratic Party has
lost something like seven out of ten presidential elections since Kennedy and Johnson.
The only three exceptions were Southern governors - Carter and Clinton - and it is
because we have lost all the southern border states in almost all of those elections.
GG: Can we say then that the civil rights legislation that you worked on and that
was ultimately passed during the Johnson administration was a great act of courage?
TS: Yes, of course it was because Kennedy knew that it was. I still think, and
both he and I hoped, that he would still win the reelection to the second term because he
gained enormous popularity in all other parts of the country. And surely some southern
states would recognize his leadership ability and the New Deal economic programs that
had done so much to revitalize the South back in the 30s. But yes, he knew it would
endanger the prospects of his party.
GG: If the book, Profiles in Courage, were updated that that would seem to be a
chapter. I was thinking about the decision making in the White House, especially early
on. People have heard about the Bay of Pigs and I know that President Kennedy felt that
that was not an operation that went well, that he did not feel good about it. What changed
in the White House after the Bay of Pigs in terms of the way operations were conducted?
TS: It is a very important question. Since Roosevelt, people get this idea that the
real time for showing what you can do with the new president while the so-called honeymoon was on, the real time was the first 100 days. Roosevelt talked about the first 100
days. In his inaugural Kennedy said that all this will not be done in the first hundred
days. But there was the Bay of Pigs, an operation that had been formulated by holdover
CIA and military leaders who had a lot of credentials, the grey hair and the medals. So,
he believed them. He believed them when we were definitely going to overthrow Castro;
that is once the Cuban exile army landed on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs the Cuban
people would rise up and throw out Castro. That was not very likely because the Cubans
who were against Castro were all in Miami or Cuban prisons. So that was one of many
false premises which they sold to Kennedy and he kicked himself afterwards for having
believed them. But two good things came out of that disaster. One was that he didn’t
make it worse. They wanted him, when the invasion failed, to go back and dig the hole
deeper by sending US airplanes over to bomb Cuba and Kennedy was smart enough to
realize that when you are in a hole the first thing to do is to stop digging. Second, he
learned lessons so that a year and a half later when we had another crisis in Cuba, the
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Cuban missile crisis, the people were different, the procedures for making decisions were
completely different. He wanted to know the pros and cons of each one. The policy was
different because he had decided that, as I said to some students at lunch today, you don’t
solve political problems - whenever Americans talk rather dismissively about other
countries and the need for ‘regime change’ that’s a political problem and you don’t solve
political problems with military force. So the whole approach to the Cuban missile crisis
was completely different, thank goodness, otherwise we wouldn’t be here talking, and it
was completely different in the results.
GG: Obviously, he had people connected to the Cuban missile crisis that he had
confidence in and whom he could trust.
TS: Yes, on the first day, the first day I can remember very clearly and it was the
only time in my life when I can remember what day of the week it was that something
happened. On Tuesday morning, October 16th, he called me in and told me what the
reconnaissance planes, the U2s over Cuba, had photographed from 50,000 feet up. It was
the beginning of the Soviet nuclear missile site and he was calling a meeting for later that
morning, not for two months later after he had gone back to the ranch to clear brush, a
meeting for later that morning. Not the National Security Council but those individuals
in government whose judgment he wanted and whose recommendations he trusted - a
dozen of us or so. The National Security Council has a membership set by statute and
there were some members of the National Security Council whose recommendation he
wasn’t interested in, and in addition to that everyone who thinks he is important in
Washington has to attend the National Security Council meeting and to show his
importance he has to bring along his deputy. And for the deputy to prove his importance
he has to bring along an assistant. And pretty soon the meeting is too big to a.) make the
kind of crisp recommendation that Kennedy liked and b.) to keep a secret. Kennedy felt
that we had a brief advantage because the Russians did not know that we knew.
Therefore, if we could keep it secret we would have time to work out our response
without some pre-emptive action by them making public that they had the missiles there,
panicking the American people or inducing Congress to pressure the President into doing
something he did not think was very wise.
GG: He was being very calm during this incredible era.
TS: He was calm. He was detached. He still had a sense of humor. The cool
way he led that group through our deliberations, day and night, was extraordinary.
GG: What was your specific role in that group?
TS: If you have seen the movie 13 Days which is a pretty good, accurate movie.
Of course, my wife said that it was too bad that Warren Beatty wasn’t available to play
me. If you see that it is clear that the director of the movie decided that my role was to
worry. Every time the camera turned on the poor guy picked to play me he had his hand
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on his chin and his brow furrowed. He was worried. But I had to do more than worry. I
was the NSO, a hold-over from the speech writing. I still had to put some words on
paper. One came early in our deliberations when the idea - everybody’s first idea was to
surgical air strike, send bombers to bomb and knock the missile site out. Bobby
Kennedy, who had a moral core, said yes and then we’ll kill a lot of innocent Cuban
civilians working at the site. We got to notify people that we’re going to drop bombs.
GG: Didn’t he make an analogy to Pearl Harbor?
TS: He said that’s Pearl Harbor in reverse. The Air Force was not too happy
about notifying the target. I was asked to draft a note from Kennedy to Khrushchev to be
delivered by a secret, high-level emissary. Once I had the assignment everyone began to
weigh in on their conditions they sought. They said don’t make it an ultimatum. Superpowers don’t respond to an ultimatum. Don’t make it complicated. Khrushchev will just
negotiate the complicated provisions for months while he finishes the missile site. And
don’t make it too one-sided or history, posterity, will blame us for mankind’s final war. I
went back to my office and tried drafting a message that would meet all those conditions.
I finally came back and reported it was impossible. Of course it was going to sound like
an ultimatum - it was an ultimatum. So that was one specific role I had besides worrying.
Finally, after there was a consensus in favor of the quarantine or blockade, and I was in
the group that favored that option, we called the President back from Chicago. As I
mentioned in the news conference earlier today, the President felt that all of us should
keep to our commitments and regular schedules, not to let people guess that there was
some emergency that was causing everyone to stay in the White House. So he, the next
day, Wednesday, the 17th, that’s why I can’t believe that anyone is talking about
canceling or postponing the [Presidential candidates’] debate now because of the crisis.
The President didn’t cancel the election and he didn’t even cancel his own campaign
schedule. He went to Connecticut to make a speech the next day while the rest of us who
were meeting came back and the meetings resumed. On Friday, he went to the mid-West
and Chicago. On Friday evening or Saturday morning, Bobby, the Attorney General, his
brother, called him and said we have reached a consensus. Please come back. When he
landed I handed him a one page memorandum which I think is in the book and which
summed up my views -- what I thought was the irrefutable case for the quarantine options
and the irrefutable case against the surgical bombing followed by an invasion option.
Then, after the President selected the quarantine option he wanted to deliver a speech on
the evening of Monday, October 22nd. He had only learned about it October 16th. We
had completed our work and had a response ready to announce six days later on October
22nd. That was the speech in which he told the American people what we had discovered
and what we were determined to do about it. I have been asked about this all over the
country over the last few years and for some time. Men about your age, Greg, come up to
me afterwards and thank me for making the President’s speech to the country that night
so scary they were able to convince their girlfriends that it was the last night on earth.
GG: That must have been the ultimate date movie....
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TS: We continued to be in session. There were high points and low points.
Finally, on Friday night, October 26th, a letter came in from Khrushchev through a secret
back channel that I tell about in the book also. I was involved a little bit in that secret
back channel. That letter from Khrushchev, even though it was full of threats and
denials, also had buried within it at least the seed of a possible peaceful resolution of the
crisis. On Saturday the 27th the Ex-Com as it was called, the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council, the name was just made up, there was no such thing, met to
decide what to do about that letter. The day was full of bad news. Another letter came
in, this one not from Khrushchev personally - it sounded like it was written by the Soviet
military presidium - it was stiff in tone and it said they were not going to do anything
unless Kennedy took NATO missiles out of Turkey. We can’t do that in a hurry by
ourselves. Then we got a briefing from the CIA that the over-flight planes have shown
that the missile sites were just about completed and ready to fire. We were meeting in the
Cabinet Room. Today, I am told, the Cabinet Room has become a reinforced concrete
bunker, safe from outside bombardment. It wasn’t then. We knew if we took the wrong
course that would be our last day. Other bad news. One of the U2 planes over Cuba had
been shot down; the only fatality of the entire crisis. The low flying reconnaissance
planes that I never fully liked because they were easy targets were fired upon by Cubans.
The shooting down of the U2 plane could only have been done by a Soviet surface to air
missile. The military insisted that because we needed that high flying reconnaissance to
give us eyes on what was going on that we would have to retaliate and bomb that surface
to air missile. Kennedy said there will be time enough to decide that. Let’s wait. Let’s
wait to see how this correspondence turns out. Then, I think you mentioned this, then in
the middle of all this tension, on the edge of war, a note comes in from the Pentagon that
an Air Force plane - I think it was a fighter plane - based in Alaska had been sent out to
sample the air, to see if the Soviets have been testing their nuclear weapons in preparation
for war. Truth of the matter is that we were testing our nuclear weapons. This fighter
plane had navigational controls which malfunctioned and he flew - how do you lose your
way when with the North Pole there is only one way to go and that’s south - he flew out
over Siberia, over Russian territory when both sides are on the edge of war! The Soviets
understandably thought that this is the beginning of World War III and scrambled their
jets. That was the message that came in and it was received in stony silence broken by
JFK saying well there is always one son-of-a-bitch who doesn’t get the message. So then
we were to decide about the two different letters. Again, we sat around the table arguing.
Tommy Thompson was the wisest among us, a career foreign service officer who had
been Ambassador to Moscow. He even knew Khrushchev personally. He said ignore the
second letter. Answer the first letter. Bobby Kennedy and I said yes, that’s what we
should do. I pointed out that there were some parts in that first letter that could receive a
constructive response. Finally, the President said all right. You two draft a reply. So that
is a long answer to your question about what role I had. It was more than speech writer.
GG: That is an incredible story and I am glad that we got to hear it. It shows, I
think, what a great role JFK played in being calm and being a good leader during this
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incredible crisis. Historian Thomas Carlyle believed in the ‘great man’ theory of history
and that is primarily single individuals and their personal decisions more than other
forces that shape history. Did JFK’s tenure in the White House lend support to Carlyle’s
theory?
TS: Yes, it did, particularly in the Cuban missile crisis because we found out
afterwards that had we bombed and invaded as the Joint Chiefs and later on the
Congressional leaders were urging, there were increased Soviet troops on the island
equipped with tactical nuclear weapons and the authority to use them on their own
initiative in the event of an American attack. Had they used nuclear weapons, even
tactical nuclear weapons, against American forces, no doubt we would have responded
with tactical nuclear weapons. No doubt they would have responded with perhaps
strategic nuclear weapons and we would have gone up that same nuclear escalator until
both sides had devastated each other. Maybe totally eliminated from the earth each
other’s country and then radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions could be carried by
wind and water to the far reaches of the earth until the planet is what scientists call a
nuclear desert.
GG: I have to fast-forward and come to 2008. I am curious to know what you
see in common between the presidential election this year and in 1960.
TS: There are many similarities between the presidential election this year and in
1960. President Kennedy, or Senator Kennedy, they said there is a young, relatively new
United States Senator running in 1960 and there is a relatively young new United States
Senator running in 2008. They said that Kennedy was too young and inexperienced. He
said experience, that is like the tail lights on a boat that show you where you’ve been and
not where you are going. Kennedy was given no chance of winning because of his
demographic obstacle - his religion. The country had never elected a Catholic president.
Obama is told that he can’t win because of his demographic obstacle - the country has
never elected a president whose skin is black. Religion, it seems to me was more relevant
to what people think about and how they decide the presidency thank skin color. Yet, if
we are in a contest of nerves it is true that Kennedy was under 44 years old and the
country had never elected a president under 44 years old. Neither had they elected a
president who was running for his first term over 70 years old. That, I think, may have
more effect on a man’s performance in the White House than being too young. Being too
young was an advantage for Kennedy. He had the energy to stay up all night with
Bobby, me and a couple of others the night the University of Mississippi was integrated
by the admission of James Meredith who encountered a violent mob. He had the energy
to work day and night during those 13 days that I just mentioned. He also appealed to the
emerging young leaders of the world, and in Africa in particular but also in Latin
American nations there were young leaders rising to the fore. They identified with
Kennedy. In my international law practice I had the opportunity to meet many of them.
They told me how on election night in 1960 they stayed by their radios until the wee
hours of the morning to find out if their candidate, Kennedy, had won. This year I have
25

received a letter just before I came out here from one of Asia’s most distinguished
statesman whom I met when he was at the United Nations. He said to me the day Obama
walks into the White House the opinion of the world for the United States will rise
dramatically. So there are many, many similarities. Kennedy appealed to the young and
Obama is bringing them back. For many years young people had been disillusioned, with
good reason, with American politics and presidents. They’ve become cynical about it all,
but Kennedy brought them into politics and government. Obama is doing the same thing.
Kennedy had perspective on American foreign policy because of the years as an
Ambassador’s son he had lived abroad. Obama has also lived abroad as a young man.
So the number of parallels is remarkable. It’s a little more negative, even dirty
campaigning, which I don’t like this year. Kennedy had the ability to laugh it off. In the
book I quote one of my favorite lines in which he said “Mr. Nixon in the last ten days has
called me a radical, a spendthrift, a pied piper, this, this and this, and all I’ve done in
return is call him a true Republican and he says that’s really getting low.”
GG: You have now spoken about a lot of the similarities between JFK and
Obama, but aside from race and the fact that President Kennedy had a privileged
upbringing, what do you see as the difference between the two?
TS: Kennedy was a war-hero. He had learned first-hand about the horrors of war
and that was one of the reasons that, like Obama, he was determined to never start
another war. Obama came to that conclusion on the basis of his principles and his
religious beliefs. He is a Christian, by the way, and not a Muslim. That’s important.
Kennedy said in his American University commencement speech the world knows that
America will never start a war; this generation of Americans has seen enough of war. So,
our last two presidents did not serve. Obama has not served in the military but he has,
never-the-less, a commitment against war as he demonstrated in opposing the war in Iraq
before it started. Also, both of them went to Harvard.
GG: In the interest of balance, John McCain, apart from the military career, what
similarities do you see between John McCain and JFK?
TS: John McCain is a conservative Republican who has views, particularly on
domestic policy, completely at the opposite end of the spectrum from Kennedy’s views
on the economy, on social justice, on women’s rights. John McCain, unfortunately, drew
different conclusions from his war service than Kennedy did from his. John McCain
seems to favor the Bush policy of perpetual war against one country after another.
Kennedy, as I said, was totally opposed to war so I don’t see any similarities between
those two. Also, as I said, Kennedy was the youngest man at that time to be elected
president and if McCain were elected he would be the oldest man to be elected president.
They are quite different.
GG: Assuming that he were alive and in office now do you think that JFK would
be as effective in today’s much changed political landscape versus what it was in the
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early 1960s?
TS: I think so. He would be effective in any political landscape. He was
completely relaxed, whether on television or on the public platform. He had this
wonderful sense of humor. He was unbelievably good looking. He simply had a
personality and a manner of speaking that enabled him to build bridges to just about any
audience, north, south, east, and west, rich or poor. He was a terrific campaigner and I
believe he would have been reelected to a second term.
GG: I wonder if he would have wanted to be in politics today given the way that
media scrutiny has gotten so intense since the early 1960s. Do you think that he might
have thought that being in politics would have been too much of a burden given today
how much politicians are under the microscope?
TS: There’s a lot of speculation about that. He was a man who conducted himself
in a way...I have a chapter in the book about his personal life which I have never written
or talked about before. I say that he was sufficiently careful and discreet in his selection
of both companions and places. He didn’t use the oval office. I don’t think there was
that much difference. After all, he was set upon leading this country away from the
Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy based on what was called massive retaliation because
he thought it was a danger to our country. Even though he suffered from a very bad back
and it was sometimes painful for him to climb up those steps to the airplane and to climb
down later to stand on truck beds making speeches endlessly, shaking all those hands
until his own hand became blistered and raw. He was a rich man. He didn’t need that
job. He could have been taking in the breeze on the beach at Hyannis Port. I don’t think
that other burdens that you referred to would have prevented him from trying to save his
country no matter what. Just as, I might add, Obama could have been a partner in a big
Chicago law firm instead of out there, day and night. I’m sure he’s hurting his back and
hand too because there is nothing more exhausting than running for President of the
United States. And that is even more so for the staff than the presidential candidate. He
gets to go to bed at night while the staff stay up and work all night. I salute Obama as I
saluted Kennedy for being willing to seek the presidency because a lot easier, more
comfortable choices were open for the both of them.
GG: Thank you very much.
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Chapter 4
President Kennedy: Profile of Power
Richard Reeves
With an Introduction by Robert Boyd
Introduction, Robert Boyd, University of North Dakota, Vice President Student
& Outreach Services:
I am Bob Boyd and it is my privilege to be able to introduce our speaker this
evening. I have also been asked to read one letter that we have received. We had our
national delegation from Washington on our invitation list, but there are some things
happening in Washington right now that kept them from coming. We did receive a letter
from one of our senators and I have been asked to read it. “Thank you very much for
inviting me to be part of the John F. Kennedy Interdisciplinary Conference and
community celebration. Unfortunately, the Senate is in session and I am unable to be
with you. I do want to tell you what a wonderful idea it is to host a celebration to
commemorate the 45th anniversary of President John F. Kennedy’s visit to Grand Forks. I
also want to extend my warm welcome to Richard Reeves who will provide a wealth of
knowledge about legacy of John F. Kennedy’s presidency for our great country.
President Kennedy’s life was cut short just two months after his 1963 visit to the
University of North Dakota and in nearly three short years of his presidency he inspired
the American people to great accomplishments. When he told the American people that
our country was going to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade he didn’t say I
think we are going to do that, or we hope to do that. He said that America is going to
accomplish that feat. He inspired so many Americans to be part of something bigger than
themselves and that is the lasting legacy of President John F. Kennedy. I hope you have
a wonderful conference in celebration. Sincerely, Byron Dorgan.
We sincerely appreciate that comment from him.
It is a pleasure this evening to first of all welcome all of you here to this
wonderful facility and to another great event in this series of events in the John F.
Kennedy: History, Memory, Legacy Conference. It has been a great conference and
tonight we are going to add to its outstanding success. I hope many of you have had the
chance to participate in some of the other activities.
Tonight we have the pleasure of hearing from Richard Reeves. Undoubtedly,
Mr. Reeves is one of America’s preeminent political authors. Although he is the author
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of what most people agree is the authoritative work on our 35th president, a book entitled
President Kennedy: Profile of Power, he demonstrated his ability to cross political lines
by writing books on both Nixon and Reagan. I have read them too and all three are
terrific. It should be noted that all three of these Presidents visited UND. Mr. Reeves is
indeed a person of many accomplishments. He has won national awards for non-fiction;
he became national editor and columnist for Esquire and New York Magazine, a chief
political correspondent for The New York Times. And if that were not enough he has
worked extensively on television and in film. He even appeared in the movie ‘Sea
Biscuit.’ I am a horseman and that was a great movie, as far as I am concerned. Mr.
Reeves has served as chief political correspondent on ‘Front Line’ and for contributions
to ABC and CBS. Mr. Reeves, it is a pleasure to have you in our city and to have you at
UND and to have the opportunity this evening to hear from you.

Richard Reeves:
Thank you. The pleasure is all mine. It has been a pleasure to part of this
program. It was also a privilege to share part of this with Theodore Sorensen. I am not
sure that he is always so happy being referred to as the last living member of the
Kennedy circle, the inner circle. Actually, there were only three people in the inner circle
- the President, Ted Sorensen and Bob Kennedy. It was also nice because Ted’s wife and
my wife worked together at the United Nations. His wife Gillian was the deputy to the
Secretary, Kofi Annan, and my wife was the American director to the UN under Kofi
Annan. Every moment here has been pleasurable. I was actually surprised - I didn’t
know the weather was always like this. But in good weather and bad I am glad to be
here.
First, how I began writing this book. I was the chief political correspondent for
The New York Times and then began to write books, to work for magazines. But like
many people I know I wanted to write fiction - you never have to leave the house. So,
there came a time when we had our fifth child, who is now the Wisconsin director for
Barack Obama. In 1984, we had decided that if the Mommy and the baby were both
healthy we were going to move to Paris and Daddy was going to write a novel.
Well, Daddy started a novel called The President’s Diary and it didn’t work. I did
not have the skills it took - because diaries are never true. Back then, if you write
something as pure diary how do you signal to the audience or the reader what’s true in
this and what’s not? But in doing it I read all the diaries of all of our presidents.
In the middle of all that process I happened to read a book which I would
recommend to all of you. It is called The Emperor and is by a Polish journalist named
Ryszard Kapuscinski. It is a biography of Haile Selassie. It is extraordinary. It opens
with Kapuscinski wandering the back streets of Addis Abba talking with people who
were in the Emperor’s court. And these are amazing stories. Haile Selassie would walk
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lions - he had two lions - through his gardens every morning while a man called the
Minister of the Pen would run along behind him hiding behind trees. If the Emperor had
an idea he called for the Minister of the Pen who would write it down. As I read the book
I wondered what did all this seem like to Haile Selassi.
Now, I didn’t know anything about Ethiopia or emperors, but I did know a good
deal about presidents. I had been a White House correspondent. I was in school when
John Kennedy was president. I have spoken with, sometimes at great length, and have
worked with all of the presidents who succeeded him. I knew that you could reconstruct
a president’s life or a president’s day. The records, recordings, memories, interviews interviews are particularly important - and often the meeting with the President is the
highest point of someone’s life. I rarely found anybody who met with the presidents I
have written about who did not keep a record of what happened during that meeting.
Often, a researcher’s dream came true when they said, well, I always meant to give my
papers to a library but they are in the garage if you want to look at them. Do I want to
look at them?! I thought I could write what it was like to be President of the United
States. As for Kennedy, Ted Sorensen wrote a great book called Kennedy and Arthur
Schlesinger wrote a great book called A Thousand Days about the Kennedy presidency.
There were flaws, I thought, in those books and in most conventional history.
And that is that classic history cleans up the mess. When people write a book it’s divided
into sections like the economy, civil rights, the war. That makes it all seem very logical
and as if everyone knew what they were doing. Of course, history knows how it all ends.
The president didn’t know how it all would end. What I wanted to do was write history
forward, to write it as it looked to the man at the center. What did the President know
and when did he know it? What did he know when he made a decision to have the
United States overthrow the government of South Vietnam? I thought that could be done
because there was that much material and because I was a journalist and I knew one thing
which I was pleased to hear Ted Sorensen talk about as well. What we forget if you read
conventional history is that all of these things happened at the same time. I was
astounded when Barack Obama said - I hope he got it from one of my books - that a
president has to be able to do more than one thing at a time in the dispute with John
McCain in the debate tonight in Oxford.
That is the reality: all of these things were happening at the same time. I’ll give
you one example, but I am going to talk more about this. October 7th, 1963. One of the
great days in John Kennedy’s life. He signed the nuclear test ban treaty, the first nuclear
treaty between the nuclear powers. That was also the day that at a National Security
Council meeting he signed off on the overthrow of the Diem government in South
Vietnam which happened less than a month later. Most people have forgotten this
because after President Diem of South Vietnam was overthrown and assassinated, John
Kennedy lived only three weeks and died on November 22nd of the same year.
That, to a certain extent, is what being president is like - not just one thing a day.
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In conventional history books, the overthrow, the disastrous overthrow, of the Diem
government--as Collin Powell would later say of Iraq, you break it you own it. We broke
Vietnam and we owned it for a long time. The nuclear test ban treaty and the overthrow
of President Diem in most history books are 500 pages apart. In John Kennedy’s life
they were 20 minutes apart.
I was also protected by the Sorensen and Schlesinger books because they were so
good that even though hundreds of books have been written about Kennedy in the 25
years after them, no serious, or very few serious books have been written in that period
about the 35th president and many of them were very specialized, such as Kennedy and
Africa, Kennedy and the Ukraine. Because of these two great towers of political writing
by eye-witnesses as opposed to outsiders Kennedy seemed to me to be really a fertile
field. That’s why I picked him. It gives me great pleasure that the preeminent histories
have been written by journalists and have tended to be chronological, whether it be
Robert Caro, David McCullough, David Halberstam, Tony Lukas, Taylor Branch,
Stanley Karnow, all journalists who have written probably the most influential histories
in our time.
There were a few other things that I knew that I learned in the White House. One
is the presidency is a reactive job. The president is there to react to events that no one has
predicted. To a certain extent, I will dwell on that fact.
The second thing that I knew from watching and reading is that we judge our
presidents by one, two, three big things. No one remembers whether Lincoln balanced
the budget. Presidents are there to respond to events unpredicted and often unpredictable.
We don’t pay our presidents by the hour. Ronald Reagan was considered to be lazy
because he worked a 9 to 5 day. Yet he was an extraordinarily effective president-between naps.
I also learned that being smart, having a high IQ, is not a qualification for the
presidency and maybe quite the opposite. Sometimes when you look at Barack Obama
you wonder if he’s not too thoughtful to be president. If it was just raw intelligence,
which Obama clearly has, there would be statues out there of Herbert Hoover, Richard
Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton. They were the smartest presidents we have had
in modern times. And, in general, they were presidents who failed. The job is not about
intelligence. It is about judgment. It’s about what you do if the locals start to shell Fort
Sumter, or if you discover that there are missiles in Cuba, or if the Iranians grab our
diplomats, or if a plane flies into the World Trade Center, or big banks begin to fail.
You can hire intelligence - you can find an awful lot of smart people in this
country. The judgment of how to deal with those things is quite a different thing. I
would argue that the current presidential race is a dramatic and great race - I teach at the
University of Southern California and it is a pleasure to find that young people are
interested one more time, as they have not been since 1960, 1968, and 1980, in the
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process of how our country runs.
If we ignore the other obvious questions of race, age and party ideology, John
McCain is an extraordinarily impulsive man. Some are using the term erratic as a
euphemism for that, but we have had impulsive presidents before, Harry Truman among
them, who succeeded. What happens if you have an impulsive president and a Cuban
missile crisis at the same time? Would you move immediately? Obviously, Kennedy
succeeded in that adventure because of patience and a willingness to let things work
themselves out without trying to destroy the island of Cuba. John McCain strikes me,
and I have had a lot experience with him, as that kind of man. He picked a vice-president
he didn’t know. That was an impulsive decision by someone who did not think it out.
On the other hand, I am writing a book now on the Berlin airlift. Although the
National Security Council, the Joints Chief of Staff headed by General Omar Bradley,
and the cabinet voted unanimously against trying to stay in Berlin, Harry Truman decided
immediately that we would and that was what led to the Berlin airlift.
Would a president who was thoughtful and patient have done that? Would
Barack Obama have done that? I don’t know the answer to that question but I do know
that that is one of the great issues between these two men. It is impulsiveness versus a
kind of thoughtfulness. John Kennedy was about as pure a politician as you could find.
However he came to it - the death of his brother, the ambition of his family, the rise of
Catholics in this society - I for one have always believed that the confrontation between
the preachers in Houston and candidate Kennedy, Senator Kennedy, has been overrated.
My feeling is that it was World War II that created the rise of Catholics in America and
of Catholicism. A third of the country in the 1940s was Catholic. They were
discriminated against in large parts of the country and had been for a hundred years.
Suddenly we are thrown into a situation that requires total commitment and everybody
with a pulse. What I read out of that is that the acceptance of a Catholic president is in
the scripts of World War II movies.
If you look at all those movies with Bill Bendix playing the Irish guy and Richard
Conte playing the Italian where they list off the names of Johnson, Langilla, McCarthy,
and what-not, we are all in this together. The message was, I suspect, that that was what
made it possible for a Catholic to become president of the United States.
The divisions in the country over Catholicism, which were very great at the time,
were resolved during the war. We are going to find out in this election, I suspect,
whether the divisions of race in this country have been resolved or how resolved they
have become. As I said, Kennedy was a pure politician. If I had to define that in one
sentence I would say that he couldn’t stand to be alone. Politicians are people who need
action all the time, who need people around them all the time, who need to be at the
center of things.
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Kennedy himself always thought he would die young. He had every disease
known to man. As Bob would say, if the mosquito bites my brother the mosquito dies.
One of the things that helped my book get to where it was, it was one of the first
examinations of the truth about John Kennedy’s health, the diseases he had, the fact that
he had had the last rites of his church three times before his 40th birthday. The fact that
he had a terminal disease. The fact that he used amphetamines among other drugs
because he was in pain all of the time.
Knowing or thinking that he would not live to an old age, he lived life as a race
against boredom. He had to be stimulated every moment by one thing or another. He
had said to friends that he wanted to be president because it was the best job in the world
because it had more action than any other job.
A third thing that was unique to him and important to us was that John Kennedy
refused to wait his turn, and now, I would argue, no one does. I’ll talk about Kennedy as
a cultural figure, as we live and see the world and not just its politics. He could never
have become the nominee of the Democratic Party by depending on the party as it existed
in the 1950s as a series of fiefdoms with bosses who controlled large areas of the country.
Kennedy was the first self-selected president. He went out for two years, more
than two years, before the 1960 Democratic convention and campaigned in every state
where there were primary elections, which were nothing; primary elections had no
influence in 1956 when compared to 1960 when Kennedy decided that he could woo the
press - his only job, other than the military, had been be to a newspaper reporter. Many
of his friends were journalists and he was extraordinarily popular among journalists.
They were the same generation, the same age. They were all the enlisted men and junior
officers of World War II. They bonded that way. Journalism was the same as politics
and many other parts of American life in that way. By the time the democratic
convention came, much to the surprise of the favorites, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Russell
of Georgia, John Kennedy had that nomination won.
As Ted Sorensen said in his appearance, they had it won but barely. If they didn’t
win on the first ballot and, as you recall, the ballot was alphabetical and John Kennedy
was nominated with the votes from Wyoming. If he had not won that roll call vote he
thought that that would be his last shot at the presidency, that the forces that opposed him
and they composed most of the party, would unite against him. As it turned out, it was
his strategy that worked.
In terms of wanting to be at the center of the action you can learn a great deal
about any president, and probably about any man or woman who run an operation, about
how they organize that operation. A Dwight Eisenhower becomes president and creates a
replica of military structure. Very few people get to talk to the commanding general- in
the pyramid where ideas were exchanged and synthesized, and decisions only come to the
president, if it is impossible to make a decision at a lower level. That is the way
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Eisenhower saw the world. It worked effectively for him.
Other presidents used other systems. Richard Nixon designed a system that was
specifically designed to keep all but the tiniest inner circle away from him. Richard
Nixon tried to take over the country with a kind of coup against his own administration.
After he was reelected in a landslide in 1972, he decided that he wanted to change many
people in his government, including the cabinet. The ones he picked to stay had to sign a
15 point contract that was done at Camp David. One of the provisions of that contract
was they would not try to talk to him. Richard Nixon was uncomfortable talking to
people including his own people.
John Kennedy, on the other hand, organized his White House and his
administration which was much smaller - there were only about 20 people in the Kennedy
White House. Ted Sorensen and I, years ago when I was working on this book, sat down
and took his job description in the White House - counsel to the President - and compared
it with the structure of George H.W. Bush’s White House, the first President Bush. His
old job had been divided by then among 221 people. That is one of the reasons we have
some of the problems that we have today.
Kennedy’s structure was a wheel and spokes with himself as the hub, at the
center. None of the people along the spokes of that wheel communicated with each other
without first going through the hub, without first going through the President. Kennedy
let them know, in general, only what he wanted them to know and they were all nervous
most of the time. This was a very tough guy who stripped away old friends who were no
longer useful in his drive for the ultimate power.
Because you only knew what your relationship was with the President you could
only talk to the President. You knew other people were doing the same thing on different
spokes of that wheel. Kennedy wanted total control over those people and he wanted to
be the center of all action. He was a young man. He wanted to know everything that was
going on; quite different from, say, a Reagan or an Eisenhower.
He wins the Presidency, the first Catholic, a Democrat from Massachusetts. It
was, in some ways, a relatively dull campaign. Two lieutenants in the Navy, Kennedy
and Nixon, who agreed on almost all of the fundamentals of foreign policy. There was
very little argument in America about what our foreign policy should be. As we look
back today, it was a pretty tepid campaign compared with what we see all around us right
now.
He becomes President - I love the fact that one of the speakers used a phrase that I
used in this book: that his presidency had an extraordinary “density of events.” Things
had been repressed during the war. People, colonies, were exploding all over the world,
all over at home. After all, we had a colony here, too, and we used the word “Negro” to
describe it.
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Kennedy becomes President and all hell breaks loose. If you judge Presidents by
the big ones there are four things that are essential to think about John Kennedy. One, he
was the first President to come into office since 1812 who had to face the fact that the
United States was vulnerable to direct attack. Soviet strategic missiles could reach the
United States by 1960. The last time anybody had been able to wage war on us, on our
own territory, was the War of 1812.
I would argue that in the new nuclear world it was a safer world when Kennedy left
office, when he was killed, than when he took office. Among other things, the nuclear
test ban treaty had been signed. The Soviet Union and the United States were able to
come to agreement on the disarmament—that was a totally new thing.
He had to handle, and handle well, crises that no one could have predicted - the
building of the Berlin Wall, the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba - and I think there
was less chance of confrontation when he left office than when he began.
John Kennedy didn’t give a damn about civil rights. I don’t think there was any
prejudice in the man but he was running a Democratic Party which depended upon the
votes of black people in the places where they were allowed to vote and a Congress
controlled by Southern whites. The last thing he needed or wanted was a racial
confrontation in the country. He got it and as I will talk about here he did an
extraordinary thing that a democratic, small ‘d’, politician can do. That is he sided with
the minority against the majority, a tiny minority, a hated minority in many parts of the
country. John Kennedy put the weight of the federal government behind them and I’ll
talk about how he did that.
Finally, he’s the President who got us into Vietnam. The Kennedy people, Ted
Sorensen among them, have done a hell of a job of saying that it was Lyndon Johnson
who got us into Vietnam. In fact, it was John Kennedy and the decision to overthrow the
government of South Vietnam, which was overthrown on November 1st, 1963. President
Diem and his brother were assassinated. That surprised Kennedy and it shouldn’t have.
If you run a revolution or a civil war you kill the leaders of the other side before they
come back to get you. It was his decision to let that go ahead that made Vietnam an
American colony. We then let it be run by our ambassadors, by the CIA and by a string
of hapless generals who had been corporals in the French army when it was still French
Indo-China.
We broke it and we owned it. We paid a high price for all of that. I want to
mention before I go into that in detail the talk and character of politicians. I am a great
believer that there is such a thing as private character and there were such things in John
Kennedy’s private character which you wouldn’t wish for your children or your family.
There is also such a thing as public character and it is as President that Kennedy
should be judged by whether he brings out the best in the American character or the
36

worse in the American character. I would argue that in general John Kennedy brought
out the best in the American character whereas a President such as Richard Nixon, bright
as he was, as accomplished as he was, managed to bring out the worst in the American
character.
As to his own character, John Kennedy obviously was a philanderer - I guess that
was his wife’s business - but he lived as a rich boy who did anything he wanted to during
his life. Daddy and the lawyers were always there to take care of it. In those days rich
people could live that way. Maybe they can today. I don’t know. He lied consistently
and necessarily about his health. He never took a medical exam when he became a
lieutenant in the Navy. His reasoning was no one of his generation would have influence
in the United States if they did not serve in that war. Yet, he could never pass the
physical examination for the Navy or any other service. His father arranged for him to
get an appointment as a lieutenant junior grade in the United States Navy without taking
a physical test which he would have surely failed.
Moving on to the civil rights question and his views on that. I think this is
essential in looking into any president - what they think privately and what they do
publicly is part of the way to judge them. Dwight Eisenhower was a racist and in private
it was very obvious to his friends. When Brown v Board of Education was passed by a
unanimous vote to desegregate public schools with all due speed Eisenhower was angry
as hell that Earl Warren, the man he had appointed, the former governor of California,
had kind of rigged this decision. But Ike never said a word in public. Had Dwight
Eisenhower, with his enormous popularity in the country, said that he was strongly
against this decision, which was his job to enforce, that’s what the executive branch does,
if he had admitted what he thought, actually thought, the country would have been torn
apart. We would have been in much worse shape in terms of race than we were.
Eisenhower kept his own counsel on that.
John Kennedy was from a different generation and his first slogan in politics,
when he ran for Congress in 1946, was “The New Generation offers a Leader.” He was a
very generational figure. He represented those young men who went overseas in World
War II, and their wives and their families.
John Kennedy learned about the Freedom Riders when he saw a picture of their
bus burning on the front page of The New York Times, the burning of the bus in Anniston,
Alabama. He called in his civil rights advisor, Harris Wofford, who was a white man,
who later became a Senator from Pennsylvania, and he said “what the hell is going on?
Who are these people? Get your friends off those god-damned busses.” Wofford said
“How am I going to do that?” And Kennedy said, “Tell them to fly.” Planes as opposed
to buses were not segregated at that time in American history. This was driven by
college students, by young, black college students in places like North Carolina. The
impact of sit-ins and then the Freedom Riders and then the demonstrations in the streets
of southern cities became national issues because of a new technology, television.
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One thing to remember about John Kennedy is that when he became President we
were using mimeograph machines. By the time he finished the presidency Xerox
machines and transistors had been invented. That changed totally the way government
operated, changed totally the amount of secrecy possible-- the democratization of
information. And this affected the presidency greatly. There would have been no
‘Pentagon Papers’ if there hadn’t been Xerox machines. Kennedy said “where are these
people getting these ideas?” And Wofford said “They’re getting them from you, Mr.
President.” Kennedy was giving speeches about individual freedom, about the rights of
man, as the French would call it. He was giving those speeches and they were aimed at
Eastern Europe, at the communist empire. They were being heard, however, by young
black students, by young black veterans back from the war who took it as an accurate
description of their place in the America of their time. Then, along came television in
that period and all of us saw how blacks were living in this country.
Martin Luther King was a great leader because he understood that the way to deal
with injustice in America was to use American rhetoric and ask people if they were the
people they said they were. That in large measure is why that revolution succeeded. It is
also why John Kennedy had to deal with it. He would have been glad never to have had
to deal with that. He hoped to pass it on to his successor.
We also remember Kennedy as a man for all generations, young forever, dying
young. Youth translates into hope and new generations translate into hope. Before the
memorial ceremony on campus they played excerpts from tapes of Kennedy speaking.
What I thought of when I heard that was that Kennedy, like Reagan, like Lincoln,
understood that in the presidency words are more important than deeds. Again, we don’t
know if Lincoln balanced the budget.
The presidency is not about running the country. It’s about leading the nation.
Words are what we remember. It is the words of Kennedy that we remember, not the
specifics of the Civil Rights Bill of 1963.
At the same time he was a towering cultural figure. John Kennedy was a genius
in the sense that, as all geniuses such as Picasso, Freud, Einstein, are people who change
the way we see the world. John Kennedy changed the way we saw the world and the way
we saw ourselves.
We were wearing those three button tubular suits, thin ties with button down
shirts. John Kennedy had long hair. He didn’t wear hats. He wore two button, rolled
lapel, European clothes. He literally changed the way we dress, certainly if you were a
man. Then there was his wife’s influence. They taught us how to be rich. America was
not rich before World War II.
Part of the enduring legacy of Kennedy is as a cultural figure. He invented ‘cool.’
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And we all bought into it. He was a role model for the people we wanted to be. That
doesn’t mean he was a nice man. He was a rich man who used people and abused some.
But I would argue that he passed the great test of the presidency which is to bring out the
best and not the worst in the country.
It’s ironic that in Ted Sorensen’s presentation he focused on the same period of 48
hours that I focus on at great length in this book. I am going to describe those 48 hours Ted is protecting the president a little more than I might. This is what happened
beginning on June 9th, 1963.
On that morning President Kennedy landed in San Francisco - he had been in
Hawaii for a conference, the US Conference of Mayors, trying to persuade the mayors to
use political influence, particularly on House members, to pass what became the Civil
Rights Bill. He landed in San Francisco and met Ted Sorensen, who was, as he said, his
intellectual blood-bank, his speech writer, and book writer.
Kennedy talked to Sorensen about his ideas on things like speeches or books.
Then, Sorensen would go off on his own and write a draft based on those ideas. These
would go back to Kennedy and he would rewrite it quite extensively. He was a good
writer, though not as good as Sorensen, and eventually they would come up with an end
product. The end product this time, which had been in the works for three months, was
the ‘peace speech.’
Norman Cousins, the editor of The Saturday Review, a popular magazine of the
day, essentially left-wing, had spent time with Nikita Khrushchev and talked about
nuclear disarmament with Khrushchev. Khrushchev went through what he saw as the
America betrayals--we were building a picket fence of missiles around the Soviet Union.
He somehow saw that differently than we saw it. He said “I’m willing to talk about these
things, disarmament, peace but Kennedy has to make the first move. I can’t stand up to
my own generals and my own Politburo and say that I am going to soften my attitude
towards the Americans. Not while you are building missiles in Turkey.” Cousins came
back and told Kennedy that. Kennedy called in Sorensen and they began work that
spring on “the peace speech.”
That Sunday, June 9th, Sorensen got on the plane and on the flight back to
Washington they edited that speech which the President was scheduled to give at 10 AM
on the morning of June 10th, the next day, at the commencement of American University
in northwest Washington.
It happened that that same day a Chinese delegation in Moscow wanted to meet
with Khrushchev. They felt the Russians were going soft on the Americans because of
Khrushchev’s grudging admiration of Kennedy. The Chinese wanted to present a letter
to Khrushchev but they were not allowed to. The delegation was headed by a man named
Deng Xaiao Ping. They were essentially thrown out of Moscow, first real proof we had
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that monolithic communism was certainly communism but it was not monolithic. There
was a great split between the Chinese and the Soviets which had essentially been
discounted by our intelligence agencies.
Air Force One landed at 9:15 in the morning on June 10 th. Kennedy got into a
steaming bath which he had to do to relax his back muscles. He stayed in there for a half
an hour, got into a limousine and drove up Wisconsin Avenue to American University.
He gave the speech. Ted Sorensen said that he thought it was the best speech that
Kennedy had ever given. I think it was one of the greatest speeches ever given by an
American president. And I am going to read a bit of it because every word that I am
going to say had not been heard by Americans up to then. This was when Kennedy had
to make the first move for Khrushchev and he said that day at American University:
“Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened
attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we
must reexamine our own attitude - as individuals and as a Nation - for our attitude is as
essential as theirs....Let us examine our attitude toward the Soviet Union....As Americans,
we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity.
But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements - in science and
space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage....[N]o nation
in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of
the Second World War. As least 20 million [Russians] lost their lives... [I]n the final
analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all
breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.” 1
Words like that had not been spoken to the Soviets, particularly our admission of
their sacrifice in World War II - 20 million people killed, mostly by the Germans. That
was the signal that Khrushchev seized on, although we didn’t know that at the time.
Kennedy went back to the White House after the speech, talking to people, in this
case Ted Sorensen, saying that that speech might cost him the presidency. How would
the Soviets react to it? How would the Americans react to it? As he walked in the White
House door and back toward the Oval Office his brother Robert came running out and
said “You have to see this.” It was Governor George Wallace on television at the
University of Alabama and what Wallace was saying was a repeat of his inaugural
address: “Segregation now, segregation tomorrow and segregation forever.”
Tomorrow had come. The federal courts had ordered the university to admit the
two Negroes, Vivian Malone and James Hood the next day, June 11th, 1963.
There has been a good deal of discussion and wonderful scholarship on that
1

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States John F. Kennedy 1963 (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1964), “Commencement Address at American University in Washington.”
June 10, 1963, 460-462.
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subject;-- the desegregation of the southern universities-- at this conference. It came the
next day and George Wallace was standing, as they say, in the school-house door of the
University of Alabama. As the officers of the National Guard said yesterday at the
dedication ceremony for the flame on campus, the way the National Guard works is that
they are commanded by the governor as the commander-in-chief. In Alabama the
commander was George Wallace. However, they are still elements of the United States
Army, Air Corps or Navy, and the president can federalize them.
George Wallace was standing at the school-house door to prevent this two young
Negroes from registering at the school. They were surrounded by soldiers wearing the
uniform of the United States Army, the National Guard. At 11:34 on the morning of June
11th Kennedy federalized the National Guard and the same people who had been taking
orders from George Wallace turned and marched him off the campus on the orders of the
President of the United States.
Vivian Malone and James Hood entered the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa
with escorts from the Justice Department. The window in the third floor above that door
opened and one white student leaned out and waved the American flag back and forth as
Hood and Malone went in.
Kennedy watched that scene on television and felt that he had to go on television
and speak about it. This time there was no text. There was no speech worked over for
weeks. He felt that it had to be done, that he had to choose sides. One of the things he
learned and this he had learned from George Reedy, who was Lyndon Johnson’s press
secretary, who in a memo to Johnson that he transmitted to Sorensen and Sorensen gave
to Kennedy, said that the racial violence in the country was going to continue and was
going to get worse until the President took sides. The blacks thought he was their guy.
The Negroes thought this was a new time, a new generation, the torch had been passed to
a new generation which had different attitudes about race, about justice, about equality
and about democracy.
The Southern Democrats in Congress thought, and most Southern officials
thought, that Kennedy was just doing this for political reasons. He was, after all, a
Senator from the North and he was just talking. What Reedy said in that memo was that
the violence will continue until you choose sides. That is when John Kennedy put the
government of the United States on the side of the minorities.
Speaking only from notes, there was no text. He and Sorensen were dictating to
two different secretaries before Kennedy went on the air at 8 o’clock that night and spoke
for 18 minutes, much of it ad-libbed. “This afternoon, following a series of threats and
defiant statements, two clearly qualified young Alabama residents who happened to have
been born Negro, were admitted. I hope that every American, regardless of where he
lives, will stop and examine his conscience about this and other related incidents. When
Americans are sent to Vietnam or to West Berlin we do not ask for whites only.” Then,
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ad-libbing, “This is not a sectional issue, not a partisan issue. This is not even a legal,
legislative issue alone. We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the
Scriptures and it is clear as the American Constitution. If an American, because his skin
is dark cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public. If he cannot send his children
to the best public schools available. If he cannot vote for the public officials who
represent him. Then who among us would be content to have the color of their skin
changed. Who among us would then be content with counsels of patience and delay. We
face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a people.”
The President put the government on the side of the minority. The President
defined it as a moral issue, not a legal issue, not a regional political issue. That was one
of the great speeches in American history and that was largely ad-libbed. If he did
nothing else in his life we would honor him.
The field agent of the NAACP, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, in Jackson, Mississippi, was driving along and heard that speech on the
radio. He was driving along, heard the speech and thought it was so extraordinary, that
he stopped his car at a gas station, called his wife on the telephone and said “Keep the
children up. I want to come home and talk to them tonight about what has happened in
our country.”
He did that. He drove into his driveway. His name was Medgar Evers, and when
he got out of the car, holding tee-shirts, a pile of tee-shirts he had been delivering marked
“No More Jim Crow.” He stopped in the driveway. His children ran out the door toward
him. He was shot and bled to death in front of his children.
At the same time, John Kennedy who was depressed because the Soviets had not
answered or responded at all to the “peace speech” was called by his brother at midnight,
as Medgar Evers was bleeding to death-- and as in Saigon Thich Quang Duc, a South
Vietnamese monk was burning himself to death. Bobby, though, was not calling about
that. He had news from Russia.
Robert Kennedy called to tell his brother that Izvestia had reprinted the entire text of the
American University speech in Russian, the first time that that has ever happened.
That’s 48 hours in the life of an American President. That is what it is like to be
President.
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PART II
JFK, LITERATURE AND THE 1960’S
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Chapter 5
THE LONG SHADOW OF THE CONFESSIONAL
AND BEAT POETS
…from notes given as a discussant at the 2008 JFK Conference, UND

Heidi K. Czerwiec
From the point-of-view of a creative writing professor, the greatest influence on
perceptions of poetry writing today come from the two mid-20th-century schools of poetry
known as the Confessionals and Beats. Confessional poetry is a co-opting of lyric poetry
wherein autobiography equals authenticity, the more shocking the more privileged; poetry as
therapy. Beat poetry purported to be anti-intellectual, “organic,” and professed “first thought,
best thought,” despite the fact many of its practitioners taught in universities, were well-schooled
in craft, and revised extensively.
I. Confessionals: include primarily Robert Lowell, Sylvia Plath, and Anne Sexton, but also
W. D. Snodgrass, John Berryman, Randall Jarrell, and Robert Duncan. Characterized by
identifying the poet with the poem’s speaker (before 1950, the lyrical “I” was assumed to
be a construct), and the use of formal poetics, possibly to attempt to contain life’s ugly
underside or as a foil to represent the inability of containment.
Those who are/were proponents feel Confessionalism allows for self-expression,
especially for those whose voices had been suppressed (women, homosexuals):
“Rationalism erected a taboo of social shame that lasts against the story of the soul,
against the dream and inner life of men the world over, that might be read were the
prejudices of what’s right and what’s civilized lost.” –Robert Duncan, Claims for Poetry
“To tell the truth to our daughters requires that we acknowledge it ourselves. The poem
becomes the tribunal where a persona will not suffice. . . . As the poet refuses to distance
herself from her emotions, so she prevents us from distancing ourselves. We are obliged
to witness.” –Alicia Ostriker, Claims for Poetry
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“This drive to self-knowledge, for women, is more than a search for identity: it is part of
our refusal of the self-destructiveness of male-dominated society.” “In those years
formalism was part of the strategy – like asbestos gloves, it allowed me to handle
materials I couldn’t pick up bare-handed.” –Adrienne Rich, Claims for Poetry
The problem for some of these writers was that while white heterosexual male experience
and lyric poetry could be universal, other points-of-view could only be personal. Some
asserted the personal is political – but lyric is often subversive; need it be confessional?
Others continue to struggle to reclaim the lyric from the confessional:
“The term ‘confessional,’ first used to describe the self-revealing poetry of Robert Lowell
[et al] has become – often with justification – pejorative.” –Joan Aleshire, After
Confession
Aleshire distinguishes between “lyric: the poem of personal experience [which] can,
through vision, craft, and objectivity toward the material, give a sense of commonality
with unparalleled intimacy;” versus confessionalism, the intent for “self-display” which
“lets the facts take over. . .a plea for special treatment.” She also cites Stephen Yenser
who distinguishes between “gossip” (fact, data, raw material) and “gospel” (parable,
pattern, truth).
“[Sexton and Plath] gave women of my generation permission to write of the macabre,
of bedlam, abortion, depression. . . . But poetry is not a cure-all nor does it promise
compassion or forgiveness.” –Colette Inez, After Confession
“Beware the poet who values content more than the handling of content, a danger
especially present in our most personal poems.” –Stephen Dunn, After Confession

II. Beat Poetry: precursors include the “Black Mountain” poets – Charles Olson, Robert
Creeley, and Denise Levertov; main practitioners include Allen Ginsberg, Gregory
Corso, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Gary Snyder, others. Characterized by so-called “organic
form,” process over product, “first thought, best thought.”
Proponents espoused poetry inspired and formed in the moment as more authentic:
“Any form, and ordering of reality so implied, had somehow to come from the very
condition of the experience demanding it.” –Robert Creeley, Claims for Poetry
“Writing poetry is a process of discovery, revealing inherent music.” Organic form is “a
method of apperception. . .based on an intuition of an order, a form beyond forms, in
which forms partake, and of which man’s creative works are analogies, resemblances,
natural allegories.” “The forms more apt to express the sensibility of our age are the
exploratory, open ones.” – Denise Levertov, Claims for Poetry
Poetry written in this manner was considered more in touch with the primitive, vatic
self, and set itself against intellectual institutions:
46

“Poets, as few others, must live close to the world that primitive men are in. . . . Poetry,
it should not have to be said, is not writing or books.” –Gary Snyder, Claims for Poetry
“As the poet stands open-mouthed in the temple of life, contemplating his experience,
there come to him the first words of the poem.” –Denise Levertov, Claims for Poetry
Yet these arguments run counter to actual practice – these poets revised heavily, and had
to choose how to shape their work:
“The measured, or formal, the contrived, the artificial are, we feel, insincere; they are
perversions of the central value of our life, genuineness of feeling. . . . [But] if
informality and antiformality are positive values, then the problem of form is how to get
rid of it. But to get rid of it we must keep it; we must have something to get rid of.” –J.V.
Cunningham, Claims for Poetry
“Forms in the phenomenal world are no more abstractions than any other forms.” –
Hayden Carruth, Claims for Poetry
“Blake’s voices returned to dictate revisions. The more intimately we observe any poet
who claims extremes of inspiration or craftsmanship, the more we realize that his claims
are a disguise.” – Donald Hall, Claims for PoetryI
Even Levertov warned that “organic” was not an excuse for sloppiness: “Not only
hapless adolescents, but many gifted and justly esteemed poets writing in contemporary
nonmetrical forms, have only the vaguest concept, and the most haphazard use, of the
line.” –from Claims for Poetry

III. So where does this leave poetry today?
The special danger, particularly for young writers, seems to come from one of
Confessionalism’s lasting effects: writers who assume self-expression equals therapy:
“Writing a good poem about how bad you feel doesn’t protect you from that feeling or
release you from it.” –Alan Shapiro, Quote Poet Unquote.
If nearly all the poets of this school committed suicide, did writing such poetry save
them?
Other lasting influences of the Confessionals and Beats:
1) Readers who assume the speaker-“I” is the same as the autobiographical author:
“Readers encountering the “I” may substitute an interest in the affairs and concerns of
a presumably real person for the experience of the poem.” –Carol Frost, After
Confession. I’ve seen this myself countless times in student workshops where
students ask “Did this really happen?” and place higher value on that work.
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2) Writers who interpret the Beats’ anti-intellectual stance as meaning not reading – the
Beats themselves were intimately familiar with the canon of poetry, especially the
Romantics, Blake, Whitman, etc.
3) As technology (radio, TV, Internet) becomes more omnipresent, the popularity of
hearing a poet read live also increases – however, this corresponds to an emphasis on
authenticity, and on privileging the poet and his/her life over the poetry.
4) Poetry slams are geared toward social listeners, and as a result, the highest scores
usually go to autobiographical poetry – the more tragic the better.
Ultimately, I find it both fascinating and troubling that two mid-20th-Century groups of
poets – mere drops in the body of written work – could have such a lasting effect on our
assumptions about what poetry is and should do. I hope our examination of these schools
and their positions, and some of the critiques of those positions, will help us to
understand those effects, and question them for ourselves.

Sources:
Hall, Donald (Ed.) Claims for Poetry. (Ann Arbor, MI: U. Michigan Press, 1982).
Dennis O’Driscoll (Ed.) Quote Poet Unquote. (PortTownsend, WA: Cooper Canyon Press.
2008).
Sontag, Kate, & Graham, David (Eds.) After Confession: Poetry as Autobiography. (St. Paul
Graywolf Press, 2001).
Wheeler, Lesley. Voicing American Poetry: Sound and Performance from the 1920s to the
Present. (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 2008).
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Chapter 6
“A Revival of Poetry as Song”
Allen Ginsberg, Rock-and-Roll, and the
Return to the Bardic Tradition
Katie M. Stephenson
Resistance to Allen Ginsberg has a long history. His provocative style shocked
the country, challenged the ethics of the Cold War consensus, and spurned a long and
ugly battle over censorship in the courts of San Francisco. However, Ginsberg’s
connection to the pulse of mid- to late twentieth century culture cannot be denied, and his
presence as a vital, poetic link between the work of several early major poets and the
music of the psychedelic scene cannot be overlooked. He was the self-proclaimed and
quite serious poetic disciple of William Blake, Walt Whitman, and Ezra Pound, and he
felt that these poets called for and inspired a return to a mystical, bardic tradition of
poetry. He recognized an answer to that call in the work of many of the big names in
music, including Bob Dylan, the Rolling Stones, and the Beatles, and considered these
figures’ combination of instruments, rhythm, and thoughtful lyrics to be a more fullbodied poetic form. As a study of the shifts in Allen Ginsberg’s work (including Howl
for Carl Solomon (1956), The Fall of America: Poems of These States (1972) First Blues:
Rags, Ballads, and Harmonium Songs (1975), and various selections from his later
works) will support, Ginsberg became increasingly influenced by the style of his rockand-roll counterparts and strove to become a part of the bardic movement that they
reinvigorated.
Ginsberg worked tirelessly and meticulously to compose Howl, the famous
lamentation for “the best minds” of a generation and his first major poem (Howl line 1).
He became inspired to write the poem in October of 1954, as he looked out of his New
York apartment to the city below. Staring across at the buildings, he was seized by the
notion that “he saw the lights of those buildings
transform into the face of an evil
monster,” and that “‘Moloch whose eyes are a thousand blind windows’” became the
driving image of the poem (Morgan 184). He began writing Howl that very night and
would devote “all-day-long attention” to it for over a year (Carter 184; interview with
Fortunato, et al. 245). He finished the first and last sections by August of 1955, but his
journals from the rest of that year and into 1956 reveal the large extent to which he was
still absorbed with finishing the rest of the work (AG Trust). When Ginsberg wrote
Howl, he was acting more as a poet, in the traditional, formalist vein, than he ever would
again. In the writing of that controversial piece, Ginsberg spent hours hunched over a
typewriter, belaboring over form and meter and fighting to master the words on the page.
In other words, he was a poet who was honoring the time-honored tradition of other
poets.
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Both the content of Howl and Ginsberg’s journal entries from the mid-1950s show
his active engagement with the work of several major poets during the time that Howl
was written. William Blake was one of these poets, and in fact, Ginsberg owed Howl’s
very existence to him. In 1948, Ginsberg experienced an auditory hallucination as he
read Blake’s “Ah Sun-flower!.” He believed that he heard the voice of the poet reading
the poem. When Ginsberg’s mind wandered to another of Blake’s poems, “The Sick
Rose,” he felt the sensation that “the entire universe was revealed to him,” and Ginsberg
“spent a week after this living on the edge of a cliff in eternity” (Morgan 103; The Book
of Martyrdom 266). Ginsberg’s mention of “radiant cool eyes hallucinating Arkansas
and Blake-light tragedy” in Howl is a reference to his Blake experience (Howl 12-13).
Although this incident was a definitive moment in Ginsberg’s life, and one which he
would repeatedly seek to recapture through the aid of drugs and mysticism, he was
initially frightened by it. Naomi Ginsberg, Allen’s mother, had recently been committed
to Pilgrim State Hospital in New Jersey on grounds of insanity, and his fear that the
hallucination was symptomatic of an inheritance of her mental illness prompted him to
admit himself to the Columbia Psychiatric Institute, where he met Carl Solomon, the man
to whom he referred in the extended title of Howl, on the first day of his stay (Carter xv).
However, it is Walt Whitman, more than any other, upon whom Ginsberg called
as a muse. Ginsberg had adored Whitman’s work since the age of fifteen, and by the
time he began working on Howl, he believed Whitman was the greatest poet in American
history (AG Trust; Morgan 210). As his reading lists from his 1955 and 1956 journals
demonstrate, Ginsberg was reading Whitman hungrily while he was writing Howl
(Journals 215; 233; 294). At the time, he was “getting interested in free verse and longline poetry,” forms which he utilized in Howl, and he looked to Whitman for guidance in
these efforts (167). Ginsberg explained that he “began ransacking all the literature I
could find to correlate with that, including reading Whitman from beginning to end”
(167). In his diaries, Ginsberg recorded several dreams about Whitman, and there is even
an entire entry dedicated to exploring “the guarded look in Whitman’s eyes – as in the
Brady photo” (273). In short, Ginsberg was completely consumed with Whitman during
the period of Howl’s creation.
Howl’s epigraph is drawn from Whitman’s “Song of Myself,” and, in many ways,
the poem acts as an artistic tribute to its predecessor. Like Whitman, Ginsberg utilizes
lists and free verse, and Howl has the same visual look on the page as “Song of Myself.”
Furthermore, Ginsberg identified with Whitman as a homosexual, and though Ginsberg’s
images are much more explicit than Whitman’s subtle and often ambiguous ones, there is
a common thread. Ginsberg seems to have adopted even the persona of the poet of “Song
of Myself.” When an interviewer later asked him how he felt when he was writing Howl,
Ginsberg replied that he had “a sense of being self-prophetic master of the universe” –
quite the Whitmanesque sentiment indeed (interview with Clark 53). However, as
Ginsberg lays out one jarring image after another, it becomes obvious that Howl is also a
conscious contradiction to the celebratory tone of “Song of Myself.” Whereas Whitman
embraces the musicality of language, Ginsberg acts in a willful struggle against it.
Ginsberg delivers sordid, and often obscene, depictions of those, among others, “who
burned cigarette holes in their arms protesting the narcotic tobacco haze of Capitalism”
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and those “who poverty and tatters and hollow-eyed sat up smoking in the supernatural
darkness of coldwater flats” (Howl 31; 4). He draws on discordance to underscore the
criticisms he delivers of America because, after all, his poem is not a song of himself but
a howl for “the best minds” of his generation (Howl 1). Nevertheless, Ginsberg’s
contemporaries recognized the Whitmanesque quality of his Howl. When Lawrence
Ferlinghetti heard about Ginsberg’s reading of Howl at Six Gallery in San Francisco, he
wrote him to say, “I greet you at the beginning of a great career” – a direct echo of
Emerson’s words to young Whitman (AG Trust).
Ezra Pound was another significant source of inspiration for Ginsberg in the long
months he spent composing Howl. Ginsberg’s extensive readings lists from this period
show that he was pouring rapidly through not only Blake and Whitman but also Pound.
In 1954 and 1955, Ginsberg read the Cantos and other Pound works repeatedly and
studied Pound’s poetic method very carefully (Journals 28; 55; 213-14). A journal entry
dated May 29, 1954, shows that Ginsberg copied down Pound’s “The Red Wheel
Barrow” and took note of all of its nuances, especially Pound’s use of structure, space,
and the positioning of images. When asked about the line in Howl which begins, “who
dreamt and made incarnate gaps in Time & Space through images juxtaposed…,”
Ginsberg named “Pound’s discovery and interpretation of Chinese” as his inspiration
(Howl 74; interview with Fortunato, et al. 249). When Ginsberg began work on Howl, he
had already attempted, without success, to meet his literary idol three times.
Nevertheless, in a 1956 journal entry, Ginsberg related that he “woke up chilled by my
scholastic inadequacy and looked at Pound’s collected Literary Essays” (Journals 231).
Although Pound had refused to meet him in person, it was still Pound to whom Ginsberg
turned for solace and wisdom in times of artistic self-doubt.
T.S. Eliot’s presence, and particularly that of Four Quartets, is also felt in Howl.
Ginsberg was devouring Eliot’s work as well in the mid-1950s. In his journals, Ginsberg
recorded dreams about Eliot and careful studies of his poetry. The fact that Four
Quartets was one of the first works to which Ginsberg turned in the effort to recreate the
Blake experience reveals his opinion of the power of the work, and its influence on
Ginsberg translated to Howl. Ginsberg employs Eliot’s objective correlative in images
such as that of the “tubercular sky surrounded by orange crates of theology,” and he takes
up Eliot’s struggle to redeem time through his depiction of the individuals “who threw
their watches off the roof to cast their ballot for Eternity outside of Time” (Howl 50; 54).
These four poets – Blake, Whitman, Pound, and Eliot - served as Ginsberg’s main
sources of inspiration during the writing of Howl, and as he read through their poems,
studied their work, and even dreamed about them, he thought of himself as actively
engaging with them through his own poem.
Although Allen Ginsberg wrote Howl with these more traditional poets in mind,
he craved creative collaboration with his peers, and he found it at the 1955 Six Gallery
reading. At this historic meeting, several Beat poets gathered together to share their
work, and Ginsberg, for one, “was determined that this should not be the typical, dry,
staid, academic affair that poetry readings had tended to be” (Morgan 208). He was
anxious about the meeting at Six Gallery; the occasion marked only Ginsberg’s second
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experience with a reading and the first time that Howl would be presented to the public.
However, the crowd’s reaction was overwhelming, and Ginsberg was ecstatic (209). He
found that he gained confidence in a situation which could only be compared to “a kind
of cross-fertilization, as when jazz musicians are suddenly turned on by each other and
perform at the top of their form” (210). Ginsberg felt that the raucous collaboration of
the Beats was similar to that of musicians, and he thrived on it. The other poets and the
audience responded to it too, and word about the Six Gallery reading spread quickly. In
response to the great demand for a repeat performance, the events were recreated a few
months later at the Berkeley Town Hall (215). Ginsberg’s “new friends in San Francisco
were hot, blazing with enthusiasm and ideas,” and their influence led Ginsberg to
challenge his beliefs about poetry (210). He formed a distaste for the belabored, stringent
forms of the establishment and “began to view poets who wrote in traditional forms as
nothing more than trained dogs” (210). With his fellow Beat poets, Ginsberg formed a
connection of mutual support that he could never have had with his former literary
heroes, and he came more and more to look to his peers for inspiration.
However, it was Bob Dylan who would fundamentally alter Ginsberg’s already
shifting definition of poetry. He met Dylan in 1964 at his own party, where Dylan was
the guest of a friend. When the subject turned to poetry, Ginsberg was pleased to hear
Dylan’s compliments of Jack Kerouac, and the two became “fast friends” (Morgan 383).
He already enjoyed Dylan’s music and was especially impressed by his lyrics. In fact,
Ginsberg felt that Dylan’s “Masters of War” was “almost a cowboy version of Blake”
and confessed that he cried the first time that he heard it (382). Although, at this point,
Ginsberg mentally separated the station of the musician from the post of the poet, “the
line between poetry and music was fading,” and he claimed that Bob Dylan was “as good
as a poet” (Morgan 394). The warm feelings were mutual, and Dylan’s 1965 Bringing It
All Back Home album is a testament to their burgeoning friendship. A picture of
Ginsberg was featured in the liner notes, along with a comment from Dylan expressing
his dismay over the fact that “Allen Ginsberg was not chosen to read poetry at the
inauguration” (Hishmeh 397). Ginsberg’s association with Dylan led to his interest in
other musicians, and soon “his consciousness was being consumed by the Beatles”
(Morgan 395). In fact, he approached Dylan’s and the Beatle’s music with the same
enthusiasm he once brought to volumes of Blake and Whitman. In 1965, Dylan
introduced Ginsberg to the Beatles, and once again, friendships were established almost
immediately (409). Ginsberg “felt that the music was a breakthrough that was destined to
change society once and for all,” and soon, he would connect it to his work as a poet
(394).
Allen Ginsberg was enamored of the musical counterculture. On one level, he
coveted the attention, fame, and glamorous lifestyles that his musician friends enjoyed.
In the mid-1960s, when he first began attending parties and concerts, he “was envious as
he watched Dylan and the Beatles hailed by a new generation” (Morgan 410). However,
as his exposure to the musical scene grew, he began to realize that the musicians were
doing much more than winning fans and fame. They were revolutionizing poetry.

52

Ginsberg felt that, somewhere along the way, poetry had lost the key
components of its original nature. In his view, each stage in the evolution of the form
marked an increase in it’s degradation. When poetry was tied to dance and the natural
rhythm of the body, it was at its zenith. It lost the important physical aspect when it was
reduced to music and shed the critical musical aspect when it was relegated to the spoken
word. Finally, poetry was condensed to its weakest, most “disembodied” form – words
on the printed page (interview with Aldrich, et al. 157-58).
In the late 1960s, Ginsberg developed a theory that the movement towards
reviving that vital bardic tradition had begun with his earliest poetic idols and would
extend past his contemporary musical champions. His definition of poetry shifted again,
and he now came to think of it as “what has been lost and what can be found” (interview
with Carroll 173). Ginsberg was always careful not to place Ezra Pound above Walt
Whitman and proclaimed him “the greatest poet of the age! Greatest poet of the
age…certainly the greatest poet since Walt Whitman” (interview with Durham 347).
However, he believed that Pound had made the first step in recovering poetry’s former
glory by bringing the form back to the spoken word and further described him as “the
first poet to open up fresh new forms in America after Whitman” (347). He basically
modeled his theory of the evolution of poetry on “Pound’s famous scheme…where he
saw the trouble with poetry is that it departs from song, and the trouble with song is that
it departed from dance” (interview with Aldrich, et al. 157). Because he believed that
Pound was “the one poet who heard speech as spoken from the actual body and began to
measure it to lines that could be chanted rhythmically without violating human common
sense,” he named him as the poet responsible for giving voice back to the words on the
page (Durham 347).
Furthermore, Ginsberg felt that the Beat poets, including him, had responded to
Pound’s influence and had ushered in the next important change in poetry. He explained
that “the next step after Pound modeling words from actual speech…is to bring it to chant
– chanting is the next step – which is what we did” (interview with Aldrich, et al. 158).
He argued that, although their work was largely excluded from the academy at the time,
they were “carrying on a tradition, rather than being rebels” (interview with Le Pellec
302). Whereas “the academic people were ignoring Williams and ignoring Pound…and
most of the other major rough writers of the Whitmanic, open form tradition,” the Beats
“had that historical continuity” that connected them to both past and future (302).
According to Ginsberg’s developing theory, it was the Beat poets, not the mainstream
writers, who had recognized Ezra Pound’s call, and their work served as a link in the
intergenerational effort to reclaim the bardic tradition of poetry.
Ginsberg argued that, in turn, members of the musical counterculture, and
especially Bob Dylan, had initiated the next step of setting poetry to song. He felt that
Dylan built upon the chanted verses of the Beats and that he had been “influenced by the
whole wave of poetry that went before and…got to thinking of himself as a poet, except a
singing poet” (interview with Aldrich, et al. 157). When he met Dylan in 1964, Ginsberg
perceived that “‘a torch had been passed,’” and he celebrated this “revival of poetry as
song” as both a crucial step in the history of poetry and a way of connecting his new
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friends to his old muses (157). He very clearly tied the two as being parts of the same,
large movement to take poetry “beyond the printed page” (157). He even spoke of the
musical counterculture in terms of his earliest poetic influences by pointing to their
“messages about tolerance, transcendency, and ecstasy” and by stressing the “Whitmanic
adhesiveness from generation to generation” (emphasis mine; interview with Elliot 69;
interview with Le Pellec 302).
Of course, Ginsberg recognized that there were further steps to be taken. The full
realization of the bardic tradition would require the reunion of verse, rhythm, and dance,
and he saw as much in “[Mick] Jagger and the others,” with their “shamanistic dancechant-body rhythm ‘I wanna go hooome, no satisfaction!’” (interview with Aldrich et al.
158). Once again, Ginsberg related this type of fully “embodied” poetry back to the
initial efforts of earlier poets and explained that “what’s happening with rock and roll,
with all the body thing which is being laid on…is actually a return to the cycle, following
Pound’s critical analysis, in a way” (158). Ginsberg claimed that this chain of influence
would continue, until “ultimately what you can expect is a naked, prophetic kid getting
up, on a stage, chanting, in a trance state, language, and dancing his prophecies” (158).
Thus, according to Ginsberg’s theory, the collected efforts of Walt Whitman, Ezra Pound,
the Beat poets, Bob Dylan, and other members of the music industry would fully reembody poetry and produce a “return to the original religious shamanistic prophetic
priestly Bardic magic!” (158).
As Ginsberg became more immersed in the late 1960s’ psychedelic scene, he
spent considerable thought on working out this new theory of poetry. The connection it
posited between his literary heroes, his Beat peers, and his rock and roll sidekicks excited
him. He explored all of the implications of such a large movement of poetry and worked
to bridge the connections between his literary ancestors and his musical peers. When he
was finally allowed to meet Ezra Pound in 1967, Ginsberg was eager to discuss music,
and he came ready with the Beatles’ Sergeant Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band album
and Bob Dylan’s Blonde on Blonde in hand (Morgan 444). When he related this
experience later in life, he commented that Pound “sat through about two hours of Dylan
and the Beatles, so he heard that at least. That was nice. Patient man” (interview with
Durham 350). Although Pound was virtually mute throughout the entirety of their
meeting, Ginsberg did not take his silence as a show of disapproval of the music, for as
Olga Rudge said, “‘if he didn’t like it, he would have gotten up and left the room’” (350).
Similarly, in his first conversation with the Beatles, Ginsberg turned the conversation
towards poetry, sat down in John Lennon’s lap, and asked if he had ever read William
Blake (Morgan 409-10). It was as if Ginsberg wanted Pound and the Beatles to see the
same connection that he saw. He hoped that Pound, the initiating link in the recovery of
poetry, could hear in the Beatles’ music what his work had inspired. In turn, Ginsberg
wished that the Beatles, a key component of the next phase of poetry, would recognize
their artistic lineage in Blake’s work. Ginsberg strove to involve even his deceased
literary heroes in his excitement over his new theory. He detected an early impulse
towards the bardic movement in Blake’s work and, claiming that it was the poet’s
original intention, sought to “re-embody” Blake’s poems. In 1968, he began his effort to
set Blake’s Songs of Innocence and Experience to music. Blake had written music to
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accompany the poems and had sung them for his friends. However, he had not recorded
his musical notations, so Ginsberg composed “contemporary scores” of his own and
released them as an album in 1970 (Morgan 457; AG Trust). Soon, Ginsberg’s interest in
the connection between poetry and music would be reflected in his own work as well.
Ginsberg soon grew weary of representing the outmoded link in the bardic chain.
Although he felt that the Beats had served a vital role in the bardic revival, the torch had
been handed off to the musicians, and his 1972 The Fall of America: Poems of These
States is the product of one of Ginsberg’s earliest efforts to align his work with this next
generation of poetry. In the effort to “re-embody” his poetry, Ginsberg chose not to
compose his works on the page but to return to an oral tradition, and he received Bob
Dylan’s help in this aim. In 1965, in the effort to encourage his friend’s natural talent at
impromptu poetry, Dylan gave Ginsberg six-hundred dollars to buy a Uher tape recorder.
The recorder was “a state-of-the-art machine for 1965” and could operate on battery
power for up to ten hours (Morgan 418). Uher recorder in hand, Ginsberg hopped in a
Volkswagen Microbus and set on a tour of America, “noting whatever struck him, from
newspaper headlines to bits of conversation to billboards to music and news he heard on
the radio” (Carter 54). Ginsberg was inspired to compose by the things he saw and the
people he met, and “the tape recorder gave him a whole new approach to composition,
making it much easier to sketch words and phrases and sounds wherever he was”
(Morgan 420). No longer chained by a typewriter to the desk in his apartment, Ginsberg
could speak oral poetry into his recorder as he experienced war-time America, in all its
turmoil, firsthand. In 1966, he began translating the recorded tapes into the manuscript
that would become The Fall of America (AG Trust).
The most famous, and perhaps most moving, poem in The Fall of America is
undoubtedly September on Jessore Road. Ginsberg was inspired by a 1971 trip to
Calcutta to write the poem. In September of that year, Keith Richards of the Rolling
Stones funded Ginsberg’s trip with the hopes that he “could report on the terrible tragedy
of the millions of people fleeing from the civil war in Bangledesh” (Morgan 480). When
he arrived in Calcutta, Ginsberg witnessed the deplorable conditions of the people there.
Hundreds of sick, hungry individuals were crowded together in “makeshift tents” and
“cardboard houses” with no sanitation or protection from the elements, and Ginsberg
found the sight of them “heartbreaking” (480). Moved by the experience, Ginsberg
sought to give voice to those individuals he saw in Calcutta with September on Jessore
Road. He hoped to reach a wide American audience with the poem and to expose the
hypocrisy of a country that would fund a war in Vietnam but leave countless individuals
around the world to die of the lack of basic necessities.
With September on Jessore Road, Ginsberg delivers essentially the same critique
of modern America that he does in Howl. As he traveled and composed spontaneous
poetry with his recorder, Ginsberg hoped to be able “to update and rethink Whitman’s
celebration of America” (Carter 54). Just as he had with Howl, Ginsberg found that he
took a much grimmer view of his country. In September on Jessore Road, Ginsberg
gives a picture of utter despair and destitution. He writes of individuals of all ages with
nothing but pain, mud, death, and sadness. Babies are shown with “Bellies swollen,”
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children are “weeping in pain,” parents are “dying for bread,” and the elderly are “silently
mad” (September 2; 104; 9; 12). Ginsberg pleads with Americans to realize that,
although the scene he depicts exists for them only “on planet TV,” it is all too real for
many (130). While Americans worry over problems that do not even exist, such as what
to “buy with our Food Stamps on Mars,” people in other parts of the world are dying
needlessly (120). Furthermore, in Ginsberg’s opinion, it is not only the American people
who are at fault. Although the American government celebrates its humanity, Ginsberg
claims that the country chooses to squander its riches on meaningless wars rather than
invest the resources to rebuild human life. Thus, when the people of Calcutta cry,
“Where is America’s Air Force of Light?,” Ginsberg can only reply sadly, “Bombing
North Laos all day and all night” (87-88).
Although the subject of September on Jessore Road is similar to that of Howl, the
poetic inspiration behind it signals Ginsberg’s shifting allegiance to the musical
counterculture. In writing September on Jessore Road, he cast aside aspirations to
imitate his former muses, such as Whitman and Blake, in the hope of being able “to offer
Dylan a text equal to his own genius and sympathy,” and Dylan’s influence is strongly
felt in the poem (First Blues iii). In September on Jessore Road, Ginsberg traded the
sprawling, Whitmanesque style of Howl for rhymed couplets, lilting stanzas, and
organized meter. Previous poets had utilized the same elements in their poetry, of course,
but Ginsberg made it clear that he was using the forms of the musician, not the poet; in
the conclusion of the book, he explains that he intended the poem to be “a mantric
lamentation rhymed for vocal chant to western chords F minor B flat E flat E minor,” and
in the preface of First Blues, he indicates that September on Jessore Road was written as
a “blues” (The Fall 190; First Blues iii). Furthermore, Ginsberg referred to specific
points in the work, not as lines in a poem, but as “lyrics” in a song (Carter 396). In the
conclusion of the poem (or song), he asks repeated questions, such as “How many
families hollow eyed lost?,” “How many loves who never get bread?,” and “How many
sisters skulls on the ground?,” and his repeated answer is a resounding “Millions” (137;
139; 141). The structure is meant to emphasis the destitution of the people of Calcutta,
but the question and answer style is more than a little reminiscent of Bob Dylan’s
“Blowin’ in the Wind,” a song Ginsberg admittedly admired and claimed “could have
been any little boy’s lyric fancy” (interview with Carroll 174). Although both Howl and
September on Jessore Road lament the superficiality and ignorance of American life,
Ginsberg’s poetic muses had definitely changed in the fifteen years since he wrote his
first masterpiece.
Ginsberg dedicated The Fall of America “to Whitman Good Grey Poet,” but it is
clearly the influence of his musical peers that permeates the book. Bob Dylan equipped
him with the technology he needed to be able to compose spontaneous, oral poetry on the
road, Keith Richards funded the trip which culminated in the birth of September on
Jessore Road, and John Lennon provided him with the artistic support and reinforcement
that he craved. When Ginsberg was writing Howl, he turned primarily to Pound for help;
he repeatedly tried to meet him, and when he awoke “chilled” by his perceived lack of
talent, he turned to Pound’s works for help (Journals 231). However, in 1971, when
Ginsberg returned from Calcutta, it was John Lennon, not Ezra Pound, with whom he
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wished to meet, and he immediately set out for Lennon and Yoko Ono’s apartment in
Syracuse. He read September on Jessore Road to Lennon and felt that the work had
succeeded when it “brought tears to the musician’s eyes” (Morgan 481). By the early
1970s, Ginsberg clearly looked to his musical counterparts, not his poetic predecessors or
peers, for help, inspiration, and guidance.
The Fall of America was not Ginsberg’s only project in the early 1970s, for he
was working simultaneously on First Blues; in this work, Ginsberg reached beyond the
oral poetry of The Fall of America to the next step in his self-devised hierarchy of poetic
effort – the setting of poetry to song. With First Blues, Ginsberg adopted the artistic
process of the musician. In 1971, he held a reading at New York University, during
which he created impromptu poetry onstage. Unbeknownst to him, Bob Dylan was
concealed in the crowd and was amazed by the performance. He called Ginsberg later
that night and showed up at his apartment. Eager to make an impact upon Dylan,
Ginsberg “tongued syllables and sentences” as quickly and skillfully as he could, while
Dylan accompanied him on his guitar (First Blues iii). He was successful in impressing
Dylan, and the informal jam session spurned a series of formal sessions together in the
recording studio. Ginsberg created poetry “out of whole cloth in the studio, right on the
spot,” while musicians played instruments, ran over the music, and recorded (interview
with Schumacher 437; First Blues iii). At last, Ginsberg had truly found the collaborative
atmosphere that he had glimpsed for a moment at the Six Gallery reading.
Although the songs were in fact translated to the page for the 1975 edition of First
Blues, Ginsberg was careful to preserve their original musical nature, even in print. The
titles of the poems reveal their musicality; twelve of the thirty-two pieces included in
First Blues are described as rags or blues, and the titles of several others, such as “Slack
Key Guitar” and “Everybody Sing,” are musical as well. For fourteen of the songs, he
included the sheet music, carefully written out in his own hand. Ginsberg was also
careful to emphasize the songs’ spontaneous, mutable nature. In order to reveal “how
raw mind actually sings,” Ginsberg chose not to revise the songs for the print version of
First Blues but rather to leave them just as they were in the studio, and “Put Down Yr
Cigarette Rag” ends with the direction to “improvise further” (First Blues v; “Put Down
Yr Cigarette” 49). Although the reader of First Blues cannot comprehend the work’s full
musical effect, the print version does retain vestiges of its original form.
Unsurprisingly, the content of First Blues reflects Ginsberg’s continued adoration
of Bob Dylan. The book is dedicated “To Minstrel Guruji Bob Dylan” and includes a
tribute to the singer, entitled “On Reading Dylan’s Writing.” In this song, Ginsberg casts
Dylan as a prophet-poet with a “heavenly soul” in which “God himself” has “entered”
(19-20). He praises Dylan’s unmatched talent and claims that “the dross of wisdom” has
left him “lone on earth” (15-16). With the lines, “I’ve broke my long line down/ to write
a song your way,” Ginsberg acknowledges that he has emulated Dylan’s music, but he is
quick to remind him that the “Sincerest form of flattery/ is imitation they say” (7-8; 5-6).
At the same time that Ginsberg was appropriating Dylan’s musical style, however, he
was becoming more convinced of the literary value of Dylan’s work. When he was asked
to speak about Dylan in a 1976 interview, Ginsberg replied that he was “a great poet,”
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dropping the quantifying phrase “as good as” that he had attached to a nearly identical
compliment in 1964 (interview with Chowka 391; Morgan 394). The title page of First
Blues features a black and white photograph of Ginsberg and Dylan sitting Indian-style
by the grave of Jack Kerouac, a poignant picture that casts Dylan as a member of the
grieving literary community, and nowhere in “On Reading Dylan’s Writings” does he
refer to Dylan as a musician. In fact, the title implies that the author of the poem is not
listening to the songs of a musician but in fact reading the words of a writer. Thus, in the
print edition of First Blues, Ginsberg blends the divisions between poetry and music by
not only acting the part of a musician himself but also by casting Bob Dylan as a fellow
poet.
In writing The Fall of America and especially First Blues, Ginsberg traded the toil
of the poet – the work with pen or keyboard to bring the words on a page into submission
– for the creative process of the musician. However, it is important to note that, for their
first incarnations, Ginsberg reduced his creations into the form with which he was most
familiar, and which was undoubtedly expected of him – lines of poetry on a page. The
oral poetry on his tape recorder was later written down as The Fall of America, and
although the spontaneous music of the studio was later released in Ginsberg’s 1983
double album First Blues, the songs were originally translated to the page and published
in a print version. In the early 1970s, Ginsberg was more clearly aligned with his idea of
the bardic movement than he had been twenty years before, but he had not yet shed the
very restriction he had named as the binding force of the modern poet – the printed page.
From the mid-1970s to the end of Ginsberg’s life, his poems drew so close to
musical numbers that they shed any semblance of classical poetic structure that would
chain them to the page at all, and Ginsberg adopted a musician’s life, complete with busy
tour schedules, collaboration with other musicians, and popular albums. In 1975, Bob
Dylan called Ginsberg in the middle of the night, asked him to sing his latest work over
the phone to him, and invited him to be a part of his Rolling Thunder Revue tour. There
were more than seventy artists, including Joan Baez and Joni Mitchell, involved with the
tour, and Ginsberg later described the group as “a traveling rock-family commune”
(interview with Chowka 392). However, he emphasized his idea that the musicians
recognized their art as poetry and related that they were all “calling each other ‘poet’”
(392). He perceived the frequent request of “sing me a song, poet” to be a “good sign” of
the health of the bardic movement (392).
Ginsberg’s other musically-inclined ventures were numerous. In 1986, he
recorded with the Hobo Blues Band, and in 1988, he worked with Philip Glass to produce
The Wichita Vortex Sutra, an opera which premiered at the Schubert Theater in New
York (AG Trust). In 1993, Bono, the lead singer of U2, asked Ginsberg to perform “Hum
Bom!” and “Put Down Yr Cigarette Rag” for a television special that was to be aired in
both Europe and the United States (Morgan 627). In 1994, Ginsberg released Holy Soul
Jelly Roll, the much anticipated four-disc collection of “poems and songs” from the
entirety of his career (AG Trust).
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In 1996, Ginsberg earned what has come to be seen as the pinnacle of success in
the musical community – a popular MTV video, and one featuring a rock icon no less. In
1995, Ginsberg traveled to London to perform at Albert Hall. Before the show, he visited
Paul McCartney at his home and asked him if he could recommend a musician to
accompany him for the night. McCartney volunteered himself, and Ginsberg’s audience
was stunned when McCartney appeared on stage with Ginsberg to perform “The Ballad
of the Skeletons.” The event was filmed and released on MTV, where it “received
significant air time” (Morgan 640-43). By the mid-1990s, Ginsberg had finally achieved
his goal of connecting poetry to music.
In many ways, Ginsberg’s own assessment of his career and his critical reception
do not match up. Overall, Ginsberg was unhappy with Howl. In his 1956 journal, he
wrote that he was displeased with “the disorganization of it,” and when he received the
first copy of Howl and Other Poems by mail, he was “ashamed it was so shoddy”
(Journals 271; 304). Even after the support of his friends at the Six Gallery reading and
their kind testaments at the censorship trial, “he wasn’t sure Howl was any good,” and the
only praise of it that he could muster was the dubious compliment that it “almost
convinces” (Morgan 252; Journals 304). When Fantasy Records offered him a contract
to record Howl in 1957, he vehemently rejected it. In fact, he used obscenities to
describe the poem and claimed to be “positive” that it “was written two years ago in
limbo by somebody else, not me” (Morgan 253). In Ginsberg’s mind, poetry could
always be improved by being set to music, and in 1994, he debuted his musical version of
Howl with the Kronos Quartet in Carnegie Hall (AG Trust). Howl was not the only poem
that he sought to redeem, and in 1983, he followed John Lennon’s earlier suggestion to
set September on Jessore Road to song (Morgan 560). The poem was “gracefully set to
music for a string quartet,” and Ginsberg performed it in 1986 when he received the
Golden Wreath lifetime achievement award in Yugoslavia (593). By setting the poem to
music, Ginsberg felt that he had restored September on Jessore Road to, and even
surpassed, its original, spoken form. He also sought to improve upon that other project
from the early 1970s, First Blues, and in 1983, he produced the album version of the
work. Although the critical reception of the album was negative, Ginsberg “had never
been so happy with a project. He loved everything about the album” (565). In July of
1976, Ginsberg wrote the poem he would name as his best. In that month, Ginsberg’s
poet father, Louis Ginsberg, passed away, and Allen penned “Father Death Blues” on the
plane ride home for the funeral (AG Trust). The poem was properly named as a blues, for
it was essentially a song, and one which Ginsberg sang at every opportunity. The poet’s
own feelings about his work speak volumes. Although most readers and scholars point to
Howl or The Fall of America as his best works, Ginsberg was unhappy with both until he
set them to music. He was exceedingly pleased with his album version of First Blues, a
project which failed according to public opinion, and he named “Father Death Blues,” a
song which most people have never heard of and which received only four mentions in
all seven-hundred and two pages of Bill Morgan’s distinguished 2006 biography of the
poet. The reason behind this seeming discrepancy is clear: Ginsberg favored those pieces
which came closest to realizing his bardic vision.

59

Until his death in 1997, Ginsberg continued to reiterate his belief that the way
back to true poetry is through music. In 1982, he responded to an interviewer’s snide
observation that “this great poet who’s written classical stuff like Howl is now dabbling
with rock’ n’ roll, New Wave, and blues,” with the response that “poetry and music have
always been allied” (interview with Schumacher 442). Ginsberg went on to say that,
although he was “a little late in practicing that,” he was trying, through his musical
endeavors, “to sharpen my practice and get back to home base” (442). He further argued
that the musicality which he had introduced into his work was not a symptom of the
degradation of his poetry but rather a sign of artistic maturity and “refinement” (442).
Through both his work and his influence, he continued to try to convince poets and
musicians of their inherent connectedness. When he met them in 1965, Ginsberg tried to
educate the Beatles about William Blake. In 1996, he was still aiming to show at least
one of them his artistic heritage, for he was working with Paul McCartney on haikus
(interview with Silberman 548). He continued to argue for his theory of the return to the
bardic tradition and the importance of the artists who represented each link. In a 1989
interview, he echoed the theory he had first put forth in the 1960s and explained that
“poetry’s extended itself in its own lineage afterward into John Lennon, the
Beatles,…and Dylan…and I think after the wave of Whitman and then maybe another
wave of Pound, it’s…the strongest wave of American influence on world literature – the
combination” (interview with Jarab 505). For Ginsberg, that combination of the two
forces was always the key.
One cannot judge the accuracy of either Ginsberg’s vision of the chain of
influence in poetry or his theory of the correct path back to the bardic tradition.
Furthermore, Ginsberg’s success as a poet (or a musician, for that matter) is, of course,
open to debate. All that is clear is that Ginsberg believed strongly in his theories himself,
and as he changed from the figure bent over the typewriter, hoping to hear William
Blake’s voice again, to the figure onstage with the microphone in hand and the band
behind, he undoubtedly felt that he had finally lived up to that self-description he had
penned in his journal so many years before – “Allen Ginsberg Bard out of New Jersey”
(Journals 168).
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Chapter 7
Living and Writing on the Edge in Don DeLillo’s Libra
Lucia Campean
In 1988, a quarter of a century after John F. Kennedy was murdered, Don DeLillo
published his ninth novel, Libra. In his alternative account of the event, its causes and
aftermath, DeLillo brought together three parallel, eventually converging stories: a
biography of Lee Harvey Oswald, a CIA plot meant to result in the near assassination of
president Kennedy and the actual assassination of Castro, and the efforts made by a
retired secret service agent to write a secret history of the assassination for the CIA.
Libra is divided into twenty-four chapters, of which half tell the story of Lee
Harvey Oswald’s life between 1956 and 1963 and are entitled after the places where he
spent these seven years. The other chapters cover the plot against Kennedy and are
named after the dates that mark its development between April and November 1963. A
temporal gap inevitably occurs between the two narrative strands that run parallel to each
other, but is eventually bridged, as Oswald comes into contact with the conspirators, in
April 1963.
The first two chapters and the titles they bear are significant for both the content
and the narrative strategy of the book. Content wise, the first chapter, In the Bronx,
clearly points to Lee Harvey Oswald as the protagonist of the novel and to his status of a
misfit, a figure of the underworld, riding the subway daily, in an attempt to meet other
lonely frustrated people. The second chapter, 17April, offers the reader a clue early in
the novel about the main reason why, in this fictional world, Kennedy was killed: it was
Kennedy’s failure to make amends for the Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 17th, 1961,
which resulted in what was probably one of the greatest embarrassments of US foreign
policy. As far as the narrative strategy is concerned, the two chapters seem to make of
Libra another novel with multiple beginnings in the tradition inaugurated by Italo
Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler. However, as the reading advances and the
plot, in both senses of the word, unfolds, the two beginnings converge, toward the end, in
a story that defies ultimate closure and invites the reader to re-visit a world made of
words.
Both Oswald’s biography and the conspiracy narrative are subordinated to
Nicholas Branch’s account, meant to provide the CIA with satisfactory answers to the
questions raised by the Kennedy assassination. The function of this character, which is
ontologically superior to all the characters in the novel, whether they are based on real
people or they are invented, is to endorse a small-scale conspiracy.
In Libra, the original plot is directed against Castro and not against Kennedy. Win
Everett, a demoted CIA agent, who, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, is forced to leave the
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foreground and teach at Texas Woman’s University, cannot reconcile with being
relegated to a petty job and searches for a solution to make the administration go back to
Cuba. He needs what he calls an “electrifying event” and he finds it, or, rather, stages it:
an attempt on the President’s life, in Dallas, that would point to the Cuban Intelligence
Directorate: Kennedy must be scared into overthrowing Castro: “We don’t hit the
President. We miss him. We want a spectacular miss.” 1 However, T-Jay Mackey, one of
Everett’s fellows, secretly alters the initial plan: he recruits Ramon Benitez and Frank
Vasquez from the growing community of Cuban exiles in Miami, and Wayne Elko, a
soldier of fortune, but fails to inform them that the shooting has to be a miss and not a hit.
The conspirators need a scapegoat and when Win Everett has devised a profile for
him, by a lucky coincidence, George de Mohrenschildt, a CIA-related businessman and
Guy Banister, former FBI agent, come up with Lee Harvey Oswald, a Marine who
defected to the Soviet Union, lived in Minsk, married a Russian woman and, back in the
United States, distributes “Hands off Cuba” leaflets and makes no secret of being a leftist.
In the scenario advanced by DeLillo in Libra, the first bullet, which hit Kennedy
in the throat, is fired by Oswald from the Texas School Book Depository. His second
bullet misses Kennedy, but hits Governor Connally. He then aims for the third time,
shoots, and, as he fails again, he has time to see Kennedy’s head blow off and is struck by
the idea that he might have been set up. It was the Cuban exile, Ramon, who, from
behind the fence on the Grassy Knoll, fired the fatal bullet. From here on, Libra follows
the official version of the Warren Report Commission: Oswald kills Tippit then is
apprehended by the police in the Texas Theater. Finally, he is shot by Jack Ruby, in the
basement of the Dallas police headquarters, in front of a national TV audience.
David T. Courtwright is of the opinion that Libra’s plot, both the story and the
conspiracy, complied with the cardinal military rule of KISS: Keep IT Simple, Stupid!
and, as such, evolves within plausible boundaries. The critic argues that, even if
DeLillo’s novel revises the Warren Report with fictional tools, it is, nevertheless, a piece
of “minimalist revisionism.” Upper-case Conspiracy would have been at odds with the
realistic context described in Libra. By the same token, Oswald had to miss; otherwise,
he would have contradicted himself and the novel would have lacked in thematic
coherence. 2
Don DeLillo corroborates Courtwright’s interpretation when he points out that
Oswald’s final miss is yet another failure in the long range of failures that make up his
life. In the end, even if he wished so much to become a historical figure and a constitutive
part of his times, that is, to take his life into his own hands, Oswald lends himself to the
circumstances that created him and, ultimately, to chance: “He misses because he is
Oswald… the antihero can’t even be a hero himself. Oswald has to know he has not
killed the president. Another failure. It is the overwhelming theme of his life… Oswald
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would not have walked two blocks to shoot at the president. But the president came to
him.” 3
In what might be interpreted as one of several ways of debunking the Camelot
myth, DeLillo chose Lee Harvey Oswald as the thematic center of the novel, rather than
President John F. Kennedy. Oswald undergoes an identity crisis and needs to project it
on the nameless, faceless people he sees everyday in the subway. He has to check his
troubles against a group of people because by transferring his fear and discontent with
society, he is reassured to belong, to be a cog in the wheel. He needs to experience anger
within a framework which he creates and of which he then becomes part. Ironically,
when he finds himself in Minsk and has the chance to be just a brick in the wall, as he has
wished, he suddenly realizes he wants to dream the American dream: “He is a loner
seeking connection in the United States, and he is a ‘comrade’ seeking individuality in
the Soviet Union.” 4 An excerpt from one of Oswald’s letters to his brother, which
DeLillo chose as an opening to the novel, suggests that Oswald’s need to become
integrated in the larger flow of History is a key theme of the story: “Happiness is not
based on oneself, it does not consist of a small home, of taking and getting. Happiness is
taking part in the struggle, where there is no borderline between one’s own personal
world and the world in general.” 5
If life could be compared to a circle, then Oswald could be pictured as the center
and the circumference of his own circle. He is the lead character of the stories he himself
has devised. His obsession with making projects of his self and trying to enact them
reaches its climax toward the end of the novel, when Oswald is satisfied to have become
part of History and to have found his goal, i.e., to analyze his assassination of the
president. But Oswald did not live to enjoy self-discovery. The way he died, though,
was consistent with the way he lived: he died watching himself die, he was actor and
witness to his own assassination by Jack Ruby: “He could see himself shot as the camera
caught it. Through the pain he watched TV (…) through the pain, through the losing of
sensation except where it hurt, Lee watched himself react to the angering heat of the
bullet.” 6 The same uncanny effect is aimed at when another character, the wife of a CIA
agent, suddenly realizes that Oswald can actually see himself die, and, thus, makes
everyone watching his accomplice to the murder of the President:
There was something in Oswald’s face, a glance at the camera before he was
being shot, that put him here in the audience, among the rest of us, sleepless in
our homes— a glance, a way of telling us that he knows who we are and how we
feel, that he has brought our perceptions and interpretations into his sense of the
crime. (…) He is commenting on the documentary footage even as it is being
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shot. Then he himself is shot, and shot, and shot, and the look becomes another
kind of knowledge. But he has made us part of his dying. 7
This brief moment of communion in violent death, has been termed by Cain “a sinister
vision of American oneness” and probably best explains DeLillo’s description of the
Kennedy assassination as “the seven seconds that broke the back of the American
century.”
In Timothy L. Parish’s words, “he goes from a writer of a plot he cannot complete
to being an actor in a plot he did not write.” 8 The critic believes that Oswald’s validity as
a character is guaranteed by his writer persona. This was most apparent in his so-called
“historic diary”, a piece of writing DeLillo found “enormously chaotic and almost
childlike”, unlike a surprisingly “intelligent and articulate” radio appearance he made in
1963. 9 To call Oswald a writer, even a “failed” one, based on a number of letters and
some reading notes on Marx, Lenin and Trotsky is too much, unless the word is used in a
broader sense to designate the notion of “plotter.” However, in DeLillo’s scenario, he
ends up being just a pawn and a scapegoat.
It is a common narrative strategy, especially in the case of novels with a
metafictional propensity, for an author to insert a representative of his own in the text, in
order to orient or, as the case may be, disorient the reader with respect to which
interpretive path he or she should follow. Usually, the delegate of the author is an artist,
particularly a writer. Timothy L. Parish believes that “Oswald is the writer in Libra who
compels and ultimately best represents DeLillo’s own authorial interest in the story”
more so than two other characters: Win Everett, the demoted CIA agent who initiated the
whole shoot-but-don’t-kill-the-President plan, or Nicholas Branch, whom the CIA
authorized to go through all the evidence and write the secret story of the assassination. I
would argue that a novel like Libra does not encourage such a reading simply because
even as it advances an alternative explanation of the assassinate, it does so within a
fictional framework that challenges closure: to intimate that Oswald is the delegate of the
author in the text is to force the reader within an interpretive enclosure, which goes
against the inner logic of the novel and is dangerous because of the nature of the
association. Rather, I would argue that it is Nicholas Branch who echoes DeLillo’s
“voice” in the text and his modernist take on historiography.
Parish concludes that: “In the fictional world of Libra, Don DeLillo, not Lee
Harvey Oswald or the conspiracy theories, is the author of November 22nd, 1963 and its
subsequent narrative possibilities.” 10 This statement is rather superfluous to those who
have no difficulty in discriminating between a factual and a fictional account.
Surprisingly enough, there still are such people among well-read readers. The inability or
7
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unwillingness to accept the aforementioned difference underlies George F. Will’s
“Shallow Look at the Mind of an Assassin” review of Libra, published in Washington
Post, on September 22nd, 1988.
George Will characterized Don DeLillo’s Libra as “an act of literary vandalism
and bad citizenship,” an “exercise in blaming America for Oswald’s act of derangement,”
“valuable only as a reminder of the toll that ideological virulence takes on literary
talent.” 11 Will accuses DeLillo of inconsistency because on the one hand he stated in the
final Author’s Note that he had not tried to provide “factual answers” and, on the other
hand, in an interview claimed to have developed “the most obvious theory” that “does
justice to historical likelihood.” 12 One doesn’t need a second reading to conclude that the
two statements buttress and not at all subvert each other. Will misread the phrase
“historical likelihood,” because he focused on the word “historical,” whereas DeLillo’s
argument centers on the concept of “likelihood,” the understanding of which is the key to
the whole debate. The “as if” logic of fiction is the issue at stake and George Will failed
to read Libra for what it is: a novel. Here is the Author’s Note that DeLillo placed at the
very end of the novel to create and maintain the suspense effect:
This is a book of imagination. While drawing from the historical record, I’ve
made no attempt to furnish factual answers to any questions raised by the
assassination. Any novel about a major unresolved event will aspire to fill some
of the blank spaces in the known record. To do this, I’ve altered and embellished
reality, extended real people into imagined space and time, invented incidents,
dialogues and characters. Among these invented characters are all officers of
intelligence agencies and all organized crime figures, except for those who are
part of the book’s background. In a case in which rumors, facts, suspicions,
official subterfuge, conflicting sets of evidence and a dozen labyrinthine theories
all mingle, sometimes indistinguishably, it may seem to some that a work of
fiction is one more gloom in a chronicle of unknowing. But because this book
makes no claim to literal truth, because it is only itself, apart and complete,
readers may find refuge here_ a way of thinking about the assassination without
being constrained by half facts or overwhelmed by possibilities, by the tide of
speculation that widens with the years. 13
Although this statement leaves no room for an interpretation of the nature of the
account Will read Libra as a piece of historical writing. His critique takes a moralizing
turn when he argues that novelists drawing on historical events should be true to life: they
should be “constrained by concern to truthfulness, by respect for the record and a
judicious weighing of probabilities.” 14 And when self-censorship does not work, George
Will feels that it is his duty to warn the reading public against the harm a book like Libra
might do. Based on a character’s definition of “history” as “the sum total of what they
11
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aren’t telling us,” Will counts DeLillo among the “paranoiacs” and “conspiracy addicts.”
But again, he fails to realize that this is a conviction of a character, i.e., a paper being
living in an imaginary universe more or less tangential to the real world, and that a
character’s thoughts and feelings should not be attributed to the author. A one-to-one
character-author correspondence is counterproductive first of all because an author
cannot be identified with each and every character and second, because an author is
ontologically superior to the figments of his or her imagination.
Will goes on to say that DeLillo, as the representative of the American left, saw
the Kennedy assassination as “the turning point in consciousness” for Americans and the
event that fueled Americans’ skepticism about historical objectivity. The President was
killed— sad, but true. The President is dead— long live the President. Oswald was
killed— justice was done. Oswald is dead— long live America! The Warren
Commission Report came out and questioning an officially established truth is an
unpatriotic act. This, in short, is George Will’s argument. His major criticism is that
DeLillo pictured America as a sick society that breeds extremism and conspiracies” and
Oswald as “a national type, a product of the culture.” 15 It is true that DeLillo placed
Oswald within a social and political context, which could not be but America in the late
fifties and early sixties— interesting times, to paraphrase the Chinese curse— but he did
not portray Oswald as a national type— that is too far-fetched. Will goes as far as to
suggest that DeLillo’s definition of a writer as “the person who stands outside society,
independent of affiliations (…) the man or woman who automatically takes a stance
against his or her government” almost associates a writer with an assassin. A
parenthetical note— “Henry James, Jane Austen, George Eliot and others were hardly
outsiders.” – comes down to saying: either you are with us, or you are out of the canon.
It is Will’s belief that DeLillo’s political affiliations make him “a good writer and a bad
influence.” 16
In an interview which appeared in Rolling Stone magazine one month after
George Will’s review, Don Delillo emphasized the purely fictional nature of the scenario
he advanced in Libra. However, he made it clear that the fictional scaffolding he raised
was undeniably steeped in facts:
If I make an extended argument in the book it’s not that the assassination
necessarily happened this way. The argument is that this is an interesting way to
write fiction about a significant event that happens to have these general contours
and these agreed-upon characters. It’s my feeling that readers will accept or reject
my own variations on the story based on whether these things work as fiction, not
whether they coincide with the reader’s own theories or the reader’s own
memories (…) I wanted a clear historical center on which I could work my own
fictional variations. 17

15

George Will, 57.
See 15.
17
Anthony DeCurtis, Interview with Don DeLillo, 50.
16

68

If there is an ideal reader for the Warren Commission Report, then that is Don DeLillo,
because he actually read the twenty-six volume report before he set to write what he
called “a work of imagination.” Someone who has done so much research work, as
DeLillo has done, must have his own opinion about the Kennedy assassination, although
Libra makes no claim to historical objectivity. Without denying the importance of
history as a discipline or the validity of historical writing, DeLillo’s endeavor proves that
novelists do have a say not only in universal matters of the heart, but also in historical
matters. Asked what fiction offers to people that history denies them, DeLillo answered
that “fiction rescues history from its confusions (…) providing the balance and rhythm
we don’t experience in our everyday lives, in our real lives (…) finding rhythms and
symmetries that we simply don’t encounter elsewhere.” 18
The Kennedy assassination has given rise to a great number of conspiracy theories
and continues to challenge the minds of people looking for an answer, or, rather, the
answer. DeLillo argued that this event has left an indelible stamp on the American
collective psyche which has never recovered from the shock: “We seem much more
aware of elements like randomness and ambiguity and chaos since then (…) we’ve
developed a much more unsettled feeling about our grip on reality.” 19 Moreover, due to
the extensive media coverage of this tragedy, Americans have become aware of what
DeLillo calls “a sense of performance.” This has been taken to the extreme by such
people like Arthur Bremer and John Hinkley who “have a sense of the way in which their
acts will be perceived by the rest of us, even as they commit the acts.” 20
Such an explanation cannot be conceived by people like George Will simply
because it is an attack on the American way of life and the values it entails, such as the
ideas of objectivity, justice, truth and progress; it is equal to saying that something is
rotten in the United States and that would violate the City-upon-a Hill-dearly-held myth.
The same way of reasoning accounts for the “lone gunman” explanation, which is rooted
in the archetype of the individual, and overrules the possibility of a plot or conspiracy in
the case of the Kennedy assassination. To accept that more than one person can be held
accountable for the murder is to admit that America has degenerated to the level of the
European way of solving conflicts. No wonder that George Will perceives a work of
fiction like Libra as a threat and that he favors the banishment of the artist from the
perfect State, so much like in Plato’s fashion.
The blatant ignorance of or refusal to distinguish between historical and fictional
modes of reference reiterates the old Plato/Aristotle conflict over the concept of
“mimesis.” In the last book of The Republic, Socrates, the creditable character in Plato’s
dialogues, gives his reasons for having banished “imitative poetry” and the “imitative
tribe” from the ideal state. Taking a bed as an example, Socrates describes the three
levels discernible in the structure of each and every object: the original level is that of
the ideal bed, created by God, the second level is represented by an actual bed made by
the carpenter, who imitates God, and on the last level stands the poet or painter’s bed,
18
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which is nothing but a second-rate copy. In Socrates’ view, an artist doesn’t have full
knowledge of the object he tries to reproduce and the artistic product has no value in
itself because it is two times separated from the truth. Imitation is not a serious activity
because it draws upon the “rebellious principle” or the irrational part of the soul and
impresses undesirable emotions upon the audience. The immediate consequence is that
the audience will identify with and imitate what it sees. The only poetry that Socrates
will allow in the State is “hymns to the gods and prayers to famous men.” He concludes
that “the imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior and has inferior springs.” 21
Aristotle’s point of view, on the other hand, is quite different from that of Plato.
He believes that “it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what
may happen, what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity. The poet
and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. The work of the historian
Herodotus might be put into verse and it will still be a species of history, with meter no
less than without it. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other
what may happen.” 22 As far as tragedy is concerned, if it produces within the audience
such feelings as fear and pity, it also turns them to good account, in the sense that these
feelings also produce a purgation and thus an elevation of the soul during the aesthetic
experience or what Aristotle calls “catharsis.”
George Will’s fallacy is that he dismisses fiction drawing on the historical record
as a threat to common sense and denies the novelist the right to address controversial
issues. Contrary to Will’s belief, a novel like Libra rejects any claim to objectivity,
without arguing against the idea of historiography. As DeLillo himself has explained, the
novel might offer the reader a stay against the confusion raised by the assassination at
least for the actual time of reading. But it can also prompt him or her to read history.
Apart from the morally and politically-oriented conflict that it raised, Libra
became an object of dispute between literary critics that consider it to be another example
of postmodernist fiction, more precisely of what Linda Hutcheon termed “historiographic
metafiction”, and those who argue in favor of it being a modernist novel.
As the very name points out, “historiographic metafiction” displays a hybrid
nature due to its double orientation: it represents the meeting point of two opposite
notions: art for life’s sake and “art for art’s sake.” On the one hand, it is concerned with
history and with the way in which the past has come down to us, and, on the other, it
feeds on itself, due to its metafictional bias. Linda Hutcheon argues that such a narrative
reconsiders the relationship between historiography and fiction, and concludes that they
do not stand apart, due to the former’s claim to objectivity and the latter’s tendency to
depart from and distort reality. On the contrary, historiography and fiction come together
on account of their being mere discourses and, as such, prone to subjectivity. Since they
are both products of the human mind, which is time-, space- and ideology-conditioned,
neither can escape the personal touch inherent in any form of discourse. The fact that
historiography sets forth with the end in view to offer an objective, credible picture of
21
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“what really happened” does not exempt it from participating to a discursive experience.
It only establishes degrees of fictionality among forms of discourse. After all, the very
notion of picture cannot be conceived of independently of a beholder and a certain point
of view, hence its built-in subjectivity. Fiction and historiography have a common
intention. Broadly speaking, they are attempts to nibble at the strangeness of the past.
They both endeavor to render coherent a chaotic reality, by translating it into a familiar
language.
Because they both use language as a means of expression, their
communicative effectiveness is one of degree. 23
In what follows I will briefly analyze this process of relativization so as to provide
the theoretical background the type of novel called “historiographic metafiction” is
steeped in. The debate over the legitimacy of historical discourse and of history as a
discipline is far from having been resolved. One might say that the blurring of the
distinction between historical and fictional writing began with the so-called “linguistic
turn” of the late sixties, which has brought about a reconsideration of the subject/object
relationship in the process of representation. The idea that language is not a transparent
medium and that our apprehension of reality is to a great extent linguistically determined
underlies the skepticism about the possibility of mapping the past and acquiring historical
knowledge. The relationship between history and art and that between history and science
have been under debate and continue to be challenged. Such intellectual historians like
Hayden White, Keith Jenkins or Frank Ankersmit, to name but three of the radical
postmodernist vanguard, deny the validity of historical objectivity and the idea of history
as a discipline. In his fairly recent book Refiguring History. New Thoughts on an Old
Discipline Jenkins denounces historians’ attempt to be objective, arguing that their
admittance of the element of subjectivity in the process of representation is hypocritical
because they still try to be objective and thus, provide ultimate truths. This goal is
unattainable in itself because of the impossibility of any kind of discourse to achieve any
kind of closure and because the past— “the before now”— lends itself to revisionist
interpretations and re-interpretations time and time again. 24
Jenkins rejoices in the infinite openness of representation and considers it the
basis of experiencing otherness to the fullest, but what he fails to realize is that this
radical mistrust of even trying to be objective ultimately leads to the state of being happy
about being happy, or, in other words, being happy about nothing. While ridiculing the
lament over the loss of an objective perspective and the death of historical discourse,
Jenkins recommends ‘favorable dispositions’ to alternative modes of representations or
what he calls “new ways of imaginings”: “a relaxed attitude towards creative failure”, “an
attitude of radical and critical disobedience that… seeks no resolution or agreement about
historical problematizations but celebrates the failure of each and every one of them”, “an
attitude which disregards convention, disobeys the authoritative voice and replaces any
definitive closure with an interminable openness, any exhaustive ending with an et cetera,
and any full stop with an ellipsis…” 25 Despite claiming that postmodernism defies the
very idea of a paradigm, which is in itself an enclosure, Jenkins strongly recommends
23

Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism. History, Theory, Fiction, 41.
Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History. New Thoughts on an Old Discipline, Routledge, 2003, 3.
25
Jenkins, Rethinking History, 6.
24

71

“attitudes”, as if he were writing a prescription or preaching to agnostics hopefully
convertible to atheism.
Preaching is not exactly the kind of discourse sanctioned by “happy”
postmodernists and the either/or logic of argumentation is theoretically foreign to
postmodernism. Yet Jenkins uses it precisely in relation to historians whom, he argues,
ought to have abandoned it and become “happy relativists.” Instead, they persist in
writing well-documented, thoroughly researched books on the modernist premise that
there is something out there that can be rendered objectively. 26 To admit that there are
more points of view on a past event is not enough, it is veiled search for what Jenkins
terms “history narrator as nobody effect.” What is required is radical relativization in
order to be admitted among the elitist caste of postmodernists. Bernd Engler, too,
complains about academic historians being reluctant to admit that what they produce is
fictional accounts of a reality that can never be experienced immediately, but only
through already acquired screens. 27 Jenkins maintains that historians, even the
“enlightened” ones, need to understand that the new cultural paradigm revised the notion
of representation by calling into question not the content of historical writing, but its form
and the structural device that it uses.
Drawing on Hayden White’s argument that historical writing is no different from
fiction because both the historian and the novelist are inescapably ideologically biased
and use the same means of emplottment and argumentation, radical postmodernist
theorists overemphasize the role of the imagination in relation to historiography. White
claims that, since history uses the same narrative strategies that fiction relies on, no
historical event can be inherently tragic, comic, romantic or ironic, to use Northrop
Frye’s terminology. It is presented as such according to the point of view and the
narrative pattern that a historian chooses before he or she sets out to elaborate what he or
she believes to be a self-sufficient, objective account. 28 I would argue that an event such
as the Kennedy assassination can only be tragic, irrespective of the cultural background
or ideological leanings of the historian that deals with it. A novelist, on the other hand,
can give the whole matter a comical or farsical twist in presenting Kennedy in heaven,
confessing of his affairs, personal and public, in an attempt to atone for having led a
“fake” life, as it is the case in Robert Mayer’s novel I, JFK. 29
Richard J. Evans took a stance on the champions of relativization when he
compared historical research with a jigsaw puzzle: even if some pieces are missing and
the historian has to reconstruct them from the actual remains at hand, he or she is still
working within clearly defined boundaries and his or her imagination is held in check by
verifiable data. 30
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John Lewis Gaddis’s concepts of “actual replicability” and “virtual replicability”
contribute to the same debate over the objectivity of historical knowledge. The difference
between history and art can be drawn with respect to sources, real or invented, reliable or
questionable. This is not to say that history is a science, as the historian cannot replicate
the past in the same way as the scientist would make the same experiment several times
with the same result. 31
Keith Jenkins and other radical postmodernists find being different liberating, but
they ignore the fact that something has to be different from something else, and that the
“other” always has a counterpart. Diversity cannot be liberating in the abstract, it has to
have a stable ground against which to assert its own identity. The solution radical
postmodernists advance is self-undermining because on the one hand they foreground the
necessity to abolish past systems of thought and the very idea of a system, and on the
other hand they try to establish a paradoxical unparadigmatic paradigm which assumes
ascendancy over all preceding theoretical structures.
Radical postmodernists or intellectual historians, as they sometimes refer to
themselves, claim that all accounts about the past are fictional. However, for something
to be fiction, there must be a counterpart that doesn’t necessarily have to be objective
according to nineteenth-century standards of empiricism, but that is closer to facts than
the figments of one’s imagination. I believe that one can still differentiate between a
factual and a fictional account and I will try to prove my point by resorting to a set of
concepts coined by Samuel Coleridge in Biographia Literaria, in 1817, namely:
“suspension of disbelief”, “fancy” and “imagination.” The first one, “suspension of
disbelief”, specifies the dichotomy as far as the reader is concerned and has been defined
as the postponement or cancellation of critical judgment required of the reader of a work
of fiction in order for him or her to enjoy the reading process. Conversely, a reader of a
historical account should maintain his or her critical judgment awake and alert and not
take anything for granted. As far as the author is concerned, a historian makes use of
“fancy,” i.e., a kind of mechanical or logical faculty to associate materials already
provided, whereas a writer of fiction uses his or her “imagination,” i.e., a poetic faculty,
which not only gives shape and order to a given world, but also creates new worlds.32
When the historian uses his or her imagination, especially in the case of virtual history,
his or her imagination is no more than a methodological tool and not a constitutive or
structural quality, as in the case of fiction. Needless to say that historical fiction requires
of its readers a considerably greater amount of cooperation and suspension of critical
thinking. However, Coleridge’s theoretical distinction is, I believe, still valid and useful
in grappling with this sensitive issue.
At first glance conservative critics like George F. Will and intellectual historians
such as Keith Jenkins seem poles-apart with respect to the difference between literary and
historical discourses, since the former draw a clear line between them on moral and
political grounds, and the latter blur the difference between them on grounds I can only
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describe as radically postmodernist. However, they share one thing: the virulence with
which they understand to engage in a debate. I believe that some tolerance on both sides
would not go amiss.
Although less acrimonious than intellectual historians, postmodernist literary
critics share their basic assumptions. They term Libra a postmodernist novel because it
draws on what they consider to be the first postmodern event in American history and
because it uses postmodernist techniques to deal with it. Dallas, November 22nd, 1963,
had often been referred to not only as a turning point in the twentieth-century, but also as
the event that ushered in the postmodern era. It is the point in time and space that
engendered a culture of violence and, at the same time, a nostalgic longing for lost
innocence. 33 Norman Mailer reads the Kennedy assassination as the moment since which
“we have been marooned in two equally intolerable spiritual states, apathy or paranoia,”
while Frederic Jameson interprets it as having raised the curtain on what he calls “a
collective communicational festival.” 34 Drawing on Linda Hutcheon’s distinction
between “events” and “facts,” that is, the real, historically accountable happenings and
the historicized recording of them, which is time-, space-, and ideology-conditioned,
Jameson suggests that the assassination established what had before been only a
tendency, namely, the ascendancy of facts over events, as the media, especially
television, gained more and more importance and influence in society. 35
Carmichael argues that Libra plays upon this cultural phenomenon extensively
and that it dramatizes this crisis of representation that history writing continues to
undergo. Furthermore, the critic maintains that DeLillo illustrates the shift from the
modernist to the postmodernist paradigm most clearly in the narrative strand dedicated to
Nicholas Branch and his efforts to write a secret history of the Kennedy assassination for
the CIA. The retired agent characterized the Warren Report as “the Joycean Book of
America” and “the megaton novel James Joyce would have written if he’d moved to Iowa
City and lived to be a hundred” and the event that prompted it as having generated “an
aberration into the heartland of the real.” 36 One of the paradigmatic features of
postmodernism is the crisis of the subject and, consequently, of language. In this respect,
Oswald’s own writings reproduced in the Warren Commission Exhibits, with their
broken syntax, misspellings and malapropisms, are, in Carmichael’s view, additional
proof that Libra draws on the postmodernist thematic repertoire.
Other literary critics, prominent among them Glen Thomas, insist on the
postmodernist quality of narrative and character construction in Libra. For example, Win
Everett’s plot rebels against its author, assumes its own life and ultimately kills him; the
plan is challenged by Mackey retaliatory urge and by historical fact, since the initial miss
turns into a hit. At the character-level, Oswald is the one most extensively analyzed
33
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within postmodernist parameters: he is the marginal, de-centered figure, who lives his life
in claustrophobia inducing spaces, struggles to become part of capitalized history and
writes his way into a framework more coherent than the one he experiences daily, even
though his texts are inarticulate and, at times, incomprehensible. Oswald’s divided
personality is most apparent at the end of the novel, when he is killed by Jack Ruby. The
uncanny effect of his death is that he is portrayed as subject of and simultaneously
witness to his own dying. 37 It is noteworthy that Glen Thomas’s theoretical and
interpretive leanings transcend the content and penetrate the language of his critical
discourse. For example, he refers to Oswald’s troubled character in terms of a
“dispersed, split and fragmented sign,” obviously drawing on the jargon of
poststructuralist linguistics. 38
N.H. Reeve too admits that the aftermath of November 22nd, 1963, displays
characteristics of postmodernism: inconclusiveness, skepticism about all-encompassing
narratives and the proliferation of such questions as: who actually shot Kennedy? Was it
from the Texas Scholl Book Depository or from behind the fence on the Grassy Knoll?
Was there a lone gunman or a conspiracy that should be held accountable for the
murder? 39 Notwithstanding these features partaking of the postmodernist paradigm,
Reeve makes an even stronger case for the modernist bias that underlies even the most
paranoid of theories: the belief in and the craving for “the pure and the
uncontaminated”— this appears to be the driving force behind the plotters in Libra, as
well as behind all those who still try to solve the Kennedy mystery. 40
Rather than considering Libra a piece of postmodernist fiction, and, more
specifically, another example of the flourishing genre of “historiographic metaficton,”
Reeve believes that DeLillo’s alternative account of the Kennedy assassination shares in
the humanist, modernist endeavor to deal efficiently with chaos and to set the individual
and collective consciousness at rest. By definition, “historiographic metafiction”
purposely blurs the difference between history and fiction and questions authoritative and
authorized historical truth. Libra goes beyond this rationale because, on the one hand,
DeLillo uses historical evidence quite substantially, even as he draws attention to the
fictionality of his account, and, on the other hand, there has never existed an undisputed
explanation of the Kennedy assassination: the Warren Report raised question marks and
suspicion from the very day of its release. Therefore, it would be fair to say that Libra is
modernist in content and message, but postmodernist in technique and treatment. 41
The modernist vs. postmodernist debate is ultimately a purely theoretical dispute
that can never be resolved, simply because different critics use different criteria by which
they label literary works as belonging to one or the other aesthetic code. Whether one
favors the content or the narrative strategies in deciding where to place a work of fiction
is another reason why this technical conflict cannot be settled.
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Although the distinction between form and content is possible only for
methodological and analytical reasons, I believe that the return to thematic criticism in
recent years can partly be accounted for by works like Libra, which, far from neglecting
the formal aspect and far from serving a propagandistic purpose either, do have a
powerful message that cannot be overlooked.
In the case of Libra, the subliminal message has to do with the relationship
between history and fiction. DeLillo’s novel draws on the historical record and, what is
more important, on a controversial event. As a “work of imagination,” it is both worldreflecting and self-reflexive in a well-balanced proportion. Rather than endorsing an
attitude of skepticism and distrust about the possibility of reaching a satisfactory
explanation or about the use of undertaking such an endeavor, Libra reflects the
individual’s hope for and belief in a world that makes sense. Fiction and historiography,
DeLillo implies, complement each other in the attempt to give shape and order to the
world we live in.
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Chapter 8
“I Feel Like a Spring Lamb”
What Clay Shaw’s Literary Life Reveals
Michael Snyder

A massive body of work has been produced investigating the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, and one branch of this research focuses on Jim Garrison’s
prosecution and trial of New Orleans businessman Clay Lavergne Shaw. The only
person ever prosecuted in connection with Kennedy’s murder, Shaw is an intriguing
personage with a contentious history. Despite all of the voluminous books, websites, and
films that have been produced attempting to find answers to the lingering questions
presented by the assassination and the Warren Report, relatively little is known about the
particulars of Clay Shaw’s life.
Even reports of the basic facts contradict one another. For instance, of Shaw’s
public school career, in 1969 attorney and Garrison critic Milton E. Brener writes, “Shaw
quit before graduation” (62) and Professor Joan Mellen reports the same in 2005. Shaw,
however, under oath states, I am a graduate of high school, I finished . . . in 1928”
(“Testimony” 1). Brener claims that Shaw “took courses at Columbia University” (62).
Shaw, however, when asked under oath by his attorney if he had attended college
subsequently, said he hadn’t (“Testimony” 1). Did Shaw lie to Brener, or is Brener
deliberately embellishing Shaw’s biography propagandistically in a book attacking
Garrison subtitled “a study in the abuse of power”? Not one full-length biography of
Shaw has been published, though researchers are at work. Even a pro-Shaw tome like
novelist-playwright James Kirkwood’s American Grotesque (1970), which was enabled
by Kirkwood’s new friendship with, and sympathy for, Shaw—brought about by
Midnight Cowboy author James Leo Herlihy through Herlihy’s and Shaw’s mutual friend
Tom L. Dawson 1 (Mitzel 8)—reveals much less about Shaw’s biography, politics, and
philosophy than one would hope.
One of the fascinating facets of Clay Shaw is his early career as a playwright and
his sustained interest in, and occasional authoring of, drama. It seems, however, that few
know much about his literary output and even fewer have actually read his work. In fact,
a Google search (July 2009) of “Clay Shaw” plus his early nom de plume “Le Vergne
Shaw”—a variant of his middle name—yielded zero results. It is sometimes noted that at
sixteen years old, Shaw wrote a one-act play, Submerged (1929), one successfully and
frequently produced by amateur theatre companies in the thirties and beyond—this play,
1
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like Shaw’s three other published plays, was actually co-authored with H. Stuart
Cottman. The editor of the duo’s third play The Cuckoo’s Nest (1936) in his Foreword
boasts that Submerged is “commonly acknowledged to be one of the best short plays
written by an American. It is doubtful if any other one-act play is produced as frequently
at this time” (3). In 1970 Kirkwood claims that it has “had thousands of performances
and is still widely played by amateur groups around the country” (18-19). Submerged
was first produced while Shaw was a student at Warren Easton High School in New
Orleans (a school Lee Harvey Oswald also attended), and like the rarely-mentioned other
three published plays, was directed by Miss Jessie Tharp of Le Petit Théâtre du Vieux
Carré, who directed many plays at that historic theatre as early as 1918 (“Jessie”). All
four published plays—Submerged (1929), A Message from Khufu (1931), The Cuckoo’s
Nest (1936), and Stokers (1938), are attributed to “H. Stuart Cottman and Le Vergne
Shaw.” Little is known of Herman Stuart Cottman, a classmate of Shaw’s (“Clay
Shaw”). Also a thespian, he played two roles in the original productions of his
collaborations with Shaw. The Le Petite Théâtre in 1930 produced two plays he singly
authored as “Herman S. Cottman”: For the Love of a Lady and Grandmere (“Herman”).
An actor named “Herman Cottman” plays the role of Officer Scott in Elia Kazan’s film
Panic in the Streets (1950), not credited onscreen—the film was shot in New Orleans, so
this is likely the same Cottman.
Some might ask why one should care about plays that Shaw wrote as a teenager
and young man. After all, we all go through youthful enthusiasms that may be
disconnected to later life. But Shaw’s early literary life was not just a phase later to be
discarded. This facet of Shaw was deeply ingrained and important to his self-concept,
and the work tells us something of the man. Shaw held literary aspirations throughout his
entire life. Brener writes that Shaw penned a full-length play called In Memoriam,
produced in New Orleans in 1948 (62). Professor Joan Mellen refers to a play authored
under the nom de plume “Allen White,” titled Memorial (130), perhaps the same play or a
different draft, which is available in Shaw’s manuscripts at the National Archives in
Maryland. Shaw himself under oath stated, “in the early Fifties, I wrote a play that was
produced here, and I used . . . the pen name, Allen White” (“Testimony” 2). Another
Shaw play is The Idol’s Eye, which Brener claims is published (63) but no bibliographic
record exists. This may have been an alternative title of Message from Khufu. Later in
his life Shaw would become friends with literary giants such as Tennessee Williams,
Gore Vidal, and James Leo Herlihy. Shortly before his retirement, the multilingual Shaw
traveled to Spain to obtain permission to translate a play by Alejandro Casona, Los
árboles mueren de pie (The Trees Die Standing) (Brener 63-64). When Shaw retired early
at age 51, he “wanted, from here on in, to devote my life to writing” (Kirkwood 19).
Prior to his arrest, “in early 1967 he was working on a drama concerning Antonio Ulloa,
the first Spanish Governor of Louisiana” (Brener 63) and after the conspiracy trial Shaw
said he hoped to write “a couple of plays” along with a book about the trial (Kirkwood
473). Shaw described to Kirkwood an idea he had an idea for a play about the recurring
problem of individuals abusing power, a dig at Jim Garrison. Even from a brief glance at
the plays we can note Shaw’s fondness of aliases. Though Shaw denied using the aliases
“Clay Bertrand” or “Clem Bertrand,” and remarked that the whole idea of him using an
alias is “ridiculous” (Kirkwood 20), he had already used two in his literary life.

Researcher and author of Let Justice Be Done, William Davy notes that “the number of
people identifying Shaw as Bertrand is well into the double digits” and that he “was told
by a veteran New Orleans police detective that Shaw’s use of this alias was an open
secret” (293).
Regarding the plays’ relevance to later events, I posit that a person’s character and
outlook retains much continuity throughout his or her life. Political and moral views can
change, but many of our most deeply-held beliefs are already imprinted by adolescence.
Clay Shaw’s early plays tell us about the man: his desires, his psychology, and his
politics, and bear interesting connections to Jim Garrison’s prosecution and trial of Shaw.
Ultimately I will argue that what these works reveal about Shaw, and his deployment of
symbol and allusion, provides additional support to arguments that Shaw was involved, to
some degree, with a conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy. My reading of
the plays in light of biographical information about Shaw’s unconventional sexuality will
suggest a novel way of understanding the Garrison-Shaw trial, one previously
unexplored. Due to their accessibility yet current obscurity, I focus on the four published
Cottman-Shaw plays, which are available at some university libraries and can be
accessed through interlibrary loan.
One revealing aspect of the four published plays is their homoeroticism, which is
certainly more legible today than in the end of the 1920s and 1930s. This is immediately
evident in the scenarios of the three one-act plays, tragedies all: Submerged, A Message
from Khufu, and Stokers. All three plays center on half-dressed men trapped in enclosed
spaces: a wrecked submarine, an Egyptian tomb, and a steam-powered yacht’s boiler
room respectively. Two photographs accompanying Submerged show two high school
companies’ stage set and actors. In the first picture of a prize-winning high school
production, two of the chiseled actors are shirtless, and one is on his knees directly in
front of three other sailors, with his face near the crotch of one and his hand on the knee
of another. In the play’s directions, these sailors’ “bodies glisten with sweat and are
smudged with oil and grime,” their torsos covered only by “sleeveless undergarments”
(25-6). In Khufu, set in a dark, Egyptian tomb, the three young male assistants wear
“dirty, torn shirts” (27). Stokers opens with Leon, a “tall, well-built, healthy young man”
laboring shirtless in the boiler room of a ship. On the whole, sweaty, muscular men
closed together in tight spaces is what we find.
In the last of the four published plays, the three-act farce The Cuckoo’s Nest,
which reflects Shaw’s new environment of New York City, we find what seems to be a
gay character, the “handsome youth of 24,” Barry Cragwell, played by Cottman in the
original production. Barry is “darkly Byronic in appearance; he knows it and does not
attempt to disguise it” (8). Barry’s connection to the bisexual English Romantic poet
Lord Byron is suggestive. Shaw and Cottman’s Wildean romp follows the exploits of an
eccentric family with a faded aristocratic legacy, the Cragwells of Nashville. Aunt
Fanny, her nephew Barry and niece Phyllis, and a disgruntled servant wanting back pay
travel to the Big Apple in order to demonstrate Barry’s concerto, but their intended
auditor Mr. Stokowski has gone abroad. They make their way penniless into an outdated
but charming rooming house to find no one home. With few options, they take up

residence, going so far as to impersonate the landlords, collecting rent from new roomers
that a cab driver, who is in on the hoax, brings from the airport. One of these boarders,
Minorah Judd, has fled her husband in Wichita. When Barry asks what happened, she
replies that Barry will never believe her. Our first clue that there’s something a bit offcenter about Barry, comes when he, “smiling wickedly,” replies, “I’m a very credulous
person. You just don’t know” (39). When Minorah reveals, “He struck me!” Barry, “still
smiling,” asks, “Once or twice?” (39). She cozies up to the quirky modernist composer
Barry, wishing to “inspire” him, but he rejects her advances (40).
When Minorah’s husband George Judd arrives in Act III, she refuses to return to
Kansas with him, concocting a tale of romance between Barry and her. Barry assures
George that Minorah is lying, but George is not convinced and charges at Barry. Barry
finally pins the older man to the floor and shouts, “Your wife’s nuts and you ought to
know it. She’s fabricating all this to send you away. I’ve never even looked at her
emotionally. I wouldn’t if I could. Take her away from you? Ye gods, I wouldn’t have
her. If she’s what you like, that’s fine; but please understand she’s not what I like” (75).
Exasperated, Barry here as much as admits that he is gay. After Minorah works herself
into a frenzy and shakes Barry violently by his shoulders, he “calmly slaps her face” (76).
George remarks that this is just what the doctor ordered, so Minorah smacks George.
Barry then bursts into laughter and Minorah “fetches him a blow,” so Barry “fetches her
another one” in return. George chuckles, and Barry collapses laughing. Humor is
derived in the way this quirky gay man, Barry, matches Minorah blow for blow, and how
her husband enjoys it. The pleasure that the playwrights expect the audience to derive
from this violence even suggests sadomasochism (S/M), a subject I’ll delve into later.
After Minorah Judd rushes out, Barry and George have a comical reconciliation,
with homoerotic undertones. Finding that they agree about the proper way to tame the
shrew, Barry offers, “Allow me to condole with you.” George, taking Barry’s hand, tells
the young man twice that he has “a good head,” congratulates him, and even though
Barry just insulted his wife, George apologizes to Barry and declares, “Say, I could use
you in my business!” First Minorah was spellbound by this handsome young composer,
and now her husband follows suit. With phallic, homoerotic humor, George asks him,
“Know anything about brass nozzles? . . . They’re very interesting after you get into
them” (76). Ultimately George enlists Barry to compose music for the nozzle company’s
commercials, and after all this talk of nozzles, Barry sadistically quips under his breath
that the music will be so high-class, “you’ll choke, but you asked for it” (77). The
homoeroticism of this play is suggested not only by the stylistic debt to Wilde’s
comedies, but also through allusion when one boarder remarks of the house, “why, Oscar
Wilde might have walked about in this room” (34).
These homoerotic scenarios and allusions to homosexuality suggest that Clay
Shaw was aware of the gay milieu and his own desires at a relatively young age, and
further supports the sustained importance of this aspect of Shaw’s personal life. While I
will later further discuss the literary and biographical connections between Shaw and
non-normative sexuality, specifically S/M, for now I only mention that these gay
resonances in Shaw’s work reinforce his longstanding same-sex desire. Given the need

for mid-century gays to be discrete, Shaw’s sexual identity led to his involvement with
the gay subculture of New Orleans, which then included such figures as David Ferrie and
Perry Russo—and, according to some reports, Lee Harvey Oswald. Jim Garrison called
Oswald “a switch-hitter who couldn’t satisfy his wife” (Phelan 151). Sources in the older
gay community, both unknown and as famous as Gore Vidal, 2 claim Oswald was a gay
hustler who worked the New Orleans bars. When asked if Oswald seemed gay, New
Orleans attorney Dean Andrews said that Oswald “swang with the kids” (Kirkwood 138),
the Latino “gay kids” whom he called “Mexicanos” (130). Andrews remarked that he
didn’t know “squares” to hang out with gays, reckoning “birds of a feather flock
together” (138). Andrews, who received a phone call from “Clay Bertrand” asking
Andrews to defend Oswald soon after Lee’s arrest, claims these gay Latino youths had
earlier accompanied Lee to Andrews’ law office (these were likely anti-Castro Cuban
exiles). The sunglasses-sporting “hepcat” Dean Andrews was known in the New Orleans
gay community as a sympathetic lawyer. Andrews said he had already received multiple
requests from this articulate gentleman “Clay Bertrand” (a name Andrews took to be a
pseudonym), to defend gay youths who had been arrested.
Several sources claim to have seen Lee Harvey Oswald with Jack Ruby in Dallas
and that moreover, they were gay lovers. Jack Ruby’s alias that he used in the gay scene,
according to Garrison, was “Pinky” (Phelan 151), which was how Rose Charamie, a
long-time dancer in his club, knew him. Charamie claimed that Ruby and Oswald, seen
together by multiple witnesses at Ruby’s club, “had been shacking up for years” (“Rose”
203). The author of an excellent study of Ruby, journalist and researcher Seth Kantor
writes that Ruby’s defense psychiatrists decided he was a latent homosexual (323-24).
Kantor notes that when arrested, Ruby was a 52-year-old bachelor who spoke with a lisp,
enjoyed applying oils and creams copiously, and “lived with a succession of young men
who sometimes worked as bouncers at the Carousel” (323-24). “Most women were
commodities” to Ruby, women ranking third in importance to him following first, his
bonds with men, especially the Dallas Police, for whom he felt a deep “love,” and
second, his pampered dogs (Kantor 328-9).
One of Jim Garrison’s early theories, which to his credit was deliberately not
exploited during the trial by the prosecution, had to do with the “homosexual” link
between the conspirators. One source, known FBI informant and “journalist” James
Phelan, even claimed Garrison talked about a “homosexual thrill killing” similar to that
committed by Leopold and Loeb (150). It should be noted that Phelan acted aggressively
to undermine Garrison’s case. Phelan did this not only through biased, vitriolic articles in
the press maligning Garrison, but also by gathering information via mysterious
“informants,” who were likely government agents, about the witnesses Garrison was to
call, handing this information over to the defense (DiEugenio “Jim Phelan”). Whatever
early theory Garrison may have shared with Phelan, he and James Alcock did by no
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Gore Vidal wrote a hand-written letter to Shaw researcher Don Carpenter from his Italian villa,
responding to his queries (of which I own a photocopy). Vidal stated that Oswald was indeed a hustler in
New Orleans and that Shaw had seen Oswald in the bars.

means exploit or emphasize the sexuality of the defendant, which was noted by gay
author James Kirkwood 3 (585, 590).
In addressing a more mature work, Stokers, I move from the personal to the
political, arguing that this play is significant because it establishes Shaw’s strong anticommunism at an early age. Shaw was born in a small Louisiana town, Kentwood, into a
prominent Louisiana family. His boyhood occurred in the midst of the first Red Scare, a
time when our country’s business owners were asked, “Is your washroom breeding
Bolsheviks?” Growing up in a community where his grandfather had been sheriff and his
father had been a U.S. Marshall (Davy 71), Shaw was without a doubt patriotic. Stokers
was copyrighted in 1932 but was revised and published in 1938 in the historical context
of Hitler’s Third Reich and the terror of Joseph Stalin’s Great Purges in the Soviet Union.
In Stokers, a seeming radical communist, the middle-aged Karst, tries to convince
the other stokers on a steam-powered yacht privately owned by an explosives
manufacturer, to blow up the yacht in order to set an example for other radicals to follow
in smashing capitalism, and die “a martyr’s beautiful death” (13). The handsome,
strapping Leon, a solid citizen, rejects the rhetoric and plans of Karst, but it seems that
George, an educated young man from the elite class who has rejected his father’s profitobsessed, dehumanizing capitalism, subscribes to most of Karst’s ideology. George has
read his Marx and mouths such unwieldy lines as, “the only salvation is in forcing the
masses to see that the path to readjustment lies in complete submersion of self into an
organized destruction of the tyrannical capitalist rulers” (11). After Leon exits the boiler
room, George enters and Karst gradually persuades him that the time for action is
imminent—it is necessary that they martyr themselves in exploding the boiler room to
take down the whole ship.
So far the play maligns communism and socialism in attaching it to violent
sabotage and pointless self-destruction. But the playwrights go further in revealing that
Karst doesn’t even believe in his own propaganda. In reality Karst holds a personal
vendetta against the yacht owner, the gunpowder manufacturer Mr. Manning, and the
communist propaganda was a ruse. According to Karst, he himself innovated the
explosives technology from which Manning profits: in earlier years Manning, then a
pacifist, convinced Karst to drop his project because of the potential lethal cost to
humanity, goes Karst’s tale. Karst had made plans to get away on a rowboat before the
blast. Glowing with an almost “insane light” Karst tells George: “You believed it all,
didn’t you? It sounds very fine, doesn’t it? Beauty and glory—humanity and salvation
and the power of purifying the earth! They’re big words, and they took you in!” (19).
So the playwrights’ moral is “don’t be a dupe to communism.” Even the
“communists” don’t really believe what they espouse, and are only looking to exploit and
sacrifice others for their own gain, Shaw and Cottman suggest. Communism is also
3

Kirkwood deliberately concealed Clay Shaw’s homosexuality, and his own, throughout American
Grotesque. Kirkwood’s stress upon Clay Shaw’s lady friends and his narrative of his own encounter with a
female prostitute during Mardi Gras deceptively imply that both were sexually interested in women, which
was far from the truth.

attacked when Karst explains, after George asks why the other stokers were to die in his
plot, answers, “You don’t matter” (20). Shaw and Cottman suggest that communist
leaders are perfectly willing to sacrifice the individual to the “people’s cause” to which
they only pay lip service. “The only way to ensure my plan was to get you to believe my
fine speeches. Then you worked for me! I’m the one who matters” (20). The play warns
how easily even the educated can be swept away by the menace of communist rhetoric;
the description of George notes that he has “evidently received what is optimistically
called ‘higher education’” (11).
This early demonstration of Shaw’s vehement anti-communism is important,
given the nature of later accusations of conspiracy. Researchers and authors such as Joan
Mellen, James DiEugenio, William Davy, and Jim Garrison argue that “free trade”
advocate Shaw was involved with anti-communist groups and individuals, and was an
informer for and asset of the CIA while he was head of the International Trade Mart in
New Orleans, the predecessor of the World Trade Center there. “Shaw’s friends were
extreme conservatives,” Mellen writes (129). Shaw’s involvement with groups infiltrated
or backed by the CIA, such as the CIA front business PERMINDEX, Italy’s Centro
Mondiale Comerciale, and anti-Castro Cuban exiles, connects him with ultra rightwingers, neo-fascists, and old-world aristocrats, all fierce anti-communists (Mellen 13142, Garrison 100-04, Davy). Such parties held that John F. Kennedy was dangerously
“soft on communism” and ought not to have withheld promised air support at the Bay of
Pigs. Shaw, an international businessman serving American establishment neocolonialist interests in Latin America (Gibson 171), did a banana-bunch of spying for the
CIA (Mellen 134, Davy 195-201). Lee Harvey Oswald was also connected to the CIA,
who “sheepdipped” the compliant Oswald as a “communist” with staged sidewalk
scuffles and agitation for “Fair Play for Cuba” and TV talk show appearances of an
ostensibly Marxist-Leninist Oswald. According to evidence presented by Professor
Donald Gibson, Professor Joan Mellen, Jim DiEugenio, William Davy, and many others,
Oswald, Ferrie, Russo, and Shaw were all radical right-wing anti-communists despite
Oswald’s leftist front and Shaw’s “FDR-Wilsonian-liberal” facade.
Stokers, then, helps to further challenge Shaw’s presentation of himself,
promulgated by charmed defenders such as James Kirkwood, as a classic “liberal” who
felt that Kennedy was “a splendid president.” As is evident from such famous cases as
Ezra Pound and Wyndham Lewis, poets, playwrights, and patrons of the arts are not
necessarily left-leaning in their politics. On a sidebar, in light of Garrison’s accusations,
there is an odd coincidence: Stokers depicts a middle aged man attempting to guide a
younger man named Leon (as Lee Oswald was known to some) into a conspiracy to kill a
prominent man of the power elite, with the intention of letting Leon be sacrificed in the
end. In the play, however, the “not unusually intelligent” working-stiff Leon is never
convinced. The real patsy here is George, also revealed to be an indecisive coward in the
end. Karst fails to escape with his life, but neither does anyone else in the end. Thus the
peril of Red rhetoric and as George’s father puts it, the “Parlor Pink” tragedy.
Politics doesn’t play as obvious a role in Cottman-Shaw’s second one-act play, A
Message from Khufu, which exploited the contemporary craze for Egyptology following

Howard Carter’s discovery of the King Tutankhamen tomb in 1922. Featuring an ancient
Egyptian curse, deadly green vapors that dispatch those who disrespect the bones of
Khufu, and a tomb wall that closes when an emerald is removed from a Khufu’s timewasted hand, to the contemporary reader the play is reminiscent of the adventure movie
Raiders of the Lost Ark. According to the publisher, “a very successful contest play,”
Khufu seems to have been fairly successful if not nearly so as its predecessor. Howard
University produced the play in 1933 (“Theatrical”).
Relevant to later events, this play, using a sarcophagus with hieroglyphics and set
in the Great Pyramid of Khufu at Giza, evidences Shaw’s interest and facility in
symbolism, code, and mysticism. The color symbolism of green, signifying envy and
avarice, and connecting to Khufu’s emerald, operates as Professor Arthur Hardin is
revealed to be selfish and corrupt, determined to take all the credit for the discovery from
Professor Britling, who is heading the overall excavation. Hardin plans to pocket and sell
Khufu’s emerald, refusing to share with his handsome assistants, who are AWOL from
the Foreign Legion. Motivated by avarice, one of his helpers, Butch, suddenly stabs him
to death. Also related to green, the Great Pyramid of Khufu is featured on the back of the
U.S. One Dollar bill, tying into the play’s theme of the consequences of greed, and
tapping into mystical Egyptian symbolism, such as that commonly deployed by the
Freemasons. Ben, the only character who feels that ignoring the curse of Khufu and
disrespecting the tomb and sarcophagus is wrong, is the only one who survives when he
replaces the emerald in Khufu’s bony old hand and the stone wall re-opens. Here we find
something indirectly political: a critique of Western, colonial Social Sciences plundering
and disgracing the sacred burial grounds of non-First World and indigenous cultures and
nations. After all, these men are led by a corrupt, greedy archeologist named Arthur.
Shaw’s literary interest in hieroglyphics and their suggestion of enigma,
encryption, and code foreshadows Shaw’s involvement in the clandestine, enciphered
world of the CIA. With regard to Garrison’s charges later made at Shaw, one interesting
coincidence is that in the original production of A Message from Khufu, Shaw played the
brawny villain, dark-haired Butch, who knifes and kills the leader, the selfish
archeologist Professor Arthur Hardin (played by co-author Cottman in New Orleans).
Butch’s use of a knife as weapon, penetrating another man, suggests phallic homosexual
sadism. And surely there is some campy in-group humor evident in the fact that Shaw,
an unusually tall and broad-shouldered masculine gay man, is playing a character named
“Butch.” (Recalling that this play is the work of men under twenty, it is also tempting to
also see “Hardin” as a pun of “hard on” in Arthur’s excitement and rapaciousness at the
discovery of Khufu.)
Shaw and Cottman’s Egypt play was in some ways a sequel to their most famous
work, the 1929 tragedy Submerged. This debut, along with being their most successful
and produced play, is also the most relevant to Clay Shaw’s later involvement in
conspiracy to murder President Kennedy, and crucially, features a character actually
named “Shaw.” As the title may suggest, the play carries Freudian undertones; the literal
denotation of six trapped sailors submerged in the wrecked sub is paired with the

connotation of the subconscious, what lies beneath the surface of a person’s actions and
stated motivations.
The trapped submarine crew, the victim of a violent storm, is forced into one
compartment of the sub, because water has broken into an adjacent part of the craft. The
noble commander at one point informs the crew that the sub’s oscilloscope is broken so
they haven’t been sending out distress signals after all. The commander announces to
them that after much thought he has decided that the only hope is for him to sacrifice
himself by launching himself out of the torpedo hold. This means certain death, but the
plan is to strap their location onto his body, which will float to the top and be spotted by
rescue ships. The conspiracy-minded reader notes here the introduction of the idea of the
head, the “commander,” being sacrificed for the good of the body, the social unit. This is
a similar logic to that of the anti-communist conspirators who figured that the “soft on
communism” commander-in-chief, JFK, must be sacrificed for the good of the body
politic, in the face of the communist threat.
Despite the commander’s noble decision, the crew refuses to allow the great man
to sacrifice himself, in what amounts to mutiny. Two of the men volunteer to go in his
place, while a third steadfastly refuses. They ultimately decide to draw cards and
whoever has the highest card will be shot into watery oblivion, perhaps to save the rest.
The “coward” Brice draws the highest, but he cowers and blubbers, saying he doesn’t
want to go. The “dreamer” Shaw steps up and offers himself as sacrifice, saying, “I
wouldn’t let you put him through that tube now if I had to kill every one of you with my
bare hands. Now you’ve got to let me go” (40). Embracing death, he reveals, “I never
did care. What does it matter, this endless, futile struggle. If I want to do it, I can. And I
do want to do it” (41). Shaw injects Freudian and archetypal symbolism here, with
Shaw’s fascination for the sea representing his attraction to the mystery of death: “Who
knows what lies out there? Many beautiful things are far beyond the imagination . . . Who
knows what I may see?” (41). Shaw’s obsession with the mystery of the sea and death,
reveals Freud’s Thanatos, or death drive. “It seems to me I’ve been searching for
something all my life. I haven’t found it, however much I’ve looked. The sea has always
had something to tell me. I never could learn what it was. Maybe I’ll find out now,”
Shaw says (41). The fact that the willing sacrificial lamb Shaw is ejected out of a phallic
submarine to his doom, but to the possible rebirth of his fellows, suggests the connection
between death drive and orgasm, Thanatos and Eros. (The coward Brice gets his
comeuppance, as becomes a trademark of the Cottman-Shaw one-acters, since the
remaining crew locks him into another compartment of the sub, which then unbeknownst
to the rest, springs a leak.) The fate of the rest of the crew is unknown, but there is at
least a shred of hope that the commander’s plan, with Shaw as the sacrifice, will bring
about their rescue.
The character Shaw in this play is most fascinating considered in light of later
events and statements of Clay Shaw. In these plays, Clay Shaw reveals a literary mind
facile in symbolism, allusion, and metaphor. If there is a correspondence between the
character Shaw and the author Shaw, I wish to call attention to, first, the notion of the
death drive, Thanatos, mixed with the life force, Eros, and second, Shaw as sacrificial
lamb. It is today generally understood that Shaw was a gay man who participated in

sadomasochism (S/M), which I am not judging in the least. An FBI memorandum dated
March 2, 1967 from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, routed to several others, states
that the FBI received reports in 1954, 1964, and 1967 that Shaw is “homosexual.” In
1964 one informant tattled that he had sex with Shaw, whom he described as a “brilliant
and powerful man, given to sadism and masochism in his homosexual activities” (Davy
293, “Some”). Chains, five whips, ropes, black robes, several leather strips, “cat-of-ninetails,” and “marble statues of penises” were all found in the upstairs bedroom of Shaw’s
home by detectives following his arrest (Brener 113, Tyler). But “the thing that
astonished” former assistant D.A. William Alford most was two “very large hooks”
mounted in a white beam on the bedroom ceiling. “You could clearly see, to the side of
each hook, full handprints” on the white surface, Alford states in director Stephen Tyler’s
documentary on Garrison’s investigation, He Must Have Something. “They were
significant enough that you could tell many hands had been next to those hooks”
(Garrison 171, Tyler).
Clay Shaw and his New Orleans high-society and media friends, and literary
friends including Kirkwood, countered that these exotic items were merely Mardi Gras
costumes. This, while likely true in the case of certain items, still doesn’t account for the
hooks and leather straps, nor does it explain why “the whips had on them what appeared
to be dried blood” (Garrison 171). If they were also Mardi Gras costumes, Shaw himself
remarked that such garb exposes an inner truth: “Mardi Gras, the day we mask up and
reveal our true selves” (Kirkwood 342). As The Cuckoo’s Nest would echo the style of
Oscar Wilde, here Shaw echoes Oscar Wilde’s bon mot, “give [a man] a mask and he’ll
tell you the truth.”
Shaw is said to have been particularly fond of the masochistic (M) role. Assistant
D.A. William Alford states that after examining all of the evidence, “the logical
conclusion that [he] arrived at was that” Shaw “had a masochistic side to him” (Tyler).
Perry Russo, who testified for the prosecution, said that his “friends . . . people I’d
generally associated with”—all participants in the S/M scene in New Orleans into “whips
and belts and chains and belts” in Russo’s words—were well aware that Clay Shaw
“entertained those kind of desires” (Kirkwood 611). Director Oliver Stone portrayed
Shaw as a masochist in JFK but it must be noted that the scene was sensationalistic,
exploitative, and homophobic and was denounced by some gay writers and critics such as
Gore Vidal (Weir). Masochism is arguably a manifestation of Thanatos and Eros in a
controlled situation. The masochist (M) desires to be hurt, punished, humiliated, maybe
even to have his or her life threatened, and while this is exciting and arousing for the M,
the S and M both know that they will not cross a certain line, no one will die.
But when Jim Garrison arrested and prosecuted Clay Shaw in New Orleans, the
stakes were higher. Garrison knew that Shaw was only one small piece of the
conspiracy, probably one involved in managing Oswald’s activities in New Orleans
(Gibson 171). But with David Ferrie, Jack Ruby, Lee Oswald, and Guy Banister all dead,
Garrison had to work with what he had, so he focused most of his energies and scrutiny
on Shaw. Garrison did not have access to many of the then-classified documents that
confirmed Shaw’s extensive involvement with the CIA (Mellen 143). With the aid of

information not available until after Garrison’s death, Mellen, DiEugenio, and Davy
make a strong case for Shaw’s deep connections with the CIA, building upon Garrison’s
On the Trail of the Assassins. Shaw, who was seen by several witnesses in close
company with Lee Harvey Oswald and David Ferrie in the town of Clinton, Louisiana
(eight of whom testified to this under oath), was clearly involved with the conspiracy, but
the precise extent of his involvement is still murky, even when we learn of all his CIA,
anti-communist, ultra right-wing, and old-world aristocratic ties.
Like his dramatic alter ego Shaw, Clay Shaw was sacrificed, this time by the CIA,
who felt that Americans were no longer buying the “lone-nut assassin” narrative. Shaw
was to be a “limited hang out,” a sacrificial lamb to attract attention away from CIA
complicity. They knew that Garrison would not be able to prove Shaw’s CIA
involvement with the evidence to which he had access. In light of this sacrifice of Shaw,
it is fascinating that when Shaw was asked before and during the trial, “how do you feel,”
Shaw repeatedly, to the point where Kirkwood says he could reply for Shaw, smiles and
declares, “I feel like a spring lamb,” (100, 101). Kirkwood, though a great storyteller,
(see his novels P.S. Your Cat is Dead and There Must Be A Pony!) did not possess a
particularly analytic mind, and never comprehended the significance of this repeated
remark, which Shaw wanted to be recorded in the press and in Kirkwood’s book. Here
Shaw reveals his gift for symbolism and allusion. A “spring lamb” is a young suckling
lamb, and while the expression “to feel like a spring lamb” connotes feeling energetic,
with Shaw’s literary mind and facility with symbolism, other layers reveal themselves.
First, it also suggests that he is as innocent as a white, pure lamb. But “Spring lamb” also
connotes “sacrificial lamb,” a scapegoat. A sacrificial lamb is killed for the good of the
rest of the social unit, who remain pure or are purified by the blood sacrifice. Clay Shaw
knows he is being made a sacrifice by the CIA, and what’s more, on some level, like his
character “Shaw” in Submerged, something deep within him welcomes it, is excited by it.
Shaw’s repeated remark amounts to communicating to insiders that he is being sacrificed.
Those with inside knowledge of his role as a CIA asset would be able to decode Shaw’s
remark when it appeared in print. Kirkwood—whose book, while significant and wellwritten, lacks “a shred of political insight” (Mellen 522)—never grasps Shaw’s deeper
meaning or wonders why he persisted in using that particular idiomatic phrase.
Shaw, at some level welcoming his own possible sacrifice, never behaved in the
expected manner of a man accused of conspiring to kill a president. Shaw’s cool affect
and emotional bearing during the trial seemed strange to some observers. He even
seemed cheery and affable prior to, and after each day’s trial proceedings, with smiles
and handshakes for the press and audience. James Kirkwood describes one of Shaw’s
entrances into the courtroom: “There seemed to be a genuine smile upon his face as he
said, ‘Good morning, good morning!’ to members of the press and then took his seat […]
his early morning spirits were not dampened” (96). In the courtroom, whenever Shaw
was spoken of, whether accused of conspiracy or homosexuality by the prosecution’s
witnesses, he would look each speaker directly in the eye, without a hint of suspicion,
bitterness, or anger, almost seeming to welcome the verbal onslaught. Simultaneously,
his death drive manifests in his chain smoking throughout the whole trial, a habit that
would cause lung cancer, killing him in 1974.

Stated plainly, the Garrison-Shaw trial can be understood as a public
performance of S/M. Like his character Shaw in Submerged, Shaw is at some level
attracted to the idea of being sacrificed, of surrendering to death, the withheld telos of
masochism. Garrison plays the role of sadist. Perry Russo’s testimony was crucial for
the prosecution’s case, as both sides pointed out in their closing arguments, and Russo’s
words were likened to sadism by S/M participants themselves. Russo’s friends, who as
stated are into the S/M scene and know Clay Shaw to be also, “wondered where [Russo]
was at” when they learned he was testifying against Shaw (Kirkwood 611). Russo said
they teased him: “who am I beating up now,” they would ask him, “and all that sort of
stuff. They’d just rap on . . . I got a lot of that” (Kirkwood 611). As District Attorney,
Garrison personally or through his detectives interrogates, surveilles, and arrests Shaw.
During the trial he puts Shaw through a grueling, lengthy legal process, one that exposes
Shaw’s secret sexuality via witnesses like Russo, humiliating him. Shaw lived highly
discrete public and private lives. Meanwhile Garrison himself doesn’t even appear in
court during most of the proceedings, as if to taunt Shaw with the image of Garrison
relaxing in the pool or slumber room at the New Orleans Athletic Club (a male
homosocial milieu that many of the city’s power players, including Shaw and Garrison,
frequented) while Shaw is laid out under the spotlight of public scrutiny. But in the back
of Garrison’s mind he doesn’t know with any precision how guilty Shaw is, even if he is
sure that Shaw is not innocent. Yet because Garrison is sure Shaw is involved to some
extent, he wants to hurt and humiliate him.
Garrison didn’t really want Shaw to die, as is fitting to the S role. Strangely,
when Shaw was found not guilty, Garrison was “relieved.” “I was really glad myself
when the verdict came in. I felt relieved for the defendant,” Garrison remarked
(Kirkwood 574, 488). This seems like a rather unusual reaction, since, as Kirkwood
noted, if you really know that someone was conspiring to kill the President, you would
want him found guilty and punished. This suggests that Garrison was less than 100%
sure that Shaw was deeply involved in the conspiracy. Today much more evidence,
marshaled by Mellen, Davy, Gibson, and DiEugenio, points to Shaw’s complicity much
more forcefully, but Garrison was not allowed to access this.
So both Shaw and Garrison were on one level hoping for the guilty verdict, with
Shaw subconsciously desiring to be that sacrificial “Spring lamb,” a masochistic martyr
like his character Shaw. On the other hand Garrison was consciously hoping for a guilty
ruling to further debunk the Warren Report’s conclusion that Oswald was a “lone-nut”
assassin. But on another level they both wanted the “not guilty” ruling that was handed
down—Shaw, consciously, for obvious reasons and Garrison, perhaps only
subconsciously, due to his lack of unequivocal evidence that would clarify the extent of
Shaw’s involvement in the conspiracy. With the unavailability of slam-dunk evidence in
Garrison’s case and doubts about Perry Russo’s and oddball Charles Spiesel’s testimony,
Garrison probably knew that it was unlikely that Shaw would be found guilty, yet he
needed to expose the Warren Report and screen, for the first time, the Zapruder film in a
public forum. Certainly a guilty verdict would strengthen the public’s belief in
conspiracy. Both Garrison and Shaw realized that a guilty verdict, though unlikely, was

possible, adding to the high-stakes S/M thrill of the case, that could actually lead to the
M’s eventual death if things got out of hand. Shaw was found not guilty, but according
to Shaw his finances were depleted by legal costs and he had to go back to work
(restoring and selling houses in the French Quarter) rather than pursue his desire to renew
his writing.
Clay Shaw’s plays have led me to a new, perhaps unusual way of thinking about
the Garrison-Shaw trial. Regardless, what these plays reveal about Shaw’s sexuality,
politics, and psychology make them important documents that have heretofore been
neglected. The importance of literary techniques such as symbolism and allusion to
Shaw and their relevance to the assassination trial should not be ignored, nor the
importance of Shaw’s self-concept as a writer, a rhetorician, and weaver of tales. These
plays help to establish at an early age Clay Shaw’s homosexuality, his masochism, his
death drive, and his stark anti-communism. These attributes support the arguments made
by Garrison, Davy, DiEugenio, Gibson, and Mellen that Shaw was a conspirator. Beyond
the relevance to later events, the Cottman-Shaw plays are economical, entertaining,
sometimes thought-provoking minor works. Submerged was even dusted off for a 1997
production, a part of the Tennessee Williams/New Orleans Literary Festival. They are
worth a read on their own merit, the product of a forgotten Twentieth Century gay
playwright.
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Chapter 9
Experiencing the Peace Corps
Panel Discussion [1]
Participants: Michael Beard: Served 1968-70 in Iran, English education
Cory Enger: Served 2006-08 in Niger, sustainable agriculture
Kathleen Gershman: Served 1967-69 in Bolivia, healthcare
Joe Vacek: Served 2006 in Georgia, judicial reform and English education [2]
Moderator: Robin David

Robin David: Welcome to the first session of the John F. Kennedy: History,
Memory, Legacy Conference. I want to explain a bit about this session before we get
started today, because this session is set up a bit differently than most will be at this
conference. In other sessions, you might get to hear four or five scholars present their
research on various aspects of JFK and his era. While most of us are academics, none of
us have conducted studies on malaria rates among Peace Corps volunteers, or the GDPs
of various countries before and after the presence of volunteers. Instead, the four
panelists today all served in the Peace Corps, and we are gathered to discuss their
experiences and their perspectives on the Peace Corps. So yes, these are experts, but
their expertise comes from more of a personal authority. (And they’ll probably have
much better stories to tell than researchers might.) I hope and expect this to be an
engaging discussion.
In the 1960s, an ad campaign showed potential volunteers two identical pictures
of a shantytown with the captions “Chimbote, Peru” and “Chimbote, Peru, two years after
the PC.” Another showed one inch on a ruler and proclaimed, “This is how the PC
measures success.” Clearly, they wanted to show volunteers that progress is incremental;
they’d not be saving the world. What did you expect to accomplish, and what did you
actually accomplish? Any stories of your best accomplishments or biggest failures?
Joe Vacek: I characterize my journey as a series of downward adjustments.
When I left I thought, “Good. I’m going to go save the world.” I’m not even kidding; I
had it written in the back of my planner under “Things To Do”—semi-jokingly. But
when we got to our village in Georgia and realized not only are we supposed to do highlevel things like teaching, we have to worry about people not even understanding that
washing hands prevents parasitic illness, things like that. And it was a series of
downward adjustments from there. It went all the way down to where I ended up with
five parasites and had to be evacuated and go home early. I had wanted to stay there and
make sure something good happened and it turned out I had to leave in the back of an
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ambulance. That was a big disappointment for me. And, now, to learn nothing I would
have done would have mattered anyway because now they’re in a civil war.
But the friendships and experiences I got from it could overshadow that a little
bit. It was a real adventure and I know I got more from it than I gave.
Robin David: That might be a good follow-up: Do you feel you gave more or got
more from your experience?
Michael Beard: I was teaching four groups of 60 students, and teaching a firstyear language to them had all sorts of difficulties. Some of them learned it very quickly,
though, and that was very rewarding. Now, I have no way of knowing whether they
actually used it later or forgot it, and consequently I think the most substantive sense of
accomplishment I came away with was the individuals I came to know. I think of the PC
as a collective, and I just imagine a lot more people in the U.S. who know a distant
country, usually a Third-World country, and know the language and know how it fits into
a global network. I think of that as somehow being an impact on our culture and that that
in some ways is just as important as the impact that you have on the culture that invited
you in.
Cory Enger: Going in, I didn’t really know what I wanted to accomplish. I
wasn’t one of those who wanted to go save the world. I didn’t want to get my hopes up
and then go there and realize, “There’s no way this is going to happen.” Probably the
biggest accomplishment wasn’t project related, but was becoming accepted in my village
as one of them, as one of the host country nationals I was living with. By being forced to
learn the local language and sit down and talk with people everyday, it’s a big challenge.
Nobody spoke English, so I had to force myself to learn their language, learn their
customs and way of life. Customs play a big role in Niger, and having respect for that is
a big thing for them. As time went on I felt more and more comfortable, and the villages
felt more and more comfortable with me. I felt I was becoming accepted as one of them
in the village, and that enabled me to do more and more meaningful work.
Michael Beard: I was also in an Islamic community and a great surprise to me
was to discover human universals, and that people who I’d been taught to feel would be
fundamentally different from me were so similar with the same sort of goals. That was a
very big and useful discovery.
Robin David: Why don’t we follow that up by asking the question: what do you
feel you’ve learned from the PC? What are the biggest lessons you took from it?
Joe Vacek: I think I concur with that, Michael, about some kind of a universal
sameness. And I might add, Joseph Stalin was from the village where I lived. Everyone
who lived there still thought he was a great guy. So we had quite a bit of a learning curve
there, and I learned quite a bit from that. This person that we learned in our history texts
was responsible for genocide and terrorism and all these sorts of things was still viewed
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as a very fatherly, strong figure. And I came to appreciate that, and that was maybe
necessary to keep that country together and running.
Kathy Gershman: One of the main things that I learned was that the Third World
is not different; it’s the United States that’s different. We’re the ones that are the
oddballs.
And no one’s mentioned that the PC trains you in a new language, and that is a
gift. In three months you have to be reasonably fluent, because you’re dropped off in the
middle of nowhere, really, and you don’t just live there; you have to do your job. Now
many years later I can still pretty much hold my own in Spanish. So I learned a new
language and I learned that all these other cultures are tremendously rich in diversity and
tremendously enriching to your own life. And if you can manage to get there, I would
say jump.
Joe Vacek: My wife and I combined made $50 a month and were able to buy a lot
of luxuries that no one else could. In fact, we gave away a lot of our money to kids who
didn’t have anything. I teach some policy classes on the environment at UND, and I
wasn’t kidding when I said that I have in the back of my planner to save the world. I still
have that as a motto, tongue in cheek, because it’s the only world we’ve got. And I don’t
think we can all live like we do here. I mean, you go home and you open the fridge and
there’s food there and you flush the toilet and it works and you flip the light switch on
and if it doesn’t work, you likely note it. It’s completely the converse everywhere else.
If something works, all the time, for more than one day, you think, “Wow. That was
cool.” That’s kind of a shocker for most people.
Cory Enger: I definitely learned how to live on not as much as we have here.
When you don’t have electricity or running water, you definitely learn that you can still
be okay when you don’t have those things. We take those things for granted here. Since
coming back things are still a little strange to me, getting used to things like that. But you
can live on a lot less than you think you can, that’s one of the things I learned.
Michael Beard: To say very much the same thing, to live closer to the ground is a
great gift. But there’s also the fact that people around you are sort of dissatisfied having
experienced popular culture, seeing what America looks like. In many ways they were
anxious to live less close to the ground. And there’s a real dilemma there.
Robin David: The next question I’m going to ask involves peace and war, and PC
service and military service. The PC has a complicated relationship with wars, especially
the Vietnam War, but there are certain parallels as well. The philosopher and
psychologist William James, early in the 20th century, claimed the need for a national
service program as “the moral equivalent to war.” There is something about the war
experience that hardens people, that helps people in their development, that unites people.
And all of you entered the PC in a time of war; two of you entered in 2006 and one in
1967 and one in 1968. My questions to you are did the fact that we were at war affect
your decision to serve in the first place and did it affect your actual service?
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Joe Vacek: Yes. My wife Kate and I went because we were thoroughly
dissatisfied with the direction this country was going domestically and foreign-policywise. Looking back on it it seems a little odd that I chose to do that. I was an attorney at
the time, and I am a white male. That’s kind of where the power lies in this country—it’s
embarrassing, really. And so we left thinking we don’t like the war, we don’t like what’s
going on domestically, we’re squandering our political capital. And so we put ourselves
into the most difficult situation we could to make a big difference—a small one, yes.
And I think that’s what it was all about: showing our host family that we don’t all live,
like Michael was saying, like you see on television. Baywatch is still on frequently in
those countries. They were a little bit shocked. “You mean you only brought two shirts
along?” “Yeah.” And we did that purposefully. We explained, “We don’t have a large
house. In fact, we lived in a small apartment before we came over here.” And that helps.
But there are only how many thousand PC volunteers and 6 billion people in the world.
It just won’t work out the way we did it.
Kathy Gershman: When I was in Bolivia we were sort of on the cusp of the postKennedy good feeling and it was not unusual to see a picture of Kennedy on the wall of
extremely modest homes in the countryside. So we came in sort of on that wave, but the
U.S. build-up in Vietnam had kicked in and most of the young men I served with
including my later husband, were not interested in going to Vietnam. And when the
election came around, I didn’t like my choices. And this is the luxury of being an
American. And this Bolivian campesino [farmworker] said to me, “Can you vote?” and
I said, “Oh, yes. We can vote by mail.” And he said, “Who are you going to vote for?”
and I said, “Well, you know, I don’t like either one of them, so I’m not going to vote.”
And to this day, I can still remember how disheartened he looked. I think he just
wanted to know someone who was voting in that election. I had a sense then of the
connection to this big enterprise, this big war that’s being voted on by the electorate and I
didn’t like either candidate so I just opted out; it was such an odd sensation to know the
people were aware of that and that somehow I had let them down by opting out. So the
war played a huge stress. We actually have a very good friend who was drafted out of
PC service in Bolivia and brought home and then flunked the physical and managed to
come back.
Michael Beard: One of the things I learned very quickly in our little village was
how centralized Iranian political culture was and how everyone was a little bit scared.
We always think of Iran as having been a positive, friendly place before 1979 and having
changed after their revolution. I found it to be a place in which despite any close
association you made, any friends you made, any participation in the community, they
were simply too frightened to talk about politics in a wider sense.
I remember the day we cast our absentee ballots. When I got out to the post office
a little bit out of town I got into a big conversation with the people at the desk about the
fact that I was voting, but nobody asked who I was voting for. It was one of those things
that was considered off-limits. And I think the attitude toward Americans, and this may
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be more historical than now, was very positive in the sense that people really admired
JFK. He had been assassinated four or five years previously and I remember an earlier
PC volunteer had been given a plate with a picture of Kennedy on it. When people spoke
of Kennedy with us it was always this image of the idealism of America.
But at the same time, people were very aware of the Vietnam War, and were very,
very angry about it. I hardly ever listened to the news, but I remember being in a bus
hearing the news in person. The first thing they did was to list how many Americans
were killed in Vietnam, and I remember thinking, “That is an odd thing to be hearing on
the radio news in a Third-World country.” And I’m not sure I even knew what their
attitude about that was, but it was clear that the Vietnam War was the other face of their
attitude toward America. That was seen as our negative side as the memory of JFK was
seen as the positive side, and I’m not sure if that was ever sorted out.
Cory Enger: The war didn’t really play a role in me deciding to go into the PC.
There were a couple of guys that I served with who had actually been in the Army before
and had served in Iraq and other places. Their specific reason for going into the PC was
as a statement. They had served in the Army and didn’t believe it was the right thing to
be doing, some of the things we were doing as a country, so they wanted to go into the
PC.
As far as affecting my service, the people in Niger don’t know too much about
what is going on in the world, but they do know some of the bigger things. And
sometimes I would get asked, “Why is George Bush going around the world killing
everybody?” I would get questions about things sometimes, but not everybody thought I
was a bad person from America.
Robin David: The next question has to do with the PC’s role in foreign policy.
The PC has a split purpose. In going to other countries, they are doing good for others.
And in doing that, that enhances US relations in that country.
On September 11 of this year, Service Nation held a Presidential Summit with the
two presidential candidates, and at that session John McCain was asked if the U.S. should
be giving money to countries who do not like us, and he said, “No.” He was asked,
“Should we be giving PC volunteers to countries that do not like us, and he said, “Yes,”
that that was the one way to show other countries the true, great American spirit. And the
audience cheered. But this duality of purposes has also been a source of conflict for PC
Directors, presidents, and the volunteers themselves. Are we doing this to help others, or
are we doing this to help ourselves? My question to you is, did you ever feel yourself to
be a tool of American foreign policy? And did that create any conflicts for you in your
service?
Cory Enger: No, I didn’t feel like I was a tool of foreign policy. As a PC
volunteer today, we’re told we’re American citizens going into these other countries. As
far as I know, everywhere the PC goes, the governments there have asked for our help.
The PC doesn’t just go into countries and tell them, “We’re going to put volunteers here
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to help you.” As an American citizen going into another country to work and to help,
we’re told we’re ambassadors, so we have responsibilities in how we act. So as far as
feeling like a tool of foreign policy, no. But I was reminded that I’m an American and
everything I say, everything I do, I stick out in my village and everybody’s going to
notice it. So I had to keep that in mind for what I did and how I acted when I was there.
Michael Beard: An American overseas is suspected of being a tool of foreign
policy whether you have any conscious awareness of it or not. And in some ways it does
make you much more representative of your culture than you wish to be. And I feel
that’s a really unsolved question. To what extent did I in fact represent not just a culture
but edge over into representing a political system? I honestly don’t think I can answer
that.
Kathy Gershman: I felt as though we were used to a certain extent. I agree with
you, Michael, in that sometimes you’re used inadvertently. People accused us of being
CIA spies when we were just there skin-testing for tuberculosis. We had a big public
relations dust-up about that. On the other hand, the—well, I don’t know who they are. I
think they maybe were the CIA. They asked us to map out the informal power structure
of the villages where we were serving. That was quite an extraordinary request and some
of us actually did refuse to do it. In those days, you just refused to do everything. But
we just didn’t want to cooperate. We thought that we were being used as tools.
But I want to say that countries accept volunteers. They don’t all voluntarily
request them. Sometimes they’re requested to request them by an administration who
wants an American presence that will do good and be somewhat innocuous. But those
governments can change and a week ago in Bolivia, for probably the second or third time
since I’ve been there, the volunteers were airlifted out because the government was in an
uproar. There was demonstrating in the streets and the PC Director of course couldn’t
guarantee their safety, which is his first responsibility. So even though you are there at
the invitation of people, PC volunteers can be in very risky postings.
Joe Vacek: During our swearing in ceremony, before we took the oath, the charge
d’affaires gave us a little pep talk in which he said, “You are tools of foreign policy.”
That’s a direct quote. It really irritated a lot of us, and in fact a number refused to swear
in; they just left. The reason we were said tools was because of the oil line. A lot of us
went over there in symbolic protest against that sort of imperialism. And it incensed us
that this guy would have the gall to say that just as we’re about ready to swear in and
promise to save the world.
Georgia did have, and I think still does to some extent, a good relationship with
our administration. They loved Americans. We were rock stars. They loved George
Bush, too. They viewed him as synonymous with Stalin. And that was a good thing in
their village! My nickname in my village was “Little George Bush” because I drew a
map or something, and that equated me with him. And I couldn’t live it down. So, yeah,
we were definitely tools of foreign policy.
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QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE:
Audience: What’s the hardest thing being in the PC?
Kathy Gershman: The hardest thing was the loneliness. By about 8:00 at night
everything is pitch black; nothing is moving. So you go to bed. And then you wake up
with the roosters at about 4:30, 5:00. And you’re always alone. Naturally, as a human,
you want to communicate, but Spanish was not my first language. So loneliness was big,
and I think fearfulness, too, worrying about whether you could get the job done and not
bolt and have to go home. You were conscientious; you wanted to do it but weren’t
always sure you could.
Michael Beard: There’s a kind of energy that I ran out of, and I remember
reading of other PC volunteers who from time to time would just get really tired. And I
think some of that is from going for long periods without speaking any English; you
realize how much English matters to you. I think married volunteers have a certain
advantage in that respect. That, and that constant question that you are asked about
representing the government. That was tiresome.
Cory Enger: I would say definitely the most challenging thing was the language.
In my case, I was in a small village where everyone spoke Hausa and they didn’t speak
anything else. So it was either speak Hausa with them or nothing. That puts a lot of
pressure on you. We had two months of language training, so we’re not placed there
without knowing anything. But there’s only so much you can learn in two months, and
the rest you have to do on your own. Unfortunately, by the time I was done two and a
half years later, I finally felt like I was getting the language. And that’s what you need to
be able to interact with the people and do your work as a volunteer. But maybe if the PC
was a 5-year program, you’d still be saying the same thing at the end of your term.
Audience: I have a question about the alleged interest in PC volunteers by the
CIA. When were you approached? Was it here or there? And do you have any
knowledge of the CIA approaching former PC volunteers and trying to debrief them once
they got back?
Kathy Gershman: It’s hard to recall; it was so long ago. I think it must have
come from people who served in foreign service in the embassy. The rumor among the
volunteers was that our PC Director told the CIA, “Keep your hands off my volunteers.
We’re here to do a job.” Another rumor that got going in the newspapers was started
probably by some leftist group that wanted the U.S. out and decided that one way to do
so was to say that these vaccinations were actually CIA-inspired. Like saying they’re
putting fluoride in the water. We were vaccinating people but we obviously weren’t
trained by the CIA. So I don’t know anybody who was recruited, but I was aware of an
attempt to have people supply information to some Americans in the Embassy. This was
the era of Che Guevara so politically it was very hot.
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Joe Vacek: And if I may add, there is a pretty extensive legal clearance,
background clearance, you must go through to be a PCV. And if you have any sort of
relationship or even dealings with the CIA you’re not going to make it in.
Audience: Could you talk a little about the relationships you developed in the
PC?
Cory Enger: The people in my village were some of the nicest, kindest people I
ever met in my entire life. It was so hard to leave. The friendships I made there, it was
so hard to leave them not knowing. . . I hope to someday get back to visit them, but I
don’t know. It’ll be awhile. In order to be an effective PC volunteer, you pretty much
have to have a good relationship with the people you’re working with and the people
you’re living with.
Michael Beard: It’s been 40 years and I still occasionally get a phone call from
one of the neighbors in the village. It’s been very surprising to me how much that has
persisted.
Joe Vacek: I would like to say the same, but with this recent conflict—we lived
in both of the cities that Russia shelled—unfortunately, I think most of the folks I worked
with are dead. It hurts to say that, but it’s reality.
Kathy Gershman: Actually, I’ve lost contact with some residents that I
exchanged letters with for a few years. But I’m still in contact with some volunteers,
including one I see every day.

Notes:
1. This panel session was recorded by Sean Windingland and, along with many
other presentations, placed on You Tube. Robin David transcribed the discussion
from that recording.
2. All participants were from the University of North Dakota.
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Chapter 10
"There are bigger issues at stake”:
The Administration of John F. Kennedy and
United States-Republic of China Relations,
1961-63
Charles J. Pellegrin

The administration of President John F. Kennedy (1961-63) focused considerable
attention to foreign policy matters, most notably to Cold War disputes over Cuba and
Berlin with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In the meantime, the White
House also faced crises with its anti-communist allies, particularly with the Republic of
China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan, just off the coast of Mainland China. Relations
between the United States and the ROC caught the attention of several of Kennedy's
advisors, some of whom suggested that the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of containment and
isolation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) should be reconsidered.
Much has been written on American Cold War policy toward China. While
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker's research on U.S.-Taiwan relations remains the standard, works
by Noam Kochavi and John Garver have provided fresh insights on this unique alliance.
Nonetheless, the most recent works on American-Chinese relations have emphasized the
adversarial relationship between the United States and the PRC, and little focus has been
cast on the collision of allied interests and bureaucratic "turf battles" over policy. 1 These
"turf battles," though, are not new to Kennedy scholars. For example, Political Scientist
Graham Allison, in his classic work entitled Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis (1971), hinted in his bureaucratic politics model that the Kennedy
administration's handling of this October 1962 predicament may have reflected a

1
Both Tucker and Garver view U.S.-ROC relations as a part of the larger American-Soviet-Communist
Chinese Cold War competition and argue that the strong relationship between the United States and the
ROC helped to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the PRC. Kochavi, on the other hand, suggests that
Cold War hardliners in the Kennedy administration were not interested in rapprochement with the PRC.
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 94; John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist
China and the American Cold War Strategy in Asia (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 1; Noam Kochavi, A
Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 250-51. In
her latest work, Tucker moves past the Cold War and analyzes the larger security relationship between the
United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan as well as the limitations of the relationship into the
1990s and the early administration of President George W. Bush. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk:
United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009),
6-8.
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collision of interests between individuals and organizations within the executive branch. 2
Likewise, the American-Taiwanese relationship between 1961 and 1963 shows numerous
examples of such collision of interests, which led to an ideological struggle over policy.
By the end of Kennedy's presidency, disagreement within the administration led some
American policymakers to become increasingly frustrated with Chiang and caused them
to more openly reconsider the larger scope of China policy, even to the point of
discussing a more flexible and accommodationist approach to East Asia.
But on the surface, Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China (ROC)
on Taiwan, may have had much to look forward to going into the 1960s. During the
previous decade, Chiang had been a strong supporter of American policy in East Asia.
After the Korean War, the ROC received copious amounts of military aid and became an
American client state. Chiang had hoped that this aid and support would continue
through the new Kennedy administration. Having won the 1960 presidential election by
an extremely slim margin, the new president could not politically advocate major changes
in China policy.
Meanwhile, Kennedy had appointed a number of advisors who would suggest that
the United States should re-think its China policy. Among the first of these appointments
was Robert W. Komer, whom Kennedy appointed to the National Security Council staff
early in 1961. A former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, Komer recommended
to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that the State Department reconsider its
Chinese relationships. 3 Komer suggested that the United States "disengage, as skillfully
as we can, from the unproductive aspects of our China policy, e.g., UN membership . . .
." 4 In his report titled "Strategic Framework for Rethinking China Policy," Komer did
not accept the idea that the American position in the Far East hinged on Taiwan. Chiang,
however, could not be allowed to lose power. Komer, therefore, proposed that policy
toward the ROC allow for greater flexibility. The Kennedy administration had to
convince Chiang that the U.S. would continue to defend Taiwan and to maintain its
international presence in the UN. Such a program would be expensive, but in the end, the
"sole determinant of our FE [Far Eastern] policy cannot be keeping Chiang happy or even
of preserving Taiwan. There are bigger issues at stake." 5 Kennedy also appointed a
group of foreign policy experts and scholars, including Adlai E. Stevenson, III, W.
Averell Harriman, and Chester Bowles, each of whom had been vocal critics of
2
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1971), 6-7, 144-47, 210.
3

Contemporary Authors, vol. 108 (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 272-73.

4

Memorandum from Robert W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, March 1, 1961, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1961-1963: Volume 22, Northeast Asia (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1996), 19, hereafter cited as FRUS 1961-63.

5

Robert W. Komer, "Strategic Framework for Rethinking China Policy," April 7, 1961, Box 22, China,
General, "Strategic Framework for Rethinking China Policy," 4/7/61, Papers of John F. Kennedy,
Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA,
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Eisenhower's containment and isolation of the PRC. They all shared the idea that the
United States should work toward a policy of accommodation with the PRC. 6
The appointment of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State was also a major factor in
the development of U.S.-ROC relations during the Kennedy administration. In May
1961, Rusk met privately with President Kennedy to explore possible changes in China
policy and to discuss the ramifications. Rusk stated that the United States could
recognize both the PRC and the ROC, work privately to bring reconciliation between the
two Chinas, or sit tight and do nothing. Kennedy, though, refused to initiate changes in
China policy. Any changes in China policy, Kennedy warned, would divide Congress
and the American people, and would hand the Republicans a political weapon to use in
1964. Rusk agreed with Kennedy, and as the Secretary left the Oval Office, Kennedy
further warned Rusk, "And what's more, Mr. Secretary, I don't want to read in the
Washington Post or the New York Times that the State Department is thinking about a
change in our China policy!" 7 Rusk publicly submerged his views with Kennedy's and
did not directly initiate any new studies of China policy. Privately, though, Rusk
contended that only by default was the ROC's government "the only Chinese government
we [the United States] recognized." 8
Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration inherited a foreign policy apparatus that
did not encourage innovation. The State Department, especially the Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs, had been emptied of experts after investigations by Senator Joseph
McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) targeted suspected communists. By 1961, the bureau had been
staffed with stern anti-communists who favored containment and isolation of the PRC.
Later that year, Kennedy assigned Harriman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs, who then appointed Edward Rice to the bureau from his position on the
Policy Planning Council. Rice, a long-serving State Department analyst who had
survived the McCarthy "witch-hunt," had long championed abandoning containment
policy toward the PRC in favor of accommodation. 9 While on the Policy Planning
Council, Rice authored a paper that included a list of possible U.S. initiatives toward the
Beijing regime, such as lifting the passport ban, opening arms control and disarmament
talks, possible PRC representation in the United Nations, and ROC evacuation of the
Offshore Islands. In short, Rice's paper proposed a policy that was flexible, moderate,
and accommodating toward the Communist Chinese. Apparently, he greatly influenced
several young staffers at the Far East office, such as James C. Thomson, Jr., and Roger
Hilsman, to likewise advocate a more relaxed policy toward the PRC. 10
6

James C. Thomson, Jr., "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics,"
The China Quarterly 50 (April-June 1972): 221-22.
7

Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1990), 282-84.
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Like Komer and Rice, Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles also questioned
the direction of China policy. In July 1961, he circulated a confidential report entitled
"Some Requirements of American Foreign Policy," recommending various changes in
American foreign policy toward Europe, Africa, and Asia, but most significantly argued
that both the PRC and the ROC threatened regional stability. Attributing its aggression to
the famine and the government's failure to meet food requirements, Bowles claimed that
the PRC was a regional threat that had to be excluded from the United Nations. But, he
argued, Nationalist China represented just as much of a problem in East Asia as the PRC.
If the United States disengaged from Taiwan, the situation in Taipei may become chaotic
and difficult to control. Instability could cause a war between the ROC and the PRC, or a
coup d'état that could result in Chiang's overthrow, or an attempt to turn Taiwan over to
the Communist Chinese. Any future China policy, Bowles concluded would have to
consider and balance these mutually explosive situations. 11
While some of Kennedy's State Department and White House appointees
privately considered a more accommodationist China policy, Eisenhower administration
stalwarts, like Everett F. Drumright and Ray Cline, opposed any such changes. A career
diplomat, Drumright had been associated with the Nationalist Chinese government in
various capacities between 1931 and 1946, and then returned to the Foreign Service in
the Office of Chinese Affairs when Eisenhower became President in 1953. He firmly
believed that the security of Nationalist China was vitally important to the United
States. 12 His hard-line anti-communist opinions concerning China policy angered many
of his colleagues in the Taipei embassy. 13 Ray Cline similarly opposed significant
changes in China policy. Since the Eisenhower administration, Cline had been CIA
Station Chief in Taipei. Taking advantage of his position, Cline had become close
friends with General Chiang Ching-kuo, President Chiang' son and Deputy Secretary
General of the ROC's National Defense Council. 14 Cline regularly conveyed Chiang's
personal messages to the State Department and the White House. Chiang, Cline believed,
feared the Democrats and contended that "the faintest indication of a change in U.S.
attitudes can seem like a matter of life and death." 15
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One of the first China policy crises the Kennedy administration faced concerned
irregular ROC forces which had been operating in the Burma-Thailand-Laos border
region since the 1950s. In 1949, 11,000 to 15,000 Chinese Nationalist troops had fled
China into this border region as the Nationalist government and most of the military
retreated to the island of Taiwan. By 1961, despite two previous attempts to evacuate
these irregular soldiers, some 10,000, including women and children, remained. 16 While
the Burmese government demanded that these irregulars be evacuated, Chiang continued
to supply these troops.
In February, 1961, the Burmese shot down two ROC aircraft: a B-24 supply
plane bound for northern Burma and a PB-4Y, supplied to the Nationalists through the
U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). The Burmese government justified their
actions on the grounds that irregular troops, armed with American equipment supplied
through such airdrops, had instigated trouble within their borders. Understanding
Burma's problem, President Kennedy wanted these irregular troops to be withdrawn from
Burma to Taiwan or broken into small groups for resettlement in Thailand and Laos. 17
Chiang, during a February 25, 1961, meeting with Drumright, denied harming
American interests. When asked to evacuate the irregulars, Chiang stated that while
doing so would meet with great resistance because of their deep hatred for the Chinese
Communists, he also recognized the inconvenience and embarrassment the situation
caused to the United States. Chiang promised to end the airdrops and to evacuate those
irregulars who wanted to be evacuated. In the case of those irregulars who were not
longer responsive to his orders, the ROC President promised to disassociate himself from
them and terminate their resupply. 18
Meanwhile, Secretary Rusk requested that Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs write a
report on these ROC irregulars for President Kennedy. The report concluded that since
the 1950s President Chiang had disregarded American requests to evacuate his irregular
troops from Burma. The irregulars, moreover, threatened the internal stability of
Thailand, Burma, and Laos, and their positions along the border with Mainland China
jeopardized peace in the region. Some were also suspected of trafficking in narcotics.
The report thus concluded that the irregulars had to be evacuated or dispersed. Fearing
16
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that President Chiang would not cooperate voluntarily, the report suggested that Chiang
could be manipulated by selectively limiting or ceasing military aid, refusing to train
Taiwanese Special Forces, and not participate in planning operations against the
Mainland. 19
Some evidence suggests that Chiang feared such repercussions and ordered ROC
irregular troops to disarm and return to Taiwan or settle as civilians. Nationalist Chinese
General Lai Ming-tang, after meeting with Ambassador Drumright in April 1961,
reported that some of the six hundred to seven-hundred irregulars living in the BurmaLaos-Thailand border and nearly one thousand living in Thailand "appear to have gone
into civilian life." Drumright, therefore, believed that the ROC had honestly and
diligently carried out the American request. By the end of the month, he regarded the
evacuation as complete. 20
As the crisis over the ROC irregulars dissipated, the Kennedy administration
faced a growing problem in the United Nations concerning ROC membership. Through
the 1950s, there had been little challenge to Taiwan's status in the United Nations, but
opposition increased in the 1960s. 21 President Kennedy publicly pledged his support to
maintain ROC membership in the UN and to keep the PRC out. 22 Meanwhile, support
for Taiwan slowly eroded as newly independent nations from Africa, some of whom were
sympathetic to the PRC, joined the United Nations. 23 Given this development, several of
Kennedy's foreign policy staff believed it was necessary to derive new ideas and tactics
to ensure the ROC's continued presence in the United Nations.
In July 1961, Roger Hilsman of the State Department's Office of Intelligence and
Research addressed the Chinese Representation issue. It was important, according to
Hilsman, for the United States to firmly establish the ROC's claim on the China. Hilsman
concluded that the most prudent course President Kennedy could take was to set up a
commission to investigate the situation and provide further advice to the President. If the
United States lost control of the issue, Hilsman wrote, "then doubts and tensions over
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United States relations to the United Nations would probably increase in the public
attitude and in the legislative attitude." 24
On the other hand, Drumright and Cline argued that President Kennedy should
take a more active stance. Ambassador Drumright expressed his concern that ROC
officials feared that the Kennedy administration was looking for a convenient way out of
the Chinese Representation issue at the ROC's expense. 25 Cline, though, worried that
Taiwanese officials might not accept changes in American policy toward the ROC.
Being that the Nationalists might lose the debate on their UN seat, Cline warned that
Chiang would not in the future trust this new Democratic administration in Washington
and would move forward on an independent policy of invading the Mainland. 26
Hilsman, Drumright, and Cline each contended that Taiwanese government
officials had to be convinced that the Kennedy administration would continue to protect
Taiwan's interests. On the other hand, the Kennedy administration could not allow the
ROC to take action to guarantee their interests independently of the United States.
President Kennedy echoed these sentiments during a July 1961 White House meeting
concerning Chinese representation. The United States and the ROC, Kennedy stated,
should have one common objective – to keep the PRC out of the United Nations.27
Meanwhile, the Chinese representation issue became more complicated when the Sovietdominated government of Outer Mongolia became independent and applied for
admission into the UN. The ROC insisted that Outer Mongolia was a part of China and
could not be admitted. Kennedy feared that a ROC veto of Outer Mongolia’s
membership could warrant a communist bloc push for Taiwan’s ouster from the UN.
Taiwan, contended Kennedy, should not veto Outer Mongolia’s application into the
UN. 28
At the end of July 1961, Rusk proposed a parliamentary ploy that would ensure
the ROC its continued membership and would exclude the PRC from the United Nations.
Rusk suggested that a representative group of UN members develop a majority proposing
that the Chinese representation issue was an “important question” which required a twothirds vote. This would hopefully delay any credentials vote regarding ROC
membership. 29 Kennedy and Rusk had to convince the ROC not to veto Outer
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Mongolia’s application and go along with the “important question” proposal. But the
Taiwanese had already begun to take steps to ensure their seat in the UN through an
African aid program called Operation Vanguard. This aid program had the ulterior
motive of securing future support from newly independent African nations for Taiwan’s
China seat in the UN. Meanwhile, the African nation of Mauritania petitioned to enter
the UN. A Soviet veto of Mauritania’s UN membership would threaten both Taiwan’s
aid program and its ability to secure future support among newly independent African
countries to maintain its China seat. 30
Kennedy tried to convince Chiang not to become too involved in the UN
representation issue. On August 15, 1961, Kennedy warned Chiang that he might not be
able to rally majority support for continued ROC representation in the UN if the ROC
vetoed Outer Mongolia’s application. If the ROC lost its seat, Kennedy warned that the
United States would not be able to generate support for military action to defend Taiwan
if the Mainland regime chose to attack. 31 Chiang responded that Outer Mongolia’s
application for UN membership was nothing more than Soviet blackmail, and that the
United States and their allies should reject it and earn the good will of African states
supporting the ROC’s and Mauritania’s membership. Chiang essentially refused to
change his plans to veto Outer Mongolia’s application. 32
Having made little headway to compromise with the ROC, Secretary of State
Rusk instructed Ambassador Stevenson to move on the "important question" tactic. 33
Rusk also sent instructions to the American embassy in Taipei that, if Chiang planned to
"go down with the ship rather than compromise on Outer Mongolia, the United States
would share no responsibility for Chiang's decision. Rusk then urged Drumright to
assure ROC officials that, because of their common interests, the United States would
provide them the strongest support possible, but also reminded Drumright of the gravity
of the situation, commenting that, "If we cannot persuade GRC . . . to meet us on any of
several significant matters whom can we persuade?"34
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But by October, Presidents Kennedy and Chiang reached an understanding. The
United States would vote for Outer Mongolia’s admission, oppose Communist China’s
entry into the United Nations, and President Kennedy would reassure Chiang that his
government had the right to represent China in the UN. Meanwhile, Kennedy would
privately assure Chiang that a U.S. veto would be used to prevent PRC entry, if
necessary. Finally, the ROC would not veto Outer Mongolia’s application to join the
United Nations. 35 On December 15, 1961, the “important question” resolution passed the
General Assembly 61-34 with seven abstentions. 36
With the UN representation issue temporarily resolved, American policymakers
became increasingly preoccupied with Chiang’s oft-repeated statements and schemes to
“retake the mainland.” Chiang insisted on a Mainland return policy because his
Nationalist government could not abandon its raison d’étre. 37 Chiang’s moment of
opportunity to attack and retake the Mainland seemed to arise in the early 1960s as the
Mainland suffered through one of the worst famines in recorded history. While the
famine caused the deaths of between forty to eighty million people, Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev recalled 1,400 scientists and engineers in April 1960, which led to reductions
in industrial production, disruptions in the national transportation system, and transfer of
workers to famine-affected areas. 38 Chiang’s intentions toward the Mainland generated
much concern and discussion in Washington, and many in the White House and State
Department believed that he had to be reined in.
Meanwhile, the growing conflict in Vietnam threatened to complicate U.S.-ROC
military relations. Chiang hoped to use the deteriorating situation in Vietnam as a means
to become more involved in Southeast Asia and, in the long run, as another front in his
civil war against Mao and the Mainland Communist regime. Differing views within the
Kennedy administration added to the complications. While Defense Department officials
sought to use the ROC in the ever widening crisis in South Vietnam, high-ranking State
Department policymakers hoped to thwart Chiang’s desires. William P. Bundy, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, wrote that South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem wished to
use Chinese Nationalist troops, naturalize them as Vietnamese citizens, and utilize them
in the Mekong River delta, where there was already a large number of ethnic Chinese. 39
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U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, warned that the
presence of Nationalist Chinese troops on the Asian mainland would open a “pandora’s
box,” drawing Chinese Communist intervention and exacerbating anti-Chinese prejudice
in the region. 40
In February 1962, Chiang pressed Cline and Bundy that the United States and
Taiwan, in a joint effort, should take immediate action to rescue the Mainland from the
communists. 41 Later, Ambassador Drumright met with Chiang and urged him to take
into consideration world opinion and American responsibilities, because the Americans
would be cautious about opening a new front in the Cold War. Drumright then warned
the State Department that Chiang was determined to order a Mainland invasion that year.
To prevent a war, the United States had to channel Chiang’s actions “in directions we
deem appropriate.” 42 Roger Hilsman also became quite nervous about a Mainland
invasion after his March 1962 meeting with Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo, who
proposed that the United States provide to Taiwan airplanes to drop several two hundredman teams of paratroopers. Hilsman compared the Defense Minister’s proposal with
earlier problems in Cuba, noting that the Mainland Chinese were discontented, but would
not risk their lives unless they were very sure of success. 43

Despite such hesitations, Kennedy proposed to send American aircraft to Taiwan
in March 1962, but refused to participate directly in Chiang’s plans. He suggested that
the United States send to Taiwan two C-123 aircraft to be flown by Chinese crews trained
in the United States. The C-123s could be used to haul cargo and as many as sixty-one
fully-equipped troops. 44 Kennedy then asked Ray Cline to persuade ROC government
officials to drop public discussion of plans invading the Mainland and make clear to
Chiang “that no commitment was being made other than to prepare the planes and be
willing to consider their use.” 45
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Throughout early April 1962, Cline met regularly with President Chiang and
Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo. In those meetings, Cline convinced the Chiangs to
postpone the target date for an initial air drop from June until October 1, 1962, but
President Chiang wanted Kennedy's reassurances that he would fully support the ROC's
plans, especially regarding the drop date and mutual study of plans for military
operations. 46 On hearing of Chiang's position, McGeorge Bundy warned Cline that the
American position "must be that it stands on what is outlined . . . We cannot safely get
ourselves in the position of negotiating on this." 47 Cline, delivering Chiang's response to
President Kennedy's position, stated that Chiang was willing to take sole responsibility
for any attack and that Taiwan was "obliged to take certain prudent military preparedness
measures to be ready to intervene in case the situation deteriorates to the point where the
U.S. agrees that action is in the Free World interest." 48
In May 1962, as tensions mounted between the United States and Taiwan over
Chiang's preparations to attack the Mainland, President Kennedy appointed long-time
family friend Admiral Alan G. Kirk (U.S. Navy, retired) as the new ambassador to the
ROC. 49 After meeting with President Chiang in July 1962, Ambassador Kirk questioned
whether the United States should provide bombers and landing craft to the ROC, or
whether granting them to Chiang's government would display American trust in the ROC
and indicate U.S. desire to help Chiang recover the Mainland. Kirk stated that the
American response to the ROC request for such weapons was being taken by ROC
officials as an indication of unwillingness to help. Nonetheless, Kirk advised the State
Department to delay such deliveries because the types of material requested were
obviously of an offensive nature and "its release to the [ROC] cannot be concealed." 50
He, therefore, proposed that the United States provide Chiang material on the condition
that U.S. policymakers oversee Taiwanese military planning. This minimal aid would
allow the Kennedy administration to back away from the previously approved 200-man
drops because of the limited capacity of the C-123s. Harriman agreed with Kirk's
proposal, which essentially assured that Chiang Kai-shek would not be able to launch an
assault against Communist China without a large number of paratroopers. 51
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In September, Kirk informed Chiang that the United States would send two C123s to Taiwan when they were ready and the crews trained, but that President Kennedy
refused to provide Chiang with the bombers and landing craft. 52 Chiang then warned
Kirk that if the Kennedy administration prevented the ROC from going ahead with these
air drop plans, he would have great difficulty maintaining his and the ROC's military
confidence. 53 The efforts of Kirk, Harriman, and others seemed to pay dividends. By the
beginning of October, American officials in Taiwan noted a decrease in invasion rhetoric
coming from the Taiwanese government and press. There were also no new reports of
"forced-draft" activities, which indicated that military training was returning to normal.54
Nonetheless, the ROC continued to launch small-scale intelligence gathering operations,
using fishing boats as "motherships" to land infiltration teams on the Mainland. 55
Thomas L. Hughes of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research grew
concerned that these missions would result in drawing the United States further into ROC
plans for a full-scale invasion. Hughes concluded that the ROC would seek greater
amount of American equipment and aircraft for larger operations, perhaps with a view to
landing one or more 200-man teams on the Mainland. 56 Later, in February, Ambassador
Kirk observed that Chiang and other ROC officials were exhibiting symptoms of "spring
fever," building landing craft, training soldiers in a new airborne division, and publicly
stating that the time to retake the mainland "was ripe, now or never." 57 In March, Kirk
questioned whether or not "the retention of the island of Taiwan in friendly hands is vital
to the interests of the United States." 58
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Although President Kennedy continued to make public statements of support for
Chiang through the spring of 1963, he and his advisors began privately to reconsider the
necessity of providing military assistance to the ROC. In the wake of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the Sino-Soviet rift, the establishment of a Washington-Moscow "hot-line," and
the signing of the Test Ban Treaty of July 1963, the worldwide diplomatic climate had
shifted from potential warfare between the superpowers to their mutual impetus to
negotiate. 59 Perhaps neither Kennedy nor his advisors were willing to chance the
diplomatic gains of peace made with the Soviets by the summer of 1963, and were thus
no longer willing to publicly support Chiang's plans to invade Mainland China.
On September 11, 1963, President Kennedy met with ROC Defense Minister
Chiang Ching-kuo in the White House. Chiang, on behalf of his father, insisted that the
United States and the ROC take advantage of the situation on the Mainland and requested
five C-130 aircraft in addition to the C-123s requested earlier, and landing craft to
conduct raids along the Mainland coast, with the goals of creating disruption and seizing
one or more provinces "south of the Yangtze [River] when the time is ripe." Kennedy
responded that American policy "should be determined by reality and not by hopes or
optimism," and that the United States "did not wish to become involved in military
operations where our role would inevitably become known and which would end in
failure." 60
While the Kennedy administration attempted to prevent the crisis in the Taiwan Strait
from becoming an all-out war between the PRC and the ROC, State Department staffers
in the Policy Planning Council initiated a plan to moderate the American policy toward
the communist world, including the PRC. Walt W. Rostow, the newly appointed
Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, authored this report entitled
"Basic National Security Policy," which suggested that the United States and the Soviet
Union could negotiate agreements over areas of mutual interest. The Soviet Union would
not "deliberately take actions which would bring about a general nuclear war," a war that
no one could win. 61 Rostow also hoped that this threat of mutual destruction from a
nuclear war would modify U.S. relations with Communist China, suggesting that the
United States "leave ajar possibilities for expanding commercial, cultural and other
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contacts with Communist China" 62 But while the United States worked toward
normalization of relations with the PRC, Rostow stated that the U.S. should continue to
work with the ROC. The United States should "make plain our enduring commitment to
sustain and defend a free government on Taiwan" 63 Therefore, the United States should
use its leverage to encourage Taiwan either to "withdraw its forces from the [Offshore]
islands or to regard the islands as outposts to be garrisoned . . . if and when this can be
done without damage to our position in the Far East." 64 Although Rostow did not
specifically call for a "two Chinas" policy, the report very clearly sated that the United
States should maintain relations with both the PRC and the ROC.
Understandably, Rostow's initiative provoked grave concern in the ROC. When
Ting-fu Tsiang, ROC Ambassador to the United States, met with Dean Rusk in early
July 1962 to discuss the Chinese Communist military buildup, he noted that opinion in
Taiwan had become alarmed by Rostow's report. 65 This would inevitably mean,
according to Tsiang, U.S. recognition of the PRC, the PRC's admittance to the UN, and
American neutralization of Taiwan. All of this was deemed unacceptable. Rusk replied
that he hoped the report would not be misleading or confusing and he would consider
Tsiang's concerns, but he reassured him that "he did not want to give [the] impression,
however, that there would be any major change in our publicly stated position." 66
Rostow's initiative never received a groundswell of support, nor did it
immediately result in a change in China policy. Nonetheless, the report remains
significant for several reasons. Although the Kennedy administration never formally
approved the report, "Basic National Security Policy" acknowledged a shift in thinking at
some levels in the State Department. Possible changes in China policy, including a more
accommodating relationship with the PRC, were at least being discussed within the State
Department bureaucracy. This report did not bode well for the ROC, which claimed to
be the government of all China and continually labeled the Beijing regime illegitimate.
Nonetheless, this report would influence future public statements of foreign policy with
the communist world and might have influenced other State Department staffers to
further challenge the established policies of containment and isolation of the PRC.
Bureaucratic changes in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs further contributed to
the elevation of Mainland Chinese affairs on its agenda. Until 1962, a single China desk
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had handled affairs concerning both the Taipei and Beijing regimes. To bring Mainland
Chinese affairs to the forefront, the Bureau in mid-1962 established two separate desks,
which included a Mainland China affairs desk and a Republic of China affairs desk. This
arrangement opened the door for the consideration of new policy ideas toward the PRC
and allowed them to filter higher up the State Department bureaucracy. By late
November 1963, the new Mainland China desk had been renamed the Office of Asian
Communist Affairs and separated from the Office of East Asian Affairs, which handled
matters concerning Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The Office of Asian Communist Affairs
could now freely access and influence policymaking. 67 Within the new Office of Asian
Communist Affairs, staffers now had a degree of freedom to explore new opportunities
toward the PRC without running afoul of the more staunchly anti-communist China
hands in the Office of East Asian Affairs.
These organizational changes soon began to bear fruit.
The Kennedy
administration had initially considered Communist China an expansionist state that
threatened regional security in East Asia and had to be contained. 68 A small group of
State Department staffers, including Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs, James C. Thomson, Jr., Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern
Affairs, Lindsey Grant of Mainland China Affairs, and Allen S. Whiting, Director of the
Office of Research for Far Eastern Affairs, contended that it was time to propose a more
realistic China policy. Believing that the remnants of the "China Bloc" and the "China
Lobby" would not mount much of a counterattack, they wrote a speech that outlined a
policy of "firmness, flexibility, and dispassion" toward Communist China. The U.S.
would firmly support its allies, in particular the Republic of china, and in their
determination to halt aggression, but the U.S. would also be willing to negotiate with the
Communist Chinese and dispassionately discuss and analyze mutual problems and seek
solutions in their common interests. Once completed, the speech was sent to the White
House and to senior officials at State and Defense for approval. Notably, the speech
cleared the White House and the State Department without having been read by new
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State Harriman, or Secretary Rusk,
who refused to go over the speech despite Hilsman's request. 69
Roger Hilsman delivered the televised speech at the Commonwealth Club in San
Francisco, California, on December 13, 1963. Hilsman stated that, in the past,
"emotionalism" and "misapprehension of reality" had guided American policy toward
China. Instead, Hilsman echoed Rostow's suggestions in "Basic National Security
Policy" and called for a China policy that sought to "keep the door open to the possibility
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of change and not to slam it shut against any developments which might advance out
national good, serve the free world, and benefit the people of China." He believed that
the Chinese Communist, like the Soviets, might be amenable toward reaching "limited
agreements which can bring some reduction" of danger between the United States and the
PRC. Hilsman's speech was the first public statement by a high-ranking State
Department official suggesting that the United States wished to reach an accommodation
with the PRC if the PRC modified its hostility toward the United Sates. This did not
mean, however, that the U.S. would abandon the ROC. Hilsman stated that the U.S.
would continue to block Communist Chinese attempts to "commit aggression on its free
world neighbors." 70
By the end of 1963, American officials had grown increasingly frustrated with
Chiang Kai-shek and the status of China policy. Although President Kennedy did not
publicly advocate change, his appointees and their reorganization of the State Department
bureaucracy brought forth new approaches toward the PRC and the ROC. But as it
seemed more certain that Chiang intended to be more aggressive toward the Mainland
than the United States wished, some policymakers became more vocal in favoring a more
flexible China policy. Their writings would influence East Asian policy through the end
of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, as the United States increasingly became
involved in Vietnam and steadily reconsidered policy toward the PRC. In the wake of
improving relations with the Soviet Union and deteriorating conditions in East Asia, there
certainly were bigger issues at stake.
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Chapter 11
JFK, Berlin, and the Berlin Crises, 1961-1963
Robert G. Waite
When John Kennedy addressed the nation at his swearing-in ceremony on January
20, 1961, he had nothing to say about Berlin, about the on-going crisis over the status of
the occupied and divided city. Rather, the newly elected President spoke on other issues,
especially “the quest for peace” and the “struggle against the common enemy of man:
tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.” 1 Berlin would soon, however, gain his
attention. Tensions in the divided city had been growing since the end of World War II
and the Berlin Question became a full-blown international crisis in 1958 when Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev announced that the issue of Berlin had to be settled and that if
the West did not agree to a peace treaty recognizing East Germany, the German
Democratic Republic, his nation would. Access to Berlin would then fall to Walter
Ulbricht and his communist government. Such actions meant that the allies would lose
more than their strategic foothold in central Europe; their strength and determination to
remain firm against the Communists would be thrown into doubt. 2
Despite the absence of references to Berlin in his initial addresses as president,
JFK had since his election victory begun to focus on Berlin, on the crises over the status
of the divided city which could erupt at any time into a full-blown east-west
confrontation. During his term of office as President, Kennedy took forceful and
deliberate steps to reassure our European allies, West German leaders, and residents of
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West Berlin, that the United States would stand by them, that the commitment to the
post-war settlement remained unshakable. The way JFK handled the on-going crises
over Berlin, the manner in which he responded to East German and Soviet challenges, the
words of his speeches and television addresses, his very public art of diplomacy, and the
historic visit to West Germany and Berlin in June 1963 reveal much about his leadership,
his style of governing, and his effectiveness as President of the United States.
Berlin emerged as a source of contention between the Western allies – Britain,
France and the United States – and the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War
when agreements divided the city into zones of occupation, each controlled by one of the
allied powers. 3 As tensions mounted over the post-war settlement and the seemingly
steady advance and aggressiveness of Communism, the importance of Berlin as a flashpoint between the world powers grew. Well before the 1960 presidential campaign, John
Kennedy became aware of the sensitivity of the Berlin question. In 1959 he told an
interviewer that Berlin was to be a “test of nerve and will.” 4 While a Senator he served
on the Foreign Relations Committee which held several hearings in 1959 on Berlin.
Witnesses addressed the recent Soviet announcement of a deadline for a peace agreement
with East Germany that would recognize its sovereignty. The Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs told the Committee that it was imperative that the western nations, led
by the United States, remain firmly committed to the maintenance of their “rights and
position in Berlin, and access thereto” as specified in post-war agreements. 5
In a speech on the floor of the US Senate on June 14, 1960, JFK elaborated his
views on foreign policy, on dealing with the Soviets, on intentions for Berlin. Following
the collapse of the U.S.-Soviet summit on May 10th and with the belligerence of Soviet
Premier Khrushchev mounting, new approaches were desperately needed, the young
senator told his colleagues. “The real issue of American foreign policy today...is the lack
of long-range preparation, the lack of policy planning a coherent and purposeful national
strategy backed by strength,” Kennedy explained. 6 Only a militarily strong and powerful
US could negotiate effectively with the Soviet leadership. Senator Kennedy offered a
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well thought out 12 point program for “long-term policies designed to increase the
strength of the non-communist world,” and Point 8 called for a “long-range solution to
the problems of Berlin,” a solution based on unshakable commitments to Berlin and
Germany. 7
During the 1960 presidential campaign, two West German leaders told the New
York Times that they hoped both Senator Kennedy and Vice President Nixon “would take
a firm position on Berlin” because they expected East German head of state Walter
Ulbricht to “warm up the ‘cold war’.” 8 In the week prior to the November 8th election
East Germany acted and “made a new inroad on the West’s position at Berlin” when its
troops held several trucks bound for West Germany. The unpredictable Ulbricht moved
again a month later when he “threatened...‘serious disturbances’” in traffic to Berlin if a
trade agreement was not ratified. The East German Communist leader “demanded that
President-elect Kennedy attend a summit meeting next spring to resolve the Berlin
crisis.” 9 Sentiment in East Germany was decidedly hostile to the new president. “One is
reluctant to call this event an election,” commented East Germany’s leading newspaper,
Neues Deutschland. “The so very important decision of who will be presented to the
American people as candidates at all is decided in the small conventions of both
bourgeoisie parties. They are nothing other than the political arm of big capitalist
interests.” The newspaper termed both candidates “apostles of American imperialism”
and saw little difference between them. 10 Walter Ulbricht’s East Germany was preparing
to step up the pressure on Berlin.
Recognizing the growing tensions over Berlin, commentators and pundits in the
US called upon president-elect Kennedy to begin addressing them immediately. Roscoe
Drummond wrote in the Washington Post that Berlin merited special attention during the
months prior to the inauguration. 11 John Kennedy did spend time studying carefully two
lengthy memoranda on foreign policy, one by Paul Nitze on “national security” issues
and a second by Adlai Stevenson on foreign policy. Each identified Berlin a central issue
because “the chances are that among their [leaders of the Communist nations meeting at
the Kremlin] decisions will be efforts to test the mettle of the new American President -
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perhaps on Berlin early next year.” 12 By early January, the newly elected President and
Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk “decided to look to this country’s most eminent
Sovietologists for advice in helping frame policy for the years immediately ahead,” the
New York Times reported. 13
West German political leaders spoke up and they urged President-elect Kennedy
to act forcefully on the Berlin question. Already on November 10th, Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer “suggested” a meeting between JFK and Khrushchev to address a number of
issues. Adenauer also anticipated a visit to Germany by President Kennedy the next
spring and that he “to put West Berlin on his itinerary,” making him the first US
president to visit the divided city. 14 For the German Chancellor a Presidential visit was
urgent because he “expects a serious Berlin crisis in the spring and wants to talk it over
with Mr. Kennedy.” 15 Adenauer and the leaders of France and Britain wanted a strong
statement on the continuing presence of American forces in Europe, much as Eisenhower
had provided. Shortly after the inauguration, the American ambassador to Germany
“declared [that] the United States will not abandon its commitments to Berlin,” as he
moved to offer reassurances 16
Berlin came to be one of the most persistent and troublesome international issues
faced by President Kennedy. It was, however, one of more than half a dozen hot-spots
around the globe that threatened to push the US and Soviet Union to nuclear
conflagration. During the first months in office, JFK had strikingly little to say about
Berlin. 17 West German leaders sent notes of congratulation to the president-elect. In a
joint telegram, Chancellor Adenauer and Federal President Lübke congratulated JFK and
assured him of the friendship and trust of the German people. They emphasized the
12
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“bond of fate” linking the two nations in their commitment of freedom and applauded the
United States for its unflagging leadership, thereby strongly reminding the newly elected
president of West Germany’s needs and expectations in the coming years, namely
unyielding support and backing at any cost. 18 In a radio broadcast West Berlin mayor
Willy Brandt applauded JFK and assured listeners that “our faith in the future is also the
result of the determination and clarity that President Kennedy stated that America is
prepared at all cost to maintain freedom and to ensure the victory of freedom.” 19
At a February 1, 1961, press conference the President was asked specifically
about Berlin and he answered succinctly: “There is no change in our view on Berlin.”
His statements reflected the views of the State Department which in a spring 1961
memorandum asserted: “However impelling the urge to find some new approach to the
Berlin problem, the facts of the situation strictly limit the practical courses of action open
to the West.” Of foremost importance was “the maintenance of a credible deterrent
against unilateral Soviet action” on Berlin. 20
JFK explained his silence on Berlin to the West German foreign minister at a
February 19th meeting. “The President was anxious to have the Germans understand the
reason why his Administration had so far been silent on the Berlin question except for a
comment made in answer to one question during a press conference,” a memo of the
discussion noted. “This did not by any means signify a lessening of United States interest
in the Berlin question,” the President insisted. “As long as there was a lull, however, he
had not wanted to provoke either action or comment in the matter,” largely because JFK
“expected renewed pressure by the Soviets in the coming months.” 21 Hoping to clarify
the stand of the US, West German Chancellor Adenauer came to Washington in April
1961 for a series of discussions with the President and members of Congress. The talks
were fruitful, and in a joint communiqué the two leaders “reaffirmed the position of their
Governments that only through the application of the principle of self-determination can
a just an enduring solution be found for the problem of Germany including Berlin.”
Furthermore, “they renewed their pledge to preserve the freedom of the people of West
18
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Berlin pending the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom and the restoration of
Berlin as the capital of a reunified country.” 22
Soviet Premier Khrushchev did not remain quiet for long. In early January 1961
he reiterated the call for a separate peace agreement with East Germany. Khrushchev
made it clear, once again, that “he would not shrink from war if the ‘capitalist’ and
‘imperialist’ powers resist a Communist victory” in the divided city, the New York Times
reported.
The expulsion of US, British and French footholds in Berlin was “the
immediate objective.” Khrushchev acted at this time for several reasons, including the
fact that Berlin was a convenient point for leveraging and pressuring the West, that his
prestige was involved, that pressure from Ulbricht was a real concern to him, and that the
current Berlin situation threatened the stability of East Germany. 23 As tensions rose in
the spring, JFK directed the Department of Defense to “report to him promptly on current
military planning for a possible crisis over Berlin.” 24
The next crisis came in June 1961 at the summit meeting in Vienna with
Khrushchev, when the two heads of state addressed seven trouble spots. 25 At the
conclusion of the summit, the Soviets handed US officials an aid memoire, outlining their
position on Berlin which also attacked the West German government for its “saberrattling militarism” and its advocacy of “the revision of the German frontiers and the
results of the Second World War.” The Soviets called once more for a peace treaty
making Berlin a “demilitarized free city.” 26 The summit concluded with “a sharp threehour disagreement on all questions concerning Germany and Berlin,” wrote James Reston
in the New York Times. JFK left Vienna “in a solemn...mood,” largely because “on the
big disputes between Washington and Moscow he had found absolutely no new grounds
for encouragement.” 27 A joint statement issued on June 4th, at the end of two days of
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“useful meetings,” noted simply that the leaders had discussed Germany and other issues.
The statement contained no mention of Berlin. 28
After consulting with the French and British governments, the President
responded on July 19, 1961, to the Soviet aide memoire on Berlin, dismissing it as “a
document which speaks of peace but threatens to disturb it.” JFK stated that the “the real
intent” was to have East Berlin “formally absorbed into the so-called German Democratic
Republic while West Berlin, even though called a ‘free city’, would lose the protection
presently provided by the Western Powers and become subject to the will of a totalitarian
regime.” 29 The President’s resolve stiffened and he started to fully articulate his stand
on Berlin in terms that the public could respond to. His rhetoric began to play a key role
in shaping the mounting crisis over Berlin.
On the evening of July 25th the President stated his position to the American
people in a lengthy radio and television broadcast. After summarizing the discussions
with the Khrushchev and Soviet leaders, JFK stated that strong measures - a far-reaching
military buildup - would be undertaken to ensure “our legal rights to be in West Berlin
and ... to make good on our commitment to the two million free people of that city.” The
President viewed the threat to Berlin as a “threat to free men” everywhere, thereby
universalizing the danger. 30 Not wanting to over react, he chose his words carefully,
determined to state in unmistakable terms the US commitment to Berlin, but also careful
“not to drive the crisis beyond the point of no return,” advisor Arthur Schlesinger Jr.
recalled. 31 On this occasion as well and other crucial moments in the on-going crises
over Berlin, JFK was unwavering in his stand. “We cannot and will not permit the
Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force,” he asserted in the
radio and television address. “West Berlin...has many roles. It is more than a showcase
of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in the Communist sea. It is...a beacon of hope
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behind the Iron Curtain.” 32
As these strong statements make clear, the President made rhetorical choices, using
carefully chosen expressions and phrases to rally support at home, to assure allies abroad, and to
demonstrate convincingly to the Soviets that the US would stand firm on Berlin, even at the risk
of nuclear war. His words resonated through West Germany and Berlin. In the address to the
American people, JFK employed “rhetorical juxtapositions,” the pairing of opposite terms to
make his points. 33 Speaking directly to the American people, the President sought, first, to
reassure and express his solidarity with the audience by voicing their concerns as well, concerns
that the US operate through strength and preparedness while at the same time the country
strongly desired a peaceful solution. “We seek peace - but we shall not surrender.” 34 Second,
JFK contrasted the sharp differences between the polices of the West and the Soviet Union on
Berlin. All of the Soviet’s actions were anthesis to those of the West and he presented the
current situation as a standoff between the evil East and virtuous West. Third, JFK made Berlin
relevant to his audience by placing the city in a broader context, insisting that the “isolated
outpost” was “not an isolated problem.” His immediate call for bolstering the military, clearly a
direct result of the current Berlin crisis, was tied to long-term plans and the recent announcement
by the Soviets that they were significantly increasing the size of their armed forces. Being strong
militarily and showing an unwillingness to back down was crucial to the maintenance of peace,
the President maintained. 35 Fourth, JFK linked individual with collective action as he urged
Americans to be willing to “pay their fair share, and not leave the burden of defending freedom
entirely to those who bear arms.” These burdens, the President stated, “must be borne if freedom
is to be defended – Americans have willingly borne them before – and they will not flinch from
the task now.” The President also called upon Congress to allocate the funds needed for the
military build-up. These moves were essential to the US having “a wider choice than
humiliation or all-out nuclear action.” 36
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Following the Vienna summit, tensions persisted and events in Berlin threatened to boil
over. During the night of August 12th, East German forces from the police and army descended
upon the tenuous border with the western sectors. The troops acted quickly, stretching barbed
wire, closing the border and halting all traffic with the West. The East German regime took this
drastic measure for a number of reasons, 37 and it claimed that the fence was necessary because
the border had been “abused for espionage purposes” and because of “continuing
provocations.” 38 West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt was outraged by the border closure and in a
speech to a rally of an estimated 250,000 individuals called upon the West to respond “not
merely [with] words but political action. Woe to us if through indifference or moral weakness
we do not pass the test,” Brandt warned. “Then the Communists will not stop at the
Brandenburg Gate. They will not stop at the zone border. They will not stop on the Rhine.” 39
The construction of the Berlin Wall was a serious blow to Allied policy, and it threatened
to erode the faith of West Berliners in the promises of the western powers to protect and
guarantee the city. That “both West Berlin and West Germany might lose confidence in the
West” had become a real “danger,” the New York Times commented. 40 JFK responded with
strong but limited action including troop reinforcements for Berlin, measures short of direct
confrontation with the East Germans or Soviets. On August 18, 1961, he directed Vice President
Lyndon Johnson to travel to Berlin on “an important mission,” telling him, “The main purpose of
your mission is to reassure the people of West Berlin.” In a letter to West Berlin Mayor Willy
Brandt, JFK expressed his “revulsion” at “the measures taken by the soviet Government and its
puppets in East Germany.” The President called for strong measures and “decided that the best
immediate response is a significant reinforcement of the Western garrisons,” a strengthening of
Allied troops in Berlin. 41 Mayor Brandt had wanted a stronger response from the American
president. JFK’s letter, calm in tone, went far in clarifying for Brandt and other West German
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political figures the position of the United States, that it supported West Berlin 42
A memo on the Vice President Johnson’s meeting with the West German Chancellor
commented that “the real situation in Germany was reflected in the warm, friendly, enthusiastic
greeting the Vice President had received.” 43 Newspaper accounts echoed that sentiment. “Mr.
Johnson’s presence and his words had an electric effect on the city,” observed a reporter for the
New York Times. “There were tears and cheers as he spoke to a crowd estimated at 300,000.”
Although he said “essentially nothing new,” the visit and powerful words of support had their
desired effect. The Vice-President directed some carefully chosen remarks to listeners in East
Berlin, telling them: “Do not lose courage, for while tyranny may seem for the moment to
prevail, its days are counted.” 44 East German radio answered his call with a terse announcement:
“Here is the latest weather report: Hurricane Johnson turned out to be harmless.” 45
In his report to the President, Lyndon Johnson wrote: “From my opening statement to
my message of farewell it was my constant purpose to remove doubts and anxieties about
American policy in the face of the new communist challenge.” The Vice President added that
Germans regarded the present crisis as “essentially a confrontation of power between the Soviet
Union and the United States.” Johnson saw an opportunity to raise support among Americans
for the administration’s strong stand on Berlin. “While the whole world is watching Berlin we
have a greater opportunity than we have ever had to drive home the unforgettable contrast
between despotism and a free society.” The record of Soviet presence is “a record of shame, of
repression.” 46
Tensions did not ease. During August and September, East German police and military
confronted US soldiers on several occasions. 47 In a November 1961 interview with a Soviet
journalist, President Kennedy stated bluntly: “Berlin and Germany have become, I think, areas
of heightened crisis since the Vienna meeting, and I think extremely dangerous to the peace.” 48
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JFK went on to explain his opposition to a peace treaty between Russia and the German
Democratic Republic, an agreement he described as “dangerous” because “the treaty will deny us
our rights in West Berlin, rights which we won through the war, rights which were agreed to by
the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France at the conclusion of the war, and which
should be continued.” The President also voiced his deep concern that an agreement turning
control of access to Berlin to East German authorities would permit, even encourage, them to
“interfere with that right of access.” That would not to be tolerated or permitted to happen. 49 By
stating his position to a Russian journalist, JFK was certain that his warnings would be heard
loudly in the Kremlin.
During 1962 friction between East and West persisted and Khrushchev made repeated
calls for a peace treaty and threatened to enact such an agreement with East Germany, the same
cards played against former President Eisenhower. On May 20th, for example, the Soviet
premier “warned the United States...that it would be dangerous to allow Chancellor Adenauer to
delay an agreement on Berlin and Germany.” President Kennedy responded the next day with
renewed pledges to Bonn “that West Germany’s interests will be safeguarded.” 50 In June, the
Soviets protested “provocative” incidents along the wall dividing Berlin, and in fact both super
powers grew concerned, fearful “that serious incidents could get out of hand and involve military
units of the big powers.” These incidents included a series of four explosions that “tore holes in
the Communist built wall” and a West Berlin police official identified as responsible “an active
movement to get down the Eastern border fortifications.” East German officials warned that
such incidents “could bring military clashes.” 51 Khrushchev issued a statement on June 9th,
voicing his concern over “several dangerous provocations on the part of the West Berlin police.”
He noted also that on at least three occasions explosions have ripped the wall. The Soviet
premier condemned these as the work of the “revanchists and militarists in West Berlin” and
called for the actions to be taken to ensure “that no dangerous provocations are allowed against
the G.D.R.” 52 By the end of the year little had changed, with Khrushchev continuing to press for
a peace treaty and President Kennedy stating yet again “that a solution of the German question
can be found only in the preservation of the right of self-determination and that the freedom and
viability of Berlin will be preserved in all circumstances and with all means.” 53
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The long discussed presidential visit to Germany came only in June 1963.
The
announcement of a presidential trip to Italy, followed by a stop in Germany for a short “working
visit,” came in January. “A side trip to Berlin had been rejected,” the New York Times reported
in March, because the President chose “not to make a political ‘demonstration’ that might
needlessly increase tension in that divided city and possibly impede constructive discussions
between the United States and the Soviet Union.” 54 Political leaders in Germany hoped to still
persuade JFK that a stop in Berlin, however brief, was important. A high ranking member of
Adenauer’s ruling party extended a public invitation in early March, and the first public
statement of a planned visit came at a March 21st press conference when a journalist asked the
President “do you plan to visit Berlin” on the forthcoming trip to Germany and Italy. JFK
answered simply: “I would hope that when I go to Germany that I would go to Berlin.” 55
The itinerary for this “informal working visit,” as the State Department referred to JFK’s
trip to several West German cities and a single-day in Berlin, was released on June 18th. The
President recognized the significance of the journey, and the State Department concluded that it
“can be expected to attract more public attention and interest than any previous visit by a foreign
statesman to modern Germany.” The visit came when the Kremlin seemingly had lost direction
and initiative, thereby offering the President a window of opportunity to voice in the strongest
terms and by his very presence the unflagging support of the United States. 56
Preparations had begun in earnest months earlier. On May 9th, press secretary Pierre
Salinger traveled to Berlin and he “made a whirlwind tour of the route President Kennedy will
probably follow,” the Washington Post reported. 57 For JFK the side-trip to Berlin had farreaching significance. Following an on-going foreign policy battle with the Soviet premier and
facing criticism at home on the necessity of an European trip, the President clearly believed that
a stop in Berlin would make a powerful statement of US commitment to Berlin and the western
alliance.
“While officially labeled ‘informal working visit’, the President’s trip to West
Germany and Berlin will have many of the trappings of a state visit and can be expected to
attract more public attention and interest than any previous visit by a foreign statesman to
modern Germany,” a State Department official wrote in a June 14th memorandum. 58
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JFK’s European trip aroused critics at home and abroad who gave him “strong advice”
that “the trip is neither necessary nor desirable,” a reporter for the New York Times wrote.
Domestic critics cited the growing racial tensions, unrest and violence in the South that needed
the President’s undivided attention. The reporter added, however, “for him to cancel the trip on
the grounds of racial disturbances at home are so bad he cannot leave the country would be a sad
admission which would undermine faith in America.” Furthermore, much of the political
uneasiness in Europe stemmed from “questions regarding American policy” although tensions
with the Allies had eased considerably and JFK “thinks his presence may be of vast importance
at this time.” 59 According to a West Berlin daily newspaper, Der Tagesspiegel, President
Kennedy also “wanted direct contact with the people...The President will personally renew the
commitment to Berlin.” 60 That observation was right - a strong show of US determination to
West Berlin outweighed any further formal discussions of its status. The trip to Germany and
Berlin would go far in setting the tone for next series of discussions with the Western allies and
with Premier Khrushchev. 61
On June 10th, just prior to the European trip, JFK delivered at Washington’s American
University one of the most important speeches on U.S. foreign policy when he called for new
discussions with the Soviet Union on the question of atomic weapons’ testing. It was a speech
that also called for an end to the Cold War, for a new way of looking at peace, at solving world
problems, at cooperating with the Soviet Union. 62 The tone was strikingly conciliatory and the
President offered specific steps toward a stronger peace. East German authorities praised the
speech, terming it “the most far-reaching statement by an American president since the Second
World War” on the “policy of peaceful coexistence against the politics of the American
imperialists in the ‘cold war’.” 63 The speech appeared to set the tone for the forthcoming
59
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European visit.
When the White House announced the President’s schedule for the 10-day European trip
it became clear that after stops in Cologne, Bonn, and Frankfurt, JFK would fly to West Berlin,
arriving there on the morning of Wednesday, June 26th and departing that afternoon. In Berlin,
he planned to give three speeches and stops to view the Wall at the Brandenburg Gate and
Checkpoint Charlie. 64 West German media covered his visit to Berlin in depth – more than
1,200 journalists were accredited. Television and radio carried the historic visit live and
broadcast the President’s day in Berlin to millions in West Germany and to many residents of
East Germany who had long turned to western television for news and entertainment. 65
From his arrival on June 23rd and his first remarks at the Bonn-Cologne airport, JFK was
warmly received by the West German public. In Bonn, he addressed “hundreds of thousands of
cheering Germans,” a Washington Post reported observed, and pledged that the U.S. and its
armed forces would remain in Germany to defend freedom. 66 At Frankfurt’s historic Paulskirche
JFK announced that “The purpose of our common military effort is not war but peace–not the
destruction of nations but the protection of freedom.” And he added, “We work toward the day
when there may be real peace between us and the Communists.”67
In Berlin, JFK spoke initially to a group of union construction workers, voicing his
identification with their city by stating “West Berlin is my country.” After a motorcade through
the city, he paused on the steps of the Schöneberger Rathaus, West Berlin’s town hall, to deliver
one of his most famous speeches to a crowd numbering in the hundreds of thousands. 68 The
American President voiced in unmistakable terms his commitment to Berlin. For those who
apologize for some elements of Communism or who excuse its excesses, he tells the audience,
“Lass’ sie nach Berlin kommen. Let them come to Berlin” to see for themselves. Standing not
far from the Berlin Wall, he called the barrier “the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the
failures of the Communist system.” JFK’s most famous line came twice in the speech when he
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forcefully announced “Ich bin ein Berliner,” firmly linking all those committed to freedom,
especially himself and America, to the city. Before leaving the city he gave another speech at
the Free University, reaffirming once again “my country’s commitment to West Berlin’s
freedom “ and restating “our confidence in its people and their courage.” 69
In Berlin and in the other German cities, JFK told the audiences that this was a period of
transition for the Atlantic alliance and that “new links must be found to hold it together,” a
reporter in the Washington Post noted. “In every speech he makes he stresses the ties that link
the free world in such a way that the security of one is the security of all,” thereby strengthening
the unity of the alliance. JFK was in fact speaking to millions of Europeans, assuring them “that
this is a new man in a new Europe, and while he pays tribute to the past he is looking to the
future,” using “rhetorical juxtapositions” as he had done in a number of other addresses. 70 That
was exactly the message they needed and wanted to hear.
The visit proved to have additional ramifications. Not to be out-done by the American
President, Walther Ulbricht announced just two days before President Kennedy’s visit that
Soviet Premier Khrushchev would later that week be in East Berlin to celebrate Ulbricht’s 70th
birthday. 71 “Kennedy went to Berlin to hold up the trousers of the Social Democrats but nothing
will come of it,” Khrushchev explained when he toured an East Berlin machine factory during
his visit. “I have read that the President of the United States looked at the wall with
dissatisfaction. He did not like it all, but me...I like it. It pleases me tremendously.” 72
Khrushchev also blasted West German political leaders, the “revanchists,” for their
unrelenting advocacy of a western presence in Berlin. The Soviet premier spoke to the public,
numbering only several thousand at East Berlin’s Red City Hall, most of who were members of
the Communist youth group. “The GDR is an inseparable part of the greater Socialist family,”
69
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he explained. Facing a thunderstorm, Khrushchev halted the speech and drove through the city
in a motorcade that observers insisted “compared in no way to triumphant procession of
Kennedy’s through West Berlin.” 73
The headline in the Washington Post read” “K Berlin Visit Fails to Offset JFK Trip” and
the article cited an Associated Press estimate that “not more than 250,000 in all saw
Khrushchev” compared to an estimated 1.4 million who turned out for the American President in
West Berlin. Khrushchev made a few pointed remarks aimed at the JFK visit, accusing the
President of saying that he wanted to “normalize relations but his actions are such as to bring
about just opposite,” as he contrasted the June 10th address at American University and JFK’s
recent comments in West Berlin. 74 The view of Khrushchev’s visit from East Berlin differed,
and the East German secret police, the Stasi, reported that the West had tried to “play down” the
visit with the typical “inflammatory arguments.” For example, the western press wrote that the
GDR and “especially” Ulbricht needed bolstering because of the growing “domestic insecurity.”
And the Stasi noted, Khrushchev was “in the driver’s seat” on the Berlin question and “he could
ratchet up the pressure at any moment if he had wanted to dampen the significance of Kennedy’s
visit.” 75
Following the visits of Kennedy and Khrushchev to Berlin, tensions over the divided city
mounted. The East Germans viewed, for example, “the numerous” state-sponsored visits to
West Berlin and the related events as “provocations.” 76 During the fall incidents along the Wall
or on the access routes to Berlin mounted. In early October, for example, East German border
guards “provoked” a brief confrontation on two occasions when they “hurled stones at United
States military police patrols” in Berlin. The Americans responded with tear gas and smoke
grenades. 77 A more serious confrontation came on October 11th when Soviet forces blocked a
US convoy on the Autobahn, the main highway link with West Germany. The convoy was
stopped early in its journey and then later at the border of Berlin. Soviet guards demanded that
the Americans leave their vehicles to be counted, a clear violation of post-war agreements. The
US troops refused and the stand-off prompted high-level discussions among the Allied
commanders in West Berlin. Additional US reinforcements went to the scene and after 15 hours
of often heated argument the Soviets relented. The incident received considerable attention and
led one columnist to write that after an apparent easing of tensions between the super powers that
the Soviets would adopt “provocative” behavior to “set back the cause of detente.” Clearly
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exacerbated, he added, “The stupidity of it all–even from a Soviet point of view–seems so
apparent.” The smoothing of relations, the easing of tensions, had suffered a major setback. 78
Little was to change through late November 1963.
Berlin, both West and East, was deeply affected by the assassination of President
Kennedy. The first reports came in radio and television news broadcasts. 79 The headlines of all
the city’s major newspapers carried news of the events in Dallas. In East Berlin, Walter Ulbricht
stated that “we have received the news of the treacherous assassination...with sadness and deep
indignation.” 80 West Berlin’s newspapers carried on the front page the details as they became
known, including the most recent press reports from Dallas. The headline in Der Tagesspiegel
on November 23rd read “President Kennedy Murdered by Assassin” and next to it was a large
photograph of JFK. Willy Brandt told the press that “a flame has been extinguished for all
humanity that hoped for a just peace and a better life.” And he added, “The world is this evening
much poorer.” 81 Brandt made a radio announcement of the assassination to the people of Berlin.
Spontaneous outpourings of emotion followed immediately. Theaters halted their productions
and television programming was interrupted. Residents of West Berlin put candles in their
windows and many poured onto the streets. Some 20,000 students marched in a show of grief
and mourning through the streets to the Rudolph-Wilde-Platz, assembling in front of the
Schöneberg town hall, the site of JFK’s famous speech. More than 50,000 Berliners soon
gathered there. Throughout the night, more people came, carrying candles to show their deep
and profound grief. The Berlin city government called for residents to assemble the next day,
Sunday, November 25th, for a memorial service. In fact, the entire Federal Republic “stood in
shock and sadness” because of the assassination. 82
The East Berlin media voiced its sympathy, too. “The world grieves with the American
people,” a columnist wrote in the Berliner Zeitung. “It has lost a first-rate statesman.” Reaction
throughout the country was “overwhelming... [and] the people expressed their deepest sympathy
at the murder of Kennedy,” a report to the Central Committee stated. While expressing the
deepest sympathy of the leaders of the German Democratic Republic, they blamed the shooting
on “right wing extremists” in the American south, and he called Texas “a center of racial terror
and repression of Negroes.” East Germans saw the assassination as an act of vengeance by the
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“ultras,” by “right-wing extremists” who vehemently opposed JFK’s domestic policies. 83
In conclusion, from 1958 through November 1963, the situation of Berlin, its status in the
post-war settlement, was the source of on-going tensions that threatened to lead to nuclear war
between the Soviet Union and the western allies. When JFK took office, it was one of the first
issues that he had to face and the Berlin crisis flared up periodically during the years of his
presidency. Berlin was, however, but one of a number of hot-spots around the globe where
communism threatened the West. 84
JFK’s handling of the on-going Berlin crises offers a case study of presidential speechwriting, rhetoric, leadership, and art of diplomacy. While the newly elected President reacted to
pressures, demands, provocations, and outrageous behavior on the part of Nikita Khrushchev and
Walter Ulbricht, JFK defined and framed the discussion of each crisis. Through his position as
President of the most powerful nation, John Kennedy molded public opinion in the US and he
gained public support by presenting each major incident as a genuine crisis provoked by the
aggressive Communists. His visit to Berlin electrified the western world. It was through
speeches, television broadcasts projecting urgency, and the media that JFK was largely able to
shape the debate, the perception of the crisis in the U.S. and Germany. With his highly skillful
rhetoric, crafted by him and speech writer Theodore Sorensen, JFK rallied public opinion and
strengthened his position.
The importance of the spoken word in the Kennedy administration was enormous. As
Theodore Sorensen explained in a 1963 lecture at Columbia University, the president had the
task “to lead public opinion as well as respect it - to shape it, to inform it, to woo it, and win it.”
In foreign affairs, “the issues are frequently so complex, the facts so obscure, and the period for
decision so short, that the American people have from the beginning - and even more so in this
century delegated to the President more discretion in this vital area; and they are usually willing
to support any reasonable decision he makes.” JFK did that brilliantly, as he summed up in his
public addresses the on-going crisis as a struggle between the champions of freedom and forces
of oppression. The American President also captured public opinion in Germany and especially
Berlin where his words and his presence had a far-reaching and enduring impact. 85
To his credit and vision, JFK insisted during the various crises that the US should “lean
forward” on negotiations and not shy from direct talks with Khrushchev. The US had to enter

83

“Peter Baranowksy, “Der Mord an Kennedy,” Berliner Zeitung (November 24, 1963).
“Erste Information über Diskussionen zur Ermordnung Kennedys,” Abetilung Organisation
Gruppe Parteiorganisation und - Information, Berlin, November 29, 1963, Bundesarchiv,
Stiftung Arciv der Parteien und Massenorganisztionen der DDR, DY/30/IVA2/9.02, Nr. 91. See
“Mordschüsse der Rechtsextremisten,” BERLINER ZEITUNG (November 23, 1963).
84
“Issues at Vienna.”
85
Theodore Sorenson, Decision Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the
Arrows (NY: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 46, 48.
133

these from positions of strength and determination. 86 Furthermore, JFK recognized the
importance of personal politics, of his ability to use his charm and his intellect to craft the
confrontations in terms that were not only readily comprehended by the pubic in the U.S. and
Germany but which also shaped fundaments of the discussion. He was, however, not always
successful, especially when dealing with the Soviets over Berlin. Nevertheless, when planning
the June 1963 trip he and his advisors recognized that by his presence in several German cities,
especially Berlin, and that by visiting the divided city, even for less than a single day, he would
send a powerful message. The President was right. His Berlin visit electrified the city, stunned
the East, and went far in bolstering the Western alliance. The reception given to him by the West
Berliners provided all the justification he needed. The impact of the visit reverberated for years
to come and it continues to be viewed as one of the finer moments, one of the few bright spots, in
the Cold War. The reporting of his assassination in newspapers throughout the divided Germany
reveal how very effective his personal style of politics and his rhetoric had been in reaching
leaders and citizens on both sides of the Berlin Wall.
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Chapter 12
JFK and Vietnam: An Unanswered Legacy in
Film and History
Scott A. Racek
In the movies “The Fog of War” and “JFK”, references are made by Robert McNamara
and Oliver Stone respectively indicating that President Kennedy intended to pull troops
out of Vietnam. Filmmaker Errol Morris includes a scene in the Fog of War that has
Johnson and McNamara discussing how Johnson argued it was a mistake for Kennedy to
have announced troop withdrawals. In JFK, the argument is much more overt; Johnson
is implicated in a plot to assassinate Kennedy so that U.S. military leaders could fight
their war. There is noteworthy debate whether Kennedy would have fought the Vietnam
War had he lived. This paper argues that the turning point of the Vietnam War was the
death of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Once the U.S. signed off on the
assassination, the Pottery Barn rule (as seen in Iraq) became fulfilled; “if you break it,
you own it.” With repeated failure of new regimes, Kennedy would have had no choice
but to remain in the war.

The history of the relationship between the Vietnam War and John F. Kennedy
has been generally a kind one, especially with regard to mainstream movies. JFK and
The Fog of War both hold John F. Kennedy in high regard. They both make explicit that
Kennedy was not going to fight the war in Vietnam. Both argue that Kennedy would
have fought the war vastly differently had he lived. While this line of argument is
speculative, it has helped perpetuate the Kennedy mystique. Defenders of Kennedy
blame Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for forcing an
unpopular war on the nation. The challenge with both films is that they fail to take into
account factors that would have forced Kennedy on a path similar to that of his
successors. First, Johnson left most of Kennedy’s Vietnam advisors in place after
Kennedy’s death. Presumably they advised Johnson and Kennedy similarly. Second, the
assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and the subsequent
illegitimate and ineffective governments forced the United States to be more involved
that it may have been otherwise. This critical period of time, July of 1963 to March of
1964 (between the assassination planning and the Gulf of Tonkin incident) shows the
United States becoming more involved rather than less. In the absence of strong,
legitimate and united leadership in Vietnam, the United States was forced to become
South Vietnam’s proxy. In the words of Colin Powell, talking about the invasion of Iraq
in 2003, “if you break it, you own it.” The assassination was a particularly important
breaking point and after that, the United States “owned the conflict”. Kennedy knew this
to be true, admitted it as much, and would have had to stay in the war, regardless of what
the films might argue.
135

Background
While Lyndon Johnson often receives the harshest assessment with regard to
America’s participation in Vietnam, direct U.S. involvement goes back as far as World
War II. 1 Through the OSS, the United States had supported the goals of Ho Chi Minh.
Vietnam was occupied by Japan and Ho led efforts to give the U.S. valuable intelligence
on enemy operations. And while an avowed communist, Ho was also pragmatic. He
understood that a temporary alliance against the Japanese could pay dividends. In fact,
though Ho was quasi-allied to the United States, he remained a committed communist
throughout World War II. While working with the OSS, Ho was also was becoming an
important liaison with the National Liberation Front (Viet Minh or NLF), who were
committed to reducing all foreign influences on their land. Prior to the Japanese
occupation, the French had significant economic interests in the area and were eager to
regain their influence. Franklin Roosevelt was realistic in his approach to Ho. Since his
most important goal was unconditional Japanese defeat, FDR could justify a relationship
with communists.2 Indeed, the United States also had an association with Joseph Stalin.
When the war ended and attention turned to the Cold War, communist friendships
that were once a necessity became untenable. Additionally, as anti-communist fervor
swept the country in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Truman could not politically afford
to be soft on communism. Moreover, Truman felt a certain obligation to De Gaulle to
help him re-establish the former Vietnamese colony. As a result, Truman began sending
significant amounts of aid to the French. 3 This aid continued throughout the Korean War
and the remainder of Truman’s term.
When Eisenhower was elected in 1952, the country was at a Cold War crossroads.
Eisenhower ended the war in Korea but insisted on a presence in Vietnam, even if it was
only to support the French. By the early 1950’s, however, the French were in trouble
politically and militarily. The Viet Minh had shown themselves to be much better
fighters than the French had ever appreciated and by 1952, the United States was paying
one-third of the cost of France’s staying in the region. 4 In 1954, at the battle of Dien
Bien Phu, the French were soundly defeated and lost control of the northern part of the
country. That same year found the division of the country at the 17th parallel, with a
unified north led by Ho, who by this time had renounced his support of the United States,
and an unstable South, a quasi-democratic, anti-communist government led by Ngo Dinh
Diem. 5 Diem suffered from profound legitimacy problems. He and most of his senior
staff were Catholic in a predominately Buddhist country. He had ignored the agreements
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of the Geneva accords, run for president against his chief rival Bao Dai and won a
disputed election. He surrounded himself with relatives in positions of power. 6 That the
United States supported this regime tacitly made the Vietnamese people even more
suspicious. National elections that were scheduled as a part of the Geneva Conference
were cancelled. Diem knew that a national referendum would have swept Ho Chi Minh
into power, but argued that since South Vietnam had technically never signed it, he was
not bound by its terms. 7
Throughout the 1950’s, the United States supported the South Vietnamese
financially, at a rate of almost two hundred million dollars per year. Eisenhower also
slowly increased the number of advisors, eventually reaching almost one thousand.
Because he was a proponent of the “Domino Theory,” (that if one country in that region
collapsed due to communism, then all the other countries would also fall), it is not
entirely surprising that this was done, especially in light of French defeats. He used this
particular phrase for the first time in an April 17, 1954, news conference, where he said,
“Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the
‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first
one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly.
So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound
influences.” 8 This argument was also used in later administrations to justify the eventual
large increase in troops and funds to South Vietnam. 9
By the election of 1960, there were several major events that put pressure on the
U.S. government to respond to perceived communist aggressiveness. In 1957, Sputnik
convinced much of the scientific and engineering community that the United States was
falling behind the Soviets. In 1960 Francis Gary Powers’ spy plane was shot down and
the Paris summit was canceled. There was a socialist revolution fermenting in Cuba
under Fidel Castro. Finally, and most significantly, there was the consistent belief that
the Soviets had opened up a missile gap between the two countries. Kennedy especially
sought to make this point throughout the 1960 campaign. There is some debate whether
Kennedy himself knew that there was no gap (as the Eisenhower administration was
arguing) but he knew that complaining of one accomplished two goals. It placed blame
for the gap on Nixon, as he was vice-president under Eisenhower. It also buffeted
Kennedy’s own “soft-on-communism” criticism while allowing him to remain on the
offensive. Nixon was thus forced to defend his own anti-communist stance. 10 All of
these events forecasted an eventual engagement in Vietnam.
6
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Throughout 1961 and much of 1962, however, Vietnam was low on Kennedy’s
priority list. There was the disaster of the Bay of Pigs and the brinkmanship of the
missile crisis. Kennedy was not at all eager to engage Vietnam, but recognized by the
end of 1962 the increasing intensity of the conflict. As a result, the “Vietnam thing” (as
Kennedy refers to it in the early 1960s) was becoming more and more of a daily concern.
At the turn of 1963, with many early crises behind him, Vietnam was one of the
remaining hot spots that demanded more and more attention. How much attention has
become the focal point of many books, films and debate within academia and serves as
the starting point for discussion here.
JFK in Film
In the highly acclaimed and controversial film by Oliver Stone, JFK, the main
plot “reveals” how and why Kennedy was killed. Among the conspirators included
Castro, the Mafia and most alarming to conspiracy theorists, Vice-President Johnson in
concert with the military industrial complex. Stone accuses Johnson of being part of the
plot so that military generals could fight the war in Vietnam and goes on to insinuate that
Kennedy would have pulled out all of the troops. The key scene in JFK that details this
plan is a conversation between the protagonist Jim Garrison and the “man with all the
answers,” known in the film as “X.” They have a conversation on the Mall in
Washington, DC and X goes on to fill in many of the unanswered questions about the
assassination. In this pivotal scene, X claims:
I spent much of September '63 working on the Kennedy plan for getting all US
personnel out of Vietnam by the end of '65. This plan was one of the strongest and most
important papers issued from the Kennedy White House. Our first 1,000 troops were
ordered home for Christmas. 11
He goes on to describe the reasons why certain groups, namely the military, would want
to get rid of Kennedy:
Already angered by Kennedy's liberal domestic politics, the Bay of Pigs fiasco,
and his signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union, top military brass
undoubtedly were incensed in late 1963 when Kennedy let it be known that he planned to
withdraw all US military personnel from Vietnam by the end of 1965.
With that decision, the military turned against him and, even if they wouldn't
openly plot against him, the military leadership would not be sorry if something were to
happen to Kennedy. . . .
It was widely rumored that Vice President Lyndon Johnson -- long associated
with dirty politics, gamblers, and defense officials -- was to be dropped from the
Democratic ticket in 1964. Texas oilmen, staunch friends of Johnson and the military-
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industrial complex, were dismayed that Kennedy was talking about doing away with the
lucrative oil-depletion allowance. 12
During that conversation, X also alludes to Johnson’s involvement:
X (VOICE OVER)
Only four days after JFK was shot, Lyndon Johnson signed National Security Memo 273,
which essentially reversed Kennedy's new withdrawal policy and gave the green light to
the covert operations against North Vietnam that provoked the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
In that document lay the Vietnam War. . . .
I keep thinking of that day, Tuesday the 26th, the day after they buried Kennedy, LBJ
was signing the memorandum on Vietnam with Ambassador Lodge.
FLASHBACK TO: the White House, 1963. Johnson sits across the shadowed room with
Lodge and others. His Texas drawl rises and falls. He signs something unseen.
JOHNSON
Gentlemen, I want you to know I'm not going to let Vietnam go the way China did. I'm
personally committed. I'm not going to take one soldier out of there 'til they know we
mean business in Asia . . .
(he pauses)
You just get me elected, and I'll give you your damned war.
X (V. O.)
. . . and that was the day Vietnam started. 13
There are several historical inaccuracies with this conversation. While it makes great
moviemaking, there was no conversation between Garrison and an “X”. The closest
person to matching X is Col. L. Fletcher Prouty USAF (Ret.), who wrote the book JFK:
The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy and from whom Stone
has taken most of his material. Prouty was the Chief of Special Operations for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy years. 14 While Prouty did work with some of the
same people who formulated the withdrawal plan, there is no evidence that he himself
worked on it. 15 The memo to which Prouty refers is National Security Action
Memorandum (NSAM) 273. This memo did not give a timetable for leaving Vietnam,
but recommended that if South Vietnam was able to support their own operations the
Americans would leave. 16 It is historical fantasy for Stone to argue that the troop
withdrawal was going to happen definitively and without caveats.
JFK also highlights the reaction of the military to the pullout decision. It further
assumes that Johnson was allied to the military industrial complex. Neither of these facts
holds up under scrutiny. An earlier version of NSC Memo 273 was created on November
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21, 1963, while Kennedy was still alive and was expected to sign once he returned from
his Texas trip. This earlier version, says, in part:
We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should
persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on
the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should
include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and
informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but
of belief, and we should seek to increase not only our control of land but
the productivity of this area wherever the proceeds can be held for the
advantage of anti-Communist forces. 17
Rather than discussing an active pullout in the memo, it predicts a higher level of
commitment. When X claims that the Vietnam War lay in NSC memo 273, it was based
on a document initially drafted under Kennedy. 18 It gives no credence to a conspiracy by
Johnson to increase troops dramatically nor lends any evidence that Johnson was
involved in a conspiracy to kill Kennedy.
A curious quote by Johnson is the “…I’ll give you your damned war” comment.
Conspiracy buffs argue that this quote proves that Johnson was pursuing a policy
opposite that of Kennedy. But consider preeminent Vietnam scholar Stanley Karnow’s
interpretation of events:
Johnson subscribed to the adage that "wars are too serious to be entrusted
to generals." He knew, as he once put it, that armed forces "need battles
and bombs and bullets in order to be heroic," and that they would drag him
into a military conflict if they could. But he also knew that Pentagon
lobbyists, among the best in the business, could persuade conservatives in
Congress to sabotage his social legislation unless he satisfied their
demands. As he girded himself for the 1964 presidential campaign, he was
especially sensitive to the jingoists who might brand him "soft on
Communism" were he to back away from the challenge in Vietnam. So,
politician that he was, he assuaged the brass and the braid with promises
he may never have intended to keep. At a White House reception on
Christmas Eve 1963, for example, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Just
let me get elected, and then you can have your war." 19
Rather than trust the military, Johnson was suspicious of their intentions.
Moreover, Johnson’s social programs were initially more important than Vietnam. Stone
implies throughout JFK that Kennedy is the dove and Johnson the hawk. It was Kennedy
who was going to pull out and Johnson who intended to escalate from the beginning. The
reality is that Johnson was fully aware that the war was a lose-lose situation for him
politically, especially in light of his Great Society plans. Johnson advisor Jack Valenti
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lamented that “Vietnam at the time was no bigger than a man's fist on the horizon. We
hardly discussed it because it was not worth discussing." 20 That Stone argues that
Johnson was behind Kennedy’s assassination because of Vietnam is more of a reflection
on Stone’s attitude on the war than on the facts. While there are unresolved questions
stemming from the assassination of Kennedy, there is no evidence that Kennedy was
killed because of a pullout of Vietnam. Moreover, there is no support that Johnson or the
military industrial complex was involved in a plot of any kind.
In The Fog of War, Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert McNamara, former
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara makes similar claims about Kennedy and Vietnam.
McNamara repeats the charge that Kennedy was going pull one thousand advisors out by
the end of 1963. The film plays a conversation between President Johnson and
McNamara shortly after Kennedy’s death that implies that Kennedy was flirting with
pulling out. In part, Johnson claims,
I always thought it was foolish for you to make any statements about
withdrawing. I thought it was bad psychologically. But you and the President
thought otherwise and I just sat silent. 21
About the potential pullout McNamara says “…we can say to the Congress and
people that we have a plan for reducing the exposure of U.S. combat personnel.”
Kennedy responds: “(M)y only reservation about this is, if the war doesn’t continue to go
well it will look like we were overly optimistic.” 22 This statement reveals not only the
challenging nature of Vietnam as early as 1963 (when there was an increase to sixteen
thousand advisors in the country), but it also reflects the fact that pullout was not
necessarily a foregone conclusion. It does reveal that Kennedy and McNamara were
potentially trying to find a way out of Vietnam. But both knew that that pullout was not
without serious political ramifications. And while one thousand troops were sent home in
December 1963, Karnow argues, “…their departure was essentially a bureaucratic
accounting exercise." 23 They were not sent home as a precursor for a larger withdrawal.
In the next scene, McNamara repeats the charge that Kennedy was going to pull all troops
out by the end of 1965. He claims that Kennedy had essentially “announced” the
withdrawal of U.S. troops by drafting NSC 273, when in fact, Kennedy was implying the
opposite.
There is more evidence to support the argument that Kennedy was going to
continue U.S. presence in the region. This is seen in the minutes from that National
Security Council Meeting. It was McNamara and General Taylor who suggested that the
military could finish their ‘mission’ by 1965. This ‘mission’ was solely to train the South
Vietnamese military for battle against the North and NLF. It was not to fight the war on
their behalf. Indeed, whether South Vietnamese troops would be ready for this
20
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responsibility was an open question in 1963. In fact, when Vietnamization was attempted
years later, it was a failure.
Finishing the mission by 1965 was more wishful thinking than reality. Moreover,
if Kennedy was interested in avoiding further escalation, why would he have implicitly
agreed to the removal of Diem? It seems that if Kennedy had wanted to disengage, he
would have washed his hands of the country once the coup occurred. Kennedy had
publicly proclaimed in July of 1963 “in my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort
[in Vietnam] would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia, so
we are going to stay there.” 24 While this may have been posturing, it would have been
hypocritical for Kennedy to make such a strong point and then pull out. Kennedy also
made a public statement in an interview with Walter Cronkite in September of 1963 in
which he argued:
I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win
popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it
is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. . . . [I]n the
final analysis it is the people and the Government [of South Vietnam]
itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we
are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should
withdraw. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like
Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans
have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important
struggle even though it is far away. 25
While it is certainly possible that Kennedy could have said one thing publicly and
another privately, to put himself in that corner plainly points to Kennedy keeping troops
beyond 1964. Overall, in his term, Kennedy increased the number of advisors in
Vietnam from nine hundred to sixteen thousand and thirty. He substantially enlarged the
number of Special Forces (specifically Green Berets). 26 Kennedy believed that using
counter-insurgency troops and tactics was the best way to deal with the “Vietnam thing”.
This commitment to irregular troops was designed to show the South Vietnamese that the
United States was there to help them. It was not a commitment to leaving.
A major point of congruence between JFK and The Fog of War is that Kennedy
was going to end military engagement after the 1964 election. Both films however, miss
the larger issue of the assassination of Diem. This coup would have prevented Kennedy's
pullout because of its political ramifications. When it did not stabilize the region, he
would have had no choice but to further engage. Trying to move the war onto the
Vietnamese took a major setback once Diem was gone.
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Coup d’état
The roots of the assassination of Diem are found in the Eisenhower
Administration. 27 One of the challenges the U.S. faced in keeping South Vietnam a
democracy, ironically, was the Diem regime itself. Diem’s actions, including his illegal
consolidation of power, raised alarm in Washington. The dilemma of supporting an
autocratic ruler was at the heart of conflict over further U.S. involvement. In October
1954, years after the U.S. had started sending aid, Eisenhower sent Diem a letter stating
he was willing to send more financial aid and support to South Vietnam in exchange for
reforms in the country. These reforms included the firing of the defense minister,
reorganizing the armed forces, selecting officials in his government based on merit rather
than loyalty and a reduction in the number of family members in prominent positions of
power. 28 The overriding concern from Washington was that Diem was using his position
for his own personal gain rather than for best serving the Vietnamese people. As a result,
Eisenhower wanted to use aid as leverage for reforms. By doing so, Eisenhower hoped
that he could control Diem. As he says in his letter:
The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by
performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed
reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will
contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong
government. 29
Unfortunately for the administration, Diem chafed at these reforms and refused to
implement them. Support came anyway, as early as January 1955. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles was wary of Diem, but ultimately believed that his government would
be the most effective one in being a bulwark against the communist north. To highlight
this point, Dulles, in August of 1955, supported Diem’s decision not to hold national
elections as mandated by the Geneva accords. 30 Dulles knew that national elections
would certainly have gone against Diem and the country would unify under Ho Chi
Minh. This would be the worst possible outcome for the U.S. and underscores how
differently the Vietnamese people saw the war. They largely saw it as a civil conflict and
a war to expel imperialists. The United States, as McNamara points out in his film, saw
the war in terms of the Cold War. The decision by Dulles to continue to support Diem
could not make this point any clearer. It is ironic that he United States was supporting a
27
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fledgling “democracy” by not supporting elections. In other words, it was acceptable for
the U.S. to support an illegitimate dictator as long as he was anti-communist.
Another way that Eisenhower tried to leverage reforms was through the threat of
troop withdrawal. As the late 1950's came however, the warning remained but the
number of troops actually increased. Another time, the U.S. threatened to withdraw their
ambassador if reforms were not enacted. This threat, however, like all the others, was
never carried out. Notably, while aid increased, members of the Eisenhower
administration were also looking at what the removal of Diem could mean for the war
effort. The person at this forefront was Ambassador J. Lawton Collins, who was
advocating removal as early as March of 1955. 31 Nothing was consummated at the time
because Diem was able to consolidate power relatively quickly; instead, Eisenhower went
to great lengths to protect Diem even though he largely ignored U.S. largesse. The CIA
warned Diem in March of 1955, for example, that it would not be seen as legitimate to
stage a rigged South Vietnamese election in which he would ‘win’ by a large
percentage. 32 Diem disregarded this warning, and won 98% of the vote. Amazingly, he
won 118% of Saigon's vote. 33 And still the aid came. Diem could discount the demands
of the United States because he knew that being anti-communist was worth a great deal
of money. In this sense, the foundation of the Vietnam War was built on the
acquiescence of the Eisenhower administration. By actually withholding aid, the
administration might have done better job of controlling Diem.
Kennedy fell into the same trap as Eisenhower. His withdrawal threats were also
aimed at leveraging Diem. As Karnow points out:
Early in 1963, South Vietnam's rigid President Ngo Dinh Diem was
cracking down on internal dissidents, throwing the country into chaos.
Fearing that the turmoil would benefit the Communist insurgents,
Kennedy conceived of bringing home one thousand of the sixteen
thousand American military advisers as a way of prodding Diem into
behaving more leniently. 34
Had Diem’s behavior changed and reforms enacted, he may not have been
removed. But did all this lead to Kennedy "plan" Diem’s removal and assassination?
Johnson, for one, believed that the Kennedy brothers were behind it. In a February 1,
1966, call to Senator Eugene McCarthy, Johnson says “they started on me with Diem,
you remember. 'He was corrupt and he ought to be killed.' So we killed him. We all got
together and got a goddamn bunch of thugs and assassinated him. Now, we've really had
no political stability [in South Vietnam] since then." 35 He was so convinced of this fact
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that when JFK himself was killed, Johnson initially believed it was in retaliation for the
Diem killing.
The truth is that Kennedy was aware of coup d’état planning that was going to
remove Diem and his brother. Documents recently released by the National Security
Archive reveal information being exchanged about Diem’s removal as early as July of
1963. In that month, John McCone, director of the CIA, briefed Kennedy about a CIA
associate being approached by South Vietnamese General Tran Van Don about an
imminent plot. That coup was allegedly scheduled for a time between July 10th and July
19th. Because the general was such a respected figure, it was believed that the plot was
real. 36 And while that particular plot did not occur, plotting was well underway for
another.
In August, the political situation in South Vietnam became more intense as
Diem’s brother and advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu's Special Forces attacked the Xa Loi Pagoda
in Saigon. Subsequent clashes pitted Buddhists against the Diem forces in which thirty
civilians were killed, two hundred wounded and one thousand four hundred Buddhist
monks were arrested. This occurred on top of the reported fifty thousand dead and
seventy thousand imprisoned that occurred under Nhu’s command. Early conversations
revolved around removing only Nhu. An August 24, 1963 memo between the State
Department and Saigon bears out U.S. concerns. In the memo, the sender, Roger
Hillsman, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
indicates that the United States supported the removal of Nhu and even Diem if that is
what it would take to get rid of Nhu. Unfortunately for Kennedy, it was not yet official
policy and the administration spent the rest of that last week in August trying to remove
its support of such a plan without seemingly reinforcing Diem. 37 During subsequent
meetings between JFK and his Vietnamese experts, he goes back and forth about a coup
and the potential consequences. Within his staff, there was support for Nhu’s removal
only, both Nhu and Diem’s removal and a plan to disassociate the administration from
any coup attempt. Notably, in meetings throughout the fall of 1963, it was Bobby
Kennedy and Max Taylor, among Kennedy’s most trusted advisors, who argued against
U.S. involvement. Kennedy ended up not orchestrating the event but supported it both
passively (by agreeing to not oppose it) and actively (the CIA gave the plotters $42,000
on the morning of the plot). 38 The administration ultimately decided that Diem and Nhu
should be removed in order to bring stability to the region. By pulling Diem’s financial
support, they gave the plotters the signal that the United States would not oppose the
coup. Interestingly, National Security Archive documents do reveal an administration
keenly interested in the coup’s outcome. Failure could delegitimize the U.S.’s efforts for
stability while further driving Diem away from collaboration. Success could mean a
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major improvement in relations between governments in Washington and Saigon and
give Kennedy a better chance at success against the North and Viet Minh. 39
The coup did not play out quite as Washington thought. Whereas the CIA had
insisted that they be given forty-eight hours in advance of the coup, the plotters gave four
minutes instead. 40 As the overthrow began on November 1st, the phone lines to the
American military advisory group were cut, leaving the United States without knowledge
as to the outcome. This silence held true through November 2nd when Diem and Nhu
were arrested and killed. Initial reports coming from the coup plotters indicated that the
brothers committed suicide by either poison or gun. It was not fully clear until two
weeks later how the brothers died, even though the CIA was initially reporting that they
had been assassinated. Diem and Nhu’s deaths took Kennedy by surprise. McNamara
made the point later that Kennedy’s reaction shocked him. As he said later, coups are
unpredictable and death was a probable byproduct. 41 Indeed, the documentary evidence
indicates that many in the administration considered the Diem brothers in personal
danger.
The Kennedy administration was culpable in the coup that removed the Diems
from power. They did not dissuade plotters from the coup attempt and gave financial
backing. Kennedy did not, however, authorize nor plan to have the brothers killed. The
Church Committee, formed in the 1970’s to investigate the government’s role in the
assassination of world leaders, concluded that Kennedy had no active role in the Diem
assassination and did not know about it beforehand. 42 Nevertheless, that the upheaval led
to an unintended murder does not erase the responsibility that Kennedy now had for
Vietnam.
Aftermath
In the aftermath of the assassination, Kennedy recorded a memo on November 4,
1963, in which he says that both Saigon and his advisors were divided on the extent they
should have supported the coup. Kennedy says, in part:
Over the weekend, the coup in Saigon took place. It cumulated three months of
conversation about a coup, conversations that divided the government here and in
Saigon…I feel that we must bear a good deal of responsibility for it, beginning with our
cable of early August in which we suggested the coup. (This is the cable which indicated
our early support for a coup.) 43
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The fact that Kennedy speaks of both U.S. responsibility and the divided nature of the
debate highlights its controversial outcome. Kennedy knew three days after the event
that the responsibility he spoke of was to be problematic.
If one of the goals of the removal of Diem was to bring Vietnam more in line with
U.S. policy, the overthrow had the opposite effect. Successor Duong Van Minh moved
his government further away. As historian George Kahin points out, "they (USG)
expected that the new leadership in Saigon would accept greater American direction of
the fighting and an escalation of U.S. military participation that would extend to the
bombing of North Vietnam." 44 This was a reasonable expectation of the new
government, yet Minh's top goal turned out to be reconciliation of the country. The
government would not be under the umbrella of communism in his plan, united
nonetheless. This is one reason why Minh sought to pacify the NLF. Minh's goals, not
surprisingly, were soundly rejected by the U.S. because it was a level of appeasement
unacceptable to U.S. goals for the region. This disagreement served as the foundation for
a series of dysfunctional relationships after Diem. Indeed, much of the southern
population saw the U.S. as being worse than the communists. Many saw the U.S. as the
imperialist successors to the French, not their protectors.
One of the problems the new government had was in its structure. General Minh
led a leadership group known as the Military Revolutionary Committee. This council
was made up of a disorganized membership of twelve who repeatedly moved in and out
of office. Their perspective on the war was similar to Minh’s and was starkly different
than that of the U.S.45 While the U.S. was looking for stability and military
aggressiveness against the Viet Minh, the new junta saw an opportunity to negotiate a
settlement. They saw themselves as being closer to the population, not anti-Buddhist as
Diem was. Minh and his minions often referred to themselves as "non-communists"
rather than "anti-communists". 46 This is an important distinction because Kennedy had
expected and needed the new group to be as anti-communist as Diem was. As an
example of this incongruence, Minh and his advisors argued that a bombing of North
Vietnam was unnecessary. They were afraid that it would prompt a full invasion of the
North and with it, their “defensive war” justification would be lost. To Minh, the
bombing made little sense because it would not only kill Vietnamese (a point that rarely
deterred Diem and Nhu) but it would also provoke a harsh response. Even the most
hawkish leader of the junta, General Khanah, was unwilling to bomb the North. 47 One of
the most important critics of this stance was McNamara. To him, the bombing of the
North was essential. The North needed to understand the military might they were up
against. As a result of his position, McNamara found himself in a dilemma. He had been
against the removal of Diem, but he found the new government even less capable and
willing to take military action.
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Minh was also opposed to an increase of American advisors and insisted that their
“advising” did not go below that of the regional level. He wanted to retain operational
control of the army by restricting access. In doing so, Minh was actively trying to assert
his independence from the United States while slowly creating a steady path to reunification. This path called ultimately for an independent South Vietnam under neither
North Vietnamese nor United States control. 48 Since reunification was also goal of Ho
Chi Minh's, it was alarming for the U.S. to hear this new plan.
As for Johnson, the new administration in Saigon was underwhelming. The
neutralist solution that the new government sought with the North would negate any
influence over the region and allow the communists to have the influence Washington
was fighting so hard to prevent. Kennedy, Johnson and their advisors all had mistakenly
believed that once Diem and Nhu were gone, the new junta would accept military
guidance and leadership from the U.S. 49
The Kennedy/Johnson administrations were not the only ones unhappy with the
direction of the new regime in Saigon. Minh was fully aware of this. As a result, there
were factions within the South Vietnamese military who were poised to be removed or
demoted under an anti-corruption sweep. Even those close to Minh were not immune
from prosecution. These two groups successfully plotted against him and overthrew him
in early 1964. 50 The subsequent government was barely organized when the Maddox
was attacked. The resulting Gulf of Tonkin resolution gave the U.S. government all the
ammunition it needed for wider military engagement regardless of who was in power in
Saigon.
Once Diem was assassinated, the United States owned Vietnam.
The
assassination was the critical threshold for U.S. involvement. To best explain how the
United States became invested to the aftermath of the coup, a contemporary example
provides guidance. In 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell made the argument that to
invade Iraq was similar to the Pottery Barn rule. That is, “you break it, you own it.”
President Bush and his administration argued that Saddam Hussein was so tyrannical that
the U.S. would be greeted as liberators. Without the proper planning as to how the postSaddam government was going to operate, however, the United States ran the country
much longer than originally anticipated. Indeed, the United States "owns" Iraq because
of a lack of Iraqi leadership. The United States “owns” Iraq because the United States
has to run the political institutions until the Iraqis are able to do it on their own. In the
same way, the U.S. owned Vietnam. The institutions of the country were externally run,
and poor forecasting forced the U.S. to be more engaged than they would be otherwise.
This Pottery Barn rule is as applicable to Vietnam as it is to Iraq.
It would have been helpful in Iraq if the U.S. government had learned the lessons
of Vietnam. Disaster can strike when a leader is removed without operational plans to
address the subsequent power vacuum. The Kennedy administration needed more than
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assurances that things would be different before they signed off on the takeover. Not
only was Minh not up to the challenge of running the country, preferring to host parties to
doing the dirty work of government, his ideas about how to reconcile with the North were
worlds apart from the U.S. plan. 51 Minh's successor, Nguyen Khanh, was no more
successful in getting the country stabilized. Ironically, the U.S. encouraged Khanh to
take over even though they had little knowledge of how he might be different. "The
episode (Khanh taking over) further illustrated how little the Americans could monitor…
…the arcane political maneuvers of their South Vietnamese clients." 52 Nevertheless,
Khanh was erroneously seen as the savior that the Americans needed. He was replaced in
a 1965 coup by Air Vice-Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky, who then was then replaced by
Nguyen Van Thieu in 1967. 53 All of these regimes were failures, largely because they
were never seen by the United States or South Vietnamese as competent or legitimate.
In my view, after the assassination of Diem, Kennedy would have had no choice
but to stay in Vietnam. He would have seen what Johnson saw; a series of ineffective
governments mostly incapable of administering themselves but willing to injure U.S.
intentions by making peace overtures. Kennedy admitted in his recordings that he felt
some responsibility in the aftermath of the coup. I would argue that this assumption of
responsibility would have meant similar outcomes to what Johnson eventually faced.
With the 1964 election only one year away, Kennedy would have had much to answer for
if he had pulled the troops out, especially in light of his earlier reputation as being soft on
communism.
One underlying theme in the study of historical political regimes is legitimacy.
Diem partially lost his when he rigged the election in 1955, and it continued to dissolve
the more he persecuted Buddhists. The fact that the U.S. government was unwilling to
see Diem creating a hostile environment for U.S. intentions argued for intervention.
Debatably, both Eisenhower and Kennedy were in a no-win situation. They had
sustained Diem and when he did not turn out to be the leader that the U.S. needed, they
had little choice but to support his removal.
The films JFK and The Fog of War both spend significant time honoring the
memory of JFK. JFK argues Kennedy was killed partially because he planned on exiting
Vietnam. And while McNamara in The Fog of War does not go nearly as far as Stone, he
still largely exonerates Kennedy from responsibility. JFK completely ignores the
assassination of Diem as an important event and McNamara only makes passing mention
of it. I argue that this incident is telling as to what Kennedy would have done had he
lived. Kennedy knew of and signed off on the coup. He understood the political,
military and strategic implications of the event and most certainly would have stayed in
Vietnam. Johnson soon learned the ineffectiveness of the subsequent South Vietnamese
regimes and as a result, found himself deeply imbedded in the future of the region even
before the Gulf of Tonkin incident. To argue that Kennedy would have left Vietnam in
similar conditions ignores the reality of the situation on the ground. As the Iraq conflict
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teaches, to remove a leader without proper planning is to possess the future of that
country.

150

Chapter 13
JFK’s Legacy Regarding Consular Relations Law
Cindy G. Buys

I.

The Barghoorn Affair

In the fall of 1963, Professor Frederick Barghoorn of Yale University traveled to
the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. 1 The 52-year-old Barghoorn was chair of Yale’s
Department of Soviet Studies and had visited the Soviet Union quite frequently. 2 On the
evening of October 31, Professor Barghoorn visited the Moscow home of Walter
Stoessel, Minister-Counselor and second-ranking official at the U.S. embassy. 3 Professor
Barghoorn told Stoessel that he planned to leave the Soviet Union by plane the following
morning. 4 Barghoorn left Stoessel’s home shortly after 7 p.m. and an embassy car drove
him to the Metropole Hotel in Central Moscow, where he was staying. 5 Barghoorn was
not heard from again until two weeks later, when TASS, the Soviet press agency,
reported that he had been arrested on charges of spying for the United States. 6 The U.S.
Ambassador to Moscow, Foy Kohler, denied the charges against Professor Barghoorn,
calling them “completely unwarranted,” and demanded Barghoorn’s immediate release. 7
The U.S. Ambassador also demanded an immediate opportunity to see the prisoner,
charging the Soviet authorities with waiting “an unjustifiably long period before
informing the embassy of the arrest.” 8 Those demands went unheeded.
On Friday, November 15, 1963, U.S. President John F. Kennedy became
personally involved. He held a news conference at which he stated that: “Professor
Barghoorn was not on an intelligence mission of any kind.” 9 He further stated that the
arrest could have “a most serious effect” on U.S.-Russian cultural relations and
demanded Barghoorn’s prompt release. 10 President Kennedy decided to postpone
meetings on a U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural exchange program and hinted that the Barghoorn
affair might interfere with a pending bilateral agreement on wheat. 11 U.S. Ambassador
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Kohler continued to make repeated requests for immediate permission to see
Barghoorn. 12
Professor Barghoorn was released on November 17, 1963, after being held
incommunicado for 16 days, and was immediately expelled from the Soviet Union.13
The Soviets continued to assert that Barghoorn had been involved in espionage activities,
but cited the personal concern expressed by President Kennedy as the reason Barghoorn
was released. 14
Incidents such as the Barghoorn affair were not uncommon during the Cold War
time period. In 1960, the Soviets shot down an American CIA U-2 plane piloted by
Francis Gary Powers over Soviet territory. The Soviets then interrogated Powers for
several months before trying him for espionage. Powers was sentenced to 10 years
imprisonment, but was freed after two years in exchange for a Soviet spy imprisoned by
the Americans. 15 In 1961, the Soviets put another American on trial for espionage in
Moscow, along with two Dutchmen and four West Germans. 16 That American was a
student studying in West Germany named Marvin MacKinnon. He went to the Ukraine
on a tourist visa and was arrested while there for photographing items the Soviets deemed
to be of military significance. 17 U.S. authorities were often frustrated by their inability to
visit or communicate with American nationals arrested or detained in the U.S.S.R.
These incidents pointed to the need for better agreements on consular access to
detained foreign nationals. The willingness of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to negotiate such
agreements was made possible in part by the slight softening in Cold War tensions during
the 1960s following the Cuban Missile Crisis. That crisis brought home the imminent
threat of nuclear war and the need for better relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. It
led directly to the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963. 18 It also
contributed indirectly to a decision by the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the rest of the
international community to conclude the first truly multinational treaty for the purpose of
improving consular relations.
While the Kennedy Administration is probably better known for its work on the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it was also instrumental in codifying the international law of
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consular relations. Both the multilateral Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 19 and
the bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention 20 were negotiated during President John
F. Kennedy’s time in office.
Ironically, the bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention was under negotiation
at the time of the Barghoorn incident. The Barghoorn case brought into focus two key
issues involved in those negotiations: (1) the right of consular officers to visit their
nationals who have been arrested in a foreign country; and (2) the obligation of a host
government to inform the foreign consulate promptly when one its nationals is arrested.
The United States had routinely granted these courtesies to the Soviet Union when a
Soviet citizen was arrested in the United States, but Moscow had rarely extended
reciprocal courtesies. 21 The Kennedy Administration was eager to secure greater
protections for Americans arrested in the U.S.S.R. through the negotiation of
international agreements.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was concluded and signed by the
Kennedy Administration in 1963, but did not come into force until several years later. 22
The bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention was concluded approximately six
months after President Kennedy’s death. 23
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations continues to be one of the most
important and widely adopted treaties in the modern era. 24 Issues relating to its
application and interpretation regularly arise both in the diplomatic context and in
litigation, particularly with respect to the right of consular notification and access to
persons who are arrested or detained. In fact, a recent search of an electronic database of
federal court cases revealed almost 400 cases involving claims under the VCCR in the
10-year period from 1998 to 2008. 25
This article provides background on the drafting of the VCCR and highlights
some of the issues that presented the most difficulties during the negotiations. It also
provides some comparisons between the VCCR and the bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular
Convention. It then discusses the continuing importance of consular treaties today, with
a particular focus on the issue of consular notification. Finally, the article highlights
areas of legal uncertainty with respect to consular notification that are currently being
litigated in U.S. courts or which are likely to be resolved through litigation in the future.
19
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II.

Background on 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

Broadly speaking, consular functions consist of protecting and facilitating the
interests of a state and its nationals in the territory of another state. 26 In particular,
consular functions include: (1) promoting commercial, economic, cultural and scientific
relations between states, (2) issuing passports and other travel documents, (3)
safeguarding the interests in the receiving state of the sending state’s nationals, both
individuals and corporate entities, (4) arranging appropriate representation of the sending
state’s nationals before the tribunals of the receiving state, (5) performing administrative
functions such as acting as a public notary or serving judicial documents, and (6)
exercising supervision and inspection of the sending state’s national flag vessels and
aircraft operating in the territory of the receiving state. 27
Consular relations between states have existed for centuries. 28 Prior to the
adoption of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the rules governing consular
relations derived largely from customary practices between states developed over time
and through a series of bilateral consular conventions. 29 There were some prior attempts
at developing a multilateral set of rules, but none were successful until the VCCR in
1963. 30
The International Law Commission (ILC), a group of experts on international law
convened by the United Nations (U.N.), was responsible for preparing a draft of the new
multilateral convention on consular relations. 31 In 1949, the ILC conducted a review of
international law at its first session based on a survey that had been prepared by the U.N.
Secretariat. 32 As a result of that review, the ILC decided to add “consular intercourse and
immunities” to its list of topics for codification. The U.N. General Assembly approved
the inclusion of that topic on the ILC’s agenda at the General Assembly’s fourth session
in 1949. 33 However, it was not until 1955 that the ILC actually began work to codify the
26
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existing rules and practices regarding consular relations. 34 Over the next six years, the
ILC prepared a series of draft articles on consular relations, which were provisionally
adopted, submitted to governments for comment, and revised in light of the comments
received. 35
The first draft of the articles was prepared by the special rapporteur, Jaroslav
Zourek of Czechoslovakia, who submitted a report to the ILC in 1957 on Consular
Intercourse and Immunities. 36 This report formed the basis for the ILC’s further work on
these issues. In his report, Mr. Zourek stated that he had reviewed the many bilateral
agreements on consular relations that already existed and tried to identify rules that were
common to those agreements and therefore likely to be acceptable to a majority of
States. 37 Where there were gaps in the rules or clarification was required, he took into
account the practices of States and their municipal laws, thereby adding to the
codification of customary international law. 38
The ILC did not spend much time as a group on consular issues in 1957, however,
because it spent most of that year dealing with a separate treaty relating to diplomatic
intercourse and immunities. The ILC’s substantial work on consular issues really began
in 1959. 39 From 1959 to 1961, the ILC had numerous meetings where they debated the
nature and scope of consular obligations. 40 The final result of the ILC’s work was a
document containing 71 draft articles on consular relations. 41 In 1961, the U.N. General
Assembly decided by way of Resolution 1685 to convene a conference on consular
relations to consider the ILC’s draft articles. 42
In the words of the Acting President of the conference, the purpose of the
conference was to codify the law dealing with an important part of international relations:
At a time when international relations has taken on an ever-increasing
significance for the lives of all mankind, it had become increasingly
desirable to place them on a secure basis of clear, generally recognizable
and generally observed rules of law. . . The general development of
foreign travel, international trade and shipping had increased the volume
of consular activities all over the world . . .Clarification of consular law
34
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would thus contribute to the promotion of friendly relations between
States. 43
The conference began on March 4, 1963 and concluded on April 22 of that year. 44 Thus,
it took the 92 states’ delegations seven weeks of negotiating and compromise to reach
agreement on the final text of the VCCR. The 78-article convention 45 was signed by
representatives from 92 countries on April 24, 1963, including the United States (but not
the U.S.S.R). 46
The VCCR did not solve all consular issues between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
however. The U.S. State Department continued work during 1963 on the bilateral
convention with the U.S.S.R. to better regularize consular relations between the two
nations. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. concluded that bilateral consular convention in Moscow
on June 1, 1964. 47 Because it took several years for a sufficient number of parties to
ratify the VCCR to allow it to enter into force, the bilateral convention between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. became the only treaty governing consular relations between the two
nations for several years. The bilateral convention also elaborated on some of the details
of their respective rights and duties.
III.

Some Difficult Issues Involved in the Negotiations of the VCCR

One of the most important issues to the United States in the 1960s, as highlighted
by the Barghoorn incident, was the issue of guaranteed and immediate consular access to
nationals who are arrested or detained in a foreign country. This issue continues to be
one of the most litigated issues in consular relations today.
The Vienna Convention provides for: “Communication and contact with nationals
of the sending State” in Article 36. 48 This article sets forth the general rule that “consular
officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have
access to them” and, correspondingly, “[n]ationals of the sending State shall have the
same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the
sending State.” 49 More specifically, subparagraph (1)(b) of Article 36 provides that, if
requested by a foreign national, “the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if . . . a national of that state
is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
43
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Summary records of plenary meetings and of the meetings of the
First and Second Committees, ¶ 5 (Opening Remarks of Acting President Stavropoulos).
44
See id.
45
The final version of the VCCR contained eight more articles that the ILC draft. Most of the additional
articles had to do with the procedural formalities relating to signature and ratification and entry into force
of the convention.
46
See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=219&chapter=3&lang=en.
47
Consular Convention and Protocol, (U.S.-U.S.S.R.), supra note 21. The bilateral convention clarifies or
expands on certain aspects of consular relations, including, inter alia, the duty of each state to assist the
other in acquiring property for the consular premises, assistance that is particularly important in a country
like the U.S.S.R. where most of the property is owned by the government. See id. at art. 4.
48
VCCR, supra note 20, art. 36.
49
Id. at art. 36(1)(a).
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manner.” 50 The article further states that “said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.” 51
Interestingly, the original draft of articles prepared by the ILC’s Special
Rapporteur did not contain any specific language relating to consular notification when a
national of the sending State is arrested or detained by the receiving State. 52 A general
listing of consular functions was included in the Special Rapporteur’s draft Article 13,
which the ILC’s Secretary, Mr. Liang, accurately predicted “was likely to raise more
difficulties than any other, in the Commission, at any conference on the subject and in the
General Assembly.” 53
Mr. Bartos of Yugoslavia was the first to raise the specific issue of consular
notification with the ILC, stating that:
His country had been very much concerned about the difficulty of
arranging for the defence [sic] of nationals arrested on foreign soil. To
deny consuls access to arrested persons was a flagrant violation of
international law; the consular function of protecting nationals of the
appointing State was fundamental, and hence should be mentioned first in
the enumeration [of consular functions]. 54
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland followed these remarks by proposing a new draft article on consular notification
(provisionally numbered Article 30A) in May 1960. 55 Subparagraph (a) of Sir
Fitzmaurice’s proposed article established that “a consul shall have complete freedom of
communication with and access to [its] nationals;” subparagraph (b) provided for visits
by the consul to nationals being detained pending trial; and subparagraph (c) provided for
visits by consuls to nationals in prison after sentencing. 56

50

Id. at art. 36(1)(b).
Id. The United States also is a party to more than 50 bilateral agreements which contain even more
extensive consular notification obligations. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS 47 (2003), available at
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_636.html. Of particular interest here, the U.S.-Russia
Consular Convention modifies the VCCR’s consular notification obligations in two important respects.
First, Article 12 requires that consular notification occur “immediately” and, second, it further defines that
obligation in the Protocol to require that notification of the consulate and access to any detained national
occur within one to four days of the arrest or detention. Consular Convention and Protocol, (U.S.U.S.S.R.), supra note 21, at art. 12 and Protocol.
52
Zourek, Consular Intercourse and Immunities, Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 29, at 83103.
53
Summary Records of the 513th Meeting, [1959] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 156, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1959 (Statement by Mr. Liang).
54
Summary Records of the 514th Meeting, [1959] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 160, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1959 (Statement by Mr. Bartos).
55
Summary Records of the 534th Meeting, [1960] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 42, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1960.
56
Id.
51
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Agreement on the final language of the consular notification article came “[o]nly
after much debate.” 57 Some of the issues that caused the most difficulties involved:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

Whether notification of the consulate should be mandatory in every
case where a national of that consulate’s State is arrested or detained,
or only if the foreign national so requests;
How quickly after arrest or detention notice of consular rights to the
individual and notice to the consulate must occur;
To what extent, if any, local rules of criminal procedure should be
allowed to delay or interfere with consular access to a foreign national
who has been detained or arrested; and
To what extent consular officers should be allowed access to foreign
nationals who are serving prison sentences. 58

Ultimately, it was agreed with respect to the first issue that the duty to notify the
appropriate consulate would only arise if the foreign national so requests. 59 Early on, the
ILC delegates agreed that consular notification would occur automatically in every
case. 60 As Mr. Dadzie from Ghana pointed out, a foreign national who is arrested or
imprisoned might not know that his consulate should be notified and, therefore, might not
request notification. 61 However, the United States delegation strongly advocated for
limiting the requirement to only those cases when the foreign national so requests for two
primary reasons: (1) mandatory notification in every case might become an unreasonable
administrative burden and thus result in less compliance; and (2) mandatory notification
might call for unwarranted intrusions upon the privacy of individuals. 62 Despite
successfully opposing mandatory notification in the VCCR, the United States has entered
into more than 50 bilateral consular conventions, including the bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Consular Convention, which require the United States to notify the appropriate foreign
consulate when a national of those states is arrested or detained, regardless of the foreign
national’s wishes. 63
57

Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna,
Austria, March 4 to April 22, 1963, S. Exec. Doc. E., 91st Cong., at 59 (1969) [hereinafter Report of the
United States Delegation].
58
Summary Records of the 534th-537th Meetings, [1960] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 42-43, 47, 57, 61, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1960.
59
VCCR, supra note 20, at art. 36(1)(b).
60
See Summary Records of the 536th Meeting, [1960] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 58, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1960.
61
See U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Eleventh plenary meeting, supra note 29, at 36 (statement of
Mr. Dadzie). This view was echoed by delegates from the U.S.S.R. Tunisia, and the Congo, among others.
See id. at 37-38.
62
See Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 58, at 59. Other delegates also expressed concern
about their States’ ability to comply in every case and about intrusions on individuals’ freedom of choice.
See U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Eleventh plenary meeting, supra note 29, at 36-38 (Statements
by delegates from New Zealand, United Arab Republic, the Federation of Malaya, Venezuela, Vietnam and
France).
63
For examples of the mandatory notification provisions of bilateral conventions, see, e.g., Consular
Convention, U.S.-P.R.C., art. 35, Sept. 17, 1980, modified Jan. 17, 1981, 33 U.S.T. 2973, Consular
Convention, U.S.-Pol., art. 29, May 31, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 1231; Consular Convention, U.S.-U.K., art. 16,
June 6, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3426; Consular Convention and Protocol, U.S.-U.S.S.R., supra note 21, art.12 (“The
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The second issue regarding the timeliness of notification also presented much
difficulty. Sir Fitzmaurice’s original draft article stated that “the local authorities shall
inform the consul of the sending State without delay” and that “communications from [a
foreign] national shall immediately be forwarded by the local authorities.” 64 Several
delegates supported this proposal. 65 However, Mr. Matine-Daftary of Iran objected on
the grounds that it was not always possible to discover the identity or nationality of a
person who had been detained, and it would therefore be wrong to impose upon the local
authorities an obligation to inform consuls immediately and automatically. 66 Mr. Yokota
of Japan agreed, and suggested that there might be conflicts with the penal codes of many
countries. 67 He suggested the insertion of the word “undue” before “delay,” a suggestion
the ILC subsequently adopted in a later draft. 68 The United States and the United
Kingdom expressed concern that the word “undue” was “susceptible to considerable
abuse” and proposed its deletion. 69 Mr. Erim of Turkey suggested that notification occur
“within a reasonable time.” 70 There also was some discussion of whether a time frame
should be included, e.g., notice must be given within a certain number of hours or days of
arrest. 71 States appeared concerned about committing to a specific timeframe in all
circumstances. In light of these objections, it was ultimately agreed to revert back to the
“without delay” language with no specific time frame in which notification must occur. 72
With respect to the third issue regarding potential conflicts with local laws, one of
the issues here was whether the consular officer must be permitted to converse privately
with the foreign national under arrest or detention. The phrase “converse privately” was
initially included in Sir Fitzmaurice’s original draft, but was struck from the ILC’s draft
during its deliberations. 73 Another issue was whether foreign nationals could be held
incommunicado for a short period of time at the beginning of an investigation, as was the
appropriate authorities of the receiving state shall immediately inform a consular officer of the sending
state about the arrest or detention in other form of a national of the sending state.”).
64
See Summary Records of the 534th Meeting, supra note 56, at 42.
65
Id. at 42-43 (see statements by Mr. Hsu (China), Mr. Edmonds (United States), Mr. Verdross (Austria),
Mr. Sandstrom (Sweden), Mr. Scelle (France), and Mr. Ago (Italy).
66
Id. at 42.
67
Id. at 43. Mr. Tunkin from the U.S.S.R. also argued strongly for inclusion of a reference to local laws,
stating that for national security reasons, consuls might not be allowed access to certain areas. Id. at 44.
68
See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, art. 6, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 9) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/4425 (1960), reprinted in [1960] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 151-52, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1960/Add.1 [hereinafter 1960 Draft Article 6]. (In earlier drafts and meetings, article 6
was referred to as additional article 30A. See Summary Records of the 586th Meeting, [1961] 1 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 32, note a, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1961.
69
See Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 58, at 59.
70
See Summary Records of the 536th Meeting, supra note 61 at 55.
71
Suggestions for the timeframe in which consular notice should be given varied widely. For example, the
representative from the Netherlands suggested that notice must be given within one month at the latest. See
Summary Records of the 587th Meeting, supra note 41, at 33. By contrast, Mr. Edmonds from the United
States suggested that a foreign national should not be detained incommunicado for more than 48-72 hours.
See, e.g., Summary Records of the 586th Meeting, supra note 69 at 32.
72
VCCR, supra note 20, at art. 36.
73
1960 Draft Article 6, supra note 69. Mr. Edmonds from the United States was particularly concerned
that consular officers be able to speak privately with prisoners in order to provide effective assistance, but
was ultimately overruled in favor of more general language. Summary Records of the 534th Meeting, supra
note 56, at 42 (Statement by Mr. Edmonds).
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Swiss practice. 74 During the negotiations, there was vigorous debate on the issue of
whether local laws or international law should prevail in the event of a conflict. 75 Some
delegates expressed concern that if local laws were allowed to prevail without
qualification the right of consular notification would be completely nullified. 76
Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby consular officers must comply with local
laws provided those laws did not act to nullify the effectiveness of consular
communication. 77
Fourth and finally, there was some debate regarding the period of time during
which consulates should be given access to detained persons. Some delegates suggested
that consular access was only necessary prior to trial to ensure that the foreign national
understood the legal proceedings and received a fair hearing, but other delegates insisted
that it was extremely important that consular officers be allowed to visit their foreign
nationals in prison to ensure that they were being treated at least as well as nationals of
the home country. 78 The ILC draft took the position that competent consular officials
would have the right to visit a national of the sending state who is in prison, custody, or
detention both before conviction and after judgment. 79 This language was largely
retained in the final version of the VCCR. 80
Mr. Edmonds, the ILC representative from the United States, summed up the
importance of the right of consular access as follows:
[T]he protection of human rights by consuls in respect of their nationals
should be the primary consideration for the [International Law]
Commission. The fact that, under the laws of some States, it was possible
to isolate an accused person from his own lawyer was all the more a
reason to safeguard the right of his consul to visit him. In many respects,
to a person who was often ignorant of the local language and laws, a visit
by his consul was more important than that of a lawyer. 81
74

See id. at 46 (Statement of Mr. Bartos).
See e.g., Summary Records of the 536th Meeting, supra note 61, at 52. See also U.N. Conference on
Consular Relations, Twelfth plenary meeting, supra note 29, at 40.
76
See U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Twelfth plenary meeting, supra note 29, at 42 (Statement by
United States and Tunisia).
77
The final language of Article 36 of the VCCR states: “The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article
shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso;
however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this Article are intended.” VCCR, supra note 20, at art. 36(2).
78
See e.g., Summary Records of the 537th Meeting, [1960] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 60, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1960 (Statement by Mr. Edmonds).
79
United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, Mar. 4-Apr. 22 1963, Draft articles on consular
relations adopted by the International Law Commission at its thirteenth session, art. 36, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/16/Add.1.
80
See VCCR, supra note 20, art. 36(1)(c).
81
Summary Records of the 534th Meeting, supra note 56, at 47 (Statement by Mr. Edmonds). Some
delegates agreed with Mr. Edmonds that the issue should be viewed as one of human rights (see Statement
by Mr. Bartos of Yugoslavia, id. at 46); but others suggested that the issue was solely about the ability of
consular officers to assist their nationals. Summary Records of the 535th Meeting, [1960] 1 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 48-49, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1960 (Statement by Mr. Fitzmaurice).
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IV.

The Continuing Importance of Consular Relations Law Today
A.

Litigation at the International Court of Justice

Issues relating to consular notification continue to be extremely important today.
The United States has been sued at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) three times in
just the past decade for violations of Article 36 of the VCCR – by Paraguay in Breard, 82
by Germany in LaGrand, 83 and most recently by Mexico in Avena, involving 54 Mexican
nationals who were on death row in the United States. 84 In virtually all of the underlying
cases, the appropriate state authorities failed to inform the foreign defendants of their
right to have their consulates notified of their arrest and detention without delay and
failed to notify the appropriate consular officers. The home States of the detained
nationals sued the United States for those failures at the ICJ. Because the United States
did not deny its failure to give proper consular notification in most cases, the disputes at
the ICJ largely revolved around the appropriate remedy. 85 In all three ICJ cases, the
defendants had not raised the government’s failure to notify them of their right to
consular notification until after trial and conviction, at least in part because they had not
been notified that they had such a right. 86 The United States took the position that the
foreign defendants could not raise this claim on appeal due to various state procedural
default rules, which require all issues to be first raised at trial. 87
Not surprisingly in light of the United States’ admissions, the ICJ found that the
United States had violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention by failing to
inform the foreign defendants, without delay, of their right to have their consulates
notified of their arrest and detention. 88 As to the appropriate remedy, the ICJ stated that
the United States has an obligation to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and
reconsideration of the affected Mexican nationals’ cases with a view to ascertaining
whether the violation of the Vienna Convention caused actual prejudice to the
defendant. 89 The ICJ further stated that state procedural default rules should not bar that
82

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Breard) (Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
84
See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31)
[hereinafter Avena]. Mexico originally brought its claim on behalf of 54 Mexican nationals, but
subsequently amended the claim to include only 51 Mexican nationals. See id. at 27, 29.
85
In Avena, the United States did not deny its failure to give the consular notification in 47 of the 51 cases.
See id. at 46. With respect to the remaining Avena defendants, the United States asserted that the
defendants had claimed U.S. citizenship and, thus, the authorities did not believe they were dealing with
foreign nationals. However, the U.S. largely failed to prove these allegations, and the U.S. claims were
rejected by the ICJ. See id. at 40-46; see also LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 20-21; Breard, 1998 I.C.J. at 253.
86
See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 52-53, 57 (describing the timing when consular notification was given, if ever).
See also LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 23 (right to notification not raised at trial or two subsequent proceedings;
LaGrands finally learned of right from other sources); Breard, 1998 I.C.J. at 249 (“Paraguay learnt by its
own means that Mr. Breard was imprisoned in the United States.”).
87
See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 55-57; see also LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 68-69; Breard, 1998 I.C.J. at 249.
88
See e,g., Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 53, 71. Because the Avena case was the most recent and the most fully
litigated of the three ICJ cases, I will focus on it here to illustrate the relevant legal issues.
89
Id. at 65-66.
83
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reconsideration. 90 Ultimately, the ICJ did not order the United States to overturn the
convictions of the Mexican nationals, but did order the United States to consider whether
lack of notice of consular access would have made a difference. 91
B.

The United States’ Reaction to Avena

The United States’ response to the Avena judgment serves to illuminate some of
the unresolved issues in the area of consular notification law that continue to be litigated
today. Following the Avena decision, then U.S. President Bush decided that it would be
in the best interests of the United States to comply with the ICJ’s judgment, both to
demonstrate the United States’ commitment to international law and to ensure reciprocal
protections for Americans traveling abroad. Accordingly, he decided to implement the
ICJ’s judgment by issuing a “Memorandum for the Attorney General” dated February 28,
2005, in which he stated in pertinent part:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, that the United States will discharge its
international obligations under the decision of the [ICJ in
Avena], by having State courts give effect to the decision in
accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed
by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision. 92
In April 2005, then U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sent this Presidential
Memorandum to the relevant states’ attorneys general 93 and filed it with state and federal
courts where the Mexican nationals’ cases were pending, including the case of Medellin94
out of Texas, which was one of the cases involved in the Avena litigation at the ICJ.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas refused to abide by the ICJ’s judgment in
Avena or the Presidential Memorandum, ruling that neither of those documents
constituted binding federal law that preempted state procedural default rules. 95 Medellin
appealed that decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which sided with the Texas court in a
decision issued in March 2008. The Supreme Court concluded that while the ICJ’s
judgment constitutes a binding international legal obligation for the United States, it is
90

Id. at 57.
Specifically, the ICJ found “that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obligation of the
United States to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and
sentences of the Mexican nationals” that were the subject of the case. Id. at 72.
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President’s Memorandum for the Attorney General, Subject: Compliance with the Decision of the
International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html [hereinafter Presidential
Memorandum].
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See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, to Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General (Apr.
5, 2005) in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Ex parte Jose Ernesto Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (No. AP-75,207), 2005 WL 3142648. (The letter can be found in the appendix at
A-1).
94
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
95
Ex parte Jose Ernesto Medellin, No. AP-75,207, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. Crim. App., Nov. 15, 2007).
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not directly binding on a Texas state court under the U.S. constitutional system. 96 In
addition, the President does not have the authority under the Constitution to make law by
way of a Memorandum that pre-empts a state court judgment applying state law. 97 As a
result, Texas proceeded to carry out Medellin’s death sentence on August 5, 2008. 98
Mexico was, of course, displeased with the United States’ handling of the matter.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, Mexico filed a diplomatic note of protest
for this violation of international law with the U.S. government 99 and filed an application
with the ICJ seeking clarification of the Avena judgment. 100 The ICJ dismissed that
request for clarification on jurisdictional grounds in January 2009. 101 However, the Court
stressed that the United States remains under a continuing legal obligation to fully
implement the Avena decision with respect to all of the Mexican nationals that were the
subject of that case. It is likely diplomatic negotiations will continue between the United
States and Mexico regarding appropriate reparations for the United States’ breach of its
obligations under the VCCR. Some of the other Mexican cases that were part of the
Avena judgment are still pending in other state courts, and it is not clear how these other
states will react to these legal developments.
V.

Where Are We Today?

A number of interesting legal issues relating to consular notification remain
unresolved. Many of these legal uncertainties were foreshadowed by the consular
convention negotiations during the Kennedy Administration in the 1960s. In particular,
the number of lawsuits based on claimed violations of Article 36 of the VCCR
demonstrates that the United States has had difficulty ensuring that state and local law
enforcement officers provide proper and prompt consular notification when arresting or
detaining foreign nationals. Some of the outstanding issues in those cases include: (1) Is
the VCCR a self-executing treaty? 102 (2) If so, and consular notification rights are
violated, can an individual sue the responsible local, state or federal government officials
for that violation? (3) How soon after arrest and detention must consular notification be
given? (4) If a private person can sue the government for failing to provide consular
notification without delay, what is the appropriate remedy? (5) Regardless of whether
96

Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
Id.
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Mexican government protests Texas execution,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/08/06/mexican.executed/index.html
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See id.
100
See Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), filed June 5, 2008, available at www.icj-cij.org. The ICJ issued
a provisional order in July 2008 requesting that the United States postpone any executions until it could
review Mexico’s request for clarification but, obviously, Texas decided not to comply with that request.
ICJ Order, July 16, 2008.
101
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2009 I.C.J. 1, 18 (Judgment) (Jan19).
102
Under U.S. law, a self-executing treaty is one that is directly enforceable in U.S. courts without the need
for implementing legislation. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). More recently, in Medellin,
the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “What we mean by ‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has automatic
domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.” Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353 n.2.
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private suits are available, what remedy does the United States owe its treaty partners
when it violates the VCCR by failing to provide prompt consular notification?
Thus far, the U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely decided whether the VCCR is
self-executing, holding in Avena only that the ICJ’s judgment is not self-executing and
side stepping the issue of the self-executing nature of the underlying treaty itself.103
There is some evidence that the political branches considered the treaty to be selfexecuting at the time of ratification. When the executive branch submitted the VCCR to
the Senate for its advice and consent, State Department Deputy Legal Advisor J. Edward
Lyerly testified that: “The Convention is considered entirely self-executive and does not
require any implementing or complementing legislation.” 104 The Senate gave its advice
and consent to the treaty with that understanding. Whether the courts agree with this
understanding remains to be seen.
The U.S. Supreme Court also has assumed without deciding that Article 36 of the
VCCR does create individually enforceable rights. 105 At least four of the Justices have
expressly stated that they would find an individual cause of action for a VCCR Article 36
violation, but the majority has not reached the issue on the merits. 106 It also has been
suggested in some lower court cases that an individual may be able to bring a claim for
relief on different grounds, such as a suit under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution for ineffective assistance of counsel or a suit under other federal laws such
as the Alien Tort Statute. 107
The U.S. Supreme Court also has not addressed the issue of how soon after arrest
and detention consular notification must be given. In Avena, the ICJ held VCCR Article
36(1)(b) satisfied when Texas gave notice to the Mexican consulate five calendar days
(three business days) after arresting one defendant, Mr. Hernandez. 108 However, the ICJ
also held that Texas breached its separate obligation to notify Mr. Hernandez about his
right to consular notification without delay in the first instance. 109 Few U.S. courts have
had the opportunity to address the issue. 110
The U.S. State Department has offered the following guidance with respect to the
timing of the notice: “[Consular] notification should also occur ‘without delay’ after the
foreign national has requested that it be made. The Department of State also considers
‘without delay’ here to mean that there should be no deliberate delay, and that
notification should occur as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances. The
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See Sanchez-Llamas 548 U.S. at 374, 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107
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See id. at 54.
110
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Department of State would normally expect notification to consular officials to have been
made within 24 hours, and certainly within 72 hours.” 111
With respect to the appropriate remedy, Article 36 of the VCCR states that: “The
rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso; however, that the said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this Article are intended.” 112 Thus far in addressing remedies
under the VCCR, the Supreme Court has stated that suppression of evidence is not an
appropriate remedy, 113 but has not yet provided guidance as to what would be an
acceptable remedy to give Article 36 rights the “full effect” to which they are entitled.
Finally, it is not clear what reparation the United States owes to its treaty partners
when it breaches its obligations under the VCCR. In past cases such as Breard,
LaGrand, and Avena, the United States has offered an apology and a promise to work
harder to prevent future violations. 114 During the Avena litigation, Mexico expressed its
dissatisfaction with these remedies, but no agreement has been reached between the U.S.
and Mexico as to the appropriate reparation for the established treaty violations in Avena.
In conversations the author has had with various consular officers, they have
expressed bitter disappointment with the United States’ perceived inability or
unwillingness to abide by its international obligations in this regard and wonder whether
they are receiving the intended benefit of these consular conventions. And, of course, the
inability or unwillingness of the United States to provide a meaningful remedy for treaty
violations has implications for the millions of Americans who travel abroad each year
and rely on their right to contact the U.S. consulate for assistance if they find themselves
in trouble. 115
VI.

Conclusion

The administration of President John F. Kennedy devoted considerable resources
to the negotiation and successful conclusion of treaties governing consular relations. One
of the primary concerns driving this effort was the protection of American citizens when
they are arrested or detained abroad. President Kennedy and his staff undoubtedly would
be disappointed to know that, 45 years later, the United States is still struggling to
111
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implement these rights in a meaningful way. One can only hope that through diplomatic
negotiations, strategic litigation, and educational outreach, the United States will improve
its implementation of consular notification rights in the future.
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Chapter 14
“We Choose to Go to the Moon”
JFK and the Race for the Moon,
1960-1963
Richard E. Collin
Space Exploration on the Eve of the Kennedy Presidency
At the time of John F. Kennedy's election to the U.S. Presidency on November 8,
1960, the Space Age was three years old. The Soviet Union had launched it with a
successful orbiting in October 1957 of Sputnik I, an aluminum ball measuring 23 inches
in diameter and weighing 184 pounds. It was not until the following January in 1958 that
the United States orbited its first satellite, Explorer I.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued its high-profile thrust into space,
capturing the world’s imagination with a series of “firsts” – orbiting the first living
creature, a female dog named Laika (in Sputnik II, November 3, 1957); sending the first
manmade probe to impact another world, in this case, the Moon (Luna II, September 12,
1959); and taking the first photographs of the far side of the Moon (Luna III, October 4,
1959).
Space, JFK and the 1960 Campaign
A key theme in Kennedy's race for the White House was his claim that the
country's prestige had declined under the Eisenhower Administration, principally because
of its record in space.
During the campaign, Kennedy pounded hard about what he perceived as
America's failures in space. Yet he remained silent about what he had in mind for his own
program. He was not at all convinced that manned space flight should play a role in his
Administration. 1
As U.S. Senator from Massachusetts from 1953 to 1960, Kennedy had displayed a
marked lack of interest in space. Aerospace pioneer Dr. Charles Draper of the
1
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology remembered when, a few years before the 1960
election, he met Kennedy and his brother, Robert, at a Boston restaurant, hoping to get
them interested in space exploration. The Kennedy brothers, said Draper, had treated his
pitch with good-natured ridicule. According to Draper, JFK and RFK "could not be
convinced that all rockets were not a waste of money and space navigation even worse." 2
And Life Magazine's White House correspondent, Hugh Sidey, observing Kennedy in his
first months as President, thought that space was JFK's weakest area. In Sidey's view,
Kennedy understood less about space than any other issue when he assumed office. Said
Dr. Jerome Wiesner, the President's science adviser, "He hadn't thought much about it." 3
Kennedy brought to the Presidency a world view that the Western and Communist
nations were in a constant struggle for advantage with the so-called Third World
emerging nations.
Once Kennedy perceived that space accomplishments played a decisive role in the
competitive relationship between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, he put
aside his initial hesitant approach and embraced exploration with extraordinary
enthusiasm and articulation. It was in this geopolitical context that JFK decided in May
1961 to go before Congress and make his dramatic announcement about sending a man to
the Moon “before this decade is out.”
Spring 1961 and Events Leading Up to the Moon Speech
Kennedy was inaugurated as the 35th President of the United States on January 20,
1961. On April 12, Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first human in space,
orbiting the Earth one time. 4
Less than a week after Gagarin's space spectacular came the Bay of Pigs fiasco, in
which a U.S.-supported attempt to overthrow the Cuban dictatorship of Fidel Castro was
routed. Kennedy was also preparing for an early June summit meeting with Soviet leader
Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna.
Against this backdrop of pressing events, JFK turned to his Vice President,
Lyndon B. Johnson, a longtime space advocate and chairman of the newly revived and
reorganized Space Council. On April 19, the President asked Johnson for
recommendations on how to accelerate the space program, following it up with a
memorandum to the Vice President the next day, which included this question:
Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets
by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around
the Moon, or by a rocket to land on the Moon, or by a
2
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rocket to go to the Moon and back with a man? Is
there any other space program which promises
dramatic results in which we could win?
On April 28, Johnson sent Kennedy a five and a half page memorandum which
included this answer to the question about the feasibility of sending men to the Moon:
. . . As for a manned trip around the Moon or
a safe landing and return by a man to the Moon,
neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. has such a
capability at this time, so far as we know. The
Russians have had more experience with large
boosters and with flights of dogs and man. Hence
they might be conceded a time advantage in
circumnavigation of the Moon and also in a manned
trip to the Moon. However, with a strong effort the
United States could conceivably be first in these
accomplishments by 1966 or 1967... 5
The Commitment to Go to the Moon
Armed with Johnson's information and astronaut Alan Shepard's successful suborbital flight on May 5, President Kennedy went before the Congress May 25 and called
upon the nation to commit itself "to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of
landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth." Kennedy also
emphasized the importance of the space race on the perceptions of people in the Third
World:
... if we are to win the battle that is going on
around the world between freedom and tyranny, if we
are to win the battle for men's minds, the dramatic
achievements in space which occurred in recent
weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the
Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the
minds of men everywhere who are attempting to
make a determination of which road they should
take... 6

Prior to Kennedy’s speech, a debate had taken place in Administration circles
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However, NASA officials, realizing the difficulty of meeting distant target dates because
of their work on Project Mercury, the first program to put Americans into space,
recommended JFK generalize it by announcing an effort at a lunar landing within the
decade. The President agreed to that.
Kennedy's decision to make the commitment was based on more than Johnson’s
recommendation, Shepard's triumphant flight and JFK's perception of a West-versusCommunist ideological struggle. The President also had solid technological reasons for
promoting the Moon shot, also called Project Apollo. In mid-1959 NASA planners, given
the responsibility of choosing a goal that would best utilize American potential in space,
selected a manned lunar landing as their agency's second-generation manned space flight
effort. As John Logsdon emphasizes in his comprehensive study of the Apollo Project,
The Decision to Go to the Moon, “almost two years before the Kennedy political decision
to attempt a manned lunar landing program, NASA had chosen such a program on
technological grounds as the logical successor to Project Mercury . . .” 7
Kennedy's Moon Commitment Draws Criticism
Critics did not accept the Kennedy Administration's argument that international
and ideological rivalry demanded a multi-billion dollar response to Soviet space
spectaculars. Instead, many considered the Moon target "madness," no more than a
display of national machismo between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.8
Former President Eisenhower also joined in the attack. In August 1962, he asked
in the Saturday Evening Post, "Why the great hurry to get to the Moon and planets?" He
supported space research, but not a "fantastically expensive crash program." And if
prestige was the true goal, asked Eisenhower, then "point to our industrial and
agricultural productivity; why let the Communists dictate the terms of all the contests?"9
He again lambasted Kennedy's program in June 1963, when he called spending $40
billion to reach the Moon "just nuts." 10
Eisenhower continued to believe the Moon commitment a major mistake long
after Kennedy was dead. Astronaut Frank Borman wrote Eisenhower about his view in
June 1965 and received this reply, dated June 18:
...What I have criticized about the current
space program is the concept under which it was
drastically revised and expanded just after the Bay of
Pigs fiasco. . . it immediately took one single project
or experiment out of a thoughtfully planned and
7
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continuing program involving communications,
meteorology, reconnaissance and future military and
scientific benefits and gave the highest priority,
unfortunate in my opinion, to a race, in other words, a
stunt... 11
Kennedy used a variety of forums to answer his critics, from news conferences to
public speeches. To those critical of concentration on a lunar landing, he pointed out that
it represented a broad-based scientific effort and that some 60 other unrelated projects
also comprised 25 percent of NASA's total budget.
In the late summer of 1962, Kennedy delivered his most revealing speech on
space exploration, as he explained the whys of his policy and attempted to quiet the
growing chorus of critics. He told a September 12 audience at Rice University in
Houston, Texas:
. . . We set sail on this new sea because there
is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be
won, and they must be won and used for the progress
of all people. For space science, like nuclear science,
has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become
a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the
United States occupies a position of pre-eminence
can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a
sea of peace or a new, terrifying theater of war...
But why, some say, the Moon? Why choose
this as our goal? And they may well ask why climb
the highest mountain? Why, 35 years ago, fly the
Atlantic? Why does Rice play Texas?
We choose to go to the Moon. We choose to
go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things,
not because they are easy, but because they are hard,
because that goal will serve to organize and measure
the best of our energies and skills, because that
challenge is one that we are unwilling to postpone,
and one which we intend to win...
It is for these reasons that I regard the
decision last year to shift our efforts in space from
low to high gear as among the most important
decisions that will be made during my incumbency in
the Office of the Presidency...
The growth of our science and education will
be enriched by new knowledge of our universe and
environment, by new techniques of learning and
11
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mapping and observation, by new tools and
computers for industry, medicine, the home as well as
the school. Technical institutions, such as Rice, will
reap the harvest of these gains.
And finally, the space effort itself, while still
in its infancy, has already created a great number of
new companies, and tens of thousands of new jobs...
During the next five years, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration expects to double the
number of scientists and engineers in this area, to
increase its outlay for salaries and expenses to $60
million a year; to invest some $200 million in plant
and laboratory facilities; and to direct or contract for
new space efforts over $1 billion from this Center in
this City...
Many years ago the great British explorer
George Mallory, who was to die on Mount Everest,
was asked why did he want to climb it. He said,
"Because it is there."
Well, space is there, and we're going to climb
it, and the Moon and the planets are there, and new
hopes for knowledge and peace are there. And
therefore, as we set sail, we ask God's blessing on the
most hazardous and dangerous and greatest adventure
on which man has ever embarked. 12
Kennedy Privately, Publicly Debates and Defends the Commitment
Two months later, Kennedy met with his advisors to discuss the space program.
Among those at that White House meeting on November 21, 1962 were NASA
Administrator James Webb, Science Advisor Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Director of the Bureau
of the Budget David Bell and several of Webb’s chief NASA administrators.
Kennedy called the meeting because of several developments, including media
reports that NASA was not devoting sufficient attention to the Apollo lunar landing
program, and whether a supplemental appropriation of $400 million to NASA’s current
budget was needed.
This meeting was recorded, but the tape was not released until August 2001. At
the meeting, Kennedy made it clear how much the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet
Union was a factor in his commitment to go to the Moon. He also talked about his desire
that NASA publicly emphasize that the lunar landing initiative was its top priority:

12
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… I do think … that the policy ought to be
that this is the top priority program of the Agency,
and one of the two things, except for defense, the top
priority of the United States government. I think that
is the position we ought to take. Now, this may not
change anything about that schedule, but at least we
ought to be clear, otherwise we shouldn’t be spending
this kind of money because (my emphasis) I’m not
that interested in space. 13
Only moments before, Kennedy had said, “And the second point is the fact that
the Soviet Union has made this a test of the system. So that’s why we’re doing it.” 14
In a revealing analysis of this meeting, U.S. space historian Dwayne A. Day
makes the case that Kennedy’s comments:
… were perfectly consistent with his decision
to establish the lunar goal in the spring of 1961. He
made that decision in response to Yuri Gagarin’s
April 1961 flight around Earth and possibly –
although this is less clear – in response to the
humiliation he and the country suffered at the Bay of
Pigs at the same time. Apollo was a political decision
to achieve a political goal, to demonstrate the
technological and organizational power of the United
States and thereby demonstrate that democratic
capitalism was superior to Soviet-style communism
as a form of societal organization … as President, he
viewed space as merely an extension of political
competition – and potentially cooperation – between
the superpowers.
Kennedy showed no other
enthusiasm about space exploration outside of this
political context. 15
Publicly, Kennedy continued to vigorously defend his lunar commitment during
the last year of his life. However, criticism continued to grow in 1963. The tone was set
on January 29 by The New York Times, when it questioned the wisdom of making a
manned lunar landing the top U.S. space priority. In its lead editorial that day, the Times
wondered about its worth:
...The achievement of a manned lunar landing
within this decade is sometimes justified on grounds
13
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of national prestige. This argument is based on the
doubtful assumption that if we do not place a man on
the Moon in this decade, Russia will get there first.
But the question remains whether the prospective
gain in prestige outweighs the loss in development of
scientific and human resources in other directions...
Whether the $20 billion (or $40 billion) race
to the Moon is justified on scientific, political or
military grounds, we do not think the matter has been
sufficiently explained or sufficiently debated. We
hope it will be in the present Congress. 16
Conservative columnist William F. Buckley, Jr., on June 1 proposed conceding an
initial lunar landing to the Soviets with the argument, "Very well, you have reached the
Moon, but meanwhile here in America, we have been trying, however clumsily, to spread
freedom and justice." 17
Just as conservatives urged Kennedy to shift space priorities to other areas,
including defense, many liberals called for more of the space funding to be allocated for
social programs. Democratic Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas on June 3 urged that
Project Apollo be cancelled. Senator William Proxmire, a Wisconsin Democrat, minced
no words. In a speech November 4, 1963, he blasted Kennedy's space program as
"corporate socialism." 18
Throughout the news conferences of his last year in office, Kennedy defended his
space policy. On March 21, 1963, he told reporters, "We are expending an enormous sum
of money to make sure that the Soviet Union does not dominate space. We will continue
to do it..." 19 On October 31, the President called his program "essential to the security of
the United States, because... it isn't a question of going to the Moon. It is a question of
having the competence to master this environment..." 20 At his last news conference,
November 14, 1963, JFK noted the space program's contribution to U.S. defense: "We
spend $5 billion on space, of which at least a good percentage has a military implication
in the sense of our national security..." 21
In the fall of 1963, the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Company, the prime
contractor for the lunar module that would eventually take men to the Moon's surface,
had a poll conducted about the Apollo Project. Most opinion leaders were skeptical
about the advantages of a lunar landing by 1970. However, among the general public
almost 50 percent said they were satisfied with the space program and its lunar goal, and
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25 percent wanted to speed up the timetable. Less than one-third thought it should be
slowed down or demoted on the list of national priorities. 22
Efforts at U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Moon Expedition
As part of an attempt to temper criticism that he was not doing enough to promote
the possibilities of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, Kennedy went before the United
Nations on September 20, 1963 – five days before his visit to the University of North
Dakota -- and proposed a joint expedition to the Moon.
After praising U.N. actions to prohibit sovereign claims in outer space, Kennedy
asked:
...Why, therefore, should Man's first flight to
the Moon be a matter of national competition? Why
should the United States and the Soviet
Union...become involved in immense duplications of
research, construction and expenditure? Surely we
should explore whether the scientists and astronauts
of our two countries — indeed of all the world —
cannot work together in the conquest of space,
sending someday in this decade to the Moon not the
representatives of a single nation, but the
representatives of all our countries.” 23
Kennedy historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his memoir of JFK's Presidency,
A Thousand Days, writes that Kennedy had initially made such an offer to Soviet Premier
Khrushchev at their June 1961 summit meeting in Vienna, almost two and a half years
before the U.N. proposal. 24
Kennedy's last public comment on this issue came at his news conference of
October 31, 1963, when he said the Soviets had not responded to his U.N. proposal. 25
However, Sergei Khrushchev, the son of the Soviet Premier, says that his father
did seriously consider Kennedy’s proposal. He writes in Nikita Khrushchev and the
Creation of a Superpower that:
The last time Father returned to this subject
was in November, about a week before Kennedy’s
tragic death. He said that when Soviet ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin met with the U.S. President (on
22
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August 26, 1963), Kennedy referred to the lunar
program … and asked Dobrynin to assure Father that
his proposal to associate the lunar projects of our two
countries was a serious one and that he would like to
discuss it in detail in the future. ‘I must think about
it,’ said Father pensively, adding: ‘It’s very tempting.
We would save lots of money, not to speak of
everything else.’ 26
Kennedy's proposal drew a mixed response in the United States. There had long
been opposition in Congress about the idea of cooperating in space with the Soviet
Union. Some members feared that if it happened, the Soviets would manage to get the
better of the deal. In the fall of 1963, both houses of Congress attached amendments to
NASA's appropriations bill for FY 1964, opposing Kennedy's proposal. The House
amendment prohibited the use of any money for a manned lunar landing attempted in
cooperation with a Communist country. The Senate amendment was designed to bar a
joint effort with any other country without the consent of Congress. 27
Kennedy continued to pursue the idea of a joint Moon mission until the very end
of his Presidency. On November 12, 1963, ten days before his death, he ordered a
comprehensive Administration review of its feasibility. 28
Kennedy's Final Days in Office
In the fall of 1963, U.S. space policy was a dominant theme in Kennedy's public
statements and activities. In addition to his speech calling for a joint U.S.-Soviet lunar
effort, he defended the rising costs of his policy. He also talked about the peaceful use of
space, dismissed rumors that the Soviets had abandoned the Moon race, and pointed out
the economic advantages his space effort was bringing the United States.
On November 16, he visited Cape Canaveral, where he examined the construction
sites that would build and launch the Saturn V that would take men to the Moon’s surface
68 months later. He also received a detailed briefing on the progress toward that goal and
reviewed models of the space hardware needed to make it a reality.
Four days later, the Senate chopped $612 million from Kennedy's NASA budget
request for FY 1964. The next day The New York Times commented editorially about the
cut, saying it raised "a serious question of whether the Administration can count on the
budgetary support necessary to achieve a lunar landing by the 1969 deadline." 29
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That same day, November 21, 1963, Kennedy spoke at the dedication of the
Aerospace Medical Health Center in San Antonio, part of a three-day political swing he
was making through Texas in preparation for his 1964 re-election campaign. It would be
his last extensive public statement about space, coming less than 24 hours before his
assassination. Kennedy talked about his recent trip to Cape Canaveral, where he had seen
the Saturn C-I booster rocket, and was upbeat about its scheduled launch that December,
when it would carry the largest payload ever sent into space. And he reiterated his
commitment to the exploration of space:
... Frank O'Connor, the Irish writer, tells in
one of his books how, as a boy, he and his friends
would make their way across the countryside, and
when they came to an orchard wall that seemed too
high and too doubtful to try and too difficult to permit
their voyage to continue, they took off their hats and
tossed them over the wall — and then they had no
choice but to follow them.
This Nation has tossed its cap over the wall of
space, and we have no choice but to follow it.
Whatever the difficulties, they will be overcome.
Whatever the hazards, they must be guarded against.
With the vital support of this Aerospace Medical
Center, with the help of all those who labor in the
space endeavor, and with the help and support of all
Americans, we will climb this wall with safety and
with speed — and we shall then explore the wonders
on the other side. 30
Conclusion
In conclusion, John Kennedy's goal of landing an American on the Moon by the
end of the 1960s was not an unrealistic one, despite charges that it was an unnecessary
waste of the nation's resources.
The Moon commitment made much sense, and looks better as time goes on.
Kennedy's move accomplished several important things. It revived a sagging aerospace
industry, bringing it back to its cutting-edge lead in international technology. It
established the permanent presence of a manned space program within the context of
U.S. space exploration efforts. It once and for all established NASA as a viable civilian
space agency, strong enough to stand on its own and free of dominance by the military;
and it accelerated by many years development of equipment needed for a Moon mission,
which in turn provided spinoffs on Earth that otherwise would not have been available to
consumers until years later, from major advances in health care to the use of personal
computers and much more.
30
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Certainly, there was a downside to his Apollo commitment — the massive gutting
of the space bureaucracy after the goal had been accomplished and the resulting
thousands of personnel laid off as a result of the project's fallout. But it is unfair to blame
Kennedy for that.
Kennedy's commitment to land Americans on the Moon symbolizes the best of
his space policy. The goal struck a deep chord with the American people — many
remembered President Kennedy on July 20, 1969, as Neil Armstrong landed the lunar
module, the Eagle, on the surface of the Moon.
That same day, Kennedy was also remembered at his resting place in Arlington
National Cemetery. A note placed on his grave, by an unknown person, notified JFK that
his dream had been realized. It read: "Mr. President, the Eagle has landed."
Kennedy speculated he might not live to see the Moon landing become reality.
That's according to his brother-in-law, R. Sargent Shriver, who related the story to The
Miami Herald the day Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins left for the Moon. The President,
said Shriver, had told him and other family members that "if I die before it is
(accomplished), all of you here now just remember when it happens I will be sitting up
there in Heaven in a rocking chair just like this one, and I'll have a better view of it than
anybody." 31
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Chapter 15
The Indochina Bind: John Kennedy and Vietnam
Albert I. Berger
Recently, when thinking about JFK and Vietnam, it occurred to me that I might
offer a few observations from some frequently overlooked sources instead of a formal
research paper. The sources are rather old; but they still seem instructive. The first is the
late novelist Norman Mailer whose article entitled “Superman Comes to the
Supermarket” appeared in Esquire magazine in the fall of 1960. The second is Daniel
Ellsberg who included “The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine” in his 1972
collection of essays, Papers on the War. Finally, I want to draw on some insights
developed in quite another context by James Warner Bellah and Willis Goldbeck.
Mailer’s article, like so much of what he wrote, was a synthesis of his genuine
capacity for cultural insight broader and deeper than the usual run of journalism and his
very considerable ego; but he captured a useful truth about John Kennedy nonetheless.
“[H]e was,” Mailer wrote, “like an actor who had been cast as the candidate.” He was a
good actor, but not a great one, according to Mailer. He said it was too easy to see the
gap between the role and the man, the aloof detachment that many others noted about
Kennedy; but he attributed that quality to “the remote and private air of a man who has
traversed some lonely terrain of experience, of loss and gain, of nearness to death, which
leaves him isolated from the mass of others.” 1 Yet Kennedy was not Mailer’s man, not at
first. The emotional and literary high point of the article was Eugene McCarthy’s
nomination of Adlai Stevenson, “the passion . . . of everything in America which was
defeated, idealistic, innocent . . . . the plea of the bewildered who hunger for simplicity
again . . . .” 2 Yet Kennedy’s “potentiality to excite” intrigued Mailer; his election would
be, he said, “an existential event: he would touch uncharted depths in American life. He
understood that Kennedy’s politics were ordinary, even “prefabricated,” he expected his
unconventional persona to push his political acts towards the conventional. He expressed
his distaste for what he took to be the candidate’s “dullness of mind,” yet
one knew . . . that regardless of his overt politics, America’s tortured psychotic search for
security would finally be torn loose from the feverish ghosts of its old generals . . . and
we as a nation would finally be loose again in the historic seas of a national psyche which
was willy-nilly and at last, again, adventurous. And that, I thought, that was the hope for
America.

1

Norman Mailer, “The Third Presidential Paper—The Existential Hero: Superman Comes to the Supermarket,” The Presidential
Papers (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1963; Berkeley Medallion rpt., 1970), 45, 48.
2
Ibid., 57.
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“So,” he wrote later, “I swallowed my doubts, my disquiets . . . and did my best to
write a piece which would help him to get elected.” 3 The article was, by his own later
admission, a meretricious act of propaganda, a distortion of reality written in a vain and
ultimately unsuccessful effort to affect reality. 4
Yet he was not wrong, at least not entirely. Kennedy had had two brushes with
death—his own shipwreck and his older brother’s death in an aircraft explosion—and he
was indeed an actor (if hardly the professional that Ronald Reagan had been). And his
persona has eclipsed his reality. In the nearly half century since Mailer wrote, people’s
memories of the flesh-and-blood John Fitzgerald Kennedy have become very fuzzy.
Kennedy’s assassination (and the possibilities that it foreclosed) became the stuff of
rumor, theory, speculation, and legend. Certainly, the Kennedy myth has obscured just
how traditional JFK's foreign policy was when he entered the presidency; and that myth
has made credible the proposition that Kennedy was prepared to abandon American
support for the Republic of Vietnam following the 1964 election. He might even have
meant what he said to several associates about it. Yet he remained a very conventional
politician whose unconventional public persona gave him no cover at all from some of
the most powerful political forces loose across the land. A calculation of those forces
suggest that his behavior had he lived would have been very different from those his
admirers would like to believe and not at all different from that his successors actually
demonstrated.
This is where Daniel Ellsberg comes in, and we must remember that Dr. Ellsberg
was (and is) considerably more than a fast man with a Xerox machine. In “The
Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine” Ellsberg used what he called “the
McNamara study,” the so-called Pentagon Papers, to dissect presidential decision-making
on Vietnam in several administrations. 5 His conclusions remain very, very troubling, and
not only as they illuminate the origins of the American war in Vietnam.
What Ellsberg called “the quagmire myth” was the explanation for the disastrous
descent into war offered in the late sixties by many former supporters—even architects—
of the war who had come to oppose it. His principal example was Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr.’s The Bitter Heritage. 6 In Schlesinger’s model of decision-making, the Vietnam War
was “a triumph of the politics of inadvertence . . . . Each step in the deepening of the
American commitment was reasonably regarded at the time as the last that would be
necessary. Yet, in retrospect, each step led only to the next, until we find ourselves
entrapped in that nightmare of American strategists, a land war in Asia.” 7
Using the McNamara study’s documents, Ellsberg then provides an almost
microscopic analysis of one critical Kennedy administration decision: to send advisers
3
4
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and materiel assistance to Ngo Dinh Diem’s South Vietnam in November 1961. The
method thoroughly debunks Schlesinger’s model. Kennedy and his councilors took that
decision, and others, Ellsberg says, not in a spirit of overconfidence, but in a spirit of
pessimistic crisis management, at times that the leadership frequently thought things were
much worse than they were willing to explain to the American public. (The long
quotations from documents not serve only as factual evidence; they illustrate Ellsberg’s
instruction in the art of reading bureaucratic memos.) Ellsberg argues that the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations did not undertake initiatives in the vain hope that they might
win the war with them; rather they did what they did in the grim hope that their actions
would stave off defeat, at least for a little while. Why did they do that? And why does
the record show that the actions they took were so frequently considered inadequate to
the problem by so many professional observers of the Vietnamese conflict?
At that point in the analysis, Ellsberg turns to an earlier decision point, 1950 and
Harry Truman’s extension of military aid to France’s effort to retain its colony. Simply
put, Ellsberg’s analysis sees that decision made in the context of the political heat that
administration was taking (from Republicans, to be sure, but also from Democrats like
young Representative John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts) for what people were calling
“the loss of China.” 8 1949 was a bad year for Truman and the Democrats and 1950 was
going to be worse. The Communist victory in China’s civil war had come only weeks
following the first Soviet atomic explosion, and at about the same time that a jury
convicted former State Department official Alger Hiss of perjury for denying he had been
a Soviet spy in the 1930s. Klaus Fuchs, a Soviet spy on the Manhattan project, whose
espionage was not in doubt after his confession, had just been caught in Great Britain.
Secretary of State Acheson and his department spent over a thousand pages explaining
the Communist victory in China and the lack of American control over it—to no avail.
“The argument simply did not ‘sell,’ even though its logic rested on the unarguable facts.
. . .” 9 Instead, Americans, many of them anyway, chose to believe what Sen. Joe
McCarthy told them: “This must be the product of a great conspiracy on a scale so
immense as to dwarf any previous venture in the history of man.” 10 Truman and
Acheson, indeed all Democrats tried to block that punch, but their aid to France in
Vietnam and their immediate military support of invaded South Korea could not protect
them. Having eked out an unexpected victory in 1948, the Democrats saw their power
ebb away beginning in the 1950 Congressional elections. After the polls closed in 1952,
the Democrats were shut out of power in both the executive and legislative branches.
By that time, not only had Truman and Acheson failed to preserve an antiCommunist China, they had also presided over a war that became a long and costly
stalemate. They had made their choice of a Korean stalemate for very good reasons, a
course and reasons with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred. It didn’t matter. With
considerable help from the Republicans (which included Sen. Robert Taft’s very explicit
support of Sen. McCarthy), the people voted the Democrats out. Opponents and voters
8
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delivered a hard, hard lesson, which the Democrats learned well enough to leave them
with two unspoken political rules. First, allow no country—especially no Asian country
and particularly not Vietnam—to “go Communist” (or to develop a coalition including
Communists or even to develop a legal Communist party) while you were in power in the
United States. The price of failure in following this rule would be political extinction.
Second, do not get into a land war on the mainland of Asia. Failure to follow this rule
had lesser immediate consequences, especially if you were acting in accordance with rule
number one. However, the United States could not win such a war at any price realistic
Americans were willing to pay, and the failure to live up to the expectations of what
Acheson called “believers in American omnipotence” would also knock you out of the
corridors of power. 11 “If I tried to pull out completely now,” Kennedy said to Mike
Mansfield in 1963, “we would have another Joe McCarthy red scare on our hands, but I
can do it after I’m reelected. So we had better make damned sure that I am reelected.” 12
Joe McCarthy and what a “Joe McCarthy red scare” could do was no abstraction to
anyone in Kennedy’s foreign policy councils. Lyndon Johnson was a freshman senator
through the years of McCarthy’s rise and fall and had seen how he had destroyed careers,
including those of senators who took issue with him. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had
been Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Truman
administration; and he was the only survivor among the State Department’s postwar cadre
of senior Asia specialists. Kennedy himself had had to steer cautious courses personally
and politically: there was some personal affinity between the two Irish-Catholic senators,
Kennedy’s father liked him, and one of Kennedy’s sisters even dated him briefly. Yet if
the two of them had to appeal to some of the same ethnic groups for support, Kennedy
understood full well that he needed both them and the liberals who despised and feared
McCarthy in order to win national office. Largely, he had ducked the issue and he may
have been relieved when life-threatening surgery kept him away from McCarthy’s
censure hearings.
Kennedy and his people were also, however, survivors of the Korean stalemate, the
second half of Truman’s end-of-term purgatory which meant they were as afraid of
violating Ellsberg’s second rule as they were of breaking the first. They had to be tough
enough, and successful enough, to forestall a Communist Vietnam on their watch. At the
same time, however, they did not want to do so much that they invited Chinese
intervention and the nightmare land war in Asia. Hence, the second half of Ellsberg’s
title, “the Stalemate Machine.”
That brings us to the insights of James Warner Bellah and Willis Goldbeck,
Hollywood scriptwriters who adapted a Dorothy M. Johnson short story into the 1962
screenplay for one of John Ford’s classic westerns, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance.
James Stewart plays an eastern-educated lawyer who has moved to the frontier, an
idealist seeking to be part of “civilizing” the West. Liberty Valance, played by Lee
Marvin, is a hired gunslinger who represents everything Stewart’s character seeks to
11
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overthrow. The tenderfoot lawyer ends up in a gunfight with Valance and he wins. And
“the man who shot Liberty Valance” is thereupon elected to political office, eventually
becoming a US Senator and Vice-Presidential candidate. But the lawyer didn’t shoot
Liberty Valance. A rancher—played by John Wayne—did, for personal reasons that
have to do with the film’s romantic sub-plot. The film, in fact, depicts Stewart’s Senator
trying to “set the record straight” by talking to a small group of reporters and editors. It
doesn’t work. “This is the West,” they tell him. “When the fact becomes the legend,
print the legend.”
Print the legend, indeed. One place to apply that insight is to the mythology of
leaders. Certainly the legends thrown around Jack Kennedy and the ways they got there
are real and important, as are the mythologies of Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, and
Ho Chi Minh. So too are the things those leaders did, whether or not they are consistent
with the mythology. Those myths exist in many different places, viewed by people with
a wide variety of perspectives. We might well ask a question begged (and not answered)
by Norman Mailer’s effort to make Kennedy exciting: how does what the military
historian John Keegan calls “the mask of command” that a leader adopts influence the
great business that leader transacts?
Yet there is something else. As Ellsberg demonstrates very well, both the
perceived Kennedy and the real Kennedy acted in the midst of someone else’s legend as
they sought to obey the rules of political survival in the Cold War. They had to live in
the legendary world Joe McCarthy had convinced Americans was real. The Truman
administration’s defense of its record in China was based on facts and sound reasoning;
its behavior in Korea in accordance with sensible military advice. So too, both options,
staying out of Vietnam, or going in with “war-winning” force were well and truly
founded. It didn’t matter. It couldn’t “sell.”
Writer Richard Rovere once described McCarthy’s method as “the multiple
untruth.” The many small lies McCarthy and his friends reeled off together created a
much larger lie, but an opponent would fly off on a wild goose chase trying to discredit
each small, component part of the Big Lie. An opponent who went after the Big Lie
could be refuted by repetition of one or more of the component small lies. Now,
McCarthy came, and eventually went, having made the mistake of making an enemy of
Dwight Eisenhower. But the caricatures of the Cold War and the Democratic Party that
the McCarthyites created persisted even though they were based on little more than
partisan buncombe. They were the “facts” that had become legend; and the papers
printed the legend.
One expects politics and political competition to have a role in determining the
policy objectives the country will pursue with its military means. Politics and political
competition are how a democratic republic does its public business. Yet it is unfortunate
(to say the least) that we realize the very great degree to which a legend conjured up by
one political party for the specific purpose of denigrating another was able to determine
great questions of peace and war a half century ago. It is something else to recognize that
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the papers, and a 24-hour news cycle, and the Drudge Report, still print McCarthy’s
legend, a half century later.
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Chapter 16
The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Narratives of the
Cold War
Albert I. Berger

The 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis was the most melodramatic and dangerous moment of the Cold War and in some ways scholars and the general public have taken it as a
microcosm of the conflict as a whole. Even the names by which we know it are different
on opposite sides of what Winston Churchill once named “the iron curtain.” The Soviets
named their operation ANADYR, after a river in Siberia half a world away from its real
object, and, even today, Russians know it as “the Caribbean Crisis.”
Even today, the American public and, especially, politicians construct a memory of
the Cold War as a consequence of Soviet aggression. The so-called “Munich analogy”
prevailed in American and western thinking. The United States had to lead the “free
world” in resisting that aggression, lest the USSR get the impression that they could continue and expand it to the point where only another World War could stop them. Especially during the Kennedy administration, and especially during the crises over Berlin and
Cuba, American leaders took every Soviet action as “a test of our resolve.” However, as
more and more of the original documentary record becomes available, and especially as
the archives of the Soviet Union and its former client states open up, one finds oneself
looking at a very different narrative and coming to grips with very different questions.
What the Soviet leadership was thinking was quite different from what the American
leadership thought it was thinking. Of equal or greater importance, what the Soviets were
thinking was different from what the American leadership told the American public it
was thinking. The Soviet leadership and public were equally clueless about the Americans.
Nevertheless, even in this new narrative, the Caribbean crisis remains emblematic
of the Cold War. The critical factors throughout the conflict, from 1943 to 1991, were
American economic superiority, American strategic advantage over the USSR, and, at
least through the Khrushchev years, efforts by the Soviets to deliver on the promises of a
better material life made by the Communist Party to their own people. In a way perhaps
not so different from Dwight Eisenhower’s “New Look” reliance on nuclear weapons and
covert operations, the Soviets sought to leapfrog American leads in bomber strength by
building up its strategic ballistic missile forces and by cultivating friendships in new nations then emerging from the colonial rule of the Americans’ European allies. As Dwight
Eisenhower had once suggested they should be, the Soviets were afraid of American mili185

tary strength and what the United States might do with it. Bluster and bluff on Khrushchev’s part substituted for advantages the USSR didn’t have and a global military reach
Khrushchev was unwilling to pay for. The trouble was that catch-up turned out to be the
most dangerous game of all in the nuclear age.
The very clear understanding of their strategic weakness on the part of the Soviet
leadership went almost completely unnoticed by their American counterparts. The Americans’ great economic power, their advanced technology, their initial leads in nuclear
weapons and launch vehicles, and their geographic advantages sat in the forefront of Soviet thinking throughout the 1950s. American U-2 spy plane flights over Soviet territory
flaunted this strength even as they uncovered the USSR’s weakness. At the same time,
Khrushchev in particular believed that the Soviet Union could gain strength by currying
allies in the developing world, where many nations were just emerging from more than a
century of European colonial rule. For its part, the United States regarded Latin America
as a sacrosanct sphere of influence. Stalin had respected that position. Khrushchev did
not. The Soviets did not create Castro’s revolution, but they were nonetheless willing to
embrace it. The United States refused to tolerate a quasi-Socialist regime, a Soviet client
state, in the western hemisphere. Before 1962, two administrations had unleashed diplomats, economic sanctions, spies, propagandists, assassins, agents, and even a miniature
army to get rid of it.
The spectacular failure of the American-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of
Pigs in 1961 actually encouraged the Kennedy administration to think about going after
Castro again, by any means necessary, including the use of overt military force if it came
to that. Kennedy had, after all, attacked Eisenhower’s record with Castro and Cuba during the 1960 presidential campaign. Now he wanted to make sure that Khrushchev and
the American electorate both understood that he was a tough and resolute leader of the
United States’ side of the Cold War. Neither the Cubans nor the Soviets learned about or
understood all aspects of the planning for Kennedy’s continuing campaign against Castro; but in the contexts of what they feared and what their ideology taught them, they
knew enough to be afraid. The CIA’s infiltration and sabotage campaign, Operation
MONGOOSE, was not yet a prelude to a full-scale landing in mid-1962; but it might have
been. American naval exercises for such a landing clearly signaled what might be on the
horizon. Getting wrong the difference between American capabilities—even American
contingency planning—and actual American intent represented a Soviet intelligence failure. It was, however, a failure easy to understand, and Cuban and Soviet intelligence
erred on what they thought was the side of prudence.
At the same time (and from their point of view, more significantly), the Soviet
leadership had to confront their substantially weaker position in the strategic nuclear confrontation with the Americans. Their shorter-range rockets could devastate Western Europe but they had a ballistic missile strike force capable of striking the United States only
one-tenth the size of the force with which the United States could strike them. Meanwhile, Khrushchev could sit on the beach beside his villa on the Black Sea and visualize
across the water the Jupiter missiles the Americans had emplaced through NATO in Turkey. These were rockets that could strike the Soviet Union in ten minutes. Khrushchev
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and his colleagues might quite literally never know what hit them. And as early as 1959,
Dwight Eisenhower had compared such a NATO base with Soviet missiles in Mexico or
Cuba that might warrant anything from serious concern to direct military action. By early 1962 those missiles, fifteen of them, were operational. So were others in Britain and
Italy.
Khrushchev’s proposal was a stroke that was bold and imaginative, but not at all
prudent. Properly respectful of the destructive power of thermonuclear explosions, and
convinced that such weapons could never actually be used, Khrushchev moved, in the
spring of 1962, to kill two, or even three or four, birds with one stone. The Americans
would eventually discover launch sites for about forty medium- and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles with one-megaton warheads, along with a squadron or so of obsolete,
but nuclear-capable bombers, surface-to-air missiles to protect them, and a contingent of
Soviet technicians to operate the complex. What Khrushchev actually sent was a powerful, integrated military force of 42,000 (about the same size as the American command in
South Korea) that could maintain and launch the land-based ballistic missiles, support
patrols in American waters by Soviet missile-launching submarines, and defend Cuba
from an American invasion. In addition to the strategic rockets, bombers, and antiaircraft equipment, the Soviet weapons included motorized infantry regiments, tanks, and
short-range cruise missiles tipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Most of these last warheads were small; the largest were only about the size of the bomb that had destroyed Hiroshima.
ANADYR’s success required that the ballistic missiles remain undetected until they
became operational at which point action to remove them could lead to their launch.
Other Kremlin leaders had warned Khrushchev of the general risks he was running, and
military advisers had warned specifically that American aerial reconnaissance would
most likely discover the installations before they were ready to fire. The failure of
Khrushchev’s gamble instantly created two dilemmas: once the United States discovered
the missiles the administration had to decide what to do about them. A week later, Kennedy and his aides had made their decisions and the Soviet Presidium had to decide what
to do in response to American demands that were far more rigorous than Khrushchev had
anticipated. Neither government wanted to back down; each realized (to a degree) that
both of them had to back down. Both were painfully aware that one wrong move
(whether deliberate, miscalculated, or simply accidental) could begin a global thermonuclear war.

After gathering his senior advisers (collectively named the “Executive Committee
of the National Security Council” or “ExComm”), Kennedy initially intended to send an
air strike to destroy the missiles where they lay. Gradually, the American leadership realized that bombing alone could not guarantee the destruction of the entire complex; and
ExComm began to talk about a full-scale invasion of Cuba projected to cost over 18,000
casualties. The actual costs would likely have been far higher than that; intelligence had
substantially underestimated the forces—tactical nuclear weapons and relatively large
conventional ground forces—that would have opposed an American landing. However,
even the underestimated resistance gave ExComm pause. Diplomacy was never a first
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option. Kennedy feared that opening with a diplomatic move would make him look
weak. However, ExComm discussed diplomatic solutions, including proposals to remove
the American missiles in Turkey in trade for the Soviet missiles in Cuba, throughout the
first week of the crisis. For several reasons, Kennedy did not like the idea of “trading”
the missiles in Turkey for those in Cuba. Only as Kennedy and his aides realized that a
direct assault was unworkable did they allow themselves to accept the less immediately
violent course of a naval blockade. The “quarantine” provided a show of military force
sufficient to impress both the Soviets and American Cold War politics, while providing
some room to think between drawing the guns and firing them.
The Soviets first realized on October 22nd that the Americans had found them out.
It was the morning before Kennedy announced the discovery of the missiles and the
blockade intended to force the USSR to remove them. Although some of their nuclear
weapons in Cuba were already operational, they had, surprisingly, made no plans for how
to use them if the United States actually attacked the island. Led by Khrushchev, the Presidium, the collective leadership of the Soviet Communist party, debated as heatedly as
ExComm had for the previous week, and then backed down. The longest-range missiles
and some of the warheads were still at sea. Defying Kennedy’s blockade might start a
war, but even if it did not, the US Navy might well capture some of the USSR’s most advanced military technology while it was still crossing the Atlantic. They continued to
deny Kennedy’s charges in public, but the Americans had the military and geographic
advantage. And they had photographic proof that they presented to a live, televised session of the United Nations Security Council.
To defend Cuba against an American attack, the Soviets and the Cubans could have
made do with what they had already had there: the strategic rockets—with their onemegaton warheads—250,000 Cuban troops, 40,000 Soviet troops and their nuclear backups, and the anti-aircraft installations, but they didn’t. Kennedy’s flat-out refusal to tolerate the missiles in Cuba had had exactly, and immediately, the impact he wanted, although, perilously, he didn’t know it. The idea of a Soviet strategic base was instantly
dead. As for his ally, Khrushchev would better have followed the instincts that told him
that no one could actually use nuclear weapons. The Americans had not been willing to
use them to defend their position in Berlin and (to Fidel Castro’s infuriated dismay) Kruschev was not willing to use them to defend Cuba. Kruschev’s problems were now twofold. First, how could he descend from the limb he had climbed out on, without his country losing too much face? Secondly, he, like Kennedy, had to keep the crisis from spinning out of control and igniting a war no one wanted.
It is ironic, and frightening, that the most dangerous moment of the crisis came after the Soviets had agreed to the United States’ principal demand, but before the United
States realized it, and before the deal had actually been closed. The situation was so
tense in Washington on the evening of Saturday, October 27th, that the American Secretary of Defense wondered if he had seen his last sunset.
Khrushchev had on October 26th written to Kennedy offering to remove the ballistic missiles in return for a simple pledge that the US would not invade Cuba. Before
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Kennedy had a chance to respond, however, Khrushchev sent a second letter received on
the morning of October 27th adding to his price a demand to trade for the American missiles in Turkey. While ExComm and the President wondered if the Soviets were doublecrossing them, or if hard-liners had deposed Khrushchev, a Soviet anti-aircraft commander, without authorization, shot down a U-2 with a surface-to-air missile. With the
possibility of a peaceful solution apparently receding, the American military began to
implement more of their contingency plans for an invasion of Cuba. Soviet forces were
preparing to repel them, although without authority to use their nuclear weapons.
It was all the result of confusion, but then so was the eventual resolution of the crisis. After he had sent his first letter, Khrushchev interpreted an article by the American
columnist Walter Lippmann proposing a Turkey-Cuba missile swap as Kennedy’s signal
that he was willing to make such a trade. Upset and angry, and unaware of all the circumstances, Kennedy chose to accept Khrushchev’s first, lower-priced proposal. Shaken
by the unauthorized missile firing, Khrushchev chose to accept Kennedy’s deal before
things got completely out of hand. At the same time, however, Kennedy, equally disturbed, sent his brother Attorney General Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to accept the missile swap, provided that the agreement to do so was kept secret.
Khrushchev, understanding that he had at last gotten lucky, broadcast his acceptance on
Radio Moscow at mid-morning 28 October (Washington time). The two countries had to
clean up some details over the next month (some of them serious); but it was over.
Since the missile swap was kept secret, and implemented months later, no one ever
successfully accused Kennedy of appeasement. Since he had cleared up the strategic
threat, he looked good because he “stood up to the Russians” successfully, especially on
Cuba. Since he had cleared up the strategic threat without war, he looked good to other
Americans because he had stood up to the “hard liners,” who had argued for immediate
and risky military action. (We do not yet know much about the counterparts debating in
the Kremlin.) Kennedy had given himself the Cold War credibility that allowed him to
argue for peaceful relations between his country and the USSR in a commencement address at Washington’s American University in June 1963.
Seen by most Americans as an act of Soviet aggression in their own backyard,
was actually Khrushchev’s attempt to redress the endemic weaknesses of Soviet
military power while, secondarily, defending the Castro regime. It seems to me that,
from a military standpoint Kennedy’s pledge was a more effective shield for the Castro
regime than an isolated outpost, even a large and nuclear-armed outpost, might have
been. (Remember, if you will, the fate of the American-occupied Philippines in the five
months after Pearl Harbor.) Khrushchev had given the United States a “taste of its own
medicine” and he had eliminated the Turkish missiles that he considered humiliating as
well as threatening. In that sense he could and did argue that he had won. But the strategic base in the western hemisphere was more important and he had lost it, as he had lost
considerable face in the Kremlin. Eventually, he lost his job and his successors replaced
his foreign policy of assertive, blustery bluffs masking weakness with long-term, expensive plans to eliminate the weakness in reality.
ANADYR
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The Soviets had taken enormous risks to create what they saw as a long overdue
capability to strike the United States with nuclear weapons and the magnitude of those
risks sobered all the leaders who survived it. Influential factions within the American
and Soviet leadership came to realize that (like nuclear tests) competition for nuclear advantage might become more dangerous than even their most mortal enemies. Even when
all parties wanted to keep a crisis from escalating, miscalculation, mischance, or communications failure would always threaten to send a it spiraling out of control. The US and
the USSR had approached such a disaster closely enough that both sides came to appreciate that the crisis itself was too dangerous ever to repeat. The world after ANADYR would
not again come so close to nuclear war.
The global brush with death brought no respite to the Cold War (in fact, some arms
buildups grew faster); but it did mark a turning point in the superpower conflict. Thereafter, the United States and the Soviet Union could sign some agreements that had never
before been in reach, and negotiations to place controls on nuclear weapons began and
became institutionalized—although consummation would take nearly a decade. In the
United States, John Kennedy’s apparent victory, without war, earned him a reputation for
Cold War management that despite critics who said he was either too reckless or too
meek, eventually overshadowed the failures of his early months in power and the disaster
of the Bay of Pigs. The resolution to the confrontation contributed to the success of Kennedy’s abbreviated third year in office; and it remains a central element of his historical
reputation. The crisis’ drama made it one of the most studied aspects of Kennedy’s presidency, or any other. The initial public record (from only one side) made it, literally, a
textbook case study in American public decision-making and crisis management. However, it was a one-sided case study based on mythology and the impossibility of admitting, in either Washington or Moscow, that the peaceful resolution depended very largely
on two somewhat reckless men who, in extremis, abandoned ideology in favor of their
shared preference for life over death.
In Moscow, Khrushchev’s retreat from the confrontation was a principal reason the
Presidium unseated him as its leader. His colleagues regarded him as too reckless and
too clever in seeking to bluff the United States. Recognizing, as Khrushchev had, that the
USSR held a weaker hand than the Americans, his successors proceeded to abandon bluff
for a new deck of cards, ships, and aircraft, and more missiles in quantities that created
“parity” with the United States within a decade of the crisis. And this may be why the
peace was preserved.
October 1962 highlighted the fact that a nuclear arms race creates situations defying what many still see as “common sense.” Neither military secrecy nor military superiority guarantees a nation’s safety any longer. The threat from nuclear weapons is so great
that one country’s superiority only makes it imperative for that country’s adversaries to
overcome it, by any means possible. The effort alone can lead to the possibility of destruction. Secrecy, if successful, can conceal—anything. Since the adversary firing first
would have the advantage in a nuclear exchange, ignorance and fear can together create
the temptation to “pre-empt” an adversary’s first strike with one’s own.
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Under the circumstances that prevailed during the Cold War, national survival relied on a “balance of terror.” Peace depended on two things: a situation in which both
adversaries possessed roughly equivalent arsenals, so that if either one of them started a
fight they would face “mutually assured destruction”; and an international regime that—
through diplomacy or technology—allowed even the most bitter enemies to see what
each other was doing all the time. Since these insights are counterintuitive, and since
they run counter to traditional military thinking, they became and remained controversial
elements over American political debates about nuclear arms control and nuclear preparedness until the Cold War was over and even more recently.
This new narrative of the Missile Crisis differs markedly from both the standard
and revisionist interpretations offered from various American historians. Yet its role as
an emblematic microcosm remains. Most notably, the story suggests that partisans of
both the Soviet and western side of the Cold War are wrong in their Manichean explanations of it. It would be a mistake to discount the role of ideology, as Vladislav Zubok
emphasizes in his histories of Soviet foreign policy. It would also be a mistake to attribute an ideological motivation to only one side. Both superpowers believed in their own
missionary faiths. Both sides believed in their respective manifest destinies. And, of
course, both sides believed in the traditionally defined national interests that also motivated them as those interests appeared modified by the marriage of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles. Neither really won and neither really lost, which is a good thing. But,
most important, politicians then and now (there and here) notwithstanding, neither was
truly innocent.
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Chapter 17
The Kennedy Justice Department’s
Enforcement of Civil Rights: A View from the Trenches
Brian K. Landsberg

Introduction
The Kennedy Justice Department faced challenges with no modern precedent: the
Southern defiance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the
rise of non-violent protests on a massive scale, and the Administration’s desire to break a
racial caste system that it did not fully understand. Reconstruction provided a precedent
for federal action, but the President was, to some extent, a captive of the myth that federal
intervention had been a colossal failure, leading only to misrule and racial division.
Much has been written about President Kennedy’s mixed record on civil rights —
his philosophical commitment to equality, his ambiguous votes on civil rights bills as a
Senator, his letter regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s prison term in Georgia, his
decision not to make civil rights a priority at the beginning of his presidency, his
appointment of racist federal judges in the South, his proposal of comprehensive civil
rights legislation after two and a half years as President, and so on. 1 In the 1960's and
1970's, several books and articles focused critically on the work of the Kennedy
Department of Justice relating to civil rights. 2 According to those critiques, the
Department’s voting rights enforcement was ineffectual, it refused to protect civil rights
workers from official and private violence, and it was only reactive with respect to school
desegregation. Reevaluation of one aspect of the work of the Division during that period
yields a more nuanced and largely positive picture and suggests that scholars should take
a second look. 3
1

See, e.g., Nick Bryant, The Bystander: John F. Kennedy and the Struggle for Black
Equality (Basic Books 2006); Ted Sorensen, Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History
(Harper 2008).
2

See, e.g., Haywood Burns, The Federal Government and Civil Rights, in Southern
Justice (Leon Friedman ed., Random House 1965); Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice
(Atheneum 1971); Richard Harris, Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order and Freedom in
America (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1970).

3

This period preceded my own work with the Civil Rights Division. I was offered a job
with the Division in the fall of 1963, but could not begin work until cleared by the FBI
and funded by Congress. I was in the air from Sacramento to Washington, D.C. on
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I approach this topic as a lawyer, not as a historian or political scientist, who
would view
the work of the Justice Department solely through the lens of politics. The political lens
is important, but I believe that a complete understanding of the Kennedy Justice
Department must also be based on the placement of the Civil Rights Division’s work in
its legal and practical framework. The Division exercises limited enforcement authority,
defined primarily by statutes. In January 1961, the Division was three years old, the
newest and smallest Division in the Department of Justice. The Department enforced the
law through court actions. The courts had not yet defined the scope of forbidden state
discrimination, had found limits on coverage of private action, and tried criminal cases
before virtually all-white juries who sympathized with the existing racial caste system.
There was no federal police force, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was more
interested in bank robbers and Communists than in racial discrimination. While
nominally a part of the Department of Justice, in practice the FBI was the private fiefdom
of J. Edgar Hoover.
In evaluating the performance of the Civil Rights Division, it is not enough to ask
what the Division could have done in any individual instance. Racial discrimination
against African-Americans was the norm in the deep South, so it was inevitable that,
given the Division’s limited staff, 4 the Division failed to act in some instances. One must
evaluate those failures in the context of the overall performance of the Division.
Moreover, in assessing whether the Division should have stretched the law, taken
extra-judicial actions, or imposed a heavier Federal law enforcement presence, one must
bear in mind the precedential impact of government decision-making during the civil
rights era. We must ask whether we want a Department of Justice that stretches the law,
takes extra-judicial actions, or imposes a heavy Federal law enforcement presence.
After first briefly sketching out the circumstances under which the Kennedy Civil
Rights Division operated, I will begin to paint a picture of the work of the Division on a
micro scale; I believe this approach will help fill in the picture painted by those who have
written at a macro level. This is a longer-term project. For this paper, I have relied
primarily upon reports of the Civil Rights Division on its voting rights cases, Annual
Reports of the Attorney General, Civil Rights Commission reports, court opinions, and
the files of one Division attorney who served during that period. Together, these sources
portray a small band of lawyers and support staff engaged in a Sisyphean effort to secure
the right to vote, while at the same time devising ways to combat racial segregation of
schools and interstate transportation. The Division did this even though Congress failed
to authorize a direct frontal attack on racial segregation.
November 22, 1963, when the pilot informed us that President Kennedy had been shot. I
began work in January 1964, under President Johnson and Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy.
4

See infra, 4-5.
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The turbulent years, 1961-63, saw so much civil rights activity, race-based
discrimination and violence that it is difficult to single out any one issue as most
important. Michal Belknap has written about the Department’s record in response to
violent intimidation of African-Americans in the South, in his article, The Vindication of
Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System and the Anti-Civil-Rights Violence of the
1960s. 5 I have written about the Civil Rights Division’s enforcement of Voting Rights, in
Free at Last to Vote: The Alabama Origins of the Voting Rights Act. My paper will not
focus on those important areas, but will look at the Kennedy Justice Department’s record
in combating school segregation — an area where the Department’s authority was much
less clear. Despite the lack of clear authority, the Kennedy Justice Department actively
adopted innovative legal techniques to bring about school desegregation.
I. Limits on Authority
The Department of Justice was created by Congress in 1870. Its authority is
defined by the legislature. The Supreme Court can, in turn, expand or shrink the
definition provided by the legislature. For example, Congress in 1875 granted the
Department of Justice authority to prosecute individuals who discriminatorily denied
access to public accommodations based on race, but the Supreme Court declared that law
unconstitutional in The Civil Rights Cases of 1883, effectively limiting the authority
Congress had bestowed on the Department of Justice. In 1957, Congress considered a
civil rights bill that included Title III, which would have given the Department extensive
authority to bring suits against those that violated constitutional rights. Over the
objection of then-Senator John F. Kennedy, Title III was stripped from the bill, which was
subsequently enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1957. It was this law that created the
Civil Rights Division. When the Kennedy Administration took office, the Division’s
statutory jurisdiction was limited to enforcing laws against racial discrimination in voting,
criminal deprivations of civil rights, and slavery. Burke Marshall, who became the
Kennedy Administration’s Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in May of 1961,
observed in an interview for Eyes on the Prize:
[W]hen the Kennedy Administration started, the only... statutory authority it had
through the Department of Justice was... in voting rights. So that the first goal of
the Department of Justice was to bring a whole lot of voting rights cases.... 6
Marshall took the limitations on the Department of Justice’s authority seriously.
He recognized the long term dangers if the Department were to take the law into its own
hands, or to seek to act without the permission of Congress or the courts. Marshall did
5

33 Emory L.J. 93 (1984).

6

Eyes on the Prize Interview with Burke Marshall (Nov. 4, 1985), available at
http://digital.wustl.edu.
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not mention the criminal laws in his interview, presumably because it was virtually
impossible to get a Southern all-white jury to convict a white person for a crime of
violence against civil rights workers. And, the Division generally did not bring cases to
enforce Brown v. Board of Education’s ban on school segregation, because it had no
statutory authority to bring such cases. Burke Marshall’s top assistant, John Doar,
explained:
We didn’t have any jurisdiction to bring school cases at that time, and we only
entered school cases as friends of the court, or if there was a violation of a federal
court order. 7
Congress had, in short, not granted the Department authority to address the many
facets
of the racial caste system in an effective way. John Doar described the strategy:
I was engaged with ... trying to see that the laws were enforced or building a
record of why the existing laws weren’t effective. And ... you do that by trying to
make the existing laws as effective as you can. And that’s what we did. 8
II. History and Makeup of the Civil Rights Division
As mentioned previously, the Division was formed in December 1957, as a result
of Congress’ passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Initially, the nucleus of its lawyers
was composed of lawyers from the Civil Rights Section of the Criminal Division. Under
President Eisenhower, the Department of Justice began its Honors Program, hiring the
best qualified law school graduates instead of relying on the old system of cronyism and
patronage. The first Division career attorney hired under Attorney General Kennedy was
a Republican, Arvid Sather. In addition, the Attorney General kept John Doar, a political
appointee toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, in the number two post in the
Division.
Burke Marshall described the Division at the beginning of his tenure as Assistant
Attorney General this way:
Many of the lawyers in the civil rights division were young and had recently been
recruited. They were recruited because they had a commitment to the cause of
racial justice, but they didn't know anything, in a way, they had no experience ...
with the reaction that was going to take place to, against the movement for racial
justice. The Attorney General was new in his job.... I was out of a big law firm in
Washington with a corporate practice.... 9
7

Eyes on the Prize Interview with John Doar (Nov. 15, 1985), available at
http://digital.wustl.edu.
8

Ibid.

9

Marshall interview, supra note 6.
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The Division, which four years earlier began with a staff of fifteen lawyers, had
barely over twenty on January 20, 1961, when President Kennedy was inaugurated. The
Division grew from this modest beginning, eventually reaching a size of about 40
attorneys in August 1963. 10 The Division had initially been composed primarily of
“desk” lawyers, who reviewed files, made recommendations, but did not spend much
time in the areas where the racial caste system was entrenched. By the time the Kennedy
administration took office, Assistant Attorney General Harold Tyler and his top assistant,
John Doar, had already begun to change the way the Division operated. Attorney General
Kennedy embraced the new style: sending attorneys into the field in order to create
relationships with local people, to begin understanding how the caste system operated,
and to find the best cases to litigate. This new style was, in part, necessitated by the
limited usefulness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose leader, J. Edgar Hoover,
had a “mindset that was anti-civil rights movement” and who viewed the Bureau’s job
with respect to civil rights investigations very narrowly. 11 Division attorneys were
expected to work very hard and to work long hours. Thus, career attorney David L.
Norman estimated that he worked an average of 25 hours of overtime per week. The
Annual Report for the year ending June 30, 1961 noted that the field work “has required a
serious work load problem, as evidenced by the fact that twenty-five Division attorneys
have spent an accumulated 904 days in the field during the past fiscal year.” 12
The Division worked primarily through lawsuits in the federal courts. Some
southern U.S. District Court Judges, including some Kennedy appointees, were often
hostile to civil rights, some regarded civil rights cases skeptically, and only a few were
strong enforcers of civil rights. Under the law, district judges’ findings of fact could be
overturned by higher courts only if they were “clearly erroneous,” a very significant
barrier to any fact-based appeal. So the Division sought to present iron-clad cases; it
treated every case as if it would lose in the district court and have to take an appeal under
the exacting, clearly erroneous standard of review.
The Division had no police force available to enforce the law. In cases of
emergency, U.S. Marshals could be deployed, and in a few extreme cases the President
was able to deploy the military and nationalize the national guard. The Kennedy
administration had a well-founded belief that a national police force, or a regional one
confined to the South, posed great danger to liberty and the federal system and would not,
in any event, be effective in stopping racial violence directed at civil rights workers.
Indeed, killings of civil rights activists Viola Liuzzo and James Reeb in Selma, Alabama

10

Testimony of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 242 (Aug. 1, 1963).
11

Ibid.

12

Annual Report of the Attorney General 1961, 167-68.
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and the shooting of James Meredith during his march in Mississippi occurred during a
period of heavy federal presence.
Despite its limited authority, the Civil Rights Division fought a multi-front war.
Top priority was given to the right to vote, both because that was where the Division’s
authority was greatest and also because it was viewed as a right that, once secured, would
lead to other rights. Although the Congress had rejected a proposal that would have
given the Division broad authority to vindicate other constitutional rights, including the
right to equal education, the Division treated school desegregation as a high priority. It
participated in several cases as a “litigating amicus curiae,” a status initially justified as
related to enforcement of court orders. It filed amicus curiae briefs with the Solicitor
General in Supreme Court cases involving school desegregation and sit-ins. It also
sought to bring desegregation suits on behalf of children in military families in school
districts in Mississippi, Alabama, Maryland, and Virginia. It brought suits to desegregate
interstate transportation facilities, such as bus stations and airports. And, it worked on
solutions to various violent crises, such as the Freedom Rides, bombings in Birmingham,
interference with desegregation, and the sit-ins. One can get a small picture of the range
of the Division’s activities, and of what Richard Reeves calls the “density of event,” 13
from a chronology I have created, which primarily lists Civil Rights Division activity in
court. The chronology is attached to this paper.
III. School Desegregation
The Deep South reacted to Brown v. Board of Education by adopting a posture of
massive resistance. When President Kennedy took office, no schools in Alabama,
Georgia, Mississippi or South Carolina were desegregated, and only one AfricanAmerican student attended a desegregated school in Louisiana. 14 Today, it is difficult to
understand the depth and breadth of Southern white resistance to school desegregation.
Efforts to enforce Brown faced multiple obstacles including repression of the primary
initiator of desegregation cases, NAACP; state legislation; threats of violence; uncertainty
as to what steps Brown required; and lack of resources. One obvious solution was to
enlist federal law enforcement. In theory, refusal to desegregate violated a criminal
statute forbidding official conduct that willfully deprived any person of constitutional
rights. However, that statute had normally been used to prosecute violent acts by
government officials, and in any event, it was clear that no southern jury would convict
an official for enforcing the state’s segregation laws. The Eisenhower Justice Department
was of the view that the ambiguities of Brown would make it difficult to bring criminal
prosecutions against school officials who failed to desegregate. Attorney General
Brownell opined that “the discretion vested in the district courts” by Brown was a barrier

13

Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, 19 (Simon & Schuster 1993).
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1961 United States Commission on Civil Rights Report, Vol. 2, Education, 238.
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to prosecute under the federal criminal civil rights statute. 15 Neither desegregation nor
respect for the rule of law would be promoted by criminal prosecutions that were
guaranteed to fail. The more promising route was to bring civil suits seeking to enjoin
school segregation. These would not require a jury trial. However, Congress had not
authorized the Department of Justice to bring civil suits to desegregate the schools.
The Attorney General could have decided to bring desegregation suits despite the
lack of congressional authority. There was some precedent for the Justice Department’s
non-statutory authority16.
However, in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations, the Department took the position that without congressional
authorization it could not bring a civil suit to enjoin violations of the Constitution. There
were policy, practical, legal, and political reasons for this position. As a policy matter,
such suits would be inconsistent with respect for the separation of powers as Congress
had rejected Part III of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Practical considerations included the
Civil Rights Division’s limited staff and its decision to emphasize suits against
discrimination in voter registration. Legally, the Congress’ decision to delete Part III
from the Civil Rights Act of 1957 would likely have led courts to infer that Congress
meant to limit the Department’s authority to what was explicitly granted. The legislative
history of the Act reflects that the deletion of Part III stemmed largely from a desire not to
“approve the race-mixing decision of the Supreme Court of May 1954.” 17 This point was
underscored by the contrast between the powers granted to the Civil Rights Division [to
bring voting discrimination cases] and those granted to the Civil Rights Commission [to
investigate voting discrimination AND denials of equal protection of the laws].
Politically, proceeding without congressional authority might alienate moderates on
whom the Administration would have to rely to get its program through Congress and
Congress was unlikely to increase staff size to enable a school desegregation initiative.
The Kennedy Justice Department’s approach to school desegregation has drawn
criticism. Victor Navasky described it this way: “Candidate Kennedy had promised
innovative litigation to speed school desegregation, but President Kennedy ignored the
counsel of men like Harvard’s Paul Freund and Mark De Wolfe Howe, Philip Elman of
the Solicitor General’s office and William Taylor (eventually director of the Civil Rights
Commission under LBJ), who advised, according to a confidential memo prepared by
civil rights aide Harris Wofford, that the government could sue to desegregate schools

15

See Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights: Race Discrimination and the
Department of Justice, 138 (University Press of Kansas 1997).
16

See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 562 (1895).

17

Statement of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia and other materials reprinted in
Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights: Race Discrimination and the Department of
Justice 12, 187 n. 43 (University Press of Kansas 1997).
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with no new legislation.” 18 The critics of the Kennedy Justice Department do not discuss
the legal merits of this approach nor do they consider the consequences that might have
ensued if the government were to bring school desegregation suits and the courts rejected
the suits on the ground that the Attorney General lacked authority to bring them.
The decision not to assert a general power to enforce Brown did not, however,
mean that the Kennedy Justice Department would ignore school desegregation. Robert F.
Kennedy gave his first speech as Attorney General at the University of Georgia Law
School in May 1961. The Attorney General showed great courage when, before an
auditorium of Southern whites plus the two lone African-Americans attending the
University of Georgia, Kennedy expressed personal agreement with the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education. He urged the people of the South to comply with Brown,
whether they agreed with it or not. He noted that he had already conferred with Southern
officials on a variety of issues and was “trying to achieve amicable, voluntary solutions
without going to court” in school desegregation cases. However, if voluntary efforts
failed, he said the Department would take legal action to enforce the laws. Stressing the
need for national unity, he issued a challenge: “For on this generation of Americans falls
the full burden of proving to the world that we really mean it when we say all men are
created equal and are equal before the law.” 19
The Attorney General’s speech made clear his commitment to school
desegregation, both because it was right and because the law demanded it. The question,
according to one critic, is whether “there was a clear dissonance between Kennedy’s
words and his actions.” 20 I think that is too simplistic a question. It fails to place the
words and actions in the context of the time. It also fails to recognize that inspirational
words may coexist with practicing the art of the possible. Finally, it fails to take account
of developments over time. The critique challenges this course of action: instead of
trying to assert a general authority to bring school desegregation cases, the Justice
Department followed a more cautious course of action. The Department tried through
negotiation with local school officials to bring about peaceful desegregation in some
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Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice 97-98 (Atheneum 1971); see also Nick Bryant, supra
note 1, at 250-260 (alleging that Attorney General Kennedy “had no intention of
hastening the pace of school integration,” and criticizing failure to intervene forcefully
and the reliance on seeking “compliance without confrontation,” as he put it). But see,
J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School
Desegregation 253 (Harcourt, Brace and World 1961) (Peltason criticizes the solely
reactive role of the Eisenhower administration and notes that the Kennedy Justice
Department had “started to take a more active role in school desegregation cases.”).
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Speech of Robert F. Kennedy, University of Georgia Law School (May 6, 1961)
available at http://www.rfkmemorial.org/lifevision/universityofgeorgialawschool/.
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Nick Bryant, supra note 1, at 260.
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urban school districts. 21 More important, the Civil Rights Division looked for other
means of enforcement. It followed a multi-prong approach: traditional amicus curiae
participation in desegregation cases; enlarging the traditional amicus role; bringing suit or
intervening in private suits in order to enforce existing federal court orders; bringing suit
on behalf of children of federal employees in federally impacted school districts; and the
use of emergency powers to combat interference with school desegregation orders. Some
of these techniques had already been used in the Eisenhower administration.
A. Traditional Amicus Curiae Participation in Desegregation Cases
The Rules that apply to the Supreme Court and U.S. courts of appeal allowed the
United States to participate in cases in those courts as amicus curiae [friend of the court].
The U.S. had done so in Brown v. Board of Education, first urging an end to the doctrine
of separate but equal and later arguing that “the vindication of the constitutional rights
involved should be as prompt as feasible.” 22 Early in the Kennedy administration, the
Department of Justice was invited to file a brief in a school desegregation case in New
York. It filed such a brief in the district court in May 1961 and another in the court of
appeals during the summer of 1961. 23 In January 1963, the Department filed a brief as
amicus curiae in the only school desegregation case to reach the Supreme Court during
the Kennedy Administration. Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall argued the case
in the Supreme Court in March. The issue in that case was the validity of a desegregation
plan, which allowed students whose race was in the minority in the school to which they
were assigned to transfer to a school in which their race was in the majority. The
Department argued that the plan was unconstitutional, and the Court agreed. 24 The
Department also pointed out the snail’s pace of school desegregation in the South and
argued that Brown required “the elimination of segregation as soon as possible,” and that
the school boards had a heavy burden to justify any delays. The brief argued: “A
prerequisite of every acceptable plan of desegregation is that it move definitely and
expeditiously away from the old regime of racial discrimination.” 25
B. Enlarging the Traditional Amicus Curiae Role

21

Nick Bryant, supra note 1, at 255.
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Brief of United States on Relief at 4, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955).
23

Taylor v. Bd. of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d. 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
24
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The Department also sought to enlarge the traditional role of an amicus curiae —
to file legal briefs and present oral argument advising the court how to rule — as the
Department sought to use the amicus curiae role to actually litigate cases by undertaking
activities hitherto limited to the parties, such as examining witnesses and filing motions.
The possibility of an enlarged role had emerged in 1957, during the Eisenhower
Administration, in a case involving violent interference with desegregation in Clinton,
Tennessee and then during the Little Rock school desegregation process, when the
Governor of Arkansas had interfered with desegregation orders of the federal court. In
Clinton, the Department participated in examining witnesses in a criminal contempt
hearing, and in Little Rock the Department moved for an order enjoining the Governor
from further interference. 26 In November 1960, the Department entered the New Orleans
desegregation case to challenge a Louisiana interposition statute that interfered with a
federal court order; it continued in that role under the Kennedy administration. 27 Less
than two months after President Kennedy’s inauguration the Department successfully
applied for an order in two Louisiana cases, designating the United States as amicus
curiae and allowing it to file a motion to have a Louisiana statute that would have allowed
school districts to close the schools rather than desegregate them declared
unconstitutional. 28 In 1962, the Department became a litigating amicus curiae in James
Meredith’s suit to desegregate the University of Mississippi, where it became embroiled
in contempt proceedings against Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett. In 1963, the
Department became a litigating amicus in a suit to desegregate Macon County,
Alabama. 29

Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 834 (1957); U.S.
v. Faubus, 2 Race Rel.L.Rep. 958 (1957).
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C. Bringing Suit or Intervening in Private Suits in Order to Enforce Existing
Federal Court Orders
It was a short step from the role of litigating amicus to actual intervention in suits
or even attempting to bring a suit on behalf of the United States. The Eisenhower
administration had attempted to bring a suit against Louisiana to declare its interposition
law unconstitutional. That case was not presented as a desegregation case but as a case to
prevent state interference with court orders to local school boards to desegregate. 30 The
Department’s entry into the New Orleans case as amicus, however, rendered it
unnecessary for the court to reach the question of whether the Attorney General could
bring a separate suit. The Kennedy administration’s first foray into being a party in a
school desegregation case came in April 1961, when the Attorney General moved to
intervene in the Prince Edward County, Virginia case, one of the cases the Supreme Court
had decided in Brown v. Board of Education. The school board in Prince Edward County
had voted to close the public schools rather than comply with the Supreme Court’s
mandate. The Attorney General attempted to justify intervention in the case as necessary
to prevent obstruction of court orders. The trial court refused to allow the intervention
because it had not found that the closure obstructed its orders and because Congress had
refused to enact Part III of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, a refusal that effectively barred
the government from bringing actions furthering desegregation. 31 However, the Civil
Rights Division became an amicus curiae in the case, and Assistant Attorney General
Burke Marshall presented the government’s arguments in the court of appeals in January
of 1963. By the end of 1963, the Civil Rights Division successfully sued Governor
George Wallace to enjoin his interference with desegregation in three school districts. 32
D. Bringing Suit on Behalf of Children of Federal Employees in Federally
Impacted
School Districts
The Civil Rights Division singled out one set of school districts where it believed
it could legitimately bring school desegregation cases; the 587 school districts in southern
and border states that received federal funds for school construction because they enrolled
children of personnel stationed or employed at military installations. While “almost a
score” of those districts had agreed to desegregate by 1963, most did not. The Division
filed a “pilot” case in September 1962 against Prince George County, Virginia, school
system. It won the case the following June, eleven days after President Kennedy
proposed the Civil Rights Act of 1963. 33 The court agreed that the contract the school
30

U.S. v. Louisiana, Civ. No. 10566 (E.D. La. 1960).

31

Allen v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 28 F.R.D. 358 (1961). Later the
court held the closure unconstitutional, Allen v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward
County, 207 F.Supp. 349, 355 (E.D. Va. 1962).
32

U.S. v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963).

33

U.S. v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince George County, 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963).
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board had signed in order to receive over a million dollars of federal construction money
obligated it to follow state law, and that the district had not followed Virginia’s pupil
placement law when it assigned African-American military dependents to all-black
schools. The court emphasized that the ruling did not authorize the United States to sue
to vindicate the personal rights of the children. It treated the case solely as one to enforce
a contract. The Civil Rights Division brought similar cases against four school districts
in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi. In May 1963, before the favorable decision in
the Prince George County case, the courts in three of those cases ruled against the United
States; the court in the fourth case, decided that August, declined to follow the ruling in
Prince George County. 34 The Kennedy Civil Rights Division appealed three of the cases.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in early 1964 and the Supreme Court refused to review that
decision. 35 The court disagreed that the school districts were under any contractual
obligation to desegregate and also held that the United States had not shown that the
segregation burdened the exercise of the war power of the United States. Both rulings
were based in part on the lack of any congressional authorization for suit asserting either
theory.

E. Use of Emergency Powers to Combat Interference With School
Desegregation
Orders
The Justice Department played a major role when hostile reaction to
desegregation orders led to crisis. President Eisenhower had sent federal troops to
enforce a federal court school desegregation order in 1957. President Kennedy issued a
Presidential proclamation deploying federal troops and marshals again in support of
federal court orders desegregating the University of Mississippi in 1962 and another to
support desegregation of the University of Alabama in 1963. Also, in 1963, the President
called the Alabama National Guard into national service to support orders to desegregate
public schools in Mobile, Tuskegee and Birmingham. Each of these moves was reactive.
There was an interesting shift in the statement of grounds for each of the 1963
Presidential proclamations. The proclamation of June 11, 1963, regarding desegregation
of the University of Alabama, refers to an unlawful combination of the Governor and
others “against the authority of the United States” and concludes: “WHEREAS this
unlawful combination opposes the execution of the laws of the United States and
threatens to impede the course of justice under those laws [the President commands them
to cease and desist].” Three months later, however, the proclamation regarding the public
school desegregation concluded by noting that the “unlawful ... combinations ... so hinder
34

U.S. v. Biloxi Municipal Sch. Dist., 219 F.Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963); U.S. v.
Gulfport Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 219 F.Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963); U.S. v. Madison
County Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 1963); U.S. v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
220 F.Supp. 243 (W.D. La. 1963).
35

U.S. v. Madison County Bd. of Ed., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 379 U.S.
929 (1964).
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the execution of the laws ... of the United States within the State of Alabama, that a part
or class of its people is deprived of rights ... named in the Constitution and secured by
law....” 36 The earlier proclamation reflected the position, evident in all the Kennedy
administration’s actions in school desegregation cases up to June 1963, that the Justice
Department was not entering or bringing cases to vindicate individual rights of AfricanAmerican children, but to enforce federal government interests, either in enforcement of
federal court orders or of federal contracts. Shortly after the June proclamation President
Kennedy made his speech proposing the Civil Rights Act of 1963, which would authorize
the Attorney General to bring suit or intervene in suit to ensure the orderly desegregation
of the schools. Under the Act, the Attorney General could bring such a suit upon receipt
of a written complaint from a parent who was unable to initiate appropriate litigation.
This proposal may have inspired the change in the later proclamation, to emphasize that
Governor Wallace was depriving school children of individual rights.
IV. Conclusion
Should the Kennedy Justice Department have taken bolder, more aggressive steps
to end school segregation in the South?
Richard Reeves tells us that one of President Kennedy’s favorite lines from
Shakespeare comes from Part I of Henry IV. Glendower says, “I can call spirits from the
vast deep,” and Hotspur replies: “Why so can I, or so can any man; But will they come
when you do call them?” 37 It would have been easy enough for the Department of Justice
to file suit against all the segregated school systems in the South, or against a sampling of
them. The hard questions come after the lawsuit has been filed. Does the law support the
suit? Do the facts? What shall the remedy be? More aggressive government litigation to
desegregate the schools could succeed only if the Southern courts agreed that the Justice
Department had authority to bring such cases.
There was reason to believe that such suits would be symbolic but not effective.
As the columnist Walter Lippman explained, excision of Part III from the 1957 Civil
Rights Act meant, “that the right against school segregation was ‘not to be enforced by
the executive power of the Federal Government.’” 38 In retrospect, the Fifth Circuit’s
ruling in the impact aid school desegregation cases confirms that assertion of such broad
authority would have met with failure, at least in the lower courts. Even the victory in
Prince George County came in a judicial opinion making it clear that the government had
no authority to sue on behalf of the rights of African-American children. The role that the
36

Proclamations 3542 and 3554.
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Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, 491 (Simon & Schuster 1993).

38

Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the
Struggle for Racial Equality, 325 (Oxford University Press 2004) (quoting Walter
Lippman).
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Department played instead, while more limited, was more firmly based in its law
enforcement role and history. The Department took forceful action, not only against
obstruction and noncompliance with desegregation orders, but also in support of more
desegregation. Its brief in the Goss case was unequivocally in favor of speeding up the
pace of desegregation.
One must view the desegregation issue in light of Congress’ refusal to get
involved. Critics of the Kennedy Administration would put it differently. They fault
President Kennedy for waiting over two years before proposing a comprehensive civil
rights act that would empower the Department of Justice to bring school desegregation
cases. He could, of course, have proposed that legislation in 1961. To paraphrase
Hotspur, however, one must ask, would Congress have passed the law if Kennedy had
proposed it? Even in 1963, the President’s civil rights legislation proposal was a huge
gamble. By the time of his assassination, it was clear that Congress would not pass the
bill that year.
I believe that the Civil Rights Division’s performance, within the resource 39 and
legal restraints, did advance school desegregation. The first phase of desegregation
consisted largely of getting at least token compliance. Most initial desegregation
occurred in the border states. By 1958-59, 733 of the 2,839 biracial school districts in the
17 southern states had desegregated to some extent. In the last two years of the
Eisenhower administration only 44 desegregated, 31 voluntarily and 13 under federal
court order. Four states’ school districts remained totally segregated. 40 The pace of
desegregation quickened during the Kennedy Administration, with over 400 more school
districts desegregating. 41 Only Mississippi remained entirely segregated, despite the
election of Governor George Wallace in Alabama, whose campaign slogan was
“segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.” Firm steps by the
Department of Justice at the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama and in the three
desegregating school districts in Alabama had ensured that states would no longer use
force to exclude African-Americans from formerly white schools. The Supreme Court,
after eight years of relative silence, followed the Department’s recommendation in Goss,
ruling against the minority to majority transfer policy and also indicating that the time for
delay had ended. The Department of Justice was involved in a growing number of cases.
39

Perhaps the Justice Department could have been overcome their resource limitations,
though it is clear that without a large infusion of new lawyers it would have been
impossible for the Civil Rights Division to simultaneously pursue the litigation to enforce
the right to vote and also undertake a multi-state offensive against school segregation.
Attorney General Kennedy said that if the Civil Rights Act of 1963 were enacted, he
would ask for an additional 40 lawyers, doubling the size of the division. Kennedy
testimony, supra note 10, at 241-242.
40

United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1961 Report, Education, 39.
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United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1963 Staff Report, Public Education, 162.
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The President had urged adoption of a bill drafted by the Division that would enable the
federal government to become the primary player in bringing about school desegregation,
a bill that would become law seven months after President Kennedy’s death.
The path to complete desegregation [i.e., every school district under a lawful
desegregation plan] took years to complete. Although a bi-partisan version of President
Kennedy’s Civil Rights bill was enacted in 1964, more than eight years passed before the
South was fully desegregated. The rocky road after 1964 contradicts the claims that if the
Department of Justice had only asserted authority to bring desegregation cases sooner, the
schools of the South would have come into quick compliance with Brown.
The Department of Justice is a law enforcement agency, not a free agent to roam
at will among policies that seem attractive or even morally compelling. Viewed in that
light, the Kennedy Department of Justice set an appropriate standard for enforcement of
civil rights, a standard that has largely prevailed ever since.
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Chapter 18
Civil Rights Division Chronology 1
January 1961-November 1963
Compiled by Brian K. Landsberg

January 1961
1/19
1/24-27

U.S. v. Atlas, Filed.
Sumter County, Ala., Records inspection.

February 1961
2/3
2/20-22
2/21, 23

U.S. v. Atlas, Meeting with Judge and Defendants.
U.S. v. Alabama, (Macon County) Tried.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, Solicitor General Cox argued for
United States as amicus curiae.

March 1961
3/6
3/17

3/27
3/28-30

President issued Executive Order 10925 regarding employment
discrimination by federal contractors.
Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd.; Davis v. East Baton Rouge Sch. Bd.,
United States applied for an order designating it as amicus curiae, and for
leave to file a petition for injunction against enforcement of Acts Nos. 3
and 5 of the Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature of 1961.
East Feliciana County, La., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Alabama, (Bullock County) Tried.

1

This is a partial chronology of activities of the Civil Rights Division during the
Kennedy Administration. It primarily lists court actions, but does list some events and
presidential actions. Dates have been culled from case reports, reports of the Attorney
General and the Civil Rights Commission, histories of the civil rights era, congressional
hearings, and case files. See, e.g., Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1965) (1964 Status Report [Prepared by Attorneys
in the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, for Intra-Department Use]). Where
the exact date of an activity is unavailable, it has been placed at the beginning of the
month in which it occurred without a specific date listed.
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April 1961
4/8
4/11
4/11
4/13
4/13
4/14
4/24
4/25-26
4/27

U.S. v. Manning, (E. Carroll Parish) Filed.
Claiborne Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Jackson Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Atkins, Filed.
Dallas County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., Hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for
preliminary injunction.
Claiborne Parish, La., Records inspection.
Jackson Parish, La., Records inspection.
Allen v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, United States filed
motion to intervene as a plaintiff.

May 1961
5/9
5/10
5/14
5/20-22
5/20
5/24

Autauga County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
inspection.
Lowndes County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
inspection.
Freedom Riders attacked by mobs in Anniston and Birmingham, Alabama
Freedom Riders assaulted in Montgomery, Alabama; Robert F. Kennedy
sent in United States marshals.
U.S. v. U.S. Klans, United States obtained Temporary Restraining Order
from Judge Johnson.
Taylor v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. District of New Rochelle, United
States filed amicus curiae brief.

June 1961
6/19
6/23

6/28
6.29
6/30

Plaquemines Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Civil Aeronautic Board requested that Attorney General file suit to
desegregate Montgomery airport [suit subsequently filed, U.S. v. City of
Montgomery].
Greene County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Pickens County, Ala., Records inspection.
Greene County, Ala., Records inspection.

July 1961
7/6
7/6
7/6
7/6

U.S. v. Ramsey, (Clarke County, Miss.) Filed.
U.S. v. Lynd, Filed.
Clarke County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Forrest County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
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7/7
7/10
7/10
7/10
7/11
7/12
7/19
7/21
inspection.
7/22
inspection.
7/26
7/31
inspection.

United States moved for leave to file amicus brief regarding Mississippi
transportation facility segregation statutes
United States filed brief in Mississippi case regarding segregated
transportation facilities.
Pickens County, Ala., Records inspection.
Plaquemines Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Lucky, (Ouachita) Filed.
Clarke County, Miss., Records inspection
Elmore County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Red River Parish, La., Demand for records inspection and records
St. Helena County, La., Demand for records inspection and records
U.S. v. City of Montgomery, Filed [desegregation of airport].
Barbour County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records

August 1961
8/1
inspection.
8/2
8/3
8/4
8/4
8/5
8/7
8/15
8/31

Russell County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
Elmore County, Ala., Records inspection.
Walthall County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Parker, Filed.
Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., Hearing on plaintiff’s application for
preliminary injunction.
U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(a)], Filed.
U.S. v. Daniel, (Jefferson Davis County) Filed.
Hearing on the Department of Justice request that Interstate Commerce
Commission issue rules regarding segregated bus and terminal facilities.
Jefferson Davis County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.

September 1961
9/11
9/13
9/20
9/21
9/21
9/22

U.S. v. Alabama (Bullock County), Further hearings.
Garner v. Louisiana, Solicitor General filed amicus brief in Supreme Court
regarding sit-in case.
Bullock County, Ala., Demand for records inspection [subpoena].
U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(b)], Filed.
U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(b)], Tried, decided and appealed. Stay of state
prosecution sought from Judge Rives.
Montgomery County, Ala., Records inspection.
East Carroll County, La., Records inspection.
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9/23

At Robert F. Kennedy’s insistence, Interstate Commerce Commission
issued new rules ending discrimination in interstate travel, effective
December 1, 1961.

October 1961
10/3
10/3, 12
10/16
10/26
10/26
10/26

U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(b)], Oral argument in 5th Cir.
Bullock County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Fox, (Plaquemines Parish) Filed.
U.S. v. Duke, Filed.
U.S. v. Ward, (Madison Parish) Filed.
St. Helena County, La., Records inspection.

November 1961
11/13
11/17
11/27
11/27
11/28
11/28

Dallas County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Dogan, (Tallahatchie County) Filed.
U.S. v. Manning, Tried.
U.S. v. Cox, Filed.
Franklin Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Morehouse Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.

December 1961
12/8
judgment.
12/13
12/13
12/13-15
12/16
12/18
12/19
12/20
12/22
12/28
12/28

U.S. v. City of Montgomery, United States filed motion for summary
Hale County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Perry County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Dogan, Tried.
Bush v. New Orleans Sch. Bd., Hearing on United States’ motion for
preliminary injunction.
Jefferson Davis County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Perry County, Ala., Records inspection.
Tallahatchie County, Miss., Records inspection.
Hale County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Louisiana, Filed.
U.S. v. Birmingham, Hearing [desegregation of bus station restaurant].

January 1962
1/3
1/3-10

Bruce v. Rogers, Oral argument in 5th Cir. [records demand case].
Davis v. East Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., United States moved for summary
judgment.
U.S. v. Parker, Tried.
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1/5
1/8
1/8
1/15
1/29

U.S. v. Lassiter, Tried [segregation of interstate transportation facilities].
Clarke County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Monroe County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Monroe County, Ala., Records inspection.
Clarke County, Ala. records inspection.

February 1962
2/15
2/16

2/19
2/21
2/26
2/28

U.S. v. City of Jackson, Filed [segregation in interstate transportation].
U.S. v. Dogan, United States filed appeal.
Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., United States filed supplemental motion
for order requiring certain defendants to show cause why they should not
be held in civil contempt.
Choctaw County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Wilder, (Jackson Parish) Filed.
Lauderdale County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Choctaw County, Ala., Records inspection.

March 1962
3/1
3/1
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5-7
3/6
3/7
3/9
3/12
3/12
3/15
3/17
3/23
3/23
3/24
3/31

Marshall County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Dallas County, Ala., Records inspection.
Hale County, Ala., Records inspection.
Barbour County, Ala., Records inspection.
Cunecuh County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Marengo County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Lynd, Trial. Application for injunction pending appeal filed in 5th
Cir.
Sumter County, Ala., Records inspection.
Wilcox County, Ala., Records inspection.
Forrest County, Miss., Records inspection.
Bossier Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Webster Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Marengo County, Ala., Records inspection.
Marshall County, Miss., Records inspection.
Cunecuh County, Ala., Records inspection.
DeSoto Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., Hearing on United States motion.
Plaquemines Parish, La., Records inspection.

April 1962
4/6
4/6

Pike County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Yazoo County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
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4/13
4/13
4/17
4/18
4/30

U.S. v. Ward, (George County) Filed.
U.S. v. Atkins, Filed.
Caddo Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Pike County, Miss., Records inspection.
Madison County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.

May 1962
5/1
5/1-3
5/2-4
5/7
5/8
5/16
5/23
5/24
5/24

U.S. v. Lynd, 5th Cir. issued contempt citation.
U.S. v. Fox, Tried.
U.S. v. Atkins, Tried.
U.S. v. Parker, Submitted on briefs.
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., United States filed motion to
intervene.
U.S. v. Bibb County Democratic Exec. Comm., (Ga.) Filed.
U.S. v. Bibb County Democratic Exec. Comm., Trial on motion for
preliminary injunction.
Franklin Parish, La., Records inspection.
Morehouse Parish, La., Records inspection.

June 1962
6/4
6/11

6/12
6/13
6/15
6/16
6/19, 22
6/21
6/22
6/25
6/25-29
6/26
6/28
6/28
6/28
6/28

Yazoo County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Alabama Governor, George C. Wallace, failed to halt admission of black
students at the University of Alabama; John F. Kennedy federalized
National Guard and promised additional civil rights legislation.
Medgar Evers killed.
Coahoma County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Ford, (Choctaw County, Ala.) Complaint filed.
U.S. v. Bd. of Educ., (Greene County, Miss.) Filed.
U.S. v. Manning, District Court and C/A proceedings regarding
applications to court.
Lowndes County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Orleans Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Yazoo County, Miss., Records inspection.
Jefferson County, Ala. Demand for records inspection and records
inspection.
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., Hearing.
Jefferson Davis County, Miss., Records inspection.
Richland Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Union Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
West Carroll County, La., Demand for records inspection.

July 1962
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7/2
7/3
7/6
7/9
7/9
7/9
7/12
7/13
7/14-15
7/25
7/25-26
7/26
7/26
7/27
7/28
7/28

U.S. v. Ramsey, Records inspection.
U.S. v. Daniel Records inspection.
Hinds County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Washington, County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Panola County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(a)], Records inspection.
Walthall County, Miss., Records inspection.
Butler County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Manning, District Court proceedings on applications to court.
Greene County, Ala., Records inspection.
Coahoma County, Miss., Records inspection.
Washington County, Miss., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Bd. of Educ., Tried.
U.S. v. Alabama (Bullock County), Further hearing.
George County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Greene County, Miss., Demand for records inspection [by agreement] and
records inspection.
U.S. v. Ward, Records inspection.
George County, Miss., Records inspection.

August 1962
8/2
8/3
8/7
8/7
8/8
8/11
8/13
8/14
8/15
8/22
8/22
8/22
8/23-34
8/24
8/27
8/28

U.S. v. Bd. of Educ., Trial completed.
Forrest County, Miss., Records inspection.
Bossier Parish, La., Records inspection.
DeSoto Parish, La., Records inspection.
Webster Parish, La., Records inspection.
Clarke County, Miss., Records inspection
U.S. v. Mathews, Filed.
Caddo Parish, La., Records inspection.
Warren County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Lee County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
East Carroll County, La., Records inspection.
Orleans Parish, La., Records inspection.
Tallahatchie, County, Miss., Records inspection.
Rankin County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Mayton, Filed.
U.S. v. Mississippi, Filed.

September 1962
9/7

Greene County, Ala., Records inspection.

215

9/17
9/17
9/17
9/17-22
9/18
9/20
9/21
9/24
9/28-29
9/28
9/30

U.S. v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince George County, Filed [impact district
case].
Copiah County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Leake County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Lynd, Trial on contempt, in 5th Cir.
U.S. v. Barnett 2, United States sought to appear as litigating amicus in
Meredith v. Fair and Court of Appeals granted motion.
U.S. v. Barnett, United States moved for further injunction
U.S. v. Barnett, United States filed contempt motion.
U.S. v. Barnett, Hearing before en banc Court of Appeals.
U.S. v. Barnett, Contempt hearings.
U.S. v. Ward, Amended complaint filed.
U.S. v. Barnett, President Kennedy issued cease and desist proclamation
and deployed marshals and armed forces to Oxford to enforce C/A orders.

October 1962
Avent v. North Carolina, Solicitor General filed 82 page amicus brief in
Supreme Court related to civil rights demonstrations.
10/1
Oktibbeka County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
10/12
U.S. v. Barnett, Further contempt hearings.
10/14-15 Griffin v. Maryland, Deputy Solicitor General argued and United States
filed amicus brief in Supreme Court.
10/23-24 U.S. v. Daniel, Tried.
10/25
U.S. v. Bd. of Educ., United States filed appeal.
10/26
U.S. v. Mayton, Tried.

November 1962
U.S. v. Lucky, Depositions of Attorney General, Assistant Attorney
General & Dunbaugh.
11/6-7
Peterson v. City of Greenville and Shuttlesworth v City of Birmingham,
Solicitor General Cox argued sit-in and civil rights parade cases in
Supreme Court.
11/11
Amite County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
11/12-13 Union Parish, La., Records inspection.
11/15
Richland Parish, La., Records inspection.
11/16
U.S. v. City of Shreveport, Tried [desegregation of interstate transportation
facility].
11/16
West Carroll County, La., Records inspection.
11/23
George County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
2

The case was Meredith v. Fair, but the U.S. proceedings were eventually renamed U.S.
v. Barnett, as described in 330 F. 2d 369 (1963).
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11/26
11/26
11/27
11/27
11/27
11/27
inspection.
11/27
11/28

LeFlore County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Wilcox County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Ward, Records inspection.
Claiborne County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
George, County, Miss., Records inspection.
Elmore County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
Wilcox County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Autauga County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.

December 1962
12/3
12/3-4
12/5
12/6
12/6-7
12/6-7
12/10
12/13
12/13
12/16
12/18
12/20
inspection.
12/21
12/26-28

Autauga County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Wilder, Tried.
U.S. v. Ward, Tried.
Jackson Parish, La., Records inspection.
Lauderdale County, Miss., Records inspection.
Madison Parish, La., Records inspection.
Lowndes County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Coahoma County, Miss., Records inspection.
Leake County, Miss., Records inspection.
Pike County, Miss., Records inspection.
Monroe County, Ala., Records inspection.
Benton County, Miss., Demand for records inspection and records
U.S. v. Barnett, United States filed criminal contempt charges.
U.S. v. Ramsey, Tried.

January 1963
1/3
1/8
1/9
1/9
1/9
1/9
1/9
1/14
1/17
1/18

1/22
1/23

Copiah County, Miss., Records inspection.
Warren County, Miss., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Atkins, United States filed appeal.
Goss v. Bd. of Educ., Solicitor General filed as amicus in Supreme Court.
Griffin v. Prince Edward Sch. Bd., Burke Marshall argued as amicus in 4th
Cir.
U.S. v. Mayton, United States filed contempt motion.
Perry County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Mayton, United States filed appeal.
Hinds County, Miss., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Biloxi Muni. Sch. District; U.S. v. Gulfport Muni. Separate Sch.
District, U.S. v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., U.S. v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., U.S. v. Mobile County Bd. of Sch. Comm., Filed.
U.S. v. Campbell, (Sunflower County) Filed.
Marengo County, Ala., Records inspection.
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1/27
1/28
1/28-30

U.S. v. Mathews, Pre-trial conference.
Montgomery County, Ala., Records inspection.
Panola County, Miss., Records inspection.

February 1963
2/5
2/6
2/8
2/14
2/18
2/18
2/20
2/28
2/28

Choctaw County, Ala., Records inspection.
Clarke County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Barnett, Oral argument on contempt charge.
Clarke County, Ala., Negotiations with Board.
U.S. v. Clement, (Webster Parish) Filed.
U.S. v. Crawford, (Red River Parish) Filed.
U.S. v. Ford, Tried.
U.S. v. Mayton, United States filed mandamus motion in 5th Cir.
Clarke County, Ala., United States sent letter threatening suit.

March 1963
Tunica County, Miss., Demand for records inspection [informal].
3/8
U.S. v. Mississippi, Motions argued before three-judge district court.
3/9
U.S. v. Louisiana, Tried.
3/14
Claiborne County, Miss., Records inspection.
3/15
LeFlore County, Miss., Records inspection.
3/17
Avoyelles County, La., Records inspection.
3/18
U.S. v. Louisiana, United States filed proposed findings, conclusions and
decree.
3/19-21 U.S. v. Duke, Tried.
3/20-21 Goss v. Bd. of Educ., Burke Marshall argued in Supreme Court.
3/21-22 Montgomery County, Ala., Records inspection.
3/22
Amite County, Miss., Records inspection.
3/23
Panola County, Miss., Records inspection.
3/25
Lowndes County, Miss., Records inspection.
3/28
Tunica County, Miss., Records inspection.
3/28-4/10 Ouachita Parish, La., Records inspection.
3/29
U.S. v. Lucky, Records inspection.
3/30
U.S. v. City of Greenwood, Filed.

April 1963
4/1
4/1

Grenada County, Miss., Demand for records inspection [by agreement].
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., Argued in 4th Cir.
U.S. v. Ramsey, Appeal filed.
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4/4

4/5
4/8
4/8
4/8
4/8
4/8-9
4/10
4/10
4/10
4/11
4/16
4/16
4/17
4/22
4/22
4/23
4/23
4/24
4/25-26
4/29
4/29
4/29
4/30

Department of Justice released names of twelve impact aid school districts
in the South that agreed to desegregate and said three others agreed but
wished to remain anonymous
U.S. v. Ward, Pre-trial conference.
Clarke County, Ala., Interviews conducted.
Adams County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Jefferson County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Wilkinson County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(a)], Tried.
U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(b)], Settled.
Clarke County, Miss., Records inspection.
Walthall County, Miss., Records inspection.
East Carroll County, La., Records inspection.
Tate County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Marengo County, Ala., Records inspection.
Franklin County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Lamar County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Marion County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Kemper County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Noxubee County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Grenada County, Miss., Records inspection.
Quitman County, Miss., Records inspection.
Carroll County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Chickasaw County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Jones County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Humphreys County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.

May 1963
5/1
5/2
5/2-3
inspection.
5/6
5/8
5/8
5/9-10
5/9-10
5/11
5/13-14
5/14
5/15
5/16-17

DeSoto, County, Miss., Demand for records inspection [by agreement].
Clay County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Iberville Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Pickens County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
U.S. v. Edwards, Filed.
Benton County, Miss., Records inspection.
Marshall County, Miss., Records inspection.
Pointe Coupee Parish, La., Records inspection.
Sumter County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Holmes County, Filed.
Iberville Parish, La., Records inspection.
Montgomery County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
West Feliciana County, La., Demand for records inspection and records
inspection.
Tangipahoa Parish, La., Records inspection.
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5/17
5/18, 25
5/21
5/21
5/22
5/25
5/27
5/28-29

St. Helena County, La., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Edwards, Tried.
Cunecuh County, Ala., Records inspection.
Monroe County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Holmes County, Tried and continued.
DeSoto County, Miss., Records inspection.
Covington County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Quitman County, Miss., Records inspection.

June 1963
6/11

6/13
6/13
6/17
6/17
6/20
6/20
6/21
6/22
6/24
6/25
6/25-30
6/26
filed.
6/26
6/28

U.S. v. Daniel, Various activities.
President Kennedy ordered Governor Wallace to cease obstruction of
desegregation of University of Alabama, and authorized Secretary of
Defense to call up National Guard.
President Kennedy gave speech proposing Civil Rights Act.
U.S. v. Parker, United States filed motion for additional relief.
Hinds County, Miss., Records inspection.
Scott County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Red River Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Webster Parish, La., Demand for records inspection.
Madison County, Miss., Records inspection.
Clarke County, Miss., Records inspection.
Webster Parish, La., Records inspection.
Red River Parish, La., Records inspection.
Jefferson County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Jones County Democratic Exec. Comm. (Ga.), Consent decree
U.S. v. Dallas County, Filed.
U.S. v. LeFlore County, Filed.

July 1963
Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., United States became litigating
amicus curiae.
7/11-12, 19 U.S. v. LeFlore County, Trial.
7/12-15 Hinds County, Miss., Records inspection.
7/13
U.S. v. Ashford, Jr., (Hinds County) Filed.
7/13
U.S. v. Bellsnyder, Filed.
7/15
Adams County, Miss., Demand for records inspection [court order].
7/15
Covington County, Miss., Demand for records inspection [court order].
7/15
Jefferson County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
7/15
LeFlore County, Miss., Records inspection.
7/16
U.S. v. Mayton, United States filed motion for records inspection.
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7/16
7/16
7/18

7/18
7/19
7/19
7/19
7/22
7/22
7/22
inspection.
7/24
7/24
inspection.
7/24-25
7/24-26
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/26
7/26
7/26
7/26
7/29
7/29-30
7/30
7/30-31

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., Court ordered United States to
participate as a party.
Etowah County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
inspection.
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy began testimony before Senate
Judiciary Committee on proposed Civil Rights Act, accompanied by Burke
Marshall
Montgomery County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Wall, (Wilcox County) Filed.
U.S. v. Cartwright, Filed.
Jefferson County, Miss., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Clement, Tried.
Covington County, Miss., Records inspection.
Tallapoosa County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
U.S. v. Duke, United States filed appeal.
Chambers County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
Robert F. Kennedy continued testimony.
U.S. v. Crawford, Tried.
U.S. v. Dallas County, Trial began.
Lamar County, Miss., Records inspection.
Russell County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Lafayette County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Marion County, Miss., Records inspection.
Newton County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Russell County, Ala., Records inspection.
Kemper County, Miss., Records inspection.
Baldwin County, Ala., Records inspection.
Noxubee County, Miss., Records inspection.
Robert F. Kennedy continued testimony.

August 1963
8/1
8/1
8/1
8/2
8/6
8/7
8/7
8/8
8/8
inspection.

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., Tried.
Robert F. Kennedy continued testimony.
U.S. v. Ashford, Jr., Amended complaint filed.
Franklin County, Miss., Records inspection.
Wilkinson County, Miss., Records inspection.
Bibb County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records inspection.
Elmore County, Ala., Records inspection.
Perry County, Ala., Records inspection.
Robert F. Kennedy continued testimony.
Henry County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records
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8/12
8/12
8/12
8/12
8/13
8/13-14
8/15-16
8/15
8/19-24
8/20
8/20
8/20
8/23
8/28
8/29
8/29
8/30-31

U.S. v. Parker, Hearing on United States motion.
Newton County, Miss., Records inspection.
Scott County, Miss., Records inspection.
Barbour County, Ala., Records inspection.
Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., Hearing.
Pike County, Ala., Demand for records inspection and records inspection.
Adams County, Miss., Records inspection.
Montgomery County, Ala., Records inspection.
Mobile County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Campbell, United States responded to motion for more definite
statement.
U.S. v. City of Greenwood, Amended complaint filed.
U.S. v. Barnett, United States filed brief in Supreme Court.
Robert F. Kennedy continued testimony.
March on Washington.
Hale County, Ala., Records inspection.
Montgomery County, Ala., Records inspection.
Rankin County, Miss., Records inspection.

September 1963
9/1
9/6
9/9

9/9-10
9/10

9/10
9/11
9/11
9/11
9/11
9/11
9/13
9/15
9/17
9/20

U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(a)], Records inspection.
U.S. v. Mississippi, United States filed answers to interrogatories.
U.S. v. Bellsnyder, Hearing on defenses motion to dismiss and strike.
U.S. v. Wallace, Filed. Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
against interfering with school desegregation in Mobile, Tuskegee and
Birmingham [after Governor Wallace issued an order against
desegregating and used state troopers to bar African-Americans from
white schools]
Jones County, Miss., Records inspection.
President issued Proclamation 3554 ordering Governor Wallace and other
officials to stop obstructing school desegregation; President issued
Executive Order 11118, calling the Alabama National Guard into United
States service.
Walthall County, Miss., Records inspection.
Robert F. Kennedy completed testimony.
Anderson v. Martin, United States filed amicus brief in Supreme Court.
U.S. v. Campbell, United States filed motion for records inspection.
Greene County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
Montgomery County, Ala., Records inspection.
Sunflower County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham bombed; four girls were
killed.
Perry County, Ala., Records inspection.
Perry County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
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9/20
9/22
9/22
923-25
9/24
9/24-25
9/24-25
9/25
9/27
9/27
9/27
9/27
9/27

Sumter County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Daniel, United States applied for OSC.
Elmore County, Ala., Records inspection.
Perry County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Wallace, Hearing before five judge district court [all of the
Alabama district court judges].
U.S. v. Lynd, Records inspection.
Forrest County, Miss., Records inspection.
U.S. v. LeFlore County, United States filed appeal.
U.S. v. Ward, United States requested trial date.
U.S. v. Wood, [§1971(a)], Final argument.
Lamar County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Noxubee County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Wilkinson County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.

October 1963
10/2
10/4
10/6
10/8
10/15
10/15
10/15
10/18
10/21, 22
10/22
10/25
10/25
10/28
10/29
10/29
10/29
10/29
10/30
10/31
10/31
10/31
10/31
10/31
10/31
10/31
10/31

Macon County, Ala., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Edwards, United States filed appeal.
U.S. v. Dallas County, United States filed petition for mandamus.
Issaquena County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Bd. of Reg. of the State of Louisiana, Filed.
U.S. v. Dallas County, District court trial.
U.S. v. Lucky, Records inspection.
Jefferson Davis County, Miss., Records inspection.
U.S. v. Mayton, United States filed appeal.
U.S. v. Campbell, United States filed briefs in opposition to motion for
more definite statement and in support of motion for records inspection
U.S. v. Crouch, Filed.
Benton County, Miss., Records inspection.
Marshall County, Miss., Records inspection.
Wilcox County, Ala., Demand for records inspection.
U.S. v. Atkins, United States applied for OSC.
U.S. v. Wall, Hearing on defendants’ motions.
U.S. v. Ford, United Sates asked for ruling.
U.S. v. Harvey, (West Feliciana Parish) Filed.
U.S. v. Mississippi, Argument on further motions.
Jasper County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Pontotoc County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Prentiss County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Sharkey County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Tippah County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Union County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Wayne County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
Walobusha County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
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November 1963
Clarke County, Ala., Records inspection.
11/3
Holmes County, Miss., Demand for records inspection.
11/11
Tippah County, Miss., Records inspection.
11/12
U.S. v. McLeod, Filed.
11/12
U.S. v. Dallas County, Citizens council filed.
11/12-13 Wayne County, Miss., Records inspection.
11/13
U.S. v. Lucky, Summary judgment hearing.
11/18
U.S. v. Fox, Appeal argued in 5th Cir.
11/18
U.S. v. Mayton, Request for preferential setting argued.
11/18
Tallahatchie County, Miss., Records inspection.
11/19
Marengo County, Ala., Records inspection.
11/19
Monroe County, Ala., Records inspection.
11/20
House Judiciary committee reported proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963.
11/21
St. Helena County, La., Records inspection.
11/21-22 U.S. v. Dogan, Hearing.
11/21-22 U.S. v. Cox, Tried.
11/23
Leake County, Miss., Records inspection.
11/26-12/4 East Baton Rouge County, La., Records inspection.
11/27-29 U.S. v. Atkins, Records inspection.
11/27-29 Dallas County, Ala., Records inspection.
11/29
Wilcox County, Ala., Records inspection.
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Chapter 19

Atomic Power, Fossil Fuels, and the Environment: Lessons
Learned and The Lasting Impact of the Kennedy Energy
Policies
Joshua P. Fershee

Abstract: Because of his short term of office, President Kennedy’s energy policies have
not been critiqued, reviewed, or analyzed in the same manner, or to the same degree, as
other administrations. This essay fills part of that void by reviewing the key components
of President Kennedy’s energy and environmental goals and policies that managed to
have a lasting impact, despite his short term in office, and discusses the results of those
policies, both positive and negative. Through this review, President Kennedy’s policies
can become a resource and roadmap for the current Administration and all those who
seek to ensure access to affordable energy while preserving the environment.
This essay considers the motivation behind President Kennedy’s key energy
initiatives and proposed legislation and puts that motivation in context. More
specifically, the essay discusses some of President Kennedy’s key energy initiatives, in
light of the technological, regulatory, economic, and political (domestic and
international) climate of the Kennedy years and compares President Kennedy’s key
initiatives to the concerns the United States faces today. From nuclear energy to coalfired power to electricity infrastructure, this comparison indicates that President
Kennedy’s energy and environmental policies were both insightful and prescient, but not
without consequences.

There are two points on conservation that have come home
to me in the last 2 days. One is the necessity for us to
protect what we already have, what nature gave to us, and
use it well, not to waste water or land, to set aside land and
water, recreation, wilderness, and all the rest now so that it
will be available to those who come in the future. That is
the traditional concept of conservation, and it still has a
major part in the national life of the United States.
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But the other part of conservation is the newer part, and
that is to use science and technology to achieve significant
breakthroughs as we are doing today, and in that way to
conserve the resources which 10 or 20 or 30 years ago may
have been wholly unknown. So we use nuclear power for
peaceful purposes and power.
-- President John. F. Kennedy, Sept. 26, 1963 1

Introduction
When President Barack Obama took office in 2009, the comparisons to President
John F. Kennedy, Jr., were inevitable. An engaging and energetic young president had
just been sworn into office during complex and rapidly changing times. In 2008, lateSenator Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy compared then-Democratic presidential nominee
Obama and his brother, President Kennedy: “There is a new wave of change all around
us, and if we set our compass true, we will reach our destination—not merely victory for
our party, but renewal for our nation. . . . [S]o with Barack Obama . . . the dream lives
on.” 2
In comparing President Obama to President Kennedy, both are often viewed as
cultural icons “who by [their] very existence denote a new social order” and are “youthful
renewer[s] of the American spirit.” 3 From a policy perspective, though, President Obama
is more often compared to Abraham Lincoln or Franklin Delano Roosevelt, than
President Kennedy. 4 Regardless of the appropriateness of these comparisons, this essay
argues that President Obama has much to gain from looking to President Kennedy’s
policies, not just his rhetoric, especially in setting energy policy.
Because of his short term of office, 5 President Kennedy’s energy policies have
not been critiqued, reviewed, or analyzed in the same manner as other administrations.6

1

John F. Kennedy, Remarks, Remarks at the Electric Generating Plant, (Hanford, WA, Sept. 26, 1963), in
JOHN F. KENNEDY IN HIS OWN WORDS 76 (Eric Freedman & Edward Hoffman eds., 2005)
2
ROBERT DENTON, JR., THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: A COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE 23 (2009)
(quoting Senator Ted Kennedy’s address to the 2008 Democratic National Convention).
3
See Matt Bai, Don’t Look Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, § MM, at 9.
4
Id. (stating that viewing President Obama as “crisis President” leads comparisons to Lincoln and FDR,
but “as cultural icon” President Kennedy is a more apt comparison).
5
See THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, OUR DOCUMENTS: 100 MILESTONE DOCUMENTS FROM THE NATIONAL
ARCHIVES 220 (2003) (stating that the Cold War shaped President Eisenhower’s presidency and that it
“would dominate President Kennedy’s own short term of office”).

226

This essay seeks to fill part of that void by reviewing the key components of President
Kennedy’s energy and environmental goals and policies that managed to have a lasting
impact, despite his short term in office, and discussing the results of those policies, both
positive and negative. Through this review, President Kennedy’s policies can become a
resource and roadmap for the current Administration and all those who seek to ensure
access to affordable energy while preserving the environment. 7
This essay considers the motivation behind President Kennedy’s key energy
initiatives and proposed legislation and puts that motivation in context. More specifically,
the essay discusses some of President Kennedy’s key energy initiatives, in light of the
technological, regulatory, economic, and political (domestic and international) climate of
the Kennedy years and compares President Kennedy’s key initiatives to the concerns the
United States faces today. This comparison indicates that President Kennedy’s energy
and environmental policies were both insightful and prescient, but not without
consequences.
I.

The Broad and Complex Nature of the Kennedy Energy Policies

President John F. Kennedy’s forward-thinking, yet pragmatic, energy and
environmental policies were, and are, uniquely comprehensive and coherent. The
concerns facing the Kennedy Administration were not that different from the concerns
facing the world today. Not since President Kennedy’s era have energy, environmental,
and public safety issues been so intertwined. Although many of the specific issues have
changed over the past fifty years, President Kennedy’s policies provide a useful model in
developing ways to address modern concerns.
President John F. Kennedy’s short time in the White House provides a somewhat
conflicted record. President Kennedy is often, and accurately, portrayed as an
environmentalist 8 and a civil rights advocate. 9 He was also a major supporter of space
exploration and atomic power, and, perhaps above all, he was committed to foreign
6

See Major Bruce D. Page, Jr., Book Review: American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical
Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century, 190/191 MILITARY L. REV. 175, 177 n.12 (2007)
(“In [this book], Phillips reviews the oil policies of every American president from Dwight Eisenhower to
Bill Clinton, excluding John F. Kennedy.”).
7
See President Barack Obama, Remarks at Southern California Edison Electric Vehicle Technical Center
(Mar.19, 2009), available at http://www.energy.gov/news2009/7067.htm (providing President Obama’s
remarks as they were prepared for delivery) (“We can remain one of the world's leading importers of
foreign oil, or we can make the investments that will allow us to become the world's leading exporter of
renewable energy. We can let climate change continue to go unchecked, or we can help stem it.”).
8
See BENJAMIN KLINE, FIRST ALONG THE RIVER: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT 75-76 (3rd ed. 2007).
9
THEODORE C. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 470 (1965).
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policy. 10 His policies reflected the complex and difficult nature of the issues of the time.
Even when some of his Administration’s policies seemed to conflict with many of his
primary goals, most of the policy decisions were part of a coherent, if complex, plan.
The complexity of President Kennedy’s policies was visible in nearly every key
issue. An outspoken champion of civil rights, President Kennedy did not move forward
on legislation until two years into his term, 11 when racial violence largely forced the
issue. 12 He founded the Peace Corps to help promote peace and prosperity in the world,13
yet his policies also set the stage for the Vietnam War. 14 An ardent supporter of the
environment, 15 he also advocated expansion of nuclear power for civilian use 16 and
proposed and supported construction of coal slurry pipelines. 17
Complex times lead to complex policies. Such were, and are, the times. As
President Kennedy explained to the United Nations in 1963, “Never before has man had
such capacity to control his own environment . . . . We have the power to make this the
best generation of mankind in the history of the world—or to make it the last.” 18 This
remains true today.
President Kennedy, more than 40 years ago, predicted that
if we fail to chart a proper course of conservation and
development—if we fail to use these blessings prudently—
we will be in trouble within a short time. In the resource
field, predictions of future use have been consistently
understated. But even under conservative projections, we
face a future of critical shortages and handicaps. By the
year 2000, a United States population of 300 million—
nearly doubled in 40 years—will need far greater supplies
of farm products, timber, water, minerals, fuels, energy,
10

See id. at 509 528.
HERBERT S. PARMET, JFK: THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 271-72 (1983).
12
Id. at 264-65.
13
SORENSON, supra note 9, at 531-32.
14
Lawrence J. Bassett & Stephen E. Pelz, The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War
in KENNEDY’S QUEST FOR VICTORY: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1961-1963, at 223-52 (Thomas G.
Paterson ed., 1989).
15
See KLEIN, supra note 8, at 75-76.
16
See CRAUFURD D. W. GOODWIN, ENERGY POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: TODAY’S PROBLEMS, YESTERDAY’S
SOLUTIONS 324(1983)
17
See ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH
WATERS 155 (2004).
18
President John F. Kennedy, Jr., Address Before the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept.
20, 1963), available at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03_18th
GeneralAssembly09201963.htm (providing a transcript of the address, as well as the audio file).
11
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and opportunities for outdoor recreation.
Present
projections tell us that our water use will double in the next
20 years; that we are harvesting our supply of high-grade
timber more rapidly that the development of new growth;
that too much of our fertile topsoil is being washed away;
that our minerals are being exhausted at increasing rates;
and that the Nation’s remaining undeveloped areas of great
natural beauty are being rapidly pre-empted for other
uses. 19
On many of these issues, President Kennedy was right, or at least in the ballpark.
The U.S. population in 1963 was approximate 189 million people. In 2000, it was more
than 280 million. 20 It was not until approximately 2007 that the population actually hit
300 million people, 21 a mere seven years “late.” As for water supply, President Kennedy
was right that water needs would increase greatly. Total water withdrawals for all uses in
1960 were 270 billion gallons per day (Bgd). 22 By 1980, that number reached a peak use
of 440 Bgd; twenty years later, the number had decreased to 408 Bgd. 23
Despite the difficult and complex problems facing the world, or perhaps because
of them, President Kennedy uniquely recognized the need to have comprehensive energy
and environmental policies. Early in his administration, President Kennedy sought to
combine “the widely scattered resource policies of the Federal Government.” 24 He noted
that prior policies “overlapped and often conflicted” and that funds were often “wasted
on competing efforts.” 25 As such, he sought to provide consistent standards when
measuring the proper Federal contribution to similar projects. 26 Perhaps most important,
he recognized that “[f]unds and attention devoted to annual appropriations or immediate
19

John F. Kennedy, Special Message, Special Message to the Congress on Natural Resources
(Washington, D.C., Feb. 23, 1961).
20
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=&geo_id=01000US&_geoContext=01000US&_stre
et=&_county=&_cityTown=&_state=&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=&_useEV=&pctxt=fph
&pgsl=010&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=ACS_2006_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=
&_keyword=&_industry= (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
21
U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=&geo_id=01000US&_geoContext=01000US&
_street=&_county=&_cityTown=&_state=&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=&_useEV=&pctx
t=fph&pgsl=010&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=DEC_2000_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&
reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry=
22
USGS Estimated Water Use in the United States in 2000,
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/circ1268/htdocs/table14.html
23
USGS Estimated Water Use in the United States in 2000,
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/circ1268/htdocs/table14.html
24
John F. Kennedy, Special Message, Special Message to the Congress on Natural Resources
(Washington, D.C., Feb. 23, 1961).
25
Id.
26
Id.
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pressures divert energies away from long-range planning for national economic
growth.” 27 Although his policies did not always reach this standard, no president since
has had such a comprehensive energy plan.
Many of the issues are similar today, but the problems have evolved, and in many
cases expanded. We still face concerns about nuclear proliferation, but instead of
primarily being concerned with the Soviet Union, 28 our concerns include Iran, Russia,
China, North Korea, and Pakistan, among others. 29 This diffusion of possible sources has
changed how the public views nuclear threats. Now, the concern about potential threats
largely focuses on terrorist activity and how that activity will be funded. This, in turn,
raises concern about foreign fuel sources, because so much of the world’s fossil fuels are
controlled by potentially antagonistic regimes.
In addition, in 2008, as in 1963, we face significant concerns about the
environment. Beyond clean air and water – areas where we have made at least some
progress – climate change is now a major issue. And access to, and consumption of,
foreign resources (particularly oil) are still a major concern. President Kennedy’s
policies, and the process through which they were developed, can help shed some light on
the critical energy and environmental issues facing the world today. With the benefit of
hindsight, President Kennedy’s policies provide valuable guidance, indicating what might
work, what should be avoided, and the difficulty in determining which is which.
A. The Power of (and from) Nuclear Proliferation
President Kennedy’s pragmatic and forward-thinking views were apparent in his
strong support for atomic energy. This support was based on two key premises. First, he
believed that having a civilian use for atomic power was essential to managing nuclear
proliferation. 30 He argued that those who believed the United States should not commit
“to being a leader in the peacetime use of atomic energy,” were choosing to waste
resources and “say[ing] no to [the] country.” 31 Accordingly, he argued, the Atomic
Energy Commission, needed to take a “hard look at the role of nuclear power in our
economy in cooperation with the Department of the Interior, the Federal Power
Commission, other appropriate agencies, and private industry.” 32
27

Id.
See MICHAEL O'BRIEN, JOHN F. KENNEDY: A BIOGRAPHY 351-52 (2005).
29
See Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe 74 (2004).
30
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Second, he believed that economically competitive nuclear power could be
realized relatively quickly, especially in areas where fossil fuel costs were high. 33 The
President believed that the base of U.S. energy resources needed to expand to promote
economic growth. 34 Plus, with so much time and money already put into the nuclear
program, President Kennedy sought to find additional ways to put that investment to
work.
The first major U.S. atomic energy project was the Hanford Nuclear Weapons
Reservation (Hanford), which was located near Hanford, Washington. 35 Built during
World War II, Hanford was the first full-scale plutonium manufacturing facility in the
world. 36 Hanford covers 560-square miles and is adjacent to the Columbia River,37
which provided the “abundant, clean water supply” that was needed for cooling.38
Operations started in 1944, and Hanford soon produced the bulk of the plutonium for the
U.S. nuclear weapons program, including that which was used for the atomic bomb
dropped on Nagasaki. 39
President Kennedy was adamant that the steam produced as a by-product of
Hanford’s operations should be used to generate electricity. He strongly supported the
Washington Power Supply System proposal to use the steam produced by Hanford to
produce power, arguing that it presented “an opportunity, dearly in the public interest, to
obtain the maximum benefits from the public investment already committed for this
facility and to demonstrate national leadership in resources development while furthering
national defense objectives.” 40 He congratulated Congress “on the success of their
unremitting efforts” to use the by-product steam of the Hanford reactor. 41 “[I]t is clearly
in the public interest to utilize the heat output of the Hanford reactor, and to obtain
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maximum benefits from the public investment already committed for this facility if there
is a feasible way to do so.” 42
In his remarks at the Hanford generating plant, President Kennedy applauded the
commencement of “work on the largest nuclear power reactor for peaceful purposes in
the world.” 43 He noted, “I think this is a good area where we should be first, and we are
first.” 44
President Kennedy also talked of using Hanford to promote conservation. He
believed that, in addition to traditional notions of conservation, science and technology
could achieve breakthroughs to conserve resources in ways that were previously
unidentified. 45 So, he said, “we use nuclear power for peaceful purposes and power.” 46
The science used at Hanford would prove to be both a benefit and burden. By
1963, Hanford had nine nuclear reactors along the Columbia River. 47 The original three
World War II reactors were updated and expanded, and 177 underground waste tanks
were built. 48 During 40 years of operations, Hanford produced the plutonium supply for
the majority of the United States’ 60,000 nuclear weapons. 49 Plainly, the transition from
making bombs to making electricity was not as easy as it may have appeared. 50 Despite
President Kennedy’s insistence that the by-product steam be used for electricity, the
science of using nuclear power to generate electricity was an entirely new undertaking. 51
As but one hurdle, plutonium for bombs was produced using low-temperature reactors;
steam for the electricity generating turbines required a much higher temperature. 52
The N Reactor, the last plant constructed on the Hanford site, combined
plutonium production and steam generation of commercial electric power. 53 The N
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Reactor produced more than 65 billion kilowatts of electricity in 24 years, making the N
Reactor the largest electric power producer in the nation during its early years. 54
As would be expected (at least today), Hanford also proved to be a major
environmental hazard. In fact, “[t]he clean-up of American military nuclear waste is the
biggest environmental program as well as the biggest public works program in the history
of the world, surpassing the Manhattan Project and the space program combined.” 55 In
the mid-1950s, leaks in the single-shell, high-level waste storage tanks were confirmed. 56
Other concerns surrounded the Columbia River, which supplied the water used for
cooling the operations. By 1960, wastewater from Hanford discharged 14,500 curies per
day into the Columbia River. 57 Recognizing this concern, “Hanford and Atomic Energy
Commission leaders discussed rising levels of contamination in fish tissues in the river
and in shellfish in coastal waters near the river’s mouth.” 58
Hanford’s eight single-pass reactors shut down between 1964 and 1971.59
Following the shutdowns, some reports noted that “radionuclide levels in river water and
organisms decreased, and by 1975, only a small measurable burden existed, mainly in the
sediments of blind sloughs and of areas behind dams.” 60 However, during operation,
“these reactors discharged billions of gallons of cooling water, laden with fission and
activation products, to the river and to the ground.” 61
In the aftermath, the United States Department of Energy (DOE), in 1987, created
the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project (HEDR), which was overseen
by the Centers for Disease Control. 62 The HEDR was created “to estimate and reconstruct
all radionuclide emissions from Hanford from 1944 to 1972, in order to ascertain whether
neighboring individuals and animals had been exposed to harmful doses of radiation.” 63
The HEDR analyzed Hanford emissions over a 75,000-square-mile area and examined
“how radiation traveled through the air, settled into the soil, and dispersed into ground
and surface water, and the resulting exposure to individuals who lived in the surrounding
urban and suburban areas.” 64
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In 1990, HEDR released the report, Initial Hanford Radiation Dose Estimates,
which, for the first time, publicly disclosed that Hanford had released large quantities of
radioactive and non-radioactive waste, starting in the 1940s. 65 The report triggered major
litigation. Thousands of individuals filed complaints, claiming a variety of illnesses
caused by Hanford's toxic emissions. 66 Beyond loss of property value, the complaints
“alleged that defendants acted intentionally or negligently, and that the radioactive and
other toxic emissions reached numerous off-site residents through ingestion of
contaminated vegetables, meat, fish, drinking water and milk, swimming in the irradiated
Columbia River, and inhalation of toxic air.” 67 Over more than fifty years of operations,
the potential plaintiffs could have been hundreds of thousands of people. 68
In a “strange twist,” the damage to the area is now becoming something of a boon
to the region. 69 The Hanford area’s Tri-Cities—Richland, Pasco and Kennewick—are
getting gearing up for another boom, similar to those of years past. 70 In the 1940s, it was
the development of nuclear bombs. 71 In the 1960s, during the peak of the Cold War, it
was for weapons production. 72 And, in the 1980s and early 1990s, then-House Speaker
Tom Foley, a Democrat from Spokane, funneled $100 million into the local economy. 73
Again the federal government is funding a major Hanford-related project. 74 This time it
is a $4 billion vitrification project to deal with Hanford’s waste. 75
A job boom related to remediation of Hanford’s nuclear operations was hardly the
legacy President Kennedy sought. Hanford’s environmental damage underscored many
of the worst parts of nuclear energy. However, despite the massive Hanford clean-up
project, it would be a mistake to assert that President Kennedy was wrong to pursue
nuclear power.
First, in all fairness, most of the damage at Hanford was not related to waste from
power production; instead, it was from “the past production of plutonium for the nation’s
nuclear weapons program.” 76 Second, although nuclear power became a lighting rod for
criticism from environmental groups as early as the late 1960s, in light of climate change
65
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concerns, many “green advocates” are rethinking their position on nuclear power.
Most prominently, Patrick Moore, a co-founder of Greenpeace, 77 has changed his
views on nuclear power and, he argues, “the rest of the environmental movement needs to
update its views, too, because nuclear energy may just be the energy source that can save
our planet from another possible disaster: catastrophic climate change.” 78 Mr. Moore’s
support of nuclear power is a major ideological transformation. 79 He explained his
transformation this way: “In the early 1970s when I helped found Greenpeace, I believed
that nuclear energy was synonymous with nuclear holocaust . . . . That's the conviction
that inspired Greenpeace's first voyage up the spectacular rocky northwest coast to
protest the testing of U.S. hydrogen bombs in Alaska's Aleutian Islands.” 80
Mr. Moore is not alone in this massive change of perspective. Other leading
environmentalists, former critics of nuclear power, now support the idea, as well.
Perhaps most notably, “British atmospheric scientist James Lovelock, father of the Gaia
theory, believes that nuclear energy is the only way to avoid catastrophic climate
change.” 81 In addition, the founder of the “Whole Earth Catalog,” Stewart Brand, now
argues that if the environmental movement is serious about removing fossil fuels from
the energy mix, additional nuclear power plants are essential. 82
In support of his transformation, Mr. Moore makes the point that coal produces
36% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, which is almost 10% percent of the world’s such
emissions. 83 Carbon dioxide is the primary greenhouse gas responsible for global
warming. 84 In contrast, nuclear energy produces about 20% of the U.S. power supply, 85
with nearly zero greenhouse gas emissions.
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There remain many hurdles to overcome—in particular, cost, safety, waste, and
proliferation—before additional nuclear power would be feasible. 86 But, as a 2003 MIT
study put it, “[T]he nuclear option should be retained precisely because it is an important
carbon-free source of power.” 87 As such, despite intervening decades of (at least U.S.)
skepticism about nuclear power, climate change concerns have rekindled President
Kennedy’s vision that nuclear power should have a role in the “other part of conservation
. . . to use science and technology to achieve significant breakthroughs.” 88
B. Promoting Conservation While Expanding Infrastructure for Coal and
Electricity: A Delicate Balance or a Practical Impossibility?
Despite his firm belief in conservation, President Kennedy also supported the use
of coal for energy. This, too, indicated his pragmatic view relative to energy and the
environment. He understood the need for additional (and economic) fuel sources to
power the economy and raise the quality of level in many parts of the country.
Specifically, during the 1960 presidential campaign, then-Senator Kennedy
promoted coal for electricity, a concept he called “coal by wire.” 89 He noted that,
between 1948 and 1960, coal employment had declined from 127,000 employees to less
than 50,000. 90 In a telling statement of the times, he stated without equivocation: “Our
experts tell us that coal consumption can be doubled and tripled within the next twenty
years – but this is a challenge, not a guarantee.” 91 Today, statements about coal are often
tied to the need to reduce traditional coal plants and increase “clean coal” technologies.
It would be rare indeed to hear of even coal advocates arguing for increased coal use
without touting an ability to reduce emissions.
The “ancient power of coal,” he stated, “burned at the mines and transmitted over
huge cables—can re-enter homes in the most modern of forms—as electric power.” 92 In
this manner, he proposed to bring coal back into the home, “not by trucks and a shovel,
but by wires and a switch.” 93 Although by no means on his own, this goal has certainly
been realized. Recently, even with more utilities shifting away from coal, more than 50%
of all U.S. electricity still comes from coal-fired plants today. 94
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1. Coal Slurry Pipelines: Attempting to Balance Environmental Concerns with
Economic Development
President Kennedy recognized the need for energy throughout the country, and
coal slurry pipelines were one way he saw to ensure progress.
We look forward to the day when energy will flow where
it’s needed. We cannot permit the railroads to prevent coal
slurry pipelines from conveying the resources of our mines.
We cannot permit the mining industry to say there shall be
no nuclear energy because it may affect them negatively. 95
Once he was in the White House, President Kennedy continued his support for
coal, at the same time he was promoting increased conservation efforts. 96 In that era,
there was nothing incongruous about advocating for conservation and increased coal use
at the same time. 97 In a special message to Congress on conservation, President
Kennedy, in addition to discussing he need to address water pollution and promote land
conservation, he also promoted the use of coal slurries (a coal and water mixture) to
produce electricity. 98 In support of coal for electricity, he announced a proposal to
develop coal slurry pipelines, similar to those used for oil, to facilitate interstate
transportation. 99
Coal slurry pipelines are still in existence today. 100 From an environmentalist’s
perspective, these pipelines are particularly unappealing. First, they move coal for use in
generating plants, which leads to significant emissions of greenhouse gases and other
toxic pollutants. 101 Second, slurry pipelines use a tremendous amount of water. 102
Large coal power plants use a hundreds of tons of coal each day, with
corresponding water needs for a slurry pipeline. This is an especially sensitive issue for
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pipelines in areas with scarce water resources. As an example, one of President
Kennedy’s two proposed coal slurry pipelines was the Black Mesa Mine, which shipped
coal slurry 273 miles from a Northern Arizona mine (in the middle of the Hopi and
Navajo reservations) to the Mohave Generating Station near Laughlin, Nevada. 103 The
pipeline was the world’s longest water-slurry pipeline and moved five million tons of
pulverized coal per year to the 1,580-megawatt electric power plant. 104 To run the
pipeline, Peabody (the original owner) began pumping 4,000 acre-feet per year of
drinking water a year from the aquifer under Black Mesa. 105 Crushed coal was mixed
with the water and injected into the slurry pipeline. 106
In 2006, rather than invest $1 billion to clean up the power plant’s emissions,
operations of the plant were suspended. 107 The plant was expected to be off-line for at
least four years, the amount of time expected that would be needed to resolve conflicts
over the plant’s emissions “and to negotiate with two native tribes over rights to the water
needed to deliver fuel to Mohave as a slurry.” 108 Efforts to reopen the plant have stalled,
and there is no indication the plant, or the pipeline, will ever resume operations. 109
2. The Continuous, and Lasting, Need for Infrastructure
President Kennedy’s time was not so different from our own in terms of a vast
need for energy infrastructure. In addition to nuclear power and coal slurry lines, there
was a continuing need for electricity infrastructure.
President Kennedy often touted the success of the Rural Electrification Act
(REA), provided the long-term financing and technical expertise needed to expand the
availability of electricity to rural customers. 111 President Kennedy’s prepared remarks
110
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for a September 1963 speech at the University of North Dakota stated that, since the REA
passed in 1936, more than 900 cooperative rural electrification systems had been built
with the assistance of federal financing. 112
The REA’s financial undertaking was enormous. “More than $5 billion has been
advanced to 1,000 borrowers. Over 1,500,000 miles of power lines—enough to crisscross the nation 500 times—have been built, serving 20 million American people.” 113
The investment, President Kennedy noted, was remarkably sound: “Out of roughly 1,000
borrowers, only one is delinquent in payment; and the total losses on the $5 billion
advanced are less than $50,000.” 114 This low level of default is especially striking in
today’s financial times.
Few investors were willing to invest in the rural electrification project without
federal financing, yet few private businesses could cite such a successful record. 115 In
1963, North Dakota-based, REA-funded cooperatives served on average around one
metered farm per mile of line, compared to the average urban-area utility system of 33
electric meters per mile of line. 116 North Dakota, at a remarkable 97%, was the state with
the highest percentage of people being served by REA-funded utilities. 117
In addition to the financing issues, President Kennedy argued that the REA raised
the standard of living, strengthened the U.S. economy, and even improved national
security by providing the power necessary to increase industrial activity when needed. 118
In the State of North Dakota, the President noted in his address, prior to the REA, 3% of
farms were powered by electricity; by 1963, nearly every farm in the state had power. 119
“What was 30 years ago a life of affluence, in a sense today is a life of poverty.” 120
President Kennedy recognized, though, that despite the success of the REA, the
task of rural electrification was not complete. 121 The President sought continuation of the
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REA to ensure that rural residents had access to power at competitive costs. 122 Today,
continued construction is necessary, but this time the need is not related to demand. 123
U.S. energy infrastructure has not kept up with the increasing needs of a growing
population that uses more per capita power than ever before. 124 Construction of energy
infrastructure continued through the 1960s, but investment in electric transmission lines
(the high-voltage lines moving wholesale electric energy), declined (in real dollars) for
the twenty-three consecutive years between 1975 and 1998. 125 Since 1998, investment
has slowly increased, but is still below 1975 levels. 126 In 2004, this failure of
infrastructure investment translated into a 0.6% increase in circuit miles on the U.S.
interstate transmission system. 127
The capital needed to improve the U.S. energy infrastructure investment remains
significant. Estimates from $56 billion to $100 billion, are not uncommon, and others
have argued that as much as $450 billion is needed to appropriately address electricity
infrastructure needs. 128 And these investment estimates do not account for all of the
additional investments that would be needed to address climate change concerns.
II.

Conclusion

The need for a coherent and comprehensive energy and environmental policy is
one of the most important issues facing our nation today. Energy and environmental
issues impact broad and diverse areas of concern, including national security, public
health and safety, economic growth, and climate change. Most of President Kennedy’s
programs have advanced to the point that little could (or should) be implemented today,
from a tactical perspective. However, from a strategic perspective, his bold and
expansive vision should still serve as a model for modern policymakers.
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President Kennedy was willing to take on multiple industries and make clear that
the government would support and facilitate projects that were in the best interests of the
country, not particular constituencies.
Although, especially in practice, this
characterization may be bit idealized, his concept was nonetheless clear. Modern
politicians would be well-served to follow President Kennedy’s admonition:
From the beginning of civilization, every nation’s basic
wealth and progress has stemmed in large measure from its
natural resources. This nation has been, and is now,
especially fortunate in the blessings we have inherited.
Our entire society rests upon—and is dependent upon—our
water, our land, our forests, and our minerals. How we use
these resources influences our health, security, economy,
and well-being.
-- President John. F. Kennedy, Feb. 23, 1961 129
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PART V
JFK- MEDIA IMAGE AND LEGACY
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Chapter 20
Kennedy’s Loyal Opposition: National Review and the
Development of a Conservative Alternative, JanuaryAugust 1961
Laura Jane Gifford
The March 25, 1961, National Review related the contents of a recent subscriber
letter in a back-cover subscription appeal. This man, “usually understood to be a liberal”
and well-placed in New York Democratic circles, wrote the magazine and explained:
Of course I am not in agreement with most of your criticism of President
Kennedy; nor do I believe you will get far in your obvious editorial support
of Senator Barry Goldwater, but renew my subscription, for I can no longer
get along without National Review.
I find that National Review is a whiskey I must sample once a week. From
every other journalist I get a sensation of either soda pop (and who does not
finally gag on effervescent, treacly sugar water), or from the intellectual
journals of my own persuasion I now get no more than strained vegetable
juices unfermented. So I am now a tippler. Eight dollars enclosed.
The advertisement’s writer went on to speculate that perhaps National Review’s rarified
appeal stemmed from its very lack of broadmindedness; rather, “it is a magazine of fact
and opinion, of discourse and criticism, on the central questions of our age,” questions
identified as dealing with how to meet the Communist challenge, “resuscitate the spirit in
an age of horror,” guard one’s mind against uniformity in the age of mass appeal, and
resist collectivism, preserve freedom and teach love of country, respect for past wisdom
and responsibility to the future.
Conservatism circa 1961 was a movement on the rise. Organizational gains
during the 1960 election would prove decisive in catapulting Barry Goldwater into the
Republican presidential nomination in 1964. While that election’s disastrous outcome
has been well documented, 1 Richard Nixon won the 1968 campaign on the strength of far
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more conservative appeals than those he had espoused in 1960. Not since 1960 have
liberal Republicans held a position of dominance within the party. 2
Within this rising movement, National Review (NR) was a foundational
publication. Founded in 1955 and edited by conservative boy wonder William F.
Buckley, Jr., NR was the first publication—or, indeed, resource of any kind—to
consolidate the various strains of post-war conservatism, combining traditionalist,
libertarian and anti-Communist elements to forge what contributing editor Frank Meyer
termed “fusionism.” Historian George H. Nash argued that if NR, or something like it,
had not entered into American life, “there would probably have been no cohesive
intellectual force on the Right in the 1960s and 1970s.” 3 NR was the only publication
challenging the liberal consensus in an organized, mass-distributed format. Unabashedly
intellectual and everlastingly cutting, it provided information and opinion, and it also
gave conservatives a forum for discussion and a means of belonging. NR brought the
conservative masses—to borrow a “leftist” term—together. 4
Careful perusal of NR’s pages offers perhaps our best insight into the American
conservative movement’s response to the Kennedy administration. Buckley and the rest
of the magazine’s editorial staff were deeply cognizant of NR’s role in articulating and
consolidating a coherent conservative intellectual position. Jeffrey Hart, a longtime
editor at the publication, has spoken of the magazine’s mission as “the quest for a
politically viable and thoughtful American conservatism.” As such, it did not merely
take “ephemeral” positions on the issues of the day, but rather, conducted a search for
“the underlying basis upon which such positions ought to be derived: which is to say,
abiding principles.” 5 That said, its weekly publication schedule meant that the fortnightly
NR and its abbreviated sibling, National Review Bulletin, kept a careful eye upon the dayto-day workings of American politics. 6 This hybrid purpose meant that the magazine’s
editorial staff remained concerned with placing the events of the day in a longer view,
even as they scrutinized the complex workings of American foreign and domestic policy.
Week after week, the pages of NR and National Review Bulletin provide a detailed source
for studying the “New Frontier” through the eyes of the opposition. This paper takes us
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from the beginning of 1961 through the end of August and the construction of the Berlin
Wall—eight months of anxiety and, from NR’s point of view, declension.
The majority of the articles excerpted and examined come from the publication’s
unsigned “Briefs” and editorial columns and were thus intended as “a corporate National
Review statement.” 7 Senior editors who might be responsible for these “corporate”
statements, however, also articulated their own discrete opinions in columns including
James Burnham’s “The Third World,” analyzing foreign policy, and Buckley’s “From the
Ivory Tower,” which was in many ways a continuation of the critique of American higher
education he began with 1951’s God and Man at Yale. When such columns or other
signed articles grant special insight into the developing conservative position vis-à-vis
Kennedy they are excerpted as well, identified by author. In some cases, the opinions of
a columnist or the writer of a signed article could differ with those expressed in the
magazine’s editorial pages. Such variation in coverage granted NR vitality not often
found in the pages of a newsmagazine. Within the context of this diversity, however,
consistent themes emerged—themes that helped NR develop the “politically viable and
thoughtful” conservatism of which Hart spoke.
Analysis of the magazine during this period reveals three important themes. First,
the Kennedy administration’s actions in the foreign policy arena revealed a disturbing
lack of government resolve in fighting the Cold War on our own terms. From Cuba to
Laos, nuclear test ban treaty negotiations to the strange case of General Edwin A.
Walker, Kennedy and his lieutenants failed to understand the dangers of the Communist
menace—and as a result, they routinely subordinated American interests in a misguided
attempt to win “friends” among opponents who operated under a fundamentally different
moralorder.
Second, while politics at home offered numerous causes for concern, the domestic
political agenda remained subordinate to international affairs. After all, it was neither
here nor there who funded the schools if they were all teaching Marxist principles in
Russian. Despite this hierarchy, however, NR’s commentary on domestic policy issues
offers insight into conservatives’ struggle to mediate between principle and strategy as
they moved beyond the fringes and onto the political stage.
Finally, NR carefully followed, and in many cases encouraged, a new
development that offered a way out of the declensionary narrative painted by the
distressing actions of the Kennedy administration from week to week. A storm was
brewing on college campuses and in youth organizations across the country. The new
rebel of the 1960s was a conservative—and most of these rebels recognized NR editor
Bill Buckley as their big brother and guiding influence. There is a certain irony in the
rise of conservative youth activism at the very inception of the young, glamorous
“Camelot,” and NR gleefully marveled at this reality. The magazine’s excitement was
palpable, and while the 1960s would soon see the rise of the left-wing radicalism that has
remained more notable in the public memory of this decade, the course of American
7
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political history since then demonstrates that in many respects, young conservatives
carried the day. 8
From January onward NR expressed considerable concern over Kennedy’s
intentions toward Fidel Castro, even as its writers advocated a strong response to this
Communist presence just 90 miles offshore. The columnist “Quincy” noted that
Kennedy was furious with former president Eisenhower for breaking off relations with
the Cuban dictator. 9 Eisenhower’s action “closed the door to a planned policy of
appeasement in the Caribbean which State Department experts, working with onetime
diplomat A. A. Berle, were sugar-coating for the American public.” 10 Even so, foreign
policy expert James Burnham urged the administration to make Cuba the litmus of
America’s resolution to stand firm despite what he termed the “bureaucratic inertia” of
the State Department. 11 It seemed, as of the April 22 edition of Burnham’s “The Third
World War” column, that the anti-Castro revolt did have Kennedy’s support, but that
support must be all-out, and it must be carried out “with overwhelming power, maximum
speed, and total success. Failure would be a catastrophe beyond calculation.” 12
Unfortunately, fail it did. In the early days of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the
Bulletin pointed out that by all objective analysis, the advantage in Cuba was with
Kennedy rather than Khrushchev. “Cuba is just 90 short miles off our coast,” the editors
pointed out, “in a sea under our absolute strategic domination.” Three days into the
invasion, however, the Soviets’ will was proving stronger—strong enough to outweigh
Communists’ strategic disadvantage. The battle could still be won, but it required an act
of will “by the one man whose single act, in this momentous chapter, controls the
outcome.” 13
By the beginning of May it was clear that this act of will would not be performed.
NR descended into satire, commenting, “Perhaps Harvard will even add to the graduate
curriculum a course or two on Invasions, Amphibious, to fill in the little lacunae in the
expertise of future Harvard Administrations.” It would be interesting to know what
8

See John A. Andrew III, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom
and the Rise of Conservative Politics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
1997) and Gregory L. Schneider, Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for
Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right (New York: New York University
Press, 1999).
9
“Quincy” appears to be a pseudonym; for whom, it is unclear.
10
NR Bulletin (January 21, 1961), 4.
11
Burnham was a Trotskyite in the 1930s and a philosophy professor at New York
University. Never pleased with Stalin, he broke with Marxism altogether over the course
of the early 1940s. He was best known for his 1941 book The Managerial Revolution:
What is Happening to the World, which posited that power was passing from the old
elites to a new, managerial class in society (Hart, The Making of the Conservative Mind,
19, 21-23).
12
NR (April 22, 1961), 248.
13
NR Bulletin (April 29, 1961), 1.
246

exactly went wrong, the editors concluded, but ultimately it was the president’s lack of
will that caused the catastrophe. The editors did offer a way out for the future.
Eisenhower had not, they observed, been a particularly reflective man. Kennedy, on the
other hand, was more disposed to analyze and learn from his mistakes. Using his
comeback against Hubert Humphrey in the West Virginia primary as an example, NR
hoped that he might face Cuba with the same determination, courage and resolution—
and, in the end, win. 14
Since the fight against Communism was viewed by NR as all encompassing,
actions within the United States—or within U.S. military and diplomatic circles—were
deemed just as important to American foreign policy as those directly involving foreign
governments. Accordingly, the magazine carefully followed cases ranging from the fight
to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities to the case of Major General
Edwin A. Walker. Walker was an Army general serving in Germany in early 1961 when
he was removed from his command of the 24th Infantry Division and accused of
advocating the beliefs of the John Birch Society among his troops. 15 On June 12, he was
officially “admonished” by General Bruce C. Clarke, the commander in chief of the U.S.
Army in Europe. Walker resigned his commission in protest, becoming a spokesman
about the dangers of Communist insurgency and an additional symbol for conservatives
of Kennedy administration policies gone dangerously awry. 16
The accusations against Walker rested upon the reporting of a notoriously
scandalous private tabloid called the Overseas Weekly and were seriously flawed.
Walker had likely overstepped his bounds in using the Americans for Constitutional
Action voter index to advise his troops in how to cast their votes. He might well have
accused public figures including Harry Truman and Eleanor Roosevelt of being
“definitely pink” in a speech to U.S. troops and their wives, although the only newspaper
to report on such a speech was the Overseas Weekly. And he did include John Birch
Society Founder Robert Welch’s book The Life of John Birch on a list of recommended
reading, leading to accusations of links between Walker’s anti-Communist education
programs and Welch’s conspiratorial views. Even so, historians have concluded that
Walker was unfairly demonized for his actions 17—and NR leapt upon the charges with
righteous indignation.
The magazine flayed the New York Times and the Washington Post for what they
“managed not to discover in their investigation of the case.” First, The Life of John Birch
was published years before the founding of the John Birch Society, and told the story of a
young American army captain murdered by Chinese Communists at the end of World
14
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War II—a pertinent subject for troops stationed to fight against Communists themselves.
It was only one of a number of relevant publications Walker recommended. Second,
Overseas Weekly alleged that Walker had titled an anti-Communist training program
“pro-Blue” because of a connection to the John Birch Society’s guide book—The Blue
Book—when in fact, “pro-Blue” referred to nothing more scandalous than the reality that
on tactical military maps, red represented the enemy force and blue the friendly one.
Finally, Walker denied he had made derogatory comments about Truman and Mrs.
Roosevelt, pitting a decorated veteran of World War II and Korea against a notoriously
scurrilous newspaper. 18 On June 24, NR reported that the West German government had
taken on General Walker’s case against Overseas Weekly—a bit of information seeming
to corroborate Walker’s position that most American media did not care to report. 19
Walker’s case was part of a larger problem within the military—a problem of lack
of resolution that mirrored the lack of will NR saw in Kennedy’s conduct of the Bay of
Pigs invasion. In early August, as the Walker case progressed, NR opined “General
Walker was carved up just for practice, just to get the knives well sharpened.” Week
after week, the Kennedy administration and its supporters took measures NR deemed
questionable at best and self-defeating at worst: removing the anti-Communist film
Operation Abolition from the list of films approved for viewing by soldiers; removing
anti-Communist literature from base libraries; fulminating against high-ranking officers
who engaged in or sponsored educational programs deemed to “ ‘veer into Right Wing
radicalism.’” Not only were these measures dangerous, they were based upon inaccurate
information. Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright equated John Birch Society-style
conspiracy theories with the very non-conspiracy oriented Foreign Policy Research
Institute, the Institute for American Strategy and the Richardson Foundation. Perhaps
Senator Fulbright would care to share exactly what he did believe soldiers should be
taught, NR concluded—“Yalta was an act of brilliant statesmanship? Better Red than
Dead?” 20
Meanwhile, the magazine directed a continual stream of ridicule toward policies
authors derided as unfocused and offering something for nothing—a nice idea that would
never hold true in reality. January 28, NR’s “This Week” section sardonically included a
list of the agencies proposed during the first week of the new Congressional session:
…National Peace Agency; Peace Corps; Youth Conservation Corps;
Department of Urban Affairs; Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence; Joint
Committee on Intelligence Matters; Federal Advisory Council on the Arts;
National Academy of Culture; Bureau of Senior Citizens; U.S. Office of
Aging; Commission on the U.S. Science Academy; Department of
Urbiculture; Department of Transportation and Communications; Federal
Agency for the Handicapped; Commission on Federal Taxation; Commission
on Educational Standards; Committee on Independent Unions; Center for
Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West; Federal
18
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Recreation Service; Office of International Travel’ Join Committee on a
National Fuels Study; Commission on Noxious and Obscene Matter and
Materials; American Joint Commission to Assist in the Unification of
Ireland. 21
Beyond the bemusement, however, NR was sincerely concerned. At the beginning of
March, a Bulletin observed that the staff was still waiting to hear of the sacrifices that
Kennedy’s inaugural speech said Americans must make “in facing the stern challenge of
our grim era.” These sacrifices, it seemed, were not to come from Social Security—those
stipends were scheduled to increase. The poor and those living in depressed areas would
not be called upon; Washington was sending new funds, food, grants and loans their way.
Soldiers would be kept in homelike comfort, and new millions were scheduled for
education. “And yet, for all the appearances,” the editorialist wrote, “there will surely be
sacrifices too before it is over. The government that is to dispense so generously,
producing nothing of itself, can give with its one hand only what it takes with the other:
less, indeed, for there is a charge for the transfer.” In the end, the same citizens would
both receive and pay, from elderly citizens finding that even larger Social Security checks
would not keep up with inflation, to teachers whose pay raises would be swallowed, and
then some, by increases in insurance rates and drops in the purchasing power of their
pensions. In the end, all Americans would pay, and not just in financial terms: “by so
much as our day-by-day affairs are further absorbed into the tentacles of Leviathan, by
that much has the range of our free choice been narrowed.” 22
At the same time, NR and its readership remained divided regarding what positive
program conservatives should promote in place of this dangerous federal growth. A postelection interview with Arizona senator and conservative icon Barry Goldwater
pinpointed an almost universal concern: “one of the weaknesses of the conservative
performance,” Goldwater told senior editor L. Brent Bozell, “has been too much verbal
criticism and too little conservative action or proposals for action.” 23 The devil in the
detail, however, was what sort of action. Senior editor Willmore Kendall, reporting on
Goldwater’s newly-published Statement of Proposed Republican Principles, Programs
and Objectives, argued that by focusing on “strategy” rather than the fundamental
“principles” that comprised Goldwater’s paradigmatic book Conscience of a
Conservative, Goldwater ran a serious risk of treating symptoms rather than problems,
accepting the foundations of the welfare state in a rush to move into positions of greater
political influence. 24 Letters to the editor reveal that while Kendall’s ideas held water
with some, others questioned his insistence on brooking no compromise. Monroe Jensen
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of Savannah, Georgia, for example, argued that while conservatives needed sound
principles, as provided by institutions like NR and the political action group Young
Americans for Freedom, elected office was different from the university circles in which
Kendall trod; “Conservatives have a great deal of political organizational work to do
before they can rightfully expect the Statement to read like the Conscience.” 25 Principle
versus pragmatism was a recurring theme throughout the period under consideration, and
as of August 1961 NR reached no firm conclusion.
In the midst of the Leviathan, however, a new force was beginning to grow. NR
devoted considerable space to chronicling the development of a burgeoning conservative
youth movement in the United States. This was a development the editorial staff viewed
with almost parental pride, and well it might—editor William F. Buckley, Jr., himself a
young man of 35, was a founder or key organizer of myriad youth organizations
springing up in the 1950s and 1960s, from the educationally-focused Intercollegiate
Society of Individualists (1953) to the more politically activist Young Americans for
Freedom (1960). Accordingly, Buckley himself penned a signed column on one of the
more lofty displays of conservative youth prowess in early 1961—the first annual awards
ceremony of the Young Americans for Freedom, held March 3, 1961 in Manhattan
Center before an overflow crowd from which over 5,000 were turned away. Eleven
awards were granted in areas ranging from education (Prof. Russell Kirk) to international
affairs (the Republic of China, represented by U.N. ambassador George K. C. Yeh).26
Arizona senator Barry Goldwater delivered the keynote address, telling a roaring crowed
that the country was being caught up in a wave of conservatism that could easily become
“the political phenomenon of our time.”
Buckley told of a friend’s curious reaction to the festivities—he burst into peals of
laughter at the “sheer impudence of it all!”—and he reflected with considerable mirth that
this did indeed represent an amusing turn of events:
Here we are, well into the last half of the century, the overwhelming majority
of our professors Stakhanovites in the cause of Liberalism-- three decades of
intensive indoctrination in state welfarism, anti-anti-Communism, moral
libertinage, skepticism, anti-Americanism. And here was foregathered, at the
Manhattan Center in New York City, possibly the largest student assembly of
the year, certainly the most enthusiastic, to pay tribute, one after the other, to
the most conspicuous symbols of everything they have studiously been taught
by the intelligentsia to look down upon with contempt. It was as though the
25
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student body of the Lenin Institute took time off in the middle of the semester
to pay tribute to the memory of the czar.
As Buckley lauded the students for their efforts, however, he also noted the guiding role
of experienced conservative activist Marvin Liebman in organizing the logistics of the
evening. 27 Liebman’s presence reveals something significant about the conservative
youth movement; here were young people working cooperatively with their elders to
forge an integrated, multigenerational movement for change. This would differ markedly
from some of the activity on the left yet to come in the course of the 1960s, and might
well demonstrate just why the conservative movement has enjoyed such lasting success.
While college-aged conservatives rallied, NR cheered on a new crop of
Republican House members elected in 1960. On balance, the magazine reported, the new
Congress was actually more conservative than the last, even with the triumph of a
Democrat in the executive office. As an advertisement for a NR Forum reported: “There
are exciting new faces on the Washington scene—brilliant young freshmen Congressmen
from many parts of the country, determined to stop America’s drift toward bankruptcy
and appeasement.” Perhaps their numbers might even include future senators—or a
president? 28 While time has dashed the latter hope, the magazine kept readers well
informed of the activities of freshmen ranging from Donald Bruce (R-IN) and John
Ashbrook (R-OH) to a young senatorial hopeful from Texas named John Tower, and
several of the freshmen of 1960-61 went on to long and productive careers.
As well as reporting on the activities and triumphs of conservative youth
organization, NR served as a clearinghouse to notify interested young readers of
programs in which they could participate. May 20, for example, the magazine’s “This
Week” column—a regular feature of the magazine, and not an advertisement—told of
two-week intensive courses in politics, economics and history that would be taught at
three different campuses that summer. All had been organized by the Tuller Foundation
for the Advancement of Economic Understanding, and would be taught by antiCommunists and libertarians. Interested parties could contact the Tuller Foundation,
Tuller Building, Red Bank, New Jersey. 29 On June 17, “This Week” directed college
students considering a campus conservative club to obtain a copy of “The ISI Leadership
Guide,” a manual available free from the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists that
included advice on handling the logistics of organizing a club, planning events and
raising money as well as providing a short list of conservative books and periodicals, a
sample announcement letter and constitution and the Sharon Statement of the Young
Americans for Freedom. Again, NR provided mailing information. 30
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The period under discussion in this paper closes with the construction of the
Berlin Wall—and a sense of weariness on the part of a staff fatigued from eight months
of sounding the alarm against Communist expansionism. Of the wall itself, the editors
wrote, “As so often with Khrushchev’s words and conduct, it exhibited a kind of peasant
fantasy raised to an nth totalitarian power: if your cattle are slipping over to your hated
neighbor’s field, just build a long ugly wall to contain them.” No matter how ridiculous,
however, the wall represented a serious action—and by doing nothing, the West
“accepted the political meaning as well as the physical consequences” of this action.
With the wall, and the West’s refusal to physically oppose its construction, the
significance of Berlin was over; “It has been the direct confrontation of East and West at
and through Berlin that gave the city its transcendent importance. This gone, Khrushchev
can let Berlin wither on the enfeebled Western vine.” Things still could be done to
counter the Soviets’ actions—Senator Thomas Dodd had called, among other ideas, for a
“Truth Airlift” of journalists from all over the world to Berlin, for embargos and for
resumption of nuclear tests. But “There is no reason, on the record, to suppose that any
of them will be done.” 31
In sum, then, the first months of the Kennedy administration were a time of
darkness and frustration for conservatives like those of NR—but there was cause not to
despair. If the United States could survive long enough to bring them to maturity, a new
generation of conservative youth might just save us from oblivion. NR functioned as
informant and clearinghouse, voice of warning and encourager to the conservative
movement of the early 1960s. Its editors and writers, and even those who contributed to
the letters columns, debated the future of a conservative movement in the United States
even as they critiqued the day-to-day actions of the Kennedy administration.
In several cases over the course of the 1960s, senior staff would even move
beyond the realm of journalism and into active political engagement. Publisher William
Rusher, for example, was a founding member of the Goldwater-for-President movement
that began in July 1961, and Brent Bozell had been the ghostwriter behind Conscience
and an advocate for the Arizona senator as early as the 1960 campaign. 32 Buckley
himself conducted a quixotic campaign for New York City mayor in 1965 to highlight an
alterative vision to that of liberal Republican incumbent John V. Lindsay. It was as
opinion-makers and arbiters of conservative opinion, however, that the leadership of
National Review made its largest impact upon the American public. The magazine
offered a national voice, and it maintained a self-conscious focus upon developing a
coherent movement that would transcend specific events and issues. It took an active
role in supporting manifestations of conservative strength wherever they appeared—most
notably in the growing youth movement of the 1960s. Upon these foundations would
grow a movement that, while controversial, has been undeniably successful over the
course of the past almost five decades.
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Chapter 21
“Primarily a Political Problem”
Constructing the Image of the Kennedy Presidency,
1961-Present
Richard M. Filipink Jr.

Introduction
The presidency of John F. Kennedy was tragically cut short by his assassination on
November 22, 1963, leaving history to judge the success or failure of his administration. The
attempt to build a historical legacy of that administration, which had begun from
inauguration day in 1961, now accelerated into high gear, as the guardians of Kennedy’s
memory sought to create a mythical vision of what their slain leader had accomplished,
buttressed by the images of what he would have accomplished had he lived. More than any
other president in American history, the image rather than the substance of the Kennedy
administration has been crucial to maintaining his place in history.
In this essay, I will examine the growth and changes in the perception of Kennedy’s
foreign policy legacy that his family, friends, administration officials, and, ultimately,
historians, created. The image of his presidency has evolved over time, reflecting initially
the needs of his administration and the next election, then the Cold War, and finally the postCold War definitions of a successful president. I will look primarily at the Cuban Missile
Crisis and Vietnam and how the historical discussion of the Kennedy presidency has evolved
from the Cold Warrior-image crafted by Kennedy biographers and historians in the 1960s
and 1970s through the transition period of the 1980s to the new statesman-image created for
the 1990s and 21st century.
Cuban Missile Crisis
At the time, and for the following two decades, supporters and even some critics of the late
President praised Kennedy for compelling the Soviets to back down and remove their missiles from
Cuba. This portrayal of Kennedy remained consistent and dominant despite revisionist attacks from
the right and left. The traditional view of Kennedy’s actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis came
from the memoirs of former Kennedy aides, such as Roger Hilsman, Ted Sorenson, and Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., or from authors such as Elie Abel and Graham Allison who based their work
primarily on the testimony of Kennedy administration officials. According to these traditionalists,
253

the resolution of the Crisis was the high point of the Kennedy presidency. Faced with an intolerable
provocation, Kennedy had to compel the Soviets to withdraw the missiles to maintain the balance of
power, preserve NATO, and convince Khrushchev of American (and Kennedy’s) resolve. 1 These
traditionalists hailed the Aquarantine of Cuba as the correct strategy because it coupled a show of
superior American force with restraint, providing Khrushchev with enough room to back down
without losing face. Kennedy was thus portrayed as both tough and pragmatic, with the emphasis on
tough.
An example of this toughness combined with pragmatism, according to the traditionalists,
was found in the so-called ‘Trollope Ploy.’ On the evening of October 26, Khrushchev sent a long,
rambling letter which seemed to offer a deal: the Soviets would remove the missiles from Cuba in
return for a pledge not to invade Cuba. A similar offer had been made by KGB station chief
Alexander Fomin to NBC correspondent John Scali earlier that day. However, the next morning a
new letter arrived from Moscow, demanding a swap of the missiles in Cuba for American Jupiter
missiles installed in Turkey. Kennedy, at the suggestion of his brother, decided to ignore the second
letter and respond affirmatively to the first. The Jupiters in Turkey, according to the traditional
interpretation, were going to be dismantled anyway. Indeed, Kennedy had ordered them dismantled
months before, and was angered to discover his order had not been carried out
In addition, Kennedy carried on a back channel negotiation with Khrushchev by sending his
brother to confer with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. During a meeting recounted in Robert
Kennedy’s diary/book Thirteen Days, the younger Kennedy related that he informed the ambassador
that if the Soviets would not remove the missiles, the U.S. would. 2 Further, when Dobrynin raised
the issue of the Turkish missiles, RFK responded that there could be no quid pro quo involving these
missiles because any decision about their status had to be made by NATO. However, Kennedy
assured the Soviet that the president was Aanxious to remove those missiles and that they would
probably be removed after the crisis. 3
After the resolution of the Crisis, UN ambassador Adlai Stevenson was portrayed as an
appeaser. Journalist Charles Bartlett published a story accusing Stevenson of proposing another
Munich. Specifically, Stevenson proposed trading the Turkish missiles and the American naval base
at Guantanamo for the Cuban missiles. Bartlett’s primary source for the story was John Kennedy. 4
1. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1994), 94.
2. Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1969), 108.
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York: Edward Burlingame, 1991), 569.
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This negative portrayal of Stevenson served three purposes. First, it was yet another humiliation for
a man whom all the Kennedys loathed. Second, Stevenson’s willingness to trade was set up as an
unfavorable contrast to Kennedy’s resolve, highlighting the President’s ability to stand up to the
communists. Third, it signaled a new standard for liberal foreign policy makers. In place of
Stevenson’s more intellectual and apparently softer approach to foreign policy, Kennedy provided a
picture of a Democrat who was, relatively, safe from the charges that had haunted the Democrats
since the loss of China.
Finally, it complimented the administration’s consistent line, a line echoed in studies of the
Crisis, that there was no deal involving the Turkish missiles. Secretary of State Dean Rusk cabled
the American ambassadors to Turkey and NATO assuring them that no deal of any kind was made
involving Turkey. 5 During 1963, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara told the House
Appropriations Committee, without any qualifications whatsoever there was absolutely no
deal...between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the removal of the Jupiter weapons
from either Italy or Turkey. 6 In his book The Missile Crisis, Elie Abel leaves the impression that
trading the Jupiters was never really considered. 7 Counsel to the President Ted Sorenson wrote that
Athe President had no intention of destroying the alliance by backing down. 8 The replacement of the
missiles in mid-1963 by a Polaris submarine, therefore, received little publicity.
For many years, the belief that Kennedy’s resolute toughness produced a great triumph for
America endured, serving as the defining moment of Kennedy’s presidency, making the foreign
policy reputation of his administration. There were some challenges. Revisionists on the left
accused Kennedy of being too rigid and too eager to take America to the brink of nuclear war for too
little cause. Critics on the right accused him of not taking advantage of American nuclear superiority
coupled with local conventional superiority to force Castro’s removal. However, most scholars (and
most Americans) accepted the official interpretation of the Crisis.
Then, beginning in 1985, and accelerating through the 1990s, a change in the interpretation of
Kennedy’s role began. The release of the transcripts of some of the recordings Kennedy secretly
made of Executive Committee (Excomm) meetings led to new insight into the issue of the
dismantling of the Turkish missiles. From the transcripts and even more so from the full release of
the tapes over the last several years, comes a picture of a president who was far more willing than
most of his advisors to seek a nonmilitary solution to the Crisis. Especially on Saturday the 27th, the
5. James Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin=s Press,
1992), 94.
6. Ibid.
7. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966), 189.
8. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 714.
255

climatic day of the Crisis, Kennedy appeared willing, even eager to trade the Turkish missiles for the
Cuban ones, preferably through a private deal, but publicly if necessary. During the morning
meeting of the Excomm, Kennedy, discussing the demand to swap the missiles put forward in
Khrushchev’s Saturday letter, stated that Amost people will regard this as not an unreasonable
proposal. 9 He also pointed out several times that if he did not trade the missiles out and the Crisis
escalated to war, he would be accused of starting a war over a bunch of obsolete missiles which he
should have traded. Kennedy consistently expressed the belief that the Turkish missiles will have to
be dismantled, and that it is a price he was willing to pay.
This view is supplemented by the revelation that Robert Kennedy offered an explicit trade of
the Turkish missiles during his secret meeting with Dobrynin. McGeorge Bundy laid the
groundwork for this revelation in his 1988 book, Danger and Survival. Bundy stated that before
Robert Kennedy’s meeting with Dobrynin, the attorney general, the president, and a small circle of
advisors met to discuss what RFK was going to say. The group consisted of the Kennedy brothers,
Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Sorenson, Undersecretary of State George Ball, former ambassador to the
Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson, and Under Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. According
to Bundy, Rusk suggested that we should tell Khrushchev that while there could be no deal over the
Turkish missiles, the president was determined to get them out and would do so once the Cuban
crisis was resolved. 10 With this statement, the removal of the Turkish missiles was now an implicit
part of the deal to remove the Cuban missiles.
During the Moscow Conference on the Crisis held in 1989, the role of the removal of the
Turkish missiles changed again when Ted Sorenson confessed that he had deceived the American
public about the nature of the deal. Sorenson stated:
Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert Kennedy’s book did not adequately express that the
deal on the Turkish missiles was part of the resolution of the crisis. And here I have a
confession to make to my colleagues on the American side, as well as to others who are
present. I was the editor of Robert Kennedy's book. It was, in fact, a diary of those thirteen
days. And his diary was very explicit that this was part of the deal; but at that time it was
still a secret even on the American side, except for the six of us who had been present at that
meeting. So I took upon myself to edit that out of his diaries... 11

9. David Welch and James Blight, The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An
Introduction to the Excomm Transcripts, International Security 12, no. 3. (Winter 19871988), 37.
10. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty
Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 432.
11. Nathan, 96.
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Thus, the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles was an explicit part of the deal, albeit a secret part.
Further, not only was the deal concealed from the public, but also Rusk and McNamara had clearly
lied to maintain its secrecy.
A different revelation at an earlier conference made it apparent that Kennedy was even
willing to risk a public trade of the Jupiter missiles. Dean Rusk revealed that Kennedy had
instructed Rusk to contact Andrew Cordier, a former UN staffer who maintained close ties to
Secretary General U Thant. Rusk dictated a letter to Cordier which asked U Thant to propose the
Turkey-Cuba swap. If Khrushchev had rejected the Trollope Ploy, Rusk was prepared to instruct
Cordier to present the letter to Thant. The Secretary General would then publicly propose the swap,
and Kennedy would accept the offer, ending the Crisis. According to Rusk, only he, Kennedy, and
Cordier knew about this proposal. 12 In fact, the former members of the Kennedy administration
present at the conference were stunned. Hawks such as General Maxwell Taylor and former
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon were deeply disappointed that Kennedy even considered
making a public swap. Scholars of the Crisis, on the other hand, generally portray the existence of
the Cordier maneuver as evidence of Kennedy’s willingness to avoid war even if it hurt him
politically.
Having briefly described a few of the more telling revelations about the Crisis, I believe there
are a number of explanations which together illustrate why Kennedy’s supporters have reinterpreted
his role. First, the records which paint JFK as a deal maker, especially the recordings of the
Excomm meetings, were going to be declassified eventually. By preempting or accompanying their
release with revelations of their own, the President’s men controlled the spin of the news. Second,
by assigning themselves insiders’ knowledge, Kennedy’s advisors maintain their own roles in
history. Actions such as the Cordier maneuver and the secret RFK/Dobrynin meetings reflect not
only on President Kennedy, but on those who were privy to this information as well. The primary
reason for this reinterpretation, I would argue, is the desire to re-craft the image of the Kennedy
presidency to match the post-Cold War model of a successful president, emphasizing statesmanship
and flexibility rather than rigid Cold War persona. In the waning days of the Cold War many former
Kennedy aides, especially Bundy and McNamara, sought to promote a less militaristic approach to
the Soviet Union. As a result of this opposition, the major lesson of the Crisis needed to be changed
from compellence through strength to the value of cooperation and conciliation. Furthermore, as the
Soviet Union collapsed, these aides wanted to promote cooperation and, in some cases, arms
reduction, not victory. 13 They performed this task of changing the lesson carefully, making sure they
did not push too hard.
An example of this is the handling of the revelation of the Cordier maneuver. When Rusk
first revealed the existence of the maneuver, both Bundy and McNamara reacted negatively to it.
12. James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the
Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 83-84.
13. McNamara, 337-346
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Bundy stated that he was profoundly depressed by the idea Kennedy had been considering a public
trade of the missiles, 14 while McNamara stated in a post-conference interview that he did not believe
Kennedy really intended to make the trade. 15 However, one year and several positive reactions to the
maneuver by scholars and others later, Bundy stated in Danger and Survival that the president would
have been able to marshal a formidable set of arguments in support of his acceptance of a public
trade. 16 Almost all recent books and articles on the Crisis present the maneuver as proof that
Kennedy was willing to negotiate an end to the crisis, using the released tapes to further buttress the
argument. 17 Oddly enough, McNamara has raised no further arguments against the idea that
Kennedy would have made the trade.
Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy’s greatest triumph, has been recast. The older
traditional interpretations of Abel and Allison have been largely pushed aside, and even revisionists
have been forced to revise their interpretations. The guardians of the Camelot legacy have done their
job well.
However, this spate of revelations and reinterpretations open up a series of deeper questions.
There are two final thoughts that this discussion of how the interpretation of Kennedy’s role has
evolved brings to the fore. First is the question: would Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, et. al. have better
served the nation if they had revealed the importance of conciliation sooner. Specifically, where
was this willingness to compromise during the Vietnam War? Presumably these men should have
recognized what they now present as the real lessons of the Crisis back in the mid-1960s. Why were
they not applied then? Was their desire to protect themselves and the Johnson administration from
charges of softness and a new McCarthyism worth the debacle in Vietnam?
Next, if the Cold War had not ended when it did, would some of these revelations have ever
come to light? I speak here primarily of the Cordier maneuver and the explicit offer to dismantle the
Jupiter missiles in Turkey. If the Soviet Union had not collapsed, would Bundy, Sorenson, and Rusk
have made those revelations, or would they have died with these men? It seems unlikely that these
former officials would have been willing to tarnish their greatest triumph and leave their old boss,
and his party, vulnerable to charges of softness. The revisioning of the Crisis in the 1980s and 1990s

14. Blight and Welch, 171.
15. Blight and Welch, 190.
16. Bundy, 436.
17. For example, Robert Weisbrot concludes that from his actions during the Crisis
Kennedy can be seen as a Amoderate leader in a militant age.@ Robert Weisbrot,
Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 208.
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provided a new paradigm for Democratic foreign policy makers: negotiations and cooperation with
the Soviets was a viable policy.
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In the aftermath of 9/11 and the ongoing war in Iraq, Kennedy’s actions were mined by both
critics and supporters of the Bush administration. Each side could cherry-pick the appropriate
lessons: toughness and unilateral action for the supporters of the Bush Doctrine, while opponents
emphasized the pragmatic negotiator who was willing to pay a political price to utilize the United
Nations.
Vietnam
The interpretation of the Kennedy administration record on Vietnam has evolved more
quickly than that of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the Kennedy
presidency, biographers, looking to stress the late President’s Cold War commitments, spoke of the
need to maintain containment in Southeast Asia and of the necessity of being in South Vietnam. For
example, in an oral history interview conducted by John Barlow Martin in 1964, Robert Kennedy
stated, The President felt that he had a strong, overwhelming reason for being in Vietnam and that
we should win the war in Vietnam. 18 When asked what the overwhelming reason was, Robert
Kennedy replied, “The loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite
clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall”. 19 When further asked if there was ever any
consideration given to pulling out, he replied with a flat no, and when asked if the President would
have proposed using ground forces Vietnamese were about to lose, Robert Kennedy replied, We’d
face that when we came to it. 20 In his biography of the late President, Arthur Schlesinger lauded the
success brought by the increased military commitment made in 1962 and referred to the presence of
16,000 American troops by the end of the administration (and 132 killed), and the uncertainty
surrounding the policy choices. 21
As the war in Vietnam began to go sour, however, and especially after Robert Kennedy
emerged as an opponent of the war, the brief Cold War emphasis was replaced by a sustained denial
of any desire on the part of the President to escalate and citations of statements implying that
withdrawal was imminent had Kennedy lived. Once the extent of the debacle of Vietnam was clear,
Kennedy’s contribution was revisioned, even in the aftermath of the release of the Pentagon Papers.
For example, when Arthur Schlesinger wrote his biography of Robert Kennedy, he portrayed the

18. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words:
The Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988),
394. Hereafter cited as RFK.
19. RFK, 394.
20. RFK, 395.
21. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Thousand Days: JFK in the White House (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1965), 548-550 & 995-998.
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President as consistently and unequivocally against an American military solution in Vietnam
regardless of the circumstances or consequences (at least after his reelection). 22 No longer were the
American soldiers in Vietnam troops; Schlesinger was careful to always refer to them as advisors,
and downplaying their participation in combat while citing the President as the only administration
official willing to stand up to the military and refuse to countenance a significant intervention.
Schlesinger’s work has served as the jumping off point for an increasing number of works
that have emphasized the reluctance of John Kennedy to resort to the use of force in South Vietnam,
contrasting his restraint with the willingness, and in some books eagerness, of Lyndon Johnson to
commit American forces to combat. For example, David Kaiser has argued that the entire blame for
escalation can be placed at the feet of Lyndon Johnson. According to Kaiser, Kennedy resisted the
military and the majority of his advisors recommendations to escalate and instead absolutely
intended to withdraw from Vietnam. Howard Jones, in his comparative study of the two
assassinations in November, argues that the recent tapes and papers definitively prove that Kennedy
never intended to resort to the use of the American military to rescue the South Vietnamese
government from its failings, and that the assassination in Dallas was ultimately more important to
the ensuing history of the conflict than the one in Saigon. 23
Thus on the issue of Vietnam, some historians have assumed the role that Kennedy
administration officials played in the Cuban Missile Crisis, in part because of the lack of credibility
of some Kennedy administration officials on the subject of Vietnam (see, for example, the response
to Robert McNamara’s memoirs which made many of the same assertions in 1995). Despite the
actions of the Kennedy administration from 1961-63 (increasing the number of American troops
from approximately 700 to approximately 17,000; authorizing the Air Force to fly missions in South
Vietnam, including the use of napalm and chemical defoliants; tacitly allowing American officers to
lead Vietnamese troops into battle; acquiescing in the overthrow of the government, which increased
American culpability for South Vietnam) and the uncertainties of the future had Kennedy survived
his trip to Dallas, the image of Kennedy as both unwilling to escalate and planning to withdraw has
seen increasing support in the historical community, if not total acceptance. In fact, how Kennedy
would have responded we do not know; thus, the burden of proof still remains for historians
regarding their assertions about Kennedy’s subsequent actions in Vietnam for 1963. The evidence as
to what Kennedy intended to do next is contradictory and can be parsed to support both the argument
that he intended to withdraw and the argument that he intended to maintain an American role in the
22. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1978), 705. This is the famous sending troops is like taking a drink quote.
23. For a discussion of the limitations of the tapes in general and the tapes regarding
Vietnam in particular, especially the issue of what remains to be declassified, see Richard
M. Filipink Jr., A Necessary Reinterpretation: Using the Kennedy and Johnson Tapes as a
Biographical and Historical Source, Journal of Historical Biography 3 (Spring 2008): 8797.
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defense of South Vietnam. 24 Kennedy’s own oscillations regarding support for the coup reinforce
the image of a man who could not make up his mind.
More fundamentally, the question of how subsequent events would have influenced
Kennedy’s thoughts and actions is largely unanswerable. 1964 was a presidential election year, and
the Cold War was still going to be a significant issue in the campaign, especially if the Republican
nominee was Barry Goldwater. With Vietnam’s emergence as a major Cold War battleground,
Kennedy’s policy choices would have been influenced at least in part by the needs of his campaign.
We do not know how the events of 1964 would have played out had Kennedy lived, nor how
Kennedy would have responded to the events. 25 We do know what Lyndon Johnson did with the
advice of the foreign policy staff he inherited from Kennedy. Johnson believed at the time and after
his presidency had ended that he carried out the wishes and policies of his predecessor regarding
Vietnam, and Kennedy’s men did not contradict this belief significantly at the time, their later works
notwithstanding.
Conclusion
As we approach the forty-fifth (now forty-sixth) anniversary of his assassination, the foreign
policy legacy of the Kennedy presidency remains a matter for debate. Even as the Kennedy Library
selectively processes the declassification of tapes and records from the administration, and hundreds
of works on the administration and the man are produced each year, a definitive interpretation
remains elusive, clouded by layers of interpretation, revision, spin, and perhaps most potently by the
grief of a nation’s loss. What is clear is that the Kennedy legacy has been remade to fit both the
current perceptions of what a successful presidency should look like, and has hung like an albatross
around the interpretations of his immediate successors. The ability to assign only the best of motives
and most successful outcomes to the administration and by extension the country, if only he had
lived has affected the interpretation of what actually happened by both the general public and
historians (who should know better). It remains to be seen if time and distance will allow for a more
objective look at the legacy of Kennedy’s Thousand Days.
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Chapter 22
JFK: The Exceptional Ideal?
James D. Boys
Introduction
The events of November 22, 1963, had a profound impact on the course of
history and on widespread public perceptions. On that date the presidency of John F.
Kennedy came to a sudden and shocking conclusion, but a powerful and emotional
legacy that continues unabated, began to emerge. In the decades that have followed,
considerations of the Kennedy legacy have undulated wildly, from initial plaudits to
salacious gossip, much of which has focused on the style of the administration to the
detriment of its achievements. Such an approach is inadequate if we are to gain an
insight into the man, his legacy and the rationale for its continuing relevance in the
Twenty-first Century. This paper will rectify this by considering both the style and
substance of the Kennedy legacy to quantify the qualities that are responsible for
memories that long endure in those who remember his presidency and which draw
such interest in those who were born after the events in Dallas.
President Kennedy’s demeanour has given rise to an adjective; Kennedyesque, a term
that is used regularly, but often without context. This has caused generations of
leaders to be characterised as Kennedyesque, but with scant explanation as to why this
is, or what it is exactly that this is meant to imply. This paper will define
Kennedyesque and consider why it is that almost half a century after coming to office,
the Kennedy style is still very much in vogue. With the election of Barack Obama and
the numerous allusions to the Kennedy style, it is important to consider two questions:
Is it possible for politicians to emulate JFK without demeaning themselves and why
do they attempt this political impersonation? The Kennedy legacy is not bound to the
confines of history, however, for it must be recognised that the legacy of President
Kennedy has exceeded the bounds of the historian and entered the realms of fantasy.
From docudramas to science fiction epics, the image of President Kennedy is
pervasive and this paper will accordingly consider the manner in which Kennedy has
entered the international psyche due to his incorporation into works of fiction.
Casting a long shadow over our appreciation of the Kennedy legacy is the manner of
his passing. No understanding of the Kennedy legacy is complete without an
acknowledgement of his assassination on the national and international psyche. The
event transcended borders and left, as Alistair Cooke noted at the time, “a desperate
and howling note over the land.” 1 The death of the president stunned the world and
forever altered his stature, but has this event made subsequent presidents appear less
Kennedyesque by their very survival in office? Is it possible to compare favourably to
Kennedy in life, or must one pay the ultimate price before any such comparisons are
possible?
1

Alistair Cooke, Letter From America 1946-2004, London: Penguin Books, 2004, 125.
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This paper addresses these questions and others, but their collective weight signifies a
profound conclusion; the presidency of John Fitzgerald Kennedy was the exception
rather than the rule in terms of U.S. administrations. His presidency was so dynamic;
his time in office so dramatic; his passing so tragic; and his legacy so profound that
emulation appears doomed to failure. However, Kennedy’s time in office appears to
have become set as the measure of success; a high-water mark against which to judge
future leaders of America. Implicit in this, is the idea that what is being measured is
not what Kennedy achieved, but more importantly, what he would have gone on to
achieve. “At its most elemental level, the Kennedy image is that of unfulfilled
promise. This is not merely because of the personal calamity of a young man cut
down in the prime of manhood, but also because Kennedy’s murder has come to
symbolise the nation’s thwarted hopes.” 2 Inevitably, his successors appear inadequate
because their efforts are measured against sentimental constructs of the Kennedy
golden age. This paper will consider the apparent shortcomings of those who have
followed in Kennedy’s wake and why they seem to have failed in comparison.
Defining Kennedy
Decades after his assassination, John F. Kennedy’s legacy remains a potent force in
American political life. The image of the late president has been adopted and imitated
by politicians from both sides of the political aisle and his demeanour has given its
name to an adjective: Kennedyesque. However, when politicians as diverse as Dan
Quayle and Barack Obama are described as being Kennedyesque, the specificity of
the expression must be questioned. How can two such diverse individuals, with such
varying backgrounds and aspirations, possibly be described in the same manner?
In an effort to reconcile this dilemma it is necessary to note the contradictions that
arise not only in the term Kennedyesque, but also in the man himself. One of the
challenges faced by efforts to comprehend the legacy of John F. Kennedy stems from
the focus upon the president’s image as opposed to his achievements or complex
personality. A superficial focus upon JFK’s image belies an individual of great
intellect and charm, yet also one of great contradiction. As Rorabaugh explains,
Kennedy was “as enigmatic a political personality as the United States has ever
produced,” however, “when asked questions, Kennedy often replied with questions
rather than answers, preferred listening to talking, deflected the unwanted probe with
quick wit, refused to make decisions that would disappoint some of his followers, and
interposed himself between two people who disagreed with each other by leaving the
impression that he agreed with that person.” 3 This may seem like the characteristics of
most politicians, but surely there was something different about Kennedy that has
caused him to be so beloved by successive generations, including those not born when
he was president.
The challenge arises partly due to the simplified legacy of the late president. By
concentrating upon the photography of Jacques Lowe and the flowing prose of
William Manchester, the inner complexities of JFK are whitewashed, allowing and
perhaps forcing us to project our own ideas and aspirations on to the memory of John
2
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Kennedy. This is all the more viable for aspiring politicians, discussed within this
paper, who have chosen to utilise JFK’s imagery and mannerisms in an attempt to
produce an echo through time that will resonate with those who seek a restoration of
the Kennedy presidency. But if the ghost of President Kennedy continues to haunt
American political life, it behoves us to consider the qualities of this man in an effort
to comprehend what it means to be Kennedyesque and why it is that diverse
politicians seek the mantel of the fallen Commander in Chief.
The on-line Urban Dictionary defines Kennedyesque as being an adjective,
“describing the actions of a person (usually a politician) that relates to an action that
John F. Kennedy would've done. Positive term, as Kennedy was seen as a rather
popular president.” 4 This rather limited description only considers actions, however,
and it is often the case that when the term Kennedyesque is utilised, it is done so in
reference to a demeanour that is projected, as much as to an action. Accordingly, for
the sake of this paper, the term Kennedyesque will be utilised to refer not only to
actions, but also to qualities and mannerisms reminiscent of President John Fitzgerald
Kennedy. When used as a compliment it can be defined as possessing an inspirational
quality in public affairs; of an individual at ease with himself and his place in the
world; of a debonair and charming manner, accompanied by deep-rooted intelligence
and a thirst for knowledge and understanding. The term can relate to a series of
images; of touch football and windswept vistas, of wayfarers and tweed jackets, of
sailing and reading, of tousled hair and rolled up sleeves; of dynamic leadership
conducted in a relaxed and stylish fashion.
However, due to revelations that have arisen in recent years, Kennedyesque is a term
that can also be applied pejoratively. Critics highlight the contradictory record of the
administration; the shadowy connections between the president’s father and members
of the underworld; the president’s recklessness in office and undisclosed health
issues; the assassination plots against foreign leaders and the sordid events in Dallas.
Kennedyesque has even been used in reference to scandals surrounding Senator
Edward Kennedy, which further complicates efforts to define the term. Indeed, the
events of the prevailing years have done much to undermine a Kennedy legacy. The
deaths of the president’s brother and son prevented political restoration, while another
brother and several nephews have damaged the family’s public perception. The fact
that imagery associated with President Kennedy remains a force in American politics
despite these factors is an indication of its potency and resilience.
Issues of Style and Substance
Efforts to fully comprehend the rationale for the lasting impact of Kennedy’s legacy
are hampered by two powerful elements; the pervasive imagery associated with JFK’s
time in office and the violent manner of his passing. Both perpetuate fascination with
the president but in a manner that divert attention from the substantive aspects of his
administration and his personality. This dilemma, of a powerful image threatening to
overwhelm substantive performance, is not a construct of recent years; indeed it was a
matter that President Kennedy was all too aware of during his time in the White
House. “Overexposure became his major concern, particularly since an expanding
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news format provided more opportunities to cover the presidency.” 5 The recognition
that image could replace a focus on substantive issues was a paradox for Kennedy,
who had been elected president partly by advancing his own carefully constructed
image as a dashing senator and as a faithful family man who was intellectually
curious and trustworthy with the future direction of the western alliance at the height
of the Cold War. His very election appears to have hinged on the first ever televised
debates. Those who saw them felt Kennedy had triumphed, while those who only
heard them on the radio felt that Nixon had emerged victorious. It must be questioned
therefore, as to whether Kennedy could have been elected without the powerful visual
impact that he brought to the campaign trail in 1960.
As Sorensen reminds us, “style (was) a part of the Kennedy legacy; a cool,
convincing, self-confident style that spoke to and for the young at heart, cut through
can’t, overrode trivia and elevated eloquence and gallantry and wit.” 6 However the
legacy endures due to the reservoir of talent that lay behind the imagery that was so
artfully projected from the White House. All too often in subsequent years it has been
the image that has been adopted and not the intellectual curiosity that Kennedy
brought to the presidency. This would be a continual annoyance to those who served
in the White House, indeed “no charge stung them more than the one that the
Kennedy administration has seen the triumph of style over substance.” 7 It is revealing
that this intelligent president would owe his election in part to the effective use of
superficial imagery and that this would be the enduring legacy that many would take
from this time in office. Accordingly, when the term Kennedyesque is applied, it is
often in relation to an appearance or mannerism, not to a Pulitzer Prize winning
mindset or a capacity to empathise with an opponent at the height of a global conflict.
Grace under pressure was the late president’s aspiration, yet discussion of any
traditional bravery is often overlooked in favour of his physical grace under the glare
of the television lights. The impact of this attention to superficial detail would impact
not only his administration, but also those of all presidents who would follow.
Indeed, just as the attention on image within the presidency has become dominant, so
too did the 1960 Kennedy campaign for the presidency become the blueprint for
modern political efforts; the focus upon an individual rather than the party; the focus
upon image rather than substance; the utilisation of mass media advertising and
simplistic slogans. The concept espoused by the candidate’s father, of “sell(ing) Jack
like soap-flakes” 8 became the all too often imitated approach to political advertising.
Therefore, this contradictory approach, of intellectualism concealed by a veneer of
glamour was initiated by the Kennedy family itself and was in part a deliberate effort
to conceal worrying aspects concerning the candidate’s health. It was a deception that
continued following his death, since the image of a robust, healthy chief executive
was central to Kennedy’s appeal both in 1960 and today. This concealed the reality of
a middle aged man suffering from a range of debilitating medical ailments, the
exposure of which may have derailed his bid for the White House. Yet Kennedy’s
determination to overcome ailments and govern effectively could be viewed as a
laudable quality revealing a strength of character that is as worthy of admiration as
5
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any act conducted in an official capacity. This more complicated element of his
personality is often overlooked.
A Kennedyesque Culture
As familiar as we are with the Kennedy years, it is important to recall that much has
changed in the decades since his time in office. John F. Kennedy was president in a
very different era and these differences are reflected in the cultural, political and
moral aspects of his presidency and legacy. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
sexual politics of the era. In the early 1960s “a tryst in the Washington area seemed
almost as common as golf at the country club,” 9 and as a result the Kennedy years are
renowned in some circles for their swimming pool parties, skinny dipping and barely
concealed adultery. The antics of the president and his advisers were concealed during
their lifetimes, but even when the tales began to emerge it merely reinforced a certain
joie de vivre that the president exuded. Rather than appearing sordid, Kennedy made
sex seem sexier than ever, associating with the skirt-chasing, hard-drinking Frank
Sinatra and the Rat Pack. Acceptance of his philandering had much to do with JFK’s
demeanour and charming personality, but this would not have been enough to save
him from the sexual McCarthyism of the 1990s. By the time Clinton arrived at the
White House, the rules had changed; employing secretaries who couldn’t type and
having affairs with world famous actresses were a thing of the past. In the 1960s,
Marilyn Monroe could openly serenade President Kennedy, but by the 1990s the
moral climate was very different. Caught red-handed in a lie to the American people,
Bill Clinton appeared sleazy rather than masculine, charming or virile. 10
The contrast between John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton is synonymous with the
differences between the times in which they served. Not only did their styles reflect
the morality of their times, but also the distinct manners in which politics was
conducted. Despite his connection with the American people, Kennedy would appear
somewhat distant compared to the empathetic politics personified by Bill Clinton. The
political culture of the early twenty-first century would appear undignified and
emotional for Kennedy’s times. Although he was mobbed by adoring supporters on
the campaign trail, Kennedy was not asked what underwear he wore on national
television, never cried in public to gain political support, was never forced to
acknowledge causing pain in his marriage live on television and was actually averse
to physical contact in many ways. The Oprah-style politics as perfected by President
Clinton sit in stark contrast to the more rigid political styling of the Kennedy years,
which was rooted in a 1950s culture straining to evolve.
In the 1960s President Kennedy battled what he saw as “a grey tide of mediocrity and
an implacable enmity toward the concept of excellence which he exalted.” 11 His 1955
Pulitzer Prize winning text Profiles in Courage extolled the virtues of sacrifice and
honour as it detailed those who had placed the needs of the country ahead of their own
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careers. Kennedy “inspired in Americans of all ages a zeal for achievement, a
yearning to test the ancient Athenian maxim that genuine pleasure can be found only
in the pursuit of excellence.” 12 Such praise from William Manchester could be seen as
an attempt to heal wounds that had arisen from the publication of Death of a
President 13, but it is important to recall that the specific phraseology reflects precisely
that used by Kennedy on a number of occasions. In a style that his brother Robert
would later adopt, the president was not averse to quoting Athenian philosophers in an
effort to make a point, in stark contrast to George W. Bush who referred to Greeks as
Grecians and courted the anti-intellectual vote. 14
Although the political environment has changed, concepts of style associated with
Kennedy continue to be imitated. The recognition of Jackie Kennedy as a style icon is
far from revelatory, but it is important to acknowledge the president’s contributions to
1960s style and its long-term impact. Before Kennedy became president in January
1961, men in America wore hats. The only time of note that Kennedy wore a hat was
at his inauguration and at this point he was still president-elect. Kennedy avoided hat
wear during his presidency, delicately avoiding political stunts, up to, and including
the morning of his assassination, when he received a white Stetson in Fort Worth. “I
will put this on Monday in my office at the White House,” he noted warily. “I hope
you can be there to see it.” 15 Kennedy was not beyond holding a hat, but American
hat manufacturers lamented the president’s unwillingness to continue the hat-wearing
motif of the 1950s over into the new decade. 16
As well as fashion, Kennedy influenced literary consumption. He not only wrote two
best selling books (Why England Slept and Profiles in Courage), but also contributed
to the James Bond phenomenon by endorsing From Russia with Love in 1961. Such
praise would prove priceless in marketing the film, which American trailers heralded
as having ‘fans from Hong Kong to Hyannis Port.’ It would also become the final film
that John F. Kennedy would ever watch, as an early print was rushed to the White
House prior to the president’s departure for Texas. 17 Culturally, President Kennedy’s
tastes ranged from the popular to the more reserved, for this was a time when an
American president could admit to being an admirer of Cecil’s biography of Lord
Marlborough, without worrying about it costing votes among anti-intellectuals.
“Those Kennedy students who rushed to the library for a copy found it described a
ruling class of people with remote resemblance to the Kennedy clan.” 18 To be
Kennedyesque today might, therefore, be to challenge low expectations and high
culture illiteracy, something a generation of politicians has avoided for fear of
appearing out of touch with mainstream, popular culture.
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Kennedy in Fiction
The far reaching impact of the Kennedy legacy is not constrained by the confines of
reality, for its influence also extends into the realm of fantasy, further idealising his
position in the history of the American presidency and blurring our comprehension of
the real John F. Kennedy. When the age and appearance of American presidents
throughout history are considered, they are, with few exceptions, grandfatherly
figures. Yet when the president is portrayed in fiction, this is often not the case. Time
and again, filmmakers portray an American president who is young, vigorous and
dynamic. The role model for such characterisations is hardly Eisenhower or Truman.
Accordingly, the appropriation of the Kennedy image has become central to the
promotion of the ideal presidency. The utilisation of a Kennedyesque image in
fictional interpretations of the American presidency contributes greatly to a subliminal
appreciation of his time in office and a projection of what may have been.
The depiction of Kennedy on screen has been accompanied by a fictionalisation of his
life and times. This has led to conflation between fact and fiction, between the real
John F. Kennedy and the reel John F. Kennedy, until the boundaries of reality have
become blurred beyond distinction to many observers. The real John F. Kennedy may
have disappeared from view on November 22, 1963, but the reel Kennedy burst into
view a decade later in December 1974. The Missiles of October, aired on ABC in the
aftermath of Watergate and Vietnam, presented a portrayal of the Kennedy brothers as
heroic and high-minded. 19 Staged in a theatrical style, the film confirmed the
traditional opinion of the Kennedy White House and of its inhabitants as having saved
the world from the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both
William Devane’s JFK and Martin Sheen’s Robert Kennedy are courageous and
dashing characters. The non-too subtle message of the film was clear. The events
depicted were historic and the individuals particularly heroic; viewers are made to feel
a sense of profound loss.
In the years that have followed, the Kennedy family has been the subject of more than
a dozen television docudramas that continue to blur the lines of understanding
between fact and fiction. The portrayal of President Kennedy by James Franciscus in
1981’s Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy, Martin Sheen in 1983’s Kennedy, Stephen
Collins in 1991’s A Woman Named Jackie, Patrick Dempsey in 1993’s JFK: Reckless
Youth and William Peterson in 1998’s The Rat Pack have ensured that the president’s
image remained dominant, but superficial, as these docudramas “were largely
morality tales, giving velocity to counter revisionist trends by disputing or ignoring
unflattering disclosures surrounding the family.” 20 However, it is important to note
that the media presentation of a glorified and glamorous JFK was not entirely a
sentimental reaction to the assassination. The process began when JFK was still alive,
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in Warner Brothers’ PT-109 staring Cliff Robertson, in a project overseen by
Kennedy from the Oval Office. 21
Perhaps the most successful attempt to portray a realistic and balanced portrayal of
the president on screen came in Thirteen Days. As portrayed by Bruce Greenwood,
Kennedy is depicted as intelligent, but also under tremendous pressure to make
decisions that may threaten the continued existence of humanity. The relationship
between the president and the military is key to the film and the apparent
insubordination that is depicted on screen mirrors that which is outlined in David
Talbot’s exposé, Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years. A key aspect to
the text is the claim that the president petitioned Hollywood to produce motion
pictures depicting the growing rift JFK saw between military and civilian leadership.
Films such as Fail Safe, Dr. Strangelove, The Manchurian Candidate and Seven Days
in May were all produced in this time period, in a chilling indication of the pressure
Kennedy felt from the Pentagon. 22
In addition to the portrayal of Kennedy as a historic character on screen, the legacy
also benefits from the efforts of filmmakers to imbue fictional presidents with
mannerisms that are Kennedyesque in tone. In 1996 a blonde, dashing war hero
president with a young daughter saved the world from annihilation. This was not a
depiction of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but rather Bill Pullman’s portrayal of President
Thomas Whitmore in Independence Day. Twelve months later a young vigorous
athletic president with an attractive wife and daughter was forced to confront his
nation’s enemies in a struggle that was literally eyeball-to-eyeball, as Harrison Ford’s
President James Marshall struggled to reclaim Air Force One. Throughout the 1990s
the American presidency became a topic of fascination and fictionalisation, aided by
the real life antics of Bill Clinton and by his willingness to open the White House to
filmmakers. The depiction of the president exploded in the decade, as The West Wing,
The American President, Dave, Forrest Gump, Commander in Chief and Nixon amply
demonstrate. Clearly these are not all focused upon the Kennedy presidency, but when
Kennedyesque aspects are revealed, there are done so in a favourable manner. The
love theme from Camelot plays subtly during the JFK scene in Forrest Gump and the
sense of reverence and loss when Nixon addresses the official portrait of JFK is all too
apparent. When Kennedy is referenced it is with a sense of awe and reverence, tinged
with a deeper sadness at the inevitability of his eventual demise.
Casting is also a salient aspect in the consideration of the Kennedy image on screen
since actors who have previously played Kennedy, have then been recast in roles
intended to tap into that reservoir of affection for the late president. The most obvious
example of this is Martin Sheen. Having played Robert Kennedy (The Missiles of
October) and JFK (Kennedy), his portrayal of Josiah Bartlett in The West Wing would
appear to be the embodiment of Presidents Carter, Clinton and Kennedy. 23 Having
played the real president, his physical manifestation cannot fail but conjure up the
image of his earlier portrayal. This is not to suggest that the producers of
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Independence Day, Air Force One or The West Wing are seeking to imply that these
fictional presidents are supplicant Kennedys, but that by choosing to cast a
Kennedyesque actor to portray a Kennedyesque character, the perception of JFK as an
action hero continues to be perpetuated, something that was exacerbated by the
production by Hasbro of a JFK G.I. Joe doll in 2000. These actions “have helped
transform JFK from a historical figure into a popular culture icon.” 24
As with all efforts to depict Kennedy on screen, even the manner of his passing has
been fictionalised. The controversy surrounding Kennedy’s assassination has been
retold in a number of ways, some directly, but often in an oblique fashion. Oliver
Stone’s JFK (1991) is only the most direct in a series of films that argue for the case
of a conspiracy. Ruby (1992) and Executive Action (1973) deal directly with the
events in Dallas, while The Parallax View (1974) and Winter Kills (1979) change the
names of the protagonists to make the case for a wider conspiracy. In all cases JFK is
portrayed as a martyr to liberalism and the victim of darker forces.
The ultimate Kennedy fantasy involves saving the president from assassination in
Dallas. This plot device has appeared in a variety of films and television shows
around the world. In the 1986 Twilight Zone episode ‘Profile in Silver’ JFK is saved
by a time travelling Harvard professor. When this causes problems in the space-time
continuum, Kennedy volunteers to return to Dallas and die in order to save the future.
However, the professor takes his place in the motorcade, allowing JFK to take his
place in the future! The episode highlights some of the strongest themes of the
Kennedy myth. His death is portrayed as Christ-like martyrdom, as he sacrifices
himself to save humanity; the historian’s willingness to trade roles with Kennedy
allows the viewer to fantasise whether they would take a bullet to save the president
for the apparent betterment of humanity. “In the end the docudrama reaffirms
Kennedy’s goodness and rescues him from death. He is alive and well and living in
the future.” 25
In addition to the Twilight Zone, JFK’s assassination is interrupted, altered or
prevented in Running Against Time (1990), Quantum Leap (1992), Red Dwarf (1997)
and Timequest (2002). Even Star Trek creator Gene Roddenberry sought on numerous
occasions to have the crew of the Enterprise rescue Kennedy in Dallas. Whenever a
film sequel was being discussed Roddenberry would suggest this storyline, only to be
vetoed by Paramount Pictures. When the Enterprise did eventually journey in time it
was to save the life of a whale rather than a president. However, when considering
fictional interpretations of President Kennedy, one need look no further than Captain
Kirk to see JFK in space. In Star Trek, the New Frontier has become the Final
Frontier; the youngest elected president has become the youngest captain in Starfleet
history; John F. Kennedy has become James T. Kirk. Both are at the heart of the
action throughout, both are self-deprecating, and both always get the girl. 26
In film and television, romanticised images of Kennedy continue to blur the line
between fact and fiction, further altering our appreciation of the Kennedy legacy. This
24
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effort to elevate the late president to mythical stature can be seen in murals, songs and
in the effort to re-christen everything from Cape Canaveral to Idelwild Airport in
honour of Kennedy in the aftermath of his assassination. Such efforts challenge the
reality of history, creating ironies that continue to cause upset, most notably between
the legacies of JFK and his successor, Lyndon Johnson. It may have been LBJ who
passed the Civil Rights legislation of 1964 and 1965, but “pictures of Kennedy, not
Johnson, grace the walls of many black families, and it is JFK who is recalled in Dick
Horder’s song Abraham, Martin and John as one of the heroic liberators of black
America.” 27 In the struggle between reality and romanticism, the latter has clearly
triumphed in the historical remembrances of President Kennedy.
The Kennedy Legacy in Reality
The influence of the Kennedy legacy and its assorted imagery has certainly not been
restricted to fictional candidates for high office. In an age when actors have become
presidents, some politicians appear to be aspiring actors, as they seek to imitate and
impersonate President Kennedy. A whole spectrum of candidates has attempted to
gain office in the reflected glory of JFK, as Republicans and Democrats have
manipulated their image to fit the Kennedy mould, or else have sought to redefine the
Kennedy legacy to suit their own political ambitions.
Few have been as personally impacted by this as Robert Kennedy. From the moment
of the assassination in Dallas until his own murder five years later, RFK became
keeper of the Kennedy flame as well as a politician in his own right, an onerous
responsibility that caused great conflicts for the former Attorney General. “As the heir
apparent, he symbolised hope to those who yearned for the restoration of the Kennedy
presidency.” 28 Despite his fears that his supporters were merely casting their vote for
the absentee Kennedy, Robert Kennedy was not beyond reminding voters of his fallen
brother; he opened his campaign for the presidency in the Senate Caucus room where
JFK had announced his candidacy eight years before, wore his brother’s leather jacket
and developed a similar speaking style as he sought to merge his brother’s imagery
with his own. RFK “quoted him frequently…it was good politics to use the same
staccato phrasing, the mass of statistics, the self-deprecating humour, the stabbing
finger, and soaring idealism.” 29
Robert Kennedy’s appreciation of the power that his fallen brother still held over the
country was apparent when discussing his advantage over his political rivals in 1968:
Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson could be elected president,
but “they can’t be President Kennedy.” 30 That RFK met the same fate as his brother
only served to highlight the tragic appeal of the legacy and cast a darker shadow over
those who would seek to follow in their footsteps.
If Robert Kennedy was in a unique position due to his family ties, then his nemesis,
Lyndon Johnson, was equally challenged by having to follow in JFK’s wake, a
challenge that would have been difficult under the best of circumstances and for
which he was singularly ill equipped. Johnson was overshadowed by the Kennedy
27
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legacy from the first moment of his presidency; stylistically his image was wrong and
to many, he personified an old style of politics that Kennedy had sought to challenge.
Johnson’s dilemma was compounded by uncertainty over whether he should embrace
or reject a Kennedy legacy. Initially, he sought to invoke the fallen president as a
means of asserting his own legitimacy and to aid passage of civil rights legislation.
However, the mystique that was already emerging around the Kennedy family proved
to be a double edged sword for Johnson, and his references to Kennedy’s heavenly
presence unwittingly positioned himself in JFK’s shadow. A Johnson aide lamented,
“I think President Kennedy will be regarded for many years as the Pericles of a
Golden Age. He wasn’t Pericles and the age wasn’t golden, but that doesn’t matter,
it’s caught hold.” 31 In seeking passage of legislation that would secure his place in
history, Lyndon Johnson was as responsible as anyone for fostering this image; his
statements alluded to Kennedy’s greatness and the impact of his loss, while Johnson’s
lewd behaviour only highlighted the seeming grace and dignity of his predecessor. To
observers in the media “LBJ seemed to represent a reversion to the past after
cosmopolitanism and modernity of the Kennedy years.” 32
White House correspondents were quick to note the change in tone as Johnson put his
stamp on the executive mansion. Gone were the New England images of sailing,
wayfarers and rocking chairs, replaced by horseback riding, Marlboros, barbeques and
ten-gallon hats. As a result, a popular refrain developed; from Kennedy to Johnson –
from culture to corn. 33 The sudden shift in tone and style did much to enhance the
Kennedy legacy and diminish Johnson, even as he sought to emulate JFK in his own
inimitable style, which backfired amid mutterings of poor taste and crassness. This
was exemplified by Johnson’s plans to travel through Dealy Plaza in Kennedy’s
limousine and his photo shoot for GQ magazine, dressed in an Ivy League suit rather
than in Western style clothing. “When he imitated Kennedy he seemed forced and
artificial, but when he revealed his more authentic qualities he inspired lament for a
bygone era.” 34 In an age when the most popular television show was The Beverly
Hillbillies, Johnson was likened to the show’s character Jed Clampett, a man suddenly
thrust into a situation for which he lacked the proper refinement. 35
President Johnson acknowledged “those who look backward to the past will surely
lose their future,” 36 but was unable to escape Kennedy’s shadow. Accordingly he
became the first in a growing list of politicians whose careers would be blighted by
comparisons to the exceptional ideal that was the Kennedy presidency. Any such list
would surely include Richard Nixon who spent his entire career in Kennedy’s
shadow. As early as 1946, the Los Angeles Times noted, “Kennedy was the Nixon that
Nixon longed to be.” 37 Nixon was only four years older than Kennedy, but he
appeared to be from an earlier generation. Nixon had an older wife and children, who
lacked the glamour that Jackie Kennedy exuded, he dressed conservatively and by
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becoming Eisenhower’s vice president, had aligned himself with an older generation.
By choice and design Nixon can be regarded as the anti-Kennedy.
However, while Nixon disparaged Kennedy’s emphasis on style, he sought to embody
some of the same qualities that made his opponent so attractive. As a former naval
officer and owner of a beachfront property, Nixon determined that he should benefit
from Kennedyesque imagery invoking the ocean and with it youthful vitality. In a
scene more reminiscent of Johnson than Kennedy, Nixon posed for reporters on a
beach in San Clemente, California. While the Kennedys had frolicked in the surf,
barefoot and striped to the waist, Nixon posed in leather shoes, a windcheater and suit
trousers, looking stilted and ill at ease. Once more he continued to be the living
embodiment of the anti-Kennedy, utterly failing in his efforts to replicate his fallen
adversary. 38 Despite the references to ‘the new Nixon’ he continued to be haunted by
Kennedy. His 1969 inaugural was referred to as “a hand-me-down speech from the
New Frontier” 39 and his visit to Berlin would become only the first in a long line of
presidential visits to that city that would be contrasted unfavourably to Kennedy’s. 40
In the decades that have passed since his time in office, JFK has become accessible to
politicians of all ages and ideologies; practically any candidate can find some element
of Kennedy’s legacy that could be interpreted to endorse his or her candidacy. On the
1980 campaign trail, Governor Reagan repeatedly drew on Kennedy’s memory and
cited Kennedy on 133 occasions during his first term. 41 By 1984 Reagan had
referenced Kennedy so often that Paul D. Erickson pronounced him, “a conservative
reincarnation” 42 of JFK. Those who protested Reagan’s invocations failed to
appreciate that the substance of Kennedy no longer existed, that his emotional appeal
could now be drawn upon from both sides of the political spectrum. In the election of
1984, President Reagan, Senator Gary Hart, Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro
each claimed to be the true embodiment of the Kennedy legacy, an indication of “how
universal, if not empty, the Kennedy legacy had become…Like Lincoln and FDR,
Kennedy had become an icon, deeply enmeshed in the American psyche. He had
become part of the useable past, as accessible as apple pie or the American flag.” 43
Twenty-five years after JFK’s death, the Democrats nominated another son of
Massachusetts, one that was happy, even eager to play the Kennedy card. Governor
Michael Dukakis took the Kennedy image and ran with it all the way to electoral
oblivion in November of 1988. The lengths that Dukakis went to in his effort to
imitate the Kennedy style were remarkable and singularly unable to affect the
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outcome. Dukakis took to wearing clothing that was reminiscent of Kennedy and even
selected Lloyd Bentsen of Texas as his running mate to replicate the Boston/Austin
axis of 1960. But Dukakis failed to recognise the shifting political dynamics of the
country and the fact that the south was now virtually un-winnable for any Democratic
presidential candidate. Dukakis’ use of Ted Kennedy to stump for him appeared to
overshadow his own candidacy and both the crowds and the press recognised this for
what it was. Dukakis was yet another politician who sought to imitate Kennedy’s style
while not recognising that times had changed. What was contemporary in 1960 was
dated in 1988 and attempts to replicate a bygone age fell flat when attempted by
someone who so singularly lacked Kennedy’s panache and charm.
When Bill Clinton ran for the presidency in 1992 it was said that he reminded people
of Kennedy, but questions were asked as to whether this referred to John or Ted? As
details emerged of Clinton’s nocturnal activities one wondered if being described as
Kennedyesque was intended to flatter or to insult. Clinton put his 1963 meeting with
JFK at the heart of his campaign imagery to convey the sentiment that a torch had
quite literally been passed from one generation to another. This powerful concept
struck a cord not only with the American people, but also with the Kennedy family,
who chose to endorse the Clinton campaign in a fashion unheard of at that time.
Clinton was happy to exploit JFK’s memory as long as it served his campaign for the
White House: On the campaign trail he was photographed with cigars, even though he
was allergic to smoke. As his campaign progressed he adopted a speaking style that
could be described as Kennedyesque and on the dawn of his inauguration, he visited
the president’s gravesite at Arlington, accompanied by JFK Jr. and Ted Kennedy.
Once in office he restored the Resolute Desk to the Oval Office and sought to
replicate Kennedy’s mannerisms in his press conferences. Clinton’s use of the myth
may not have been an overriding factor in his victory, but it commanded occasional
attention and reminded voters of a time of perceived greater promise. 44
Clinton’s flaw, however, was ignorance of where to draw the line and as his
presidency continued, he seemed to be content to become a surrogate Kennedy; he
holidayed with the family in Martha’s Vineyard and spoke at the rededication of the
Kennedy Library, greeted warmly by Jackie Kennedy, in sharp contrast to her cool
reception of Jimmy Carter at the initial dedication in 1979. Clinton arguably took the
idea a step too far in July 1994 when he addressed a crowd in German while speaking
at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. Some argued he crossed a delicate line between
reminding people of Kennedy and inviting unfavourable comparisons. 45 Clearly
Clinton was no Jack Kennedy, but he was a politician who actively sought to exceed
expectations of his birth and who openly championed America and its people to better
themselves, an aspiration that would be overshadowed by events of the president’s
own making.
Despite the best efforts of Bill Clinton to embody the Kennedy legacy for a new
generation, there would always be those who dreamed of a restoration of the Kennedy
presidency. As long as John Fitzgerald Kennedy Jr. was alive Americans could cling
to the not-impossible dream that they would awaken one morning to find JFK back in
the White House. The president’s son recognised the hold that he had over a portion
44
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of the population and at the launch of his magazine George, teased the collective
media with the revelation “I hope eventually to end up as president….of a very
successful publishing venture.” 46 When JFK Jr. died in 1999, few were aware that the
increasingly unlikely dream of ‘JFK’ returning to the White House was still feasible,
in the form of Senator John Forbes Kerry.
John Kerry’s background made Bill Clinton look like a country bumpkin who had
simply enjoyed a lucky encounter with Kennedy. As a teenager Kerry had moved in
the same circles as the president and colour photographs exist of them sailing
together. Incredibly, however, these images were singularly under-utilised. Rather
than highlighting his initials and experience with the president in the summer of 1963,
Kerry instead emulated Al Gore’s approach to victory. Choosing to adopt a selfrighteous approach and seeking intellectual independence rather than victory, Kerry
lost the opportunity to emulate Clinton’s success and followed Gore to electoral
disaster. When considering Kerry’s narrow margin of defeat in the crucial Ohio
election, such symbolism may have made a difference. Images of Kennedy sailing off
Hyannis Port became synonymous with his time in office. By the time Kerry ran for
office his opponents successfully lampooned Kerry’s passion for water sports as being
out of touch with mainstream values.
Due to the fluctuating fortunes of the Kennedy family, Kennedyesque has become a
term that is both sought and avoided by politicians, and it is, interestingly, a term that
has been applied to Democrats and Republicans alike. This continued in the 2008
presidential campaign season, which saw both eventual candidates seeking the
Kennedy mantle. In March 2008, Senator Joe Lieberman highlighted John McCain’s
Kennedyesque qualities, stating, “I find among the candidates running this year that
the one, in my opinion, closest to…the John F. Kennedy legacy, is John S.
McCain.” 47 Compounding this was the oblique literary reference made by Sarah
Palin, who lamented, “Profiles in courage: They can be hard to come by these days.
You know, so often we just find them in books. But next week when we nominate
John McCain for president, we're putting one on the ballot.” 48 This subtle reference to
the title of Kennedy’s 1955 Pulitzer Prize winning book sought to reinforce McCain
as a man of action and integrity, in keeping with the positive elements associated with
being Kennedyesque.
The Republicans were always going to struggle to legitimately claim the Kennedy
mantle. Not only was their candidate the oldest man to seek the office (in contrast to
Kennedy, the youngest to win elected office), but his opponent, Senator Barack
Obama, was described as being the ‘black Kennedy.’ 49 This placed Obama in a
fascinating position. He did not need to talk about Kennedy and he certainly did not
have any past roots that harked back to Camelot. What he had was the president’s
youthful vitality, dark haired wife and young family. The symbolism was simply there
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and did not need to be dissected. Compounding this was the euphoric endorsement
that Obama received from Caroline Kennedy Schlossberg, the late president’s sole
surviving child. While the family had previously endorsed candidates, never before
had they been so open in their support. Their snub of Hillary Clinton’s campaign was
particularly surprising, since the Clintons openly courted the Kennedys throughout the
White House years and their support must have been seen as guaranteed.
Senator Obama’s willingness to be swathed in the Kennedy aura contributed to a
superficial campaign, focused upon the perpetuation of the candidate’s image and
personality. Not for the first time in presidential politics, serious discussions of issues
and policy received short shrift as attention was focused on image and style. Stories
appeared lauding the Obamas as the new Kennedys, while comparing Michelle
Obama to Jackie Kennedy as a fashion icon for the new millennium. Fact threatened
to give way to fantasy as Kennedy’s former assistant, Ted Sorensen, moved to
endorse the candidate in October 2007. 50 The fact that Obama went on to win the
White House may well be an indication of America’s sentimental longing to
reincarnate the fallen leader of Camelot.
Kennedy as the Exceptional Ideal
In contrast to other presidents Kennedy was “like a Hemmingway hero,” while Jackie
came “from a milieu which is familiar to any reader of the novels of F. Scott
Fitzgerald.” 51 This was not therefore, a normal couple in a normal place in a normal
time. They were instead, exceptional people in unique circumstances during a
tumultuous time. The time period was so dynamic, the events that dominated were so
dramatic and the personalities involved so vital, that in retrospect the years seem to
stand out from history. For better or for worse, Kennedy introduced the modern
political era, with its focus on appearance at the expense of policy, of “mediaoriented, televisual, celebrity politics.” 52 Before him, candidates were conservative in
appearance, mature in years and purposefully dour. After Kennedy, successful
candidates needed to be attractive, youthful, athletic, charismatic and energetic; “shirt
sleeves were rolled up, ties were loosened, hair was tousled.” 53
Clearly sentiment plays a part in this, but Kennedyesque is about more than
romanticism. “The Kennedy assassination has come to symbolise a rupture in the
collective experience of the American people.” 54 By an accident of history, the
Kennedy years appear in hindsight to be a golden age that preceded a time dominated
by Watergate, Vietnam, Monica and 9/11. Since Dallas, politicians have failed to
capture the international imagination in the manner achieved by Kennedy. Despite the
fact that no other president has looked or sounded like him, and history has, thus far,
been unable to produce another such leader, Kennedy continues to be promoted as the
quintessential American ideal. The pretence was not lost on President de Gaulle, who

50

John McCormick, ‘Ted Sorensen to join Obama in Iowa,’ The Chicago Tribune’ October 2, 2007.
Available at http://www.barackobama.com/media/2007/10/02/ted_sorensen_to_join_obama_in.php
51
William Manchester, Portrait of a President, London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1967, 75.
52
Rorabaugh, Kennedy and the Promise of the Sixties, 1.
53
Henggeler, The Kennedy Persuasion .8
54
Thomas Brown, JFK: History of an Image, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988, 2.
278

noted at Kennedy’s funeral, “This man was the country’s mask, but this man Johnson
is the country’s real face.” 55 It was not a compliment to the Texan, or the country.
Summation
Kennedy’s time in office was an exceptional ideal; an era made all the more
compelling by its abrupt conclusion, preventing delivery of its aspirations. The
Arthurian concept of Camelot has long been associated with the era, which has given
rise to claims of sentimentality and superficiality. While every culture needs heroes,
perpetuating the Kennedy legend threatens to demean current politicians as they seek
to emulate the unachievable. JFK is venerated to a degree that has proved to be
detrimental for a successive generation of politicians. “If Kennedy had looked like
William Howard Taft, with the personality of Herbert Hoover, his influence on the
presidency might have been negligible.” 56 Instead, his thousand days in office
continues to cast a shadow over the White House and its occupants, as American
politics continues to struggle to come to terms with Kennedy’s assassination and its
deeper meaning for the American experience.
It would be wrong to blame John F. Kennedy for the steady stream of imitators that
have followed in his wake. Nor does it seem particularly instructive to berate those
who have sought to emulate JFK, since they were simply following a winning
formula. However, a key element of Kennedy’s appeal was his originality. At no point
did he seek to emulate a presidential predecessor. Quoting Pericles, Kennedy stressed
on the eve of his presidency, “we do not imitate-for we are a model to others.” 57 All
who have followed in his wake have singularly failed to live up to JFK’s own
expectations as they have sought merely to emulate and impersonate to one degree or
another. The very term, Kennedyesque, is therefore a contradiction, conveying a
comparison with the past, while implying a lack of originality. As has been amply
demonstrated by those who pursue the Kennedy mantle, none can succeed when they
merely imitate and those who refuse to be liberated from the past risk being tarnished
by it.

Note
The author is grateful to Carly Beckerman for her love and assistance in the process
of writing and editing this paper. Thanks also to Gregory Gordon and John Williams,
Kate Scheurer, Crystal Alberts, Theodore Sorensen, Dr. James Fetzer, and Richard
Reeves for their kindness and hospitality at the JFK Conference at the University of
North Dakota in September 2008.
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Chapter 23
Rhetoric in the Campaign Website of Barack Obama
Mary Stromme
In the presidential campaign of 1960 John F. Kennedy gained popularity through
a series of televised debates with Richard Nixon. Unlike Nixon, Kennedy did not
underestimate the power and nuances of communicating via the newest technology of the
day, and his inspired insight helped him to win the election:
In 1950, only 11% of American homes had television (all black and
white); by 1960, the number had jumped to 88% (a tiny fraction in color).
An estimated seventy million Americans, about 2/3 of the electorate,
watched the first debate on September 26th. Kennedy had met the day
before with the producer to discuss the design of the set and the placing of
the cameras. Nixon, just out of the hospital after a painful knee injury, did
not take advantage of this opportunity. Kennedy wore a blue suit and shirt
to cut down on glare and appeared sharply focused against the gray studio
background. Nixon wore a gray suit and seemed to blend into the set.
Most importantly, JFK spoke directly to the cameras and the national
audience. Nixon, in traditional debating style, appeared to be responding to
Kennedy.
Most Americans watching the debates felt that Kennedy had won. (Most
radio listeners seemed to give the edge to Nixon.) The candidates had
appeared as equals. Almost overnight the issues of experience and
maturity seemed to fade from the campaign. Studies would later show that
of the 4 million voters who made up their minds as a result of the debates,
3 million voted for Kennedy. Nixon seemed much more poised and
relaxed in the three subsequent debates, but it was the first encounter
which reshaped the election. 1
Similar to television in the 1960s, internet technology, as it continues to inform and shape
mass communication is having a major impact on presidential elections today.
The role of the World Wide Web in a democracy and its impact on American
political campaigns has been discussed for several years now, but until recently little
attention has been focused on the websites of individual candidates. The rapid rise in
popularity of relatively unknown 2008 presidential candidate, Barack Obama, along with
1
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the substantial increase in the number of voters attending primaries and caucuses during
the 2008 election prompted reporters, political experts, educators, and others to try to
figure out how and why. Many have commented on Obama’s rhetorical skills, but fewer
have written on the rhetorical appeal of his campaign website.
Because Barbara Warnick is one of only a handful in the field of rhetoric who has
spent time researching and publishing in the area of rhetoric on the internet, her book,
Rhetoric Online: Persuasion and Politics on the World Wide Web (2007) serves as a
useful guide. Following Warnick, I examine Obama’s website as a text, analyzing the
use of rhetorical strategies with, as she suggests, a “move more toward reader-centered
criticism of texts” (122). I will begin by providing a brief definition of rhetoric and
explain the components of field dependency, interactivity, and intertextuality and their
significance within an analysis of a website. Since rhetoric’s success is dependent not
only on its skillful presentation, but also on how it is perceived and interpreted by an
audience, it is also necessary to devote some attention to the site’s target audience. From
there I will move to a closer examination of Obama’s website by examining some of its
visual, organizational, and interactive components and, for a point of contrast, compare it
with John McCain’s. The ultimate goal of my analysis is to provide a better
understanding of the role rhetoric plays in the electronic environment of a presidential
candidate’s website, but also to help provide some context and perspective of this website
within the larger milieu of the internet.
In Rhetoric Online Warnick explains how technology is rapidly changing the way
we communicate and she emphasizes the need for more analyses of the persuasive
techniques being utilized online (viii). Rhetoric is, as she explains, “the persuasive
dimension of all forms of discourse addressed to audiences” and it “functions as
ubiquitously on the World Wide Web as it does in other communication environments”
(121). While acknowledging that rhetoric can be analyzed as it occurs within different
mediums, Warnick also notes that the art of persuasion online contains variables that are
different from more traditional forms of rhetoric. For example, it is not possible to
analyze the ethos of one specific author/speaker when looking at a website that has been
created, maintained, and updated by several people (25). Also, the way an audience
extracts information from a website is different from the way they read a printed text or
listen to a speech: “The consumer of hypertext… chooses his or her own path through the
links presented and thus decides on the order in which textual components will be read.
The nonsequential reading that results means that online texts generally do not rely on the
forms of organization and argument that are characteristic of continuous texts” (Warnick
28). The ability to read and interact with a text in a personalized nonsequential order by
clicking on links that pertain to a viewer’s interests is very appealing to many website
users and is a component that I will return to later.
Because a growing number of people have access to computers and are seeking
information online, it is important to understand how different visual and textual
components are strategically combined to convey remediated messages for our
consumption. It is also important to differentiate between the audience’s participation in
the larger arena of the internet and those who are interacting with the more specific
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location of a particular website. According to the Pew Research Center’s June 2008
results in “The Internet and the 2008 Election”:
More Americans have gone online to get political news and campaign
information so far [as of May 11, 2008] than during all of 2004.
40% of all Americans (internet users and non-users alike) have gotten
news and information about this year’s campaign via the internet.
19% of Americans go online once a week or more to do something related
to the campaign, and 6% go online to engage politically on a daily basis.
23% of Americans say they receive emails urging them to support a
candidate or discuss the campaign once a week or more.
While research such as this reveals the increasing importance of the internet on American
presidential campaigns, the online audience tracking service, Compete, provides more
specific information about the number of people who had been viewing the current
presidential candidates’ websites. The “data shows that McCain’s site had 807,518
unique visitors in June [while] more than 2.5 million unique visitors checked out
Obama’s site the same month” (“McCain’s Web Site Traffic Surges, But Obama Still
Leads Online,” Wired, July 18, 2008, by Sarah Lai Stirland, par. 2). There are a number
of reasons why Obama’s website was viewed by such a substantial number of people, and
part of it may be its rhetorical appeal.
Field Dependency
The criteria for evaluating the ethos, or credibility, of a website, is different
depending on the audience’s perception of the site’s purpose and function. In her book,
Warnick refers to this as “field dependency” (67), and explains that “[u]sers will not
judge the credibility of a medical site in the same way as an entertainment site, an
alternative media site, or a travel site. The standards they apply will depend on the
characteristics of the field in which the site is located.”
(67) Focusing on political
campaign websites in general, it is helpful to understand user expectations specific to this
particular field. According to Jennifer Stromer-Galley and Kristen A. Foot’s research in
“Citizen Perceptions of Online Interactivity and Implications for Political Campaign
Communication” (2002), most people are “wary about being duped or used by
campaigns” (par. 48) and “they [want] the Internet to allow them to participate directly in
the campaign, yet they [do] not want to be involuntarily pulled into it” (par. 48).
Considering this information, it appears that most viewers are aware that the content of a
campaign website is likely to be biased and is designed to be persuasive. This may be
why the January 2008 results in a Pew Research article reveal that even though more
people are accessing the internet for news, only 2% of those who get their campaign
information online report visiting candidate websites (7). 2 Most of the website’s users,
2
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then, are not going to a candidate’s website for fair and balanced information or updates
on the campaign. Research from both Warnick and Stromer-Galley suggest that most
users are attracted to a candidate’s website because they want to participate or interact
with others.
Interactivity and Intertextuality
Stromer-Galley and Foot reveal that although users may be skeptical when
entering a candidate’s website, they are very interested in being able to participate in
some way. They note that “the focus group participants in [their] study talked
substantially more about their ability to manipulate content on a website than about their
fear of being manipulated by a site producer” (Stromer-Galley and Foot par. 25). 3
Having the ability to easily access information in a personalized way via the various links
or interact with others by posting messages on a blog are significant features. This
corresponds with Warnick’s discussion of “the rhetorical dimensions of intertextuality as
used on the World Wide Web” and her assertion that “the presence of intertextuality may
contribute to a site’s appeal as readers participate in the construction of textual meaning”
(91). Even though this is an important component of a candidate’s website, for first-time
viewers the initial impression conveyed by the overall appearance of the site affects their
perception of its credibility.
The Importance of Appearance
Those who are interested in finding out more about the candidate and his/her
stance on specific issues will likely be influenced first by the site’s appearance. In their
essay, “Believe It or Not: Factors Influencing Credibility on the Web” (2002), C. Nadine
Wathen and Jacquelyn Burkell explain that “surface credibility is evident in the
assessment of Internet information. Information coupled with a well-designed interface
and attractive graphics may result, in the absence of more substantive cues, in a tendency
for users to make a positive credibility judgment” (138). Within the field of campaign
websites Obama’s and McCain’s both contained similar features: prominently displayed
links for viewers to “contribute” or “donate” to the campaign, links that led to
information on the candidate’s background and family, and links that took viewers to
content concerning the candidate’s thoughts on pertinent issues.
The general
organization and appearance of Obama’s website was, in many ways, typical of others in
this field, yet there were noticeable differences as well. Although many viewers may not
be aware of the subtle effects of supposedly minor details, the cumulative effect is
powerful. Everything from the choice of font design to the mantras of “hope” and
“change” were carefully designed to correspond with and support Obama’s appeal to a
diverse American audience. In a January 2008 Boston Globe article, “What font says
‘Change’? Kate Sontag and David Graham Type designers decode the presidential
candidates,” Sam Berlow and Cyrus Highsmith analyzed the font choices of presidential
candidates emphasizing the ways in which “the type talks to us, the reader[s]” (Berlow
3
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and Highsmith par. 1). When describing Obama’s choice of Gotham font, they included
adjectives such as “contemporary” and “fresh”, and said that: “This typography is young
and cool. Clearly not the old standards of years past” (Berlow and Highsmith par. 4).
Like the choice of typography, there were several persuasive visual elements on
Obama’s website that were strategically coordinated to influence viewers. Incorporating
specific shades of the color blue, for example, that provided a subliminal yet
complementary layer of support for the site’s text and visual images was an aspect that
many users were likely not consciously aware of. Also, the website creators’ choice to
use a specific shade of sky blue, applying the lightest shades most distinctly in the area
immediately surrounding an image of Obama’s head and upper torso, which was
positioned strategically next to his plea, “I’m asking you to believe”, had the cumulative
effect of making him appear savior-like (See Figure 1). The lightest shades of blue

Figure 1

located near the top of the website’s home page evoked a sense of ‘hope’ in a new day.
Integrating lighter shades of blue with white, rather than choosing a consistently darker
shade of blue or a more liberal use of other colors were also a strategic choice. In Visual
Communication: Images with Messages (2006), Paul Lester explains that “lighter colors
tend to be viewed as soft and cheerful, and darker colors have a harsh or moody
emotional quality about them” (35). He stresses the importance of colors by explaining
how they affect us on emotional and psychological levels:
Because color—more than any other visual attribute—has the capacity to
affect the emotions of the viewer, a message may be forever remembered
or forever lost, depending on how color is utilized. For that reason, pay
particular attention to the use of colors in graphic design. Color easily
draws attention to itself. Used the right way, color can emphasize an
important part of a message; if used casually or too often, color can be a
serious distraction. (Lester 37)
In contrast to Obama’s website, McCain’s (particularly before May 2008) was definitely
darker (See Figure 2). Different color schemes, images, and the organization of
information on each of
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Figure 2 (from April 8, 2008)
these websites were all used to present a specific persona of the candidate but they also
contain an implicit vision of an American audience. As noted previously, the colors and
organization of Obama’s website corresponded with his message of hope (Figure 3) while
the darker, more serious tone of McCain’s website in April evokes the steadfast loyalty
contained in his military history. 4

Figure 3.

User Interactivity at www.barackobama.com
Appearance and organization may draw viewers in and help to create a credible
ethos, but the user’s ability to interact with site content as well as other users keeps them
coming back. Most internet users expect and are familiar with the personalized
4
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interaction they experience by clicking on the links within websites. There are numerous
paths a viewer may take, depending on his or her interests. As noted earlier, the websites
of Obama and McCain had many of the same links. One option that was unique to
Obama’s website, however, was the “People” link. 5 When viewers clicked on this link
they were presented with a lengthy list. At first glance the list appeared to be a curious
group of categories—a mixture of ethnicities, sexual orientation, gender, interests, and
affiliations—which may have appeared strange on the website of a candidate who
proclaimed the importance of unity in America. 6 Considering this list from a rhetorical
perspective, the creators of Obama’s website capitalized on the highly personalized
reading atmosphere that occurs through the nonsequential reading on websites. The
flexible structure of a website provides a unique opportunity for rhetorical appeals that
are personalized to viewers already familiar with the process of seeking only information
that interests them. Obama clearly could not base his stance of national unity on the
previous fiction of a “typical” American, although to some the inclusion of a list such as
this may have appeared as if he was encouraging identities of separateness or the
continuation of entrenched divisiveness over certain issues. To many who have felt
marginalized in America, though, it may have been validating, in a way, to see their
identifying group, affiliation, or interest available as a link. For example, Native
Americans, or “First Americans” as the website creators referred to them, are rarely
addressed directly and publicly in a presidential campaign. They may have interpreted
this as an acknowledgement of their concerns in a visible way. Some may have
perceived that they, as individuals, were taken seriously by a presidential candidate and
that he was aware of their unique problems.
Another option that, until mid-May 2008, was not available on McCain’s website
was the ability to view the text in either English or Spanish. This small link was located
in the upper right-hand corner of every page and carried with it an implicit indication of
the level of the candidates’ concern for and interest in communicating with Spanishspeaking constituents. 7 I am not sure if the initial absence of this feature was an
unintentional oversight by the creators of McCain’s website, but they obviously decided
it was important enough to add later.
Blogging: Interactivity with others at www.barackobama.com and beyond
There are many subtle factors that influence the credibility and appeal of a
website. The ability to participate along with other users in creating a portion of the
5

After April 2008 McCain added a similar “Coalitions” link.
I am referring to Obama’s call for unity during his widely praised keynote speech at the 2004 Democratic
National Convention in which he proclaimed that we are not “red states” or “blue states” but the “United
States” and also, in his call for a more united national identity he asserted that “There’s not a black
America and white America and Latino America and Asian America; there’s the United States of America”
(Illinois Senate Candidate Barack Obama’s 2004 Speech at the Democratic National Convention.
Washington Post).
7
On Obama’s section dedicated to “Asian Americans & Pacific Islanders”, the option of viewing the
information in Chinese, Korean, or Vietnamese was also available for viewers. This type of attention to
detail by the site’s creators is part of what may have made his website appealing to diverse groups of
people. It portrayed an aware and concerned ethos for people from a variety of backgrounds and locations.
6
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website is perhaps one of the most appealing features of a campaign website. Viewers
who are actively writing on blogs, whether to present their own opinion, share a piece of
news, or react to the writings of others, are participating in the co-creation of a part of the
candidate’s website. My intermittent visits to the blog on Obama’s website between
February and May 2008, as well as less frequent visits to Clinton’s and McCain’s blogs
for comparison, reveal that the majority of bloggers on campaign websites are loyal
supporters of their candidate. 8 The blog is a location where users can and do voice their
support of one another, share their anger over the most recent media stories, add links to
encouraging articles or other fundraising sites, and report on the progress of fundraising
efforts. In her book Warnick refers to this process as “fanout” (88) and it is a process that
Obama’s campaign staff and loyal supporters advanced to heightened levels.
Conclusion
Considering the amount of money Obama was able to raise 9 and the interest he
helped to generate among younger voters, 10 my research indicates that a candidate’s
website can be a central force in the successful election of a candidate to office.
According to a March 2008 article in Wired, “Most prominent in Obama’s suite of sites is
the social networking tool my.BarackObama.com. Since its launch a little more than a
year ago, more than 500,000 accounts have been created and 30,000 supporter-created
campaign events listed at the site” (Stirland par. 10). As this article suggests, the ripple
8

My visits to campaign blogs coincide with the results of Warnick’s research on the interactive
components in George Bush’s 2004 campaign website. She suggests that “By involving users in posting
and reading user-contributed content, campaign sites can promote user/candidate identification and thus
intensify loyalty to the campaign” (Warnick 89).
9
The April 4, 2008 New York Times article, “For Obama, a 2-to-1 Edge Over Clinton in Donations” by
Leslie Wayne reveals that “[t]he $40 million raised in March brings Mr. Obama’s total [received from
donations] to $237 million, compared with $193 million for Mrs. Clinton” (par. 6), and Ken Dilanian’s
article, “Obama’s Claim of Independence Questioned” in the April 15, 2008 issue of USA Today which
states that Obama’s “raising of $193 million and counting [is] the most of any presidential campaign” (par.
7).
10
According to Jan Hoffman’s April 28, 2008 article, “Young Obama Backers Twist Parents’ Arms,” in
The New York Times “the young supporters of Mr. Obama, who has captured a majority of under-30
primary voters, seem to be leading in the pestering sweepstakes. They send their parents the latest Obama
YouTube videos, blog exhortations and ‘Tell Your Mama/Vote for Obama!’ bumper stickers” (par. 3).
Also, after the February 5, 2008 primaries and caucuses held in more than 20 states, Rock the Vote blog
reported that “[a]ccording to CNN’s exit polls and the Center for Information & Research on Civic
Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), in nearly ever state holding a primary of caucus last night, youth
voter turnout increased significantly—doubling, tripling and even quadrupling turnout from 2000 and
2004” (par. 3).

289

effect created by a relatively small number of people who are inspired and motivated is
difficult to ascertain.
Obama’s campaign demonstrated the ways in which a candidate’s website can
quickly turn into a “suite of sites” that can exponentially increase the momentum,
popularity, and support of a candidate. Obama’s campaign website appears to have been
an integral meeting center and touchstone for many of his supporters. Whether they
arrived to organize offline activities, to connect with others, or to exchange ideas and
links, the activity on this website had an impact on far more people than just those who
accessed the site.
Because an electronic environment such as the internet has the capacity to reach
and influence such a large number of people, more attention needs to be focused on the
rhetoric contained within a candidate’s website. Although it is admittedly only one
aspect of a campaign, the rhetorical strategies on a candidate’s website present and reflect
a candidate, as well as persuade or dissuade others. Like the rhetorical strategies
Kennedy had the insight to see as working uniquely well within the medium of television,
Obama recognized the potential of success through rhetorical appeals that worked
particularly well within a digital environment. Rhetoric within campaign websites needs
to be considered and evaluated as the integral part of contemporary political campaigns
that it most certainly is.
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The DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT
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Chapter 24
That Day in Dallas
Eleanor Williams
Who doesn’t remember that day in Dallas when Jackie stood splattered in blood
beside a hearse carrying her husband’s body? That day in Dallas when Jackie in her
blood-stained pink suit stood in a crowded Air Force One and watched helplessly as
Lyndon B. Johnson took the oath of office? Not one of us will forget Caroline Kennedy
in the rotunda, kneeling before her father’s coffin, nor John F. Kennedy, Jr. saluting his
father’s casket as his mother held his hand. Not one of us will forget Jacqueline Kennedy
sheathed in veils, flanked by her brothers-in law, Bobby and Teddy, reaching out for the
American flag that covered her husband’s casket, face tear-streaked. Nor will we forget
that the same day she buried her husband, she held a small birthday party for their son,
John F. Kennedy, Jr. It was his third birthday.
Some images remain in our hearts and minds forever. It doesn’t matter that I was
only a little girl in elementary school; it doesn’t matter that my parents voted Republican;
nothing mattered but the fact that my forty-seven-year old president was assassinated and
later we would all watch his brains spatter over his wife in her hot pink suit, red roses
tossed to the floor of the limo, on the Zapruder film, over and over and over again.
Dallas. 12:30 p.m. Death. Walter Cronkite wiping away his tears. The announcement
on our black-and-white TVs and knob radios at 1:06 p.m.
JFK and Jackie had become icons to me as a little girl. I bought and still have
every magazine about Jackie—her clothes, her sister, her relationship with JFK, her
stillborn little girl, and then Caroline. I had articles on their house in Georgetown, how
she loved to redecorate and buy couture clothes and all the bills would be sent to Joe
Kennedy—the man some say bought his son the presidency. Who some say bought all
the copies of Why England Slept and put them in his attic to get it to the bestseller list.
My parents gave me a book for Valentine’s Day called I Was Jacqueline Kennedy’s
Dressmaker and it was filled with designs Jackie had made herself—these were the years
before the marriage, before the White House, before the killing.
In Miss Bonn’s third grade class in the old Longfellow school with its scary cloak
closets, where I spent a great deal of time for talking out of turn, we held a mock election
in the fall of 1960 after one of the debates that we had been assigned to watch. The class
elected Nixon. I’ll never forget that—what kind of a third-grade class was I in, anyway?
It was a third-grade class in Binghamton, New York boasting a one-percent minority
population—any minority.
My parents had a huge fight on election day—November 10, 1960—I still
remember my father literally trying to strong-arm my mother—he in his dark suit with a
crisp white shirt, narrow dark tie—and because I had to polish his shoes, I knew he wore
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garters to hold up his socks beneath those slacks of his—she in her Donna Reed red-andwhite housedress—hair looking fresh from getting it “done” at Tony’s Salon—or
perhaps, she’d just had a comb-out—at any rate, I was home for lunch with my three
siblings—in those days we walked home for lunch every day—and then back for the
afternoon classes. My dad came home for lunch, too—and he could not believe she was
going to vote for Kennedy! He had a lot of issues with Democrats and their spending and
he particularly hated the Kennedys. He was a doctor and the Democrats—especially
Kennedy—wanted to use his money for social welfare issues. Thieves, those Democrats!
To use his hard-earned money for people too lazy to work. How dare they?
My mother stood up to him—eyeball to eyeball—and a slap or two may have
been exchanged, but I’m willing to bet, she voted for Kennedy—not because of his
politics, but because of his wife and her clothes and her little girl, Caroline. Plus both
women were pregnant. It turned out that my mother gave birth to my sister Carolyn just
hours before Jackie gave birth to the little boy everyone—except his family—called
John-John. My mother was so proud to have given birth first.
The Presidency—from a little girl’s POV—Clothes and Crises
Mostly Jackie’s clothes. I designed my Barbie doll’s clothes after Jackie’s—
complete to her wedding gown, heavy satin, a long train, a frilly veil. And there are the
dinner party clothes. A Grecian-style dress. Upswept hair. Pablo Casals at the White
House. Jackie’s restoration of the President’s home and her televised tour. Glued to the
black-and-white RCA. Jackie giving a speech in Spanish. The French going berserk
over Jackie, leaving JFK to introduce himself as the man who accompanied Jacqueline
Kennedy to Paris. Horses—like at our own farm. My family lived in Binghamton, New
York, but we had a farm out in the hills of the Pennsylvania Endless Mountain—a place
we always called the farm and we had horses and cows and sheep—even a maple
sugaring facility. Jackie in jodhpurs—just like mine—horses nibbling apples from her
hand just like they did from mine. Caroline and her pony, Macaroni. Caroline and JohnJohn playing beneath the Oval Office desk. Sometimes my siblings and I went to my
father’s office—we were afraid of those visits, no game playing or joyous smile—always
somber occasions—your great-grandmother fell and broke her hip. Your grandfather has
had a heart attack. Your aunt has polio. Your mother has cancer. Such a contrast to the
Kennedy family sailing in Hyannisport. A favorite image—the two brothers, Jack and
Bobby walking across the White House lawn, heads close together. Jackie and her sister
Lee atop a camel. Jackie starting a play school in the White House for her children—a
circular room with a lot of sunshine. I loved all these images and incorporated them into
my own consciousness until it seemed as if the Kennedys were my family, too.
Crises
I know about the Baby of Pigs disaster because my father talked about it and the
Communists incessantly. He said Nixon proposed the Cuban attack, Eisenhower planned
it, RFK championed it—but JFK approved it and had the CIA carry it out. Fiasco.
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We had a shelter beneath our basement should there be a nuclear attack at our
Binghamton house—plastic garbage cans filled with soup and baked beans and sardines
lined the basement walls. Fear crept into my heart that lasted the next years—fears about
more than my father, fears about the communists. I lay in bed awake night after night,
afraid of them and what they might do. Like McCarthy, the Red Scare loomed large in
my mind. Tangible. My little brother and I held hands on the way home to and from
school, fearing that Communists lived in one or more of the houses we passed.
And then the real deal—the real fear—the thirteen days where we lived cowering
and afraid. The Cuban Missile Crisis—October 1962. On what might have been the fatal
day, my family was gathered as always around the kitchen table at exactly six p.m. for
dinner. My baby sister sat in a high chair between my mother and father. The other four
of us children clustered close together as my father said to us, “Well, you may as well tell
each other good-bye tonight. It’s probably the last time we’ll see each other.”
I understood nothing but the racing of my heart and my cold, clammy hands.
Never see my beloved brothers Charlie and Pete again? My sisters Jan and Carolyn?
What about our dogs, Helga and Duke? Our cat Judy? The horses? What about my
grandparents? My father was calm. He kept on eating. He didn’t tell any of us goodbye. I remember an image of Khrushchev taking off his shoe and slamming it on the
table—what table? Where? I don’t know. I picture him sitting at our own kitchen table,
bald head gleaming, as he slams down that shoe over and over again. I know I was
afraid.
The next morning I woke up—shocked to see my sister Jan sleeping in the twin
bed beside me. I crept around the house—Duke and Helga were okay—baby Carolyn was
in her crib—Charlie and Pete were in the bunk beds, my parents in their room. We had
survived the crisis—but I wonder if that scared little girl survived, if she isn’t still
somewhere in my heart?
The U.S. emerged victorious and that year for Christmas my father bought
Vaughn Meader’s record album The First Family recorded during those terrifying
thirteen days. I played it over and over and over again. I thought it was funny the way at
the end the president says, Goodnight, Jackie, Goodnight, Caroline, Goodnight, JohnJohn, Good night Bobby—and so on—I think I thought the record was the Kennedys, and
I liked listening to them talk to each other. Sometimes I’d sit my Barbie and Ken dolls
and my Ginny dolls, who served as their children, in front of the record player to listen to
my Kennedy family.
And then—another crisis—a more heartbreaking crisis—so much more personal.
The Kennedys were my family, afterall. August 7, 1963, rolled around and Jackie gave
birth to Patrick Bouvier —a baby with heart problems who could have lived longer than
his short forty-eight hours had he been born in recent years. My family lived in
Binghamton, New York, but we were out at the farm when little Patrick was born and
died. My mother and I sat next to the radio for hours. Later, in books, I read that that
baby brought the Kennedys closer together, that that was the first time anyone had seen
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JFK cry—and I cried reading this. Two dead babies. Both buried now beside their
parents in Arlington Cemetery. The stillborn baby’s grave says Baby Kennedy—but
Jackie had named her Annabel. I wanted to name my daughter Annabel, but my mother
didn’t like the name. I know that Jackie Kennedy should have been my mother.
The killing begins: JFK, Martin Luther King, RFK—affecting an entire
generation—but assassinating my president was right up there with the old hymn, Were
you their when they crucified my Lord? Sometimes it causes me to tremble, tremble,
tremble—Were you there when they assassinated my president?
I was. I was there. And I still tremble.
I am now in sixth grade, having skipped fourth grade— eight of us skipped and
went on through high school together taking what were known in New York State as the
Regence Classes.
On November 22, 1963 after lunch, we exalted eight were in Mrs. Kosack’s class
at the MacArthur school library. It was a brown room—brown textured carpet, lightbrown maple round tables, brown maple chairs, brown tweed drapes. The room smelled
of fresh paint—beige—and that lovely, musty odor of books. The clock was round—a
big black and white one high on the wall not far from the Intercom system. The Intercom
system was a way for the front office to make announcements—and the voice of whoever
gave the announcements came through this big round metal thing with a grate over it.
Mrs. Kosack kept a sharp eye on her students, and even I wasn’t whispering. It was
then—and I don’t really remember the time—only that it was after lunch in the library—
that the deep voice of MacArthur Elementary School’s principal, Ben Gold, in
Binghamton, New York, told school children all over the building that my president had
been shot in Dallas. Time passed before he came on again—a time in which we were all
dead silent and Mrs. Kosack stood ramrod still in the corner beneath the clock.
“President Kennedy has been killed,” he said.
I don’t know what he said after that. I know we were dismissed from school. No
one’s mother worked outside the home in those days. It was safe to let us walk home.
What wasn’t safe was for my president to ride in an open motorcade through Dallas.
Images: Jackie climbing across the back of the car to get to Clint Hill, the secret
service man. The grassy knoll. The crying people. One girl with cat-eye glasses and a
headscarf.
My biological family was headed to the farm that weekend. We jammed into my
parents’ two vehicles. I rode with my mother, the radio on—all of us quiet, listening,
listening. That’s how we spent the weekend, but by then we had a black and white TV at
the farm, too, and we turned it on and left it on. We ate our meals in front of it on those
old metal TV trays, black metal with a pink flowered design in the middle.
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Sunday, November 24—my father’s birthday—we didn’t go to the church; we
attended at the farm. We always went to church. Our not going only made that black and
white TV and its reportage of Jackie and her children that much more terrifying.
Unearthly. And so I was there when Jack Ruby shot Lee Harvey Oswald—just darted out
in front of the entourage guarding the man—I still can picture that big cop in a suit
wearing a ten-gallon hat.
Lee Harvey Oswald pronounced dead. Information that he shot J.D. Tippet, a
police officer using a revolver, as he, Oswald, walked the streets after leaving the sixth
floor of the Texas School Book Depository building, a rifle left among a clutter of
cartons. Did you know that Jackie took the time to send Officer Tippett’s wife a
sympathy note?
Monday, November 25—birthday of my sister and JFK, Jr.—the day my
president was buried—I see that flag-draped coffin, that prancing riderless horse—all
those international dignitaries marching, marching—and at the front of this cortege,
Jackie, flanked by Robert and Edward Kennedy. No school that day. And I sat in front
of the TV in Binghamton now—watching these seminal events in my life take place.
Within weeks I joined the Girl Scouts so that I could go with them to Arlington
Cemetery to see if JFK’s grave is really there, that there is a white picket fence
surrounding the area and an eternal flame. We’re not Catholic, of course, the Catholics
are all immigrants according to my parents, we’re Episcopalians come over no doubt in
1607 to the Jamestown Colony, and no one in our family crosses him or herself, but
Jackie does and now I do, too. I put my knee to the ground, bow my head and cross
myself. And I cry. If only I had a veil.
My husband wasn’t born when JFK was elected. Sometimes I think that if
anything could tear us asunder, it would be that he wasn’t there when they assassinated
my president. It didn’t break his heart. Sometimes it causes me to tremble, tremble,
tremble.
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Chapter 25
“I Looked Up and I Looked Down.”
JFK, Mrs. D, and the Space of Citizenship 1
Steve Andrews
Mrs. D had left the room. What exactly we were studying on that Friday
afternoon, I cannot recall. With the shortened school week and Thanksgiving holiday
coming up, I probably didn’t give much thought to schoolwork at all. As a third-grader
about to turn the corner on the third anniversary of coming to this country, I had already
assimilated enough to know that this was the beginning of the holidays—a time when
carols would be practiced in school as well as in church, and when the early birds, here
and there, would already have feathered their homes with strings of lights. It was a time
when cookies and candy of all shapes and colors seemed to come out of the paneled
woodwork, and you didn’t even have to push any buttons. All you had to do was be
yourself. More than just a feast for the eyes, the holidays seasoned all my senses until by
the 24th of December to be myself was more than I could stand. No, I don’t recall
exactly, but I’m sure I was looking ahead when Mrs. D came back.
The venerable Walter Cronkite of CBS announced President John Fitzgerald
Kennedy’s death at 1:38 CST. 2 Again, my memory betrays me. Had we heard the news
on the intercom from Uncle Walter himself, or did we hear it from the Principal? Was
Mrs. D now telling us that our beloved President was dead, or was she telling us that we
were going home early? I do not recall, for those are not the details that 45 years have
grooved into my memory. What I remember is how Mrs. D looked, a look that has
become for me a private touchstone both for a singular moment in American history and
for a pivotal moment in my life as an immigrant adoptee.
I should probably tell you that I didn’t much like Mrs. D. Playground taunting
during those heady days of first and second grade had reinforced for me the notion that,
in a social world hinged on the binary pivot of white and Indian, my mixed-race ancestry
(Black-Korean) along with my adoptee status would often prove to be a difference that
1

An earlier version of this paper was presented at John F. Kennedy: History, Memory, Legacy—An
Interdisciplinary Conference, at the University of North Dakota, Sept. 25-27. I wish to thank J. Harley
McIlrath, who read an earlier draft and made helpful comments.
2
In a Thursday, November 20, 2003, appearance on CBS’s The Early Show, which would go on to do a
live show from Dealey Plaza that Friday, Cronkite recalls delivering the following statement on that fateful
day: “President Kennedy died at 1:00 p.m. Central standard time, 2 p.m. Eastern standard time, some 38
minutes ago.” See “Cronkite Remembers JFK,” at
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/20/earlyshow/main584646.shtml . According to the Dallas Morning
News, Kennedy was shot at 12:30 and pronounced dead by Dr. William Kemp Clark at 1 p.m. CST. See
The Day JFK Died: Thirty Years Later: The Event that Changed a Generation/Dallas Morning News
(Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1993), 17, 24.
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mattered just a little too much. I represented what the late French cultural theorist Rene
Girard would call, in The Scapegoat, a “difference outside the system,” a difference that
was threatening precisely because it exposed “the relativity … fragility … and …
mortality” of the dominant system defined most emphatically by the white/Indian
binary. 3 Within that framework I was invariably, and sometimes problematically, an
object of fascination. Set off against the larger framework of generations of racial
animus, I had the capacity to unite, as in “he is different from us,” the “us” being Indian
and white; or set within the contours of concepts of family patrolled by the Four
Horsemen of biological determinism (Adenine, Thymine, Guanine and Cytosine), I could
divide once again, as the awkward fact of my white family reinforced for both sides my
radical deviation from their hand-me-down norms. Early on, I had to learn to negotiate
both of these capacities, in and out of the classroom, even as, with help from my parents,
I had to commit to the idea of mutability, of difference, within the system itself. That it
would not always be like this nor was everyone treating me that way was their mantra.
They were right, of course, but even so, there were moments when I wanted nothing more
than to be lifted up, like Elijah, to another plane. But more, I wanted an assumption of
innocence without the attendant hassles of being an exemplar, for anyone. Failing such
divine uplift, and in a counter-blast of logic the brilliance of which was exceeded only by
its circularity, I determined that since I was bound to be a center of attention, I would be
the center of attention on my own terms. Lift-off, re-entry, crash landing: enter Mrs. D.
Mrs. D, you see, brooked no deviation from the protocols of decorum she laid
down in her class. It was her way or the hallway. And her way cramped my style, a style
I’d managed to nurture in the friendly chaos of first and second grade, each taught by
attractive, single women, who, with ink still wet on their teaching certificates, were as
inexperienced in their field as I in mine. Mrs. D, of course, was none of those things. And
if I sagged a bit to think about the prospect of incubating for nine months beneath her
withering stare, I have to wonder now how much these two young women, in measuring
themselves against her no-nonsense and even-less-lipstick example, struggled to come to
terms with what the next thirty years in this small rural town would be like.
I know they struggled. My father was their minister, and my parents would
occasionally invite them over for dinner. Long after we kids had excused ourselves from
the table the grown-ups would still be talking. The young UCC minister and his wife,
recently transplanted New Englanders, hunched over their coffee, commiserating with the
freshly-minted teachers. We preacher’s kids, we hear things. But in fuming the dust that
bedevils our past, we too often look only one way: it is always the young who are
stunted; always the beautiful who are trapped; the banker’s daughter from Connecticut
who bemoans the unbearable loneliness of dust rising from dirt roads.
What, then, of Mrs. D? She, too, had once been young and newly certified; she,
too, was—well, she was Mrs. D. It occurs to me now that I know nothing of Mrs. D, and
that in all these long years, I have reduced her to a series of looks that cut me to the quick
and held me—hold me—in my place. Formidable, well-organized, and impersonal, she
dispensed tough love as only a walking Bureau can, by dint of constant discipline and
3

See Girard, The Scapegoat (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 21.
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that hard, supervisory gaze. Even now, through the haze of those dust-covered years, I
can still manage to hear her say, “No, it goes there.” Whether “it” was “Stephen, to your
desk” or a comma in a sentence, there seemed a proper and permanent place for
everything. It was depressing. But it wasn’t the way she looked at me that Friday
afternoon that made such an impact on me. It was how she looked. She stood there as
she always had, but now she struggled to keep her composure. Staring, she looked as if
she, too, had been rifled, as if some hidden hand, unbidden, had reached inside of her and
emptied her of all that was worth holding. And then, in front of us all, she broke down
and cried.
In the historical record, it is, of course, no contest. The headline is obvious, if
unduly triumphant: Kennedy Assassination Trumps Mrs. D’s Public Disclosure of an
Inner Life. Indeed, we would no doubt quickly reach a consensus that the assassination
caused Mrs. D to react in that way. But in the private world of gestures and tokens with
which each of us measures the epochs of our lived experience, it was Mrs. D’s reaction
that brought home the awful gravity of the news of the President’s death. As when a
toddler falls down and then awaits adult reaction before registering an embarrassed
“oops” or an anguished howl, we who were in that classroom likewise followed Mrs. D’s
lead into grief and anguish. And if back then Mrs. D’s disciplinary gaze robbed me of my
self-fashioned pose of the know-it-all lurking beneath the madcap antics of the class cutup, and if back then that same gaze tethered me to my desk in ever tighter orbits, her
breakdown now, as then, has given me a place on which to hang the hat of my
citizenship.
Indeed, the psychological trauma of Kennedy’s death as manifested in Mrs. D’s
demeanor was the single most important assimilative event in my life, even more so, in
retrospect, than the naturalization ceremony I had undergone the previous winter. As of
that moment—Nov. 22nd, 1963—I knew, as did everyone else of my generation, exactly
where I was. Such knowingness implies, for me, the primal scene of my Americanization,
for I now shared something with each and every one of my classmates. In watching Mrs.
D show me exactly what it felt like to be an American citizen, I was indubitably there,
transfixed forever to my desk, and no amount of taunting on the playground could ever
take that away.

Such thoughts occurred while I was teaching in my college’s Washington DC
program and were occasioned by an upcoming conference on JFK at the University of
North Dakota for which I was preparing a paper. Needing something a bit more
dependably genuine than my memory with which to anchor a point about Mrs. D that I
wished to make, I called my wife back home and asked her to go through the stuff that
my father’s second wife had sent shortly after he died. “I know my third grade report
card is in there,” I said. “It might have something in it I can use.” Specifically, I was
hoping to get some purchase on the daily class schedule so I could then make some kind
of claim about what we were studying at the exact time when Mrs. D broke the news of
Kennedy’s death. Sure enough, a few hours later my wife reported back, her mission
accomplished. “I’m looking at the report card,” she said. “Subjects are listed, but there’s
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no way to know when they were taught.” Perhaps sensing my disappointment, she
blurted out, “Do you want the stuff on citizenship?” Citizenship? What stuff? “Well,
there are a couple of paragraphs on the report card explaining what citizenship is and the
rationale as to why they were focused on it. Apparently, you did pretty well,” she said,
dawdling a bit over “apparently.” “You got check marks in all the right boxes.” If she
was surprised, she had the good grace not to say so.
My search for the genuine had, in fact, turned out even better than I expected. I
knew that JFK had concluded his convocation speech at University of North Dakota on
Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1963, with a call to action on behalf of education and citizenship:
What we seek to advance, what we seek to develop in all of our colleges and
universities, are educated men and women who can bear the burdens of
responsible citizenship, who can make judgments about life as it is, and as it must
be, and encourage the people to make those decisions which can bring not only
prosperity and security, but happiness to the people of the United States and those
who depend upon it.
What I did not know, or rather, what I had long forgotten, was that some 280 miles away
in the northwestern part of the state, teachers the likes of Mrs. D were putting that call
into action. While not as elegantly phrased as in Kennedy’s speech, my third grade report
card nonetheless underscored that “citizenship can best be developed by participation in
citizenship activities. In the school as well as in the home, the child is not only preparing
for citizenship later, but he is practicing as a citizen now.” The report card goes on to
suggest that the molding of good citizenship can only be done in tandem with ongoing
efforts at home. “In marking the pupil on these traits,” it states, “we are giving you our
opinion of his outstanding qualities, those in which he is strongest as well as those in
which he needs most help from the home and the school. We invite your hearty
cooperation in aiding your child in this development.” Next followed a list of “Habits
and Attitudes Desirable for Good Citizenship”—“Carefulness; Co-operation; Courtesy;
Dependability; Obedience; Health; Industry; Initiative; and Thrift”—virtues of which
even the ever self-improving Jimmy Gatz, doomed soon to be Mr. Nobody from
Nowhere, North Dakota, could be proud. If the report card was a way of “marking the
pupils on these traits,” Mrs. D’s looks, far from being motivated purely out of sheer
orneriness, were actually a way of marking these traits on her pupils.
I have chosen to focus on issues of citizenship primarily because as a naturalized
citizen these issues have always been visible in ways they may not be for native-born
Americans. I am, as they say, a citizen by virtue of consent; all of my classmates in Mrs.
D’s class were citizens by descent. The Fourteenth Amendment makes no distinction
between these two avenues of citizenship, since it declares that “[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside.” 4 Well and good; but as Albion
Tourgee explained in his brief on behalf of Homer Plessy, “[t]his provision of Section I
4
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of the Fourteenth Amendment creates a new citizenship of the United States embracing
new rights, privileges and immunities, derivable in a new manner, controlled by new
authority, having a new scope and extent, depending on national authority for its
existence and looking to national power for its preservation.” 5 And part of the newness, I
daresay, is the focus on citizenship as birthright. That was the part I did not have, and
even though by the third grade I was officially a citizen, I still felt that the distinction
mattered, that my citizenship was supplemental to the real thing. Didn’t Article II of the
Constitution underscore that very point when it made “natural born” citizenship an
essential qualification for the Presidency? 6 And if I could not aspire to the highest office,
then how could I be a fully-vested citizen? Such was my thought process then. And
now, in view of the 14th Amendment as a new kind of citizenship to fit with the “new
birth of freedom” that Lincoln had announced at Gettysburg, JFK’s assassination would
be the genesis of my own symbolic rebirth as a citizen, not by means of consent but by
way of geographic default.
Here, then, is an example that underscores my meaning: among the many media
events in 2003 commemorating the 40th anniversary of the assassination was a show on
MSNBC hosted by Chris Matthews entitled “JFK: The Day that Changed America.”
The focus, however, wasn’t on America per se but rather on individual Americans—
celebrities and politicians—who were interviewed about “where they were when they
heard the news” (NYT 11/19/03). Fast forward five years, where, in preparation for an
event commemorating, for all intents and purposes, the 45th anniversary of the
assassination, I was slated to present an essay on a panel entitled, “Where were you when
they shot my President?” Apparently, in relation to the day that changed America, we
who were there, somewhere, are compelled to remember exactly where we were. 7
Obviously, then, place is of paramount importance. But I want to suggest that in
asking and addressing the question of placement we are participating in something more
than the collective articulation of a map of mourning. As elaborated by Michel de
Certeau, the difference between place and space is fundamentally a difference between a
static configuration and one that is actualized by “vectors” of desire. Place, he suggests,
implies “an indication of stability,” a desire for univocality. On the other hand, space is
“practiced place,” by which he means that space is the “effect” of human operators as
they engage, reinforce, and undercut the static, statist—that is to say, “proper”—
assumptions of a given place. “Space,” he goes on to say, “is like the word when it is
5
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spoken, that is, when it is caught in the ambiguity of an actualization.” 8 One can thus
understand the iconic query, “where were you when…,” as an attempt, then, to bring
order and stability to an event that has been notoriously, perhaps even paradigmatically,
resistant to such ordering. By locating us, the many, in our particular places at an acutely
particular moment, we merge thereby the acts of personal memorialization and national
commemoration: et in arcadia ego meets e pluribus unum. But as oft-repeated
practice—what will we do, one wonders, when the 50th anniversary rolls around?—as
repeated practice, the roll call of places becomes the space of the Kennedy assassination,
a space in which difference and deviation are as fundamental to it as are identity and
affirmation.
Take, as an example, the path I took to get to Mrs. D’s classroom. Sure, I could
have taken a ready-made network of streets and sidewalks, all articulating a series of
right-angled turns that mapped the “proper” way to get to school. But if you could go
back to my town then, or any town now, you will see worn in the grass—across vacant
lots (behind my house); private lawns (the Hanson’s, say, although don’t tell my folks);
and public commons (the field north of the High School)—a shortcut that traces a snaky
hypotenuse in relation to the angles formed by sidewalks or streets. All of which suggests
that there are folks enough who diverge from our planners’ paths to inscribe that
deviation on the land itself. Indeed, so pervasive is this tactic that, much to the
consternation of National Park Rangers, you will find them, here and there, even in that
most carefully planned of all national places, the National Mall. Such a snake in the
grass is defined by Lan Samantha Chang in Home Ground as a “desire path”—an
alternative “route” that “people have chosen to take across an open place, making a
human pattern upon the landscape.” 9 As such, you would be hard-pressed to find it on
any official map.
The space of the Kennedy assassination is just such an open place, its topography
crisscrossed by desire in patterns that are as recognizably human as the overpowering
grief expressed on that long weekend of his funeral, or the Friday cheering of young
schoolchildren in Dallas upon receiving the news that the President had been shot. 10 In
such a space, the State’s official story, the Warren Commission Report, with its
voluminous desire for the univocal acclamation of its single shooter theory, must forever
answer to a thousand conspiracy theories, whether in books or on film, each with its
multiple shooters in their particular places at that particular moment. “The more you
investigate it,” says Robert Groden, himself the author of a JFK assassination exposé,
“the farther away you seem to get.” 11 Perhaps that is the tantalizing fate of those who
would look for causes, or assign blame.
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Consider, in light of that last comment, that at one time “cause” and “blame”
meant the same thing. “‘[C]ause’ does not, as [we] might expect, mean originally an
earlier event, nor yet an explanation,” writes philosopher Mary Midgley. “It originally
means in Latin simply ‘blame’ or ‘lawsuit.’” 12 Whether state-sanctioned and state
affirming, as in the case of the Warren Report, or whether daring to place the blame on
various members in various agencies of the State itself, as in theories put forward by
James Fetzer and others, 13 all of these endeavors monumentalize an event the contours of
which (those vectors of desire I spoke of earlier) seem beyond the reach not only of
concordance but also of reparation. Taken together, such disparate projects embody the
actual variance imbedded in the word “monument” itself. According to Charles
Griswold, the word “derives from the Latin monere, which means not just ‘to remind’ but
also ‘to admonish,’ ‘warn,’ ‘advise,’ [and] ‘instruct.’” 14 In building a monument to a
particular cause, then, one is necessarily confronted by a congeries of possibilities, many
of which are at cross-purposes with a single, univocal meaning. “Let the word go forth”
may, indeed, be written in stone, as at the Kennedy gravesite, but who will control it, and
how will they do that?
In responding to the question of where I was when JFK was killed, I had thought
to leave aspects of control, of finger pointing, to others. There are enough of them,
replete with their angles of entry and of exit. In the end, the dust that needs to be settled
just seems to make more dust, and I wanted to be no nearer or farther away than the place
where I actually was on that day, at that moment. For the simple fact of my having a
place, anchored so acutely in my memory by the pathos of Mrs. D’s response, becomes
for me a desire path to citizenship as birthright. But in choosing that path, I turn out not
to have been blameless after all.
If the space of JFK’s death is an open space, the place of his burial, like most
commemorative sites, limits our engagement with it. 15 In order to get there, one has to
walk from the main entrance at Arlington Cemetery and head west-southwest, up toward
the Custis-Lee mansion, which is what I did on a brilliant September afternoon in search
once more of the genuine. After the dizzying uplift of the monuments and memorials of
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the National Mall, it was something of a relief to see so much at eye level; or, as with the
row upon row of white crosses, to have to look down.
The gravesite, finished in 1967, has an elegant simplicity that underscores the
selected phrases from the Inaugural Address etched into the marble set in a semicircle
along its northeastern edge. As intimated earlier, “Let the word go forth” is how the
inscription begins, and the marble itself is canted outward at an angle amenable to
reading, or, perhaps, to ushering such travels along. For in articulating a border that
defines one edge of the site, the wall also seems to project the words beyond the
boundary of the site itself. The actual grave, southwest in relation to the wall, is overlaid
with blocks of pinkish-red Cape Cod granite, their geographic dislocation holding fast to
the tacit assumption that when the dead “belong to the people,” as the President’s widow
had declared of her assassinated husband, “home” has to come to them. Indeed, with the
exception of the eternal flame, the gravesite is explicitly “designed to recall a natural
Massachusetts field setting.” 16 Thus the granite paving stones and the four tablets
marking the family members buried therein—the two-day old Patrick, the President,
Jackie, and an unnamed “Daughter”—are interlaced by clover and sedum, a living mortar
for their eternal rest, at “home” in Arlington, Virginia.
Above, or west, of the grave-markers, the eternal flame is situated in the center of
a round tablet that may or may not invoke the Round Table so famously a part of the
legend of Camelot. As the tablet is cracked from 12 to 6, the hands of our eternal flame
are seemingly fixed at 12:30, the time of the shooting in Dallas. But the flame itself
belies such fixture with its incessant, lively flickering, always and never in the nick of
time. It is hard in such a place not to think of opportunities lost.
Above me, I imagine Robert E. Lee stalking the vista before him, loving, if
wistfully, the soldier’s eternal dream of high ground. 17 Turning around, with passages
from the Inaugural curving round me, I can clearly see the Lincoln Memorial, bringing
home the fact that so much of JFK, in death as in life, was strategically aligned with the
symbolic apparatus that is our national memory of Lincoln. 18 Lee has the high ground
16
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behind me, but in looking down across the Arlington Memorial Bridge at the Lincoln
Memorial, I cannot help but think of the higher ground embodied in the Gettysburg
address and in the unimaginable suffering of untold thousands on both sides who ushered
in that new birth of freedom inscribed most emphatically in the 13th, 14th, and 15th
Amendments.
But the words I think about in that moment are not the clarion call to citizenship
as national service so famously invoked in Kennedy’s Inaugural Address. No, the words
I have in mind are from the nomination acceptance speech given in Los Angeles, on July
15, 1960. “I stand tonight facing west on what was once the last frontier,” he tells his
fellow Democrats. He then articulates his vision of the New Frontier, a vision that begins
with an admonition against the complacencies of nostalgia attendant on feelings of
belatedness in relation to the “old” frontier: “Today some would say that those struggles
are all over--that all the horizons have been explored--that all the battles have been won-that there is no longer an American frontier. But I trust that no one in this vast
assemblage will agree with those sentiments. For the problems are not all solved and the
battles are not all won--and we stand today on the edge of a New Frontier--the frontier of
the 1960's—a frontier of unknown opportunities and perils—a frontier of unfulfilled
hopes and threats.” Pulling his audience ever forward, Kennedy then reminds them what
is at stake, here and now:
For the harsh facts of the matter are that we stand on this frontier at a turning
point in history. We must prove all over again whether this nation—or any nation
so conceived—can long endure; whether our society—with its freedom of choice,
its breadth of opportunity, its range of alternatives, can compete with the singleminded advance of the Communist system. 19
For all its forward propulsion, the New Frontier borrowed key phrases from
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, as in “whether this nation…or any nation so
conceived…can long endure.” Such borrowing reinforced, however subtly, the notion
that Kennedy’s New Frontier, like Lincoln’s “new birth of freedom,” would always
already be haunted by an irrecoverable sense of loss incurred by violence. In seeking to
regenerate America by way of the frontier myth, Kennedy implicitly invoked the violence
that lies at the heart of the cultural logic of the myth of the frontier, violence that had
traditionally been perceived as “a morally justifying action,” most often visited, to brutal
consequences, against Native Americans. And now, in 1960, the frontier was being
invoked on behalf of “heroic engagement with Communism.” 20 But Richard Slotkin, the
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critic behind the logic of that myth from whom I have been citing, was regrettably belated
in relation to Kennedy; and having read Slotkin years after the advent of the New
Frontier, I, too, am haunted by loss. For in locating within the context of the
assassination the affective agency of my own regeneration as a citizen, am I not complicit
in that very logic? When all was said and done, what could be more stereotypically
American than to become American through the agency of violence? There it was:
achieving at last what I yearned for, it comes to me now as cracked as the tablet at
Kennedy’s gravesite. How were we to know, begins my meek defense, that instead of
dancing the twist to the infectious beat of the New Frontier, we should have been busy
looking for the bodies, or for the conspiracy?
What I do know is that the fact of the redoubtable Mrs. D breaking down in front
of me was a sign of how significant that November moment was. I also know that it was
a harbinger of the piece, or pieces, that we would all be missing for the rest of our
lives. For my generation, a generation shaped, as Tom Brokaw has recently suggested, by
the imperative of booms—sonic, nuclear, space-race, assassinations—the specter of John
Fitzgerald Kennedy hangs over each of us like a subjunctive mood that just won’t go
away. 21 The certitude of where we were is constantly undercut, here and now, by what if.
But if, in articulating a nation’s worth of places, we are able, more or less, to probe what
was, don’t we owe those folks who helped us get through it something more than an
eternal return to loss?
I had not intended a mash note to Mrs. D when I started. As I said, I never much
cared for her. But the more I think back on that moment, the greater is my appreciation
for what she gave me. Sure, the State-sanctioned catechism of Mercury space flights
broadcast over the intercom compelled a looking up; and since I couldn’t be President,
lord knows I aspired to the higher office of the astronaut, each orbit tethering me ever
more fiercely to a longing to be a part of what Kennedy had called, in reference to the
race to the moon, “the most hazardous and dangerous and the greatest adventure on
which man has ever embarked.” 22 But when the dust had settled, and the boosters had all
fallen away, it was the lesser and more important catechism of American citizenship
taught to me by Mrs. D, as well the exposure of the awful burden of her—of our—deep
investment in the promise of the New Frontier, which compelled a looking down. For
down here, here, in those places where we were forever and in those places where we are
now, is where space is practiced. Can there be a better place in which to confront the
causes, assess the blame, and, if we are lucky, affirm the pleasures of all the desire paths
we took to get from there to here?
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Chapter 26
The Day Kennedy Was Assassinated
David F. Marshall
As we were in a strategy meeting on Second Avenue just north of Grand Central
Station, New York City, the secretary rushed in announcing that something had happened
to the President in Dallas. Details were sketchy and all she knew was that President
Kennedy and Governor Connelly had been rushed to a Dallas hospital.
After the meeting broke up a half-hour later, I walked over to Grand Central
Station to take the subway back to Columbia University to get ready for a graduate class
in apologetics, and while walking across that vast concourse at Grand Central, the ceiling
far over head, the milling human herd lost in the vastness, Walter Cronkite came on the
large television above the confused, skittering crowd to announce President Kennedy had
died from a gunshot wound. There seemed to arise a psychological miasma starting at our
feet, an emotional fog heightening to envelope the crowd; we stopped, people rushing
just stood, shocked, silent, faces seemingly frozen unbelievably by surprise and utter
confusion.
You could have heard a dime drop on the floor among almost a thousand people,
the silence lasting three or four minutes, then a buzz of persons unknown to each other,
talking, gesturing, commenting, exchanging ideas with strangers all at once. You don’t
talk to strangers in New York, but at that moment, we did.
Some staggered toward the exits, too stunned to speak; others looked around,
seeking some kind of reassurance, many shaking their heads in the negative,
trying to grasp history smacking them in the face, their fear visible and determinate,
confounded by now-rushing unbelievable events in their new world suddenly turned upside down, instantly no longer safe or knowable, a place of tension and doubt, lost in
overwhelming uncertainty.
We all walked more slowly, spoke more carefully, practiced--believe it or not for
New Yorkers—more courtesy, deferring, letting persons go first through the doors.
Was this really central Manhattan? Suddenly, we were in a different reality, life had
become more precious, markedly less sure. We had realized that persons counted for
something important, for what can never be replaced. Maybe we were more conscious?
Maybe not? One could only hope.
For a brief moment, a city of millions had become a village. We didn’t know what
we would do, but those few minutes during which our masks came off, and pretensions
309

broke down, when we recognized the strangers around us as precious, that would stay
locked in memory, and thus nothing was ever the same again.
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Chapter 27
Three Gunshots at Life?
Gary Severson
Do three gunshots in a 1967 retirement film of a Life Magazine executive hold a
clue to the J.F.K. assassination? Do these shots indicate executives at Life magazine
engaged in cover-up activities in the assassination of J.F.K. in the weeks and months
following his murder? What were some of the other events in the record that would lead
one to consider collusion by Life executives in the cover-up?
In previous articles dealing with the possible connection of Oswald to North
Dakota, it has been suggested that the possibility existed of an attempt on JFK's life
during the Conservation Tour of 1963. [1] This scenario was explained by Richard Case
Nagell, the double agent described in Dick Russell's book, The Man Who Knew Too
Much. Nagell had uncovered a plot in New Orleans that included a September 24-29,
1963, attempt on JFK’s life. Nagell didn't seem to know this was the time frame for the
JFK Conservation Tour which included stops in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Wyoming and Montana on the 24th and 25th of September 1963. Nagell
had himself arrested on September 20, 1963, in El Paso, Texas, in a fake bank robbery.
He believed this arrest would not only protect him from the conspirators, but would derail
the planned September 24-29 assassination attempt. [2]
In July 2000, I interviewed Lee Eitongon Thompson, widow and second wife of
Edward K. Thompson. Edward K. Thompson was the managing editor of Life magazine
from 1949 to 1961. He was promoted to editor in 1961 and served in that position until
1967 when he retired and became, as he put it, the inventor of the Smithsonian magazine.
Thompson said he didn't invent Life magazine; that was Henry Luce. But he did invent
the Smithsonian and the confidential W.W.II U.S. Air Force intelligence journal Impact.
As head of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) air force
intelligence division he was in charge of Impact from1942-44 while on leave from Life
where he had been employed since 1939. During 1944-45 Thompson was reassigned to
the War Department's G-2 Special Branch where he worked with the British Ultra
intelligence unit interpreting decoded messages intercepted from the German Enigma
coding machine.
Edward T. Thompson owned a dry goods business in St. Thomas, North Dakota
and became the local banker in 1888. [3] Edward K. Thompson, his son, was born in St.
Thomas in 1907. Acquaintances noticed the unusual ability of four-year old Edward to
identify great artists and paintings in books his mother spent hours viewing with him. [4]
His childhood was spent in this village 60 miles north of Grand Forks, North Dakota. The
passenger train that traveled between Grand Forks and Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
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brought the Minneapolis and Grand Forks newspapers to this village of 300 people each
day. This provided a window on the world for young Thompson. His father was also able
to take the family to Europe and around the U.S. So even though he lived in a very
isolated spot in America, Edward had experiences that were fairly exotic for someone
growing up in the first two decades of the 20th century. [5]
Thompson finished high school at age 15 in 1923 and moved to Grand Forks,
North Dakota, with his mother at 16 to begin college at the University of North Dakota.
At the time, Grand Forks was a city of only about 15,000 people, but Thompson later
remarked in his autobiography that he was more impressed by his first experiences in
Grand Forks than when he moved on to Milwaukee and New York City. [6] Thompson
became the editor of the Dakota Student newspaper his senior year at The University of
North Dakota. The student paper was a daily in those days. Thompson had to ride a
trolley a few miles each day from the campus to downtown Grand Forks, then cross the
river to East Grand Forks, Minnesota, to deliver the newspaper copy to be printed and
then, catch the last nighttime trolley back to campus. [7] East Grand Forks (EGF) in the
1920s was the center of area nightlife because the North Dakota side of the Red River
had been under liquor prohibition since 1895 and Minnesota wasn't. EGF was considered
“sin city” and was actually called "Little Chicago.” [8]
Before his editorship of the student newspaper was over, he had gotten in hot
water with the local Ku Klux Klan. The Klan had won electoral control over the Grand
Forks school board and city council from 1924-1928. Thompson was called on the carpet
by UND's president because a writer on the Dakota Student had insulted the local
Presbyterian minister, a Reverend Wesley Ambrose, the Klan leader. Of course, the
Klan's bias was directed against the fairly large Catholic and Jewish communities in
Grand Forks. Rev. Ambrose and the Klan were instrumental in the defeat of a local
politician and candidate for governor, J.F.T. O'Conner. O'Conner went on to become
Controller of the Currency under F.D.R. In any case, a young writer under Thomspon's
editorship "fessed" up to the inflammatory comments in the student newspaper and got
young Thompson off the hook. [9] Thompson graduated from UND with a degree in
journalism in 1927. Thompson married Marguerite Maxam from Montana in 1928. His
first of two sons, Edward T. was born that year. This son later went on to become the
editor of Reader's Digest and was instrumental, according to author Henry Hurt, in
getting Reasonable Doubt published in 1985. Hurt's book about the Kennedy
assassination in fact is dedicated to Thompson's son, Edward T. Thompson. [10]
Thompson and his new family moved to Milwaukee where one of his UND
journalism professors had connections at the Milwaukee Journal. Thompson worked at
the Journal from 1929 to 1937 and also was a stringer for Time magazine during that
period. He was very ambitious and always was looking for advancement in his
profession. He became the picture page editor at the Milwaukee Journal in 1933. He was
the first journalist to start using pictures on a large scale in newspapers. Thompson came
to the attention of Henry Luce at Time magazine who was thinking of starting a national
picture magazine, which in fact became Life magazine. Thompson developed the
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procedure for creating seamless composite photos. He would bevel the edges of pictures
with sandpaper to achieve this seamlessness. [11]
The first issue of Life was, according to Thompson, a fairly crude example of
photo journalism, and he knew he could do just what the new Life magazine needed in
the way of photo editing. Henry Luce hired this ex-North Dakotan away from the
Milwaukee Journal for a hefty pay raise in 1937. Thompson became assistant picture
editor under Wilson Hicks at Life. Coincidentally, Henry Luce's father, a missionary in
China, had raised the young Luce with tales of Teddy Roosevelt and his adventures on
his ranch in western North Dakota around the turn of the century. Obviously, Luce would
have been impressed by someone from North Dakota, especially someone who could do
magic with pictures. [12]
Thompson's boyhood fascination with photos of great artworks finally paid off.
His second wife, Lee Thompson, told this author it was truly amazing to watch him
choose just the right picture for an issue of Life magazine. He personally managed the
production of approximately 600 issues of Life between 1949 and 1961. Mrs. Thompson
worked as his assistant in the photo section of Life according to David Cort. Most of her
career was spent as a reporter with Time magazine, who at one time was stationed in the
Paris bureau. [13]
Thompson had divorced his first wife Marguerite Maxam, in May of 1963. He
then married Lee Fitongon. Her father had been an "international-capitalist imprisoned by
the Bolsheviks in 1917. He bought his way out of a Moscow prison and emigrated to the
U.S." where Lee was born in 1921. [14] Interestingly, David Cort, a disgruntled Life
journalist, referred to her as a communist fellow traveler in his book, The Sin of Henry R
Luce. [15] According to Thompson, Henry Luce did tolerate a communist cell within the
employee group at Life. Thompson said Luce didn't care what your ideology was as long
as you didn't vote communist. [16]
During Thompson's absence from Life from 1941-45, he worked as the head of
SHAEF air force intelligence division where General Eisenhower was presiding. At the
same time C.D. Jackson, the publisher of Life under Luce, was involved in intelligence
operations in the European theater. It seems likely that Jackson and Thompson would
have crossed paths in Europe. They did, of course, cross paths as colleagues at Life. [17]
During my six-hour interview with Lee Thompson in July 2000, she said that the
one thing she and Ed disagreed most about was the Vietnam War. "You know he worked
for Dean Rusk and was a hawk," [18] she said to me. Ed Thompson was a registered
Democrat during his time as Life managing editor. One would surmise he might, in
essence, have been a conservative Democrat considering his wife's reference to his
hawkishness on the question of American involvement in Vietnam.
Thompson's office was next door to Henry Luce's office from 1949-67. Lee
Thompson said her husband and Luce had a very good relationship. In a memorandom to
Luce, Thompson told Luce how much he admired him and how he believed the world
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should resemble Luce's vision. In 1964, although Henry Luce, along with his wife Clare
Booth Luce, supported Barry Goldwater's presidential candidacy, Thompson convinced
Luce to abandon support of Goldwater, though Clare Booth Luce continued being an
active supporter of Goldwater. Henry did not, however, start supporting Thompson's
man, Lyndon Johnson. Even though Lee Thompson characterized her husband as
apolitical in comparison to her own political activity, he seemed in fact to be quite
political, i.e. a hawk on Vietnam, an outspoken supporter of Lyndon Johnson, an almost
advisor to the Greek Junta, and a member of Air Force intelligence in World War II. [19]
In 1958, Thompson received an honorary degree from his alma mater, the
University of North Dakota. He continued to maintain contact with his home state,
renting out his family's farmland around St. Thomas where he was born. [20] He attended
the University of North Dakota alumni reunions in New York City in the 1950's and,
according to correspondence in North Dakota Senator Quentin Burdick's archival papers,
was invited to stop by the North Dakota congressional office any time Thompson
happened to be in Washington, D.C. [21, 22]
In 1961 Thompson was promoted from managing editor of Life to editor. He
considered it a demotion in actuality because he would no longer be in charge of micromanaging each weekly edition of the magazine. The fact that he was highly respected by
his staff of photographers meant giving up a sort of support group in exchange for more
isolated work as editor (As previously mentioned, he held this title from 1961-67.). His
wife said he could be extremely tough on those who worked for him and if he didn't
respect someone, that person was in trouble. [23]
After retiring from Life in 1967, he was given an opportunity to work for the
Greek Junta but his wife convinced him he didn't belong in that role. I found it interesting
that when he was writing his autobiography, his wife said he did it from memory because
when I asked if he had any other papers in any archives, she said his secretary at the
Smithsonian Museum had thrown everything away. Lee said she was extremely upset
with the secretary but that Ed didn't seem to care. She seemed to think he wasn't upset
because he had a great memory and wasn't worried about not being able to complete the
autobiography. [24]
Ed Thompson's career at Life also included negotiating with Gen. Douglas
MacArthur and Ernest Hemmingway for their memoirs. The memoirs were published in
their entirety in many installments, which was unusual for a picture magazine like Life.
He also became acquainted with Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and John F.
Kennedy. He tells the story about the time JFK was showing him around the White
House and pointed out the golf shoe spike marks left on the wooden floor by Eisenhower
in front of the door to the Lincoln bedroom. [25]
In 1928 Henry Luce was writing essays indicating that he (Luce) was flirting with
fascism. He stated that he believed the U. S. Constitution was obsolete and needed to be
scrapped. Mussolini was a leader that he believed had what it took to run a country. He
said he thought that the real leaders and important people politically were not the men
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who became congressmen, but the men who rose to the top of the various business and
industrial sectors. The masses needed a strong leader since they were incapable of really
making a country function without one. [26] In 1928 Edward K. Thompson was just
finishing college, but 20 years later, just before he was promoted to managing editor, he
told Luce in a memo that he believed that the model Luce envisioned for the world was
his model too. On occasion, Clare Luce also said that she guessed that at heart she was a
fascist. She did in fact become the ambassador to Italy. It would seem that working as a
managing editor and editor for Luce for 18 years, Thompson needed to be ideologically
compatible with Luce and his wife to survive in his position as editor.
Dan Rather, in his 1977 book, The Camera Never Blinks, [27] said that security at
Life was so weak immediately after the assassination that any executive could have made
his own copy of the Zapruder film. I asked Mrs. Thompson if she happened to have any
film around the house, thinking she might have a copy of the original Z-film. Apparently
she didn't, but she did give me a copy of her husband's 1967 retirement film, which was
made up of various segments, including interviews with people in his boyhood home in
North Dakota. There is one unusual scene at about 11 minutes into the film when the
narrator says that, "Ed liked to hob-knob with presidents". This comment is superimposed over a photo of Thompson walking down a street with Harry Truman. The next
photo shows Thompson leaning over a light table with two colleagues examining strips of
film. At this point the narrator says, "But Ed much preferred hob-nailing willing
subordinates." Then one hears three gunshots which are super-imposed aurally over the
light table photo just after the hob-nailing comment. When I asked Mrs. Thompson what
the gun shot sounds were, she didn't seem to have any idea and proceeded to give me a
duplicate of the film. Is this a cryptic memorial to Life magazine's involvement
concerning knowledge of the assassination of JFK inserted into the film by Thompson's
colleagues at Life? The three shots, of course, are a reference to the official number of
shots fired in Dealey Plaza on Nov. 22, 1963. [28]
The film Thompson and his colleagues are seen examining consists of 24 frames
in eight vertical strips of three each. They seem to be larger than 35mm., perhaps about
55 mm., according to one expert. Detail cannot be seen clearly. Of course even if these
frames are not actually significant in themselves, they could be symbolic of the altering
of the Z-film that may have begun the night of Nov. 22 at the Life offices in New York
City. [29]
What other indicators are there of persons at Life magazine having involvement in
events surrounding the assassination, in so far as the evidence exists in the record? One is
the testimony to Warren Commission staff by Isaac Don Levine, Life magazine's
representative in Dallas. [30] Ed Thompson and C.D. Jackson channeled $25,000 to
Marina Oswald via Levine to her business manager James Herbert Martin (CD 470.24).
This money was ostensibly for her life story to be done by Meredith Press, which in fact
was never published. C.D. Jackson had been Eisenhower's special assistant for
psychological warfare in W.W. II and had worked regularly with Isaac Don Levine on
anti-Communist propaganda for Eastern Europe. Jackson was president of the CIA's Free
Europe Committee in the 1950's. Levine headed the CIA Liberation Committee. He
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spoke Russian and spent an intensive week with Marina Oswald just prior to her first
session of testimony before the Warren Commission on February 3, 1964. [31] Also
remember Edward K. Thompson was SHAEF's air force intelligence director in W.W.II.
Obviously these three had the connections to be involved in the machinations at Life
magazine concerning the control of information in the weeks following the assassination
of JFK.
The combination of the above information with the events described in three
previous Fourth Decade articles about the possible connection of Lee Harvey Oswald to
witnesses in the Stanley, North Dakota, events in the 1950's seems to strengthen the
original hypothesis of John D. Williams and myself. The likelihood of an Oswald legend
building process at work in North Dakota seems more plausible than ever before. The
function of this LHO legend could have been to serve as a cover leading up to an
assassination attempt on JFK during his visit to the University of North Dakota in Grand
Forks on Wednesday morning, September 25th 1963.
In 1995 the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) requested the trip
planning documents for the Conservation Tour of 1963. Shortly after the request was
made the Secret Service had those documents destroyed. [32] On September 25, 1963,
upon the arrival of the JFK entourage in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for an overnight stay,
the decision was made to extend the upcoming Texas trip to two days. [33] Could this
decision have been a reaction to the fact that the window of opportunity for killing JFK
had passed in the previous 24 hours? Were other arrangements now needed? Only the
September 20 arrest in El Paso, Texas, of CIA double agent Richard Case Nagell may
have prevented the killing of JFK at UND, the alma mater of Life magazine executive
Edward K. Thompson. Two months later the plotters succeeded in Dallas.
Edward K. Thompson passed away in 1996 at the age of 89.
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Chapter 28
Lee Harvey Oswald;
North Dakota and Beyond
John Delane Williams and Gary Severson
North Dakota would become part of the JFK assassination story subsequent to a
letter, sent by Mrs. Alma Cole to President Johnson. That letter [1] follows (the original
was in Mrs. Cole’s handwriting):
Dec 11, 1963
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Dear Sir,
I don’t know how to write to you, and I don’t know if I should or shouldn’t.
My son knew Lee Harvey Oswald when he was at Stanley, North Dakota. I do not recall
what year, but it was before Lee Harvey Oswald enlisted in the Marines. The boy read
communist books then. He told my son He had a calling to kill the President. My son told
me, he asked him. How he would know which one? Lee Harvey Oswald said he didn’t
know, but the time and place would be laid before him.
There are others at Stanley who knew Oswald.
If you would check, I believe what I have wrote will check out.
Another woman who knew of Oswald and his mother, was Mrs. Francis Jelesed she had
the Stanley Café, (she’s Mrs. Harry Merbach now.) Her son, I believe, knew Lee Harvey
Oswald better than mine did.
Francis and I just thought Oswald a bragging boy. Now we know different. We told our
sons to have nothing to do with him (I’m sorry, I don’t remember the year.)
This letter is wrote to you in hopes of helping, if it does all I want is A Thank You.
Mrs. Alma Cole
Rt 3 Box 1H
Yuma, Arizona
A facsimile of the original can be found in [2].
The response to the letter, which was sent to the FBI on December 19, 1963, was
immediate. On December 20th, Mrs. Cole was interviewed in her home in Arizona, and a
day later her son, William Timmer, was first interviewed in Spokane, Washington. Also,
the FBI began interviewing several persons in Stanley, North Dakota (and nearby towns).
The FBI Interview of William Timmer
William Henry Timmer was interviewed by FBI Special Agent (SA) Donald
Head. The interview transpired over two days, December 21 & 22, 1963. During the
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summer of 1953, a person Timmer knew as either Harv or Harvey Oswald [This is the
first known use of Harvey Oswald], appeared to be older than Timmer (Oswald was born
10/19/1939; Timmer was born 5/14/1941) Oswald was observed riding a bike with no
chain guard, and he kept getting his pants leg caught in the chain. Oswald wore shabby
clothes. Timmer met with Oswald several times (perhaps half-a-dozen times). Oswald
showed Timmer a communist pamphlet, written by someone named Marks (Marx?).
Timmer recalled Oswald as having been in a couple of fights. Oswald mentioned being a
member of a gang in New York City. Timmer invited Oswald to his grandmother’s
property, where Timmer and his mother were staying in a trailer, to see Timmer’s pet
rabbits. Timmer wanted to introduce Oswald to his mother, but when Oswald saw her, he
rode off on his bicycle. At another meeting, Oswald told Timmer, “Someday I’m going to
kill the President” or words to that effect.
Timmer indicated that he had been ill recently, and at the time of the
assassination, he was in a motel room without a TV. Timmer heard that Lee Harvey
Oswald had killed the President, but that name didn’t mean anything to him. Timmer’s
mother, Alma Cole, sent a letter to Timmer with two pictures of Oswald, one where
Oswald was being lead by policeman in jail, and one when Oswald was shot. Timmer
wrote to his mother, in answer to her letter, that Oswald was the same boy he saw in
Stanley. Timmer wasn’t quite sure who was with him when he saw Oswald, but he did
give the agent some names of some of his acquaintances from that time. [3]
Other FBI interviews associated with Stanley, North Dakota
Mrs. Alma Cole confirmed that she wrote the letter, and said that she had only
seen Oswald once briefly. [5] Mary Wurtz, the mother of Alma Cole and the grandmother
of William Henry Timmer, said that she didn’t know any of her grandson’s
acquaintances. She was 80 at the time of the interview. [6] Jerry Evenson, an
acquaintance of Timmer, did not recall a person named Oswald from the summer of
1953. [7] Bud Will, Mayor of Stanley and proprietor of City Trailer and Motel, stated that
his records did not show that Oswald or his mother had ever stayed at his establishment.
[8] Lane Evans vaguely remembered an incident in the park (involving a fight), but
Evans could recall little else. [9] Delvin Douglas Jelesed indicated that he was unaware
that Lee Harvey Oswald or his mother had ever been residents of Stanley, North Dakota.
[10] Mrs. Harry Merbach indicated that she was not personally acquainted with Lee
Harvey Oswald or his mother. [11] Ralph Hamre, Sheriff of Montrail County (Stanley is
the county seat) said that, “To my knowledge, Lee Harvey Oswald has never been a
resident at Stanley, North Dakota.” Hamre also indicated that Timmer was an itinerant
and unreliable. [12] Mrs. Elmer Nelson, mother of Jack Feehan, gave the FBI her son’s
current address. [13] The FBI decided not to interview Feehan, given their negative
findings to that point. [14] Walter Poulson, a lifelong Stanley resident, denied ever
having known Lee Harvey Oswald. [15]
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More Recent Interviews of William Henry Timmer
Timmer was interviewed by the BBC sometime in the 1960’s, but that interview
was never broadcast. Timmer was interviewed by John Armstrong on October 27, 1994.
[16]
Subsequent to that interview, Timmer was interviewed in 1995 by Nigel Turner, a British
filmmaker who was known for his series, The Men Who Killed Kennedy, which was
broadcast in Britain and then on various networks in the United States. [17] The last
broadcast of The Men Who Killed Kennedy occurred on November 22, 2003, a segment
that investigated the culpability of Lyndon Baines Johnson in the assassination of John F.
Kennedy. [18] Jack Valenti tried unsuccessfully to have a prior restraint placed on the
History Channel to keep them from airing this episode. He was successful in stopping the
History Channel from re-airing the episode, and preventing sales of DVDs that included
the episode. [19, 20] Presumably, Turner spent two days interviewing Timmer with the
intent that a subsequent episode would address events in Stanley, North Dakota.
Timmer wrote his mother after she sent him the newspaper photographs that the
man in the newspaper was the same boy whom he had met in Stanley. His mother then
sent her letter to President Johnson. [21] Oswald, or an imposter, was probably in North
Dakota during July and August, 1953. [22] Timmer was one of several persons whose
evidence was ignored by the FBI and never interviewed by the Warren Commission. The
evidence supplied by many of these persons was contradictory for the evidence that they
chose to use. [23] It was Armstrong’s contention that the evidence, placing Oswald in
two different places at the same time, were too numerous not to investigate. Armstrong
would conclude that there were two Oswalds- a Lee Harvey Oswald, and a Harvey Lee
Oswald. [24]
Interviews in 1999
These writers conducted a series of interviews 36 years after the FBI interviews,
addressing events in Stanley relating to Oswald. [25] Mrs. Alma Cole, Jerry Evenson,
and Lane Evans, all interviewed in 1963 by the FBI, were interviewed by us. Jerry Fehan,
whom the FBI decided not to interview, was interviewed by us. Two significant persons
living in Stanley, Keith Schulte, States Attorney for Montrail County (1947-1957) and
(1960-1975) and Russel Kilen, editor of the Montrail County Promoter (1946-1979) were
interviewed by us.
Interview of Mrs. Alma Cole
Two interviews were held with Alma Cole, mother of William Henry Timmer.
[26] Several significant points were raised. First, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald was said by
Cole to be living in Stanley for the duration of the time Lee Harvey Oswald was in North
Dakota. Mrs. Oswald was pointed out to Mrs. Cole in a dress shop by Cole’s cousin,
Francis Jelesed, who had seen Mrs. Oswald at Jelesed’s restaurant in Stanley. Mrs.
Oswald was loud and wanted everyone to know she was from Texas. Mrs. Oswald was
described as having grey hair, glasses, and was at most 5’3” tall. Also, Cole indicated that
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her son had told her that the boy wanted to be called “Lee Harvey” rather than just “Lee”.
Her son was with Oswald when Oswald stole the book by Marx from a small library in a
room of the Memorial Building in Stanley. William Henry Timmer declined to be
interviewed by us at this time.
Interviews with Jerry Evenson and Lane Evans
Jerry Evenson had kept in touch with Bill Timmer and had visited him in the
summer of 1999. Timmer had never talked about the Oswald incident to Evenson.
Timmer is not a “bullshitter” in Evenson’s view. Evenson had thought about the FBI
interview 36 years previously. Evenson was interviewed at the Montrail County
Courthouse in Stanley. Present were himself, Sheriff Ralph Hamre and SA Fred Harvey.
[27]
Lane Evans does recall a fight on the south side of Stanley where the swimming
pool was located in 1999. The fight involved an out of town person. Evans cannot recall
who was present. Evans was not instructed by the FBI to avoid talking about his
interview with them. Evans was acquainted with Timmer, Jelesed, Evenson, Jack Feehan,
Lyle Aho and Vern Buehler (the significance of the last two named individuals is
addressed later in this paper). [28]
Interview with Jack Feehan
Jack Feehan was scheduled to be interviewed by the FBI in 1963. After talking to
his mother, Mrs. Elmer Nelson, the FBI decided interviewing Feehan would not be
necessary. We contacted Feehan through his son Greg. Jack Feehan indicated that he had
never discussed the Harvey Oswald experience with Timmer, though they had remained
in contact. Feehan had no recollection of Harvey Oswald himself. [29] In a subsequent
interview, Greg Feehan indicated that his father had called Timmer and asked him about
the Oswald circumstances. Timmer, according to Greg’s father, denied knowing anything
about the Oswald events. [30]
Interviews with Keith Schulte and Russel Kilen
Keith Schulte, States Attorney for Montrail County, 1947-1957 and 1960-1975,
stated that he had never heard of the FBI coming to Stanley regarding investigations of
the Kennedy assassination. He thought that Sheriff Hamre and Mayor Will would surely
have told him about being interviewed by the FBI. [31] Similar views were expressed by
Russel Kilen, editor of the Montrail County Promoter, 1946-1979. [32] Both men
expressed friendships with the sheriff and the mayor; their expectations of
communication in this matter were not met. Dan Will, son of ex-Mayor Bud Will, said
that his father never mentioned being interviewed by the FBI in regard to an investigation
of the assassination. [33]
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Interviews with Lyle Aho
We initiated our trip to Stanley, coordinating with Mrs. Arlene Clark of the
Montrail County Historical Society. She suggested to us that there was a person we might
like to talk to; his curious story related to Lee Harvey Oswald. [34] We began a series of
three interviews with Lyle Aho. [35] Lyle was an unassuming man, 5’10”, born on May
9, 1939 (making him slightly older than Oswald) in Belden, North Dakota. Belden was a
Finnish community, and during the 1930’s a stronghold for the Communist Party USA;
Belden is now a ghost town. Aho’s story took place in either the summer of 1955 or
1956. At the time, Aho was perhaps 5’6”. That summer, Aho spent a lot of time with a
relative, Vern Buehler. Buehler was thought to be less than a year younger than Aho
(Buehler was born September 27, 1943, making him more than four years younger than
Aho.) Aho was introduced to an “older” boy, perhaps 3-4 years older, whose name was
Lee. Lee seemed to spend a lot of time with Vern Buehler. Aho thought Lee might be
staying at the Buehler’s. Lee told people that he was a furnace salesman; Aho thought
this was a cover, since Lee didn’t have anything like brochures or other material to back
up this claim. He didn’t seem to spend any time going door to door trying to sell
furnaces. Lee said that the salesman job was just a cover and that he actually worked for
the government. He was trying to recruit Buehler and Aho to get two years of training
and then go to Cuba. They would make a lot of money. [36] Lee did seem to have
considerable money to spend. Lee drove a ’49 or ’50 black Mercury. Lee would drive
around town with Vern Buehler, Doug Jelesed, and perhaps Lane Evans, Pat Feehan and
Lionel Ellis. Ao stated, “Lee seemed to always have enough money to go uptown and
have pops and such for himself and the guys with him. He always seemed to have the
money to buy a hamburger if he wanted one.” Aho described Lee as having dark hair.
Aho was shown a series of pictures during the two subsequent interviews. [37, 38]
The pictures were taken from a number of sources, most of which showed Oswald,
among other persons. The first picture he identified as Lee was a picture of Oswald as a
twelve year old at a zoo in New York City. Aho stated, “It’s a poor picture; possibly, the
guy was older than that.” (See Groden, 39, p. 12) The next tentative identification was a
picture of Oswald in a classroom in New Orleans in 1955, in which Oswald was holding
his head up so that the missing front tooth shows. [40] The next picture Aho identified as
possibly being Lee was the picture of Oswald alone in Moscow. [41] The picture of
Oswald with his coworkers in Moscow [42] elicited the response “Well, it could be, but
you can’t see the cheekbones very good.” A collage of 77 pictures taken throughout
Oswald’s life was shown to Aho. [43] Aho picked three of the pictures as “kinda looking
like the guy.” The first two of these were the backyard photos showing Oswald with the
gun and copies of The Militant and The Daily Worker. In the cropped pictures Aho saw,
only the head showed. The last picture that Aho recognized as possibly being Lee was
Oswald dressed in civilian clothes holding a gun while in the Marines. [44].
Aho did not have any particular recollection of the assassination. He was probably
in Stanley, but he doesn’t recall with any clarity news of the assassination. He did not
connect Oswald with the Lee he knew.
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Aho further described Lee as having a southern accent, probably Texan. Lee
weighed about 150 pounds, and he wore baggy clothes; he was slender. Aho thought he
might be getting a gang together to rob banks or something.
Aho had in his adulthood worked on construction for a company known as Brown
& Root. When asked, “Who owned them?” Aho replied, “Mrs. Lyndon Baines Johnson.”
He saw her picture in a company magazine, Ground Builder. Aho was disabled in a car
accident in 1976; eventually he took up tailoring to make a living. He lived most of his
life in Stanley.
After the questioning was done, Aho asked of the pictures, “Who is this guy?” He
seemed genuinely unaware that he was looking at pictures of Lee Harvey Oswald.
Vern Buehler
It would have been important to contact Vern Buehler to corroborate or refute
Aho’s information. Aho thought Buehler died sometime in the 1960’s. Aho was able to
give us a list of Buehler’s siblings. Vern Buehler was found to be living in Seattle,
Washington with his younger brother Dale. Vern remembered the person named Lee in
Stanley, but he was not as close a friend as Aho thought him to be. Lee did not live with
the Buehlers. Buehler remembered the talk about going to Cuba; he also remembered Lee
as a fast talker. [45]
The Cuba Connection
The Lee in this story could be Lee Harvey Oswald, an imposter, or just some
Southern boy named Lee. If it is the latter, there are several possibilities. But it is
interesting to note that Castro was in Mexico preparing to invade Cuba, and was training
his troops for that effort. Lee may have heard about the Cuba story from Oswald or
someone else. Of course, Lee’s name could have been something other than Lee. “Lee”
may have given some thought of trying to join Castro’s group, though we can’t imagine
Castro welcoming three gringo youths into his revolution. “Lee” might have been testing
the waters to see if he could find others foolhardy enough to try to go to Mexico and join
Castro. On the other hand, Oswald may have already been an asset of the CIA by this
time. Were Oswald interested in infiltrating Castro’s group, then training at Rancho Santo
Rosa near Chalco, approximately 20 miles from Mexico City, [46] he would probably
have either gone there alone, or brought companions who had some military experience.
Given that Oswald had already attempted to enter the Marines at 16, and would enter the
Marines in October of 1956, [47] it would seem most unlikely that he would go to
Stanley to recruit two boys who would look less than 15 years old. If the CIA were
already in a process of building an Oswald legend, an imposter might have been sent to
Stanley for that purpose, particularly if Oswald or an impersonator had been there in the
summer of ’53.

323

Information about Oswald
At the time of the Warren Report, [48] the information about Oswald had mainly
come from government sources. The material in the Warren Report itself built a case for
establishing Oswald’s guilt in the assassination. Along with the Report, which was
widely published and disseminated, were the 26 volumes [49] of evidence; only a few
thousand of these 26 volumes were produced, and many were sent to libraries. Few
initially read these volumes, but those who did found a different picture than was woven
in the Report itself. In the 26 volumes, there were several FBI reports of sightings of
Oswald not mentioned in the much shorter Report. The first 15 volumes consist of 7909
pages of testimonies and affidavits. The final 11 volumes contain 3912 “Commission
Exhibits” in 9831 pages. There were also “Commission Documents” that were seen as
too sensitive to publish; these documents constituted 357 cubic feet of material; the
Stanley FBI interviews were among the latter. The government sought to have these
documents kept under seal until 2039 [50]; many of these materials (often with
substantial redaction) were made available through releases by the archives, through The
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), or through the Assassination Records Review Board
(ARRB, 51). One diligent researcher, Harold Weisberg, working mainly before the
ARRB report became available, wrote several books attacking the Warren Report, using
only Warren Commission documents. One particularly damaging publication was the
transcript of the Warren Commission as its members were setting the Commission’s
guidelines. The Oswald picture they were intent on painting, of a loner, deranged
individual, was already challenged by reports that Oswald was an FBI informant. [52]
Because of Weisberg we have the complete transcript, which came into his possession
through the FOIA.
There have been any number of books that have addressed Oswald and the Warren
Report conclusions. Fewer have addressed Oswald as a person. One that did was the
unpublished manuscript by George deMorenschildt, I am a Patsy! I am a Patsy! [53]
deMorenschildt had befriended Lee and Marina Oswald and had introduced them to the
Russian speaking community in Dallas. deMorenschildt saw Oswald as being badly
treated by Marina. “She picked on him, annoyed him, as if she desired a separation,
which she achieved through us. The letter from Marina’s ex-lover which Lee intercepted.
[sic] What annoyed us also was that Marina tried to ridicule Lee. She called him a fool, a
moron.” [54]
Two other writers of note addressed Oswald in far more depth than other writings,
and they need to be explored. John Armstrong [55] wrote a definitive book on the
hypothesis that there were two Lee Harvey Oswalds. One was the boy born in New
Orleans in 1939, but who essentially disappeared after the assassination (probably taking
on another persona). The other was probably a Russian speaking youth who was brought
over around age twelve and would eventually assume Oswald’s identity. Armstrong
called the boy born in New Orleans Lee, and the Russian speaking boy, Harvey. [56] The
other books are by Judyth Vary Baker. [57, 58] Whereas Armstrong again relies
prominently on the documents from the 26 Volumes accompanying the Warren Report
and documents pried loose by the FOIA and the ARRB, along with many interviews
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conducted by him and members of his research team, Baker’s story is her personal story
with Lee Harvey Oswald. Her story was also broadcast on The Men Who Killed Kennedy,
Part VIII. [59] Baker has recently completed another book about Oswald. [60] At this
point, we need to address the big enigma regarding Oswald—how did he become as
proficient as he did in spoken Russian?
Oswald’s Ability in Spoken Russian
According to Armstrong, “For reasons that may never be known, Lee Oswald was
chosen, and sent to New York City in the fall of 1952, to begin the process of lending his
identity to a Russian speaking boy from Eastern Europe. Several years later, this boy
‘defected’ to Russia after assuming the Harvey Oswald’s identity and background.” [61]
It should be pointed out that this was Armstrong’s hypothesis, to be contrasted with the
Warren Report thesis.
Another hypothesis is that Oswald learned Russian under the auspices of the CIA. It
would also explain why Oswald, who was fairly fluent in Russian, refrained from
speaking Russian during his stay in Russia; he did not want to be suspected of being a
CIA false defector. It has been suggested that Oswald studied some language at the
“Monterey School of the Army”, now the Defense Language Institute. [62] Oswald
claimed not knowing a word of Russian on his defection to the Soviet Union on October
16, 1959. [63] While Judyth Baker disputes that Oswald was anything other than
American born, she recognized his facility in Russian; Baker had studied Russian in high
school. [64]
While it is not presently known how Oswald learned Russian, It seems most likely
that the Lee Harvey Oswald arrested on November 22, 1963 was clearly American born
and with a residual Cajun accent. Consider Oswald’s encounter in the hallway while in
police custody:
Newsman: Did you kill the President?
Oswald: No, I’ve not been charged with that, in fact, nobody has said that to me yet. The
first thing I heard about it was from the newspaper reporter in the hall who AXED me
that question. [65]
It seems most unlikely that a Russian born person would lapse into a Cajun pronunciation
of the word, “asked”.
Oswald and the Customs Agent
It is interesting that though Baker insisted Oswald was born in the U.S., it is
through her that a mechanism for the second Oswald could come to the U.S. According
to Baker, Oswald had skipped school and gone to Niagara Falls, where a cooperative
Customs agent, Arthur Young (later known as Charles Thomas) allowed the 12 year old
unaccompanied Oswald to cross over into Canada, and then let him back into the U.S.
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later in the day. Whatever the actual details of that story (a Customs agent who would
allow said 12 year old to cross the boundary with Canada), ten years later (previously
Young, now Thomas) was sent to New Orleans to facilitate Oswald’s passport
application to go to Mexico City. The passport was available to Oswald the day after he
applied. [66] Now, that is quite a coincidence!
One could hypothesize that “Harvey Oswald”, an Eastern European youth, would
immigrate to the U.S. through the Niagara Falls Customs with the cooperation of
Young/Thomas, and that Young/Thomas was later enlisted to facilitate Oswald’s visa to
Mexico. It is possible, however, that the actual facts may support the simple story that
Oswald was allowed to cross the boundary and then come back across later. No
hypothesized “Harvey” was necessarily involved.
Other Useful Oswald References
Armstrong’s two Oswald theory is by no means the first such theory. Rather, his is
the most extensive expression of a two Oswald theory, backed up by a considerable
amount of research, producing a thousand page text together with a similar amount of
exhibits on a CD-Rom. There are a variety of persons who have developed theories
related to discrepancies in the Warren Documents, particularly regarding Oswald’s
activities; for example, Oswald was on a bus trip to Mexico City when he supposedly was
seen at Sylvia Odio’s home in Dallas. Twyman wrote on the two Oswald scenario in his
book. [67] An earlier book that theorizes a Russian speaking Eastern European would be
substituted for Oswald was written by W.R. Morris and J.B. Cutler. [68] A pictorial
record of Lee Harvey Oswald was produced by Grodin. [69] In an excellent volume
edited by James Fetzer, Fetzer wrote a chapter on Jesse Curry’s assassination file, and
asks the rhetorical question, “Could Oswald have been convicted? Fetzer then sets about
showing probable doubt, if not exoneration for Oswald. On this one point I’ll disagree
with Fetzer; all he did was show Oswald was probably innocent. [70] Henry Wade would
have probably prosecuted the case. Wade never lost a case he prosecuted (never mind the
fact that many of the persons he helped convict would have their convictions overturned
through DNA evidence [71]). In Wade’s jurisdiction, at that point in time, innocence was
not a deterrent to conviction.
Judyth Vary Baker
Judyth Vary Baker’s story about Lee Harvey Oswald differs from other accounts in
that her account is at the personal level. Very briefly, Judyth and Lee met in a post office
in New Orleans on April 26, 1963. Judyth Vary had gone to the post office to get a letter
from her fiancé Robert Baker. Judyth was holding a rolled up newspaper with a circled
coded message in it (to Robert) that fell when she reached over the counter to give the
postal worker a letter. The newspaper fell, and Oswald, who was in line behind her,
picked it up. Judyth said, in Russian, “Thank you, comrade.” Lee answered her in
Russian. Judyth had a habit of using Russian and other foreign languages in salutations
and letters. [72]
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From that encounter, they would quickly become friends, though Judyth’s
impending marriage would, for a while, preclude more than a friendship. Judyth had
come to New Orleans to work with Dr. Alton Ochsner, an internationally known cancer
researcher who had a clinic that treated cancer patients as well as others. Judyth had an
outstanding record in doing science research and had recently been working with fast
acting cancers, even though she was only 19 years old in 1963. Oswald first introduced
Judyth to David Ferrie as well as to Guy Banister. Banister confirmed to Judyth that
Oswald was working on the anti-Castro project. Later that day (April 27, 1963), Oswald
took her to Charity Hospital for their appointments with Dr. Ochsner, with Oswald going
in first. Oswald’s interview lasted about 40 minutes. After Oswald left Dr. Oschner’s
office, Judyth was invited in. In Judyth’s interview, she agreed to participate in
clandestine projects. [73]
On May 2, Judyth and Robert Baker were married. On the evening of May 3, 1963,
Robert Baker left for his summer employment on a seismic survey ship in the Gulf of
Mexico. Judyth had arrived early to New Orleans; Ochsner had asked Judyth to come at
the end of the school year, but he was unfamiliar with the trimester system, which let out
about three weeks earlier than a semester system. Her work with Ochsner would begin
May 10. Apparently through a mix-up, she was thought to be the young researcher who
would liaison with David Ferrie and his research with mice and cancer. She began this
work through a clandestine arrangement; she and Oswald were hired by Standard Coffee,
[74] a subsidiary of Reily Coffee, to be transferred to Reily Coffee the following week.
It would appear that Oswald was getting “money under the table”. He gave Judyth
$400 before she left New Orleans. This gift has a double meaning; not only does it relate
to Oswald’s caring for Judyth, it also addresses the issue of Oswald having considerably
more money than his meager wages at Reily Coffee would have afforded him. Even this
low paying job had been lost several weeks prior to Oswald’s $400 gift to Judyth. [75]
The most likely source of this money would seem to be unvouchered money from the
CIA. Oswald being involved with the CIA could also explain Oswald’s apparent
relationship with Alton Ochsner and Oswald’s relationship with Guy Banister. Without
rehashing Judyth’s books on Oswald, from her viewpoint, they fell in love, had begun an
intimate relationship, and in late August planned to get together in Mexico in the next
several months. Rather than being the loner and crazed assassin that the Warren
Commission painted him to be, Oswald was a complex young man, but one who was
caught up in a web of circumstances that left him no way out. As to whether Oswald and
Jack Ruby knew each other, Ruby was asked by Carlos Marcello to keep an eye on
Oswald, after Oswald’s first attempt to get into the Marines. At one point, Ruby asked
Oswald if he wanted to be in Marcello’s “family”. Oswald was already at least somewhat
connected to the Mafia through his Uncle, Dutz Murret. Oswald said he preferred to be in
the “military family”. [76]
Why did Judyth Baker Wait so Long to Tell Her Story?
First, there was the issue that she was, until 1989, still married to Robert Baker.
From Judyth’s point of view, she saw herself going to Mexico to live with Oswald in a
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few months, so she could tread water until then. Her husband never asked any questions
about Judyth’s activities while he was working on the Gulf coast. After Oswald’s death,
she just settled in, eventually having 5 children with Baker; they finally divorced in 1989.
Judyth decided to write a book about Oswald. Given the many deaths associated with
those close to the JFK assassination [See Roberts & Armstrong, 77], being careful
seemed prudent. She had already been warned by Dave Ferrie in December 1963 that she
would die if she ever revealed what she knew; she was told that Santos Trafficante was
having Judyth monitored. Ferrie told her, “You have to be a vanilla girl, a nobody. Keep
your head down, don’t make waves, if you want to stay alive.” Ferrie finished with, “I
can never contact you again, and you can never speak about this to anyone again, for all
our own good”. [78]
Judyth’s plan in the early 1990’s was to write the book and leave it with her son,
who was a professor of economics. She would eventually go through three separate
versions; there were problems with getting it published. When the two volumes were
published in June of 2006, contractual problems made it necessary to remove them from
the market in less than a month.
Who was in Stanley ND in the Summers of 1953 and 1956?
The person seen in Stanley in the summer of 1953 most likely would have been
Lee Harvey Oswald or an Oswald imposter, which could include “Harvey”, if
Armstrong’s hypothesis about an Eastern European Russian speaking youth having
emigrated to the United States were true. Note that admitting an Oswald imposter at this
point would have clearly pointed to a conspiracy; the more benign version would be that
it was Oswald. True to the FBI’s process of ignoring contrary evidence, given the choice,
it appears the FBI chose to make the interpretation that the witnesses must have been
mistaken. What of the FBI interviews showing several persons saying neither Oswald,
nor his mother, were residents of Stanley?
Our interpretation is that the meaning of the term “resident” allowed the speaker to
deny this status to the Oswalds. In 1953, Stanley’s population had doubled due to an
infusion of new persons involved in the expanding oil industry. Locals often saw the oil
people as itinerants, and thus not “residents”. A personal example might shed some light.
In 1990, I (JDW) was living with my family in an older section of Grand Forks, ND; we
had lived in this location for 10 years. I was out doing some yard work in the front yard
when an older couple was walking by. The husband asked, “Do you live here?” I
answered, “Yes.” He responded, “How long”, to which I responded, “10 years.” The man
turned to his wife and, in a low voice said, “Newcomers.” It would have served the
purposes of J. Edgar Hoover that the persons interviewed in Stanley had a different
meaning to “resident” than might be inferred from reading the FBI reports.
The person seen in Stanley in 1956 named Lee with the Southern, probably Texan
accent, could have either been Oswald, an Oswald imposter, or simply a young
Southerner with a remarkably similar appearance to Oswald, together with an interest in
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going to Cuba, also coincidental in the interests that an older Oswald would have. Nearer
to the assassination, it seems likely that more than one Oswald imposter was active.
Personal Research Refuting the Warren Commission’s Findings
For some reason, despite the voluminous literature showing that a conspiracy
existed, and that the conclusions of the Warren Commission were erroneous, many
Warren critics still contribute to that literature. Alas, I (JDW) also suffer from
contributing to the overkill. As a young 23 year old junior college teacher, I attended a
rally on August 17, 1962, in Pueblo, Colorado at which President Kennedy was the
featured speaker. As I walked into the stadium, where I had played high school and
junior college football only a few years before, I walked up the aisle and noticed my
brother, Gerald R. Williams, who had become a state trooper within the past year. I said,
“Hi, Gerald.” He ignored me, but I noticed he was holding a rifle. I suddenly became
engrossed with the degree of protection provided President Kennedy. Inside the stadium,
there were three troopers in every aisle, with at least 14 aisles. There were troopers
surrounding the perimeter, and several more on the field. This was in a city that voted
overwhelmingly for Kennedy in the election, and a city where President Kennedy was
beloved. Clearly, there was more than adequate protection. A week later I asked my
brother about him ignoring me at President Kennedy’s speech. Gerald replied, “They sent
me there to protect the president, not to talk to my brother.” [79] Unfortunately, the
protection afforded President Kennedy in Dallas was not equal to the protection provided
in Pueblo a year earlier. In Dallas, persons in the sheriff’s department, which was
overlooking Dealey Plaza, were told to stand down for the parade. [80] Palamara, who
has written extensively about the lack of security provided in Dallas, has termed this lack
of security as “security stripping.” [81]
Yet a second effort in addressing the validity of the Warren Report happened almost
by accident. We were interviewing Madeleine Brown. Brown had in years past been a
mistress of Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson, and had a son with him. [82] She made a
comment that slipped right by me. [JDW] I was transcribing the transcript the following
April; I was astounded by what Madeleine said: “See, through the years, I’ve met Marina
[Oswald]. And I’ve talked to Marina over and over again. And I say ‘Marina. Tell me
what you want others to know. You couldn’t speak English in those years.’ And she told
me that the police came out and picked up the rifle the next day after the shooting. I said,
‘Are you sure? She said, ‘Yeah.’ [83] I stopped transcribing and immediately called
Madeleine on April 3, 2002 and confirmed the conversation in the interview. [84] The
import of this is immense. If they picked up Oswald’s gun on Saturday, he could not have
had it available to him at the Texas School Book Depository on Friday, the day of the
assassination.
Three Patsies
While Oswald claimed to be a patsy, he apparently was not the only one. There
were two plots prior to Dallas, the first being set for November 1, 1963, in Chicago. The
designated patsy in Chicago was Thomas Arthur Vallee, a Chicagoan who was
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outspokenly opposed to President Kennedy, and who had in his possession several
weapons; he also was an ex-Marine. [85] Vallee’s place of employment overlooked the
planned motorcade route where President Kennedy was scheduled to pass. [86] Vallee
had been recruited to train anti-Castro guerrillas for the assassination of Fidel Castro. [87]
A four man assassination team, separate from Vallee, was being monitored in Chicago.
One of the secret service agents involved in protecting the President was Abraham
Bolden, the first Black Secret Service agent to be involved in protection detail for the
President. [See 88, 89, 90.] Through Bolden’s efforts, President Kennedy’s appearance in
Chicago was cancelled at the last minute. Bolden later tried to make arrangements to
testify before the Warren Commission regarding the Chicago assassination plot. Such
testimony could have blown the non-conspiracy theory out of the water. [91] A plan was
hatched to accuse Bolden of being involved with counterfeiting, an area that he
investigated in Chicago. He was actually set up through false testimony by Richard Cain,
the Chief Investigative agent for the Special Investigations Unit of the Cook County
Sheriff’s office in Chicago. Cain, a made member of the Chicago Mafia, was trying to
keep Mafia involvement in the aborted assassination attempt from reaching public
knowledge. [92] Bolden would serve six years in prison for his attempt to reach the
Warren Commission.
Cain was a complex person. After Fulgencio Batista was deposed from his position
as President of Cuba by Fidel Castro, Batista and several other Cuban exiles took up
residence in Cain’s garage until they made other arrangements. Cain worked with the
exiles to help train them for a return to Cuba. Cain had previously done wiretapping work
for Batista. [93] Cain would eventually be scammed himself, and sent to prison. [94]
Cain would hold a grudge against Kennedy for not providing air support in the Bay of
Pigs invasion. [95]
The person of interest in the Tampa assassination attempt was Gilberto Policarpo
Lopez, who also was a defector to the USSR. [96] No connection has been made between
Lopez and the assassination. Had President Kennedy been assassinated in Tampa on
November 18, 1963, Lopez would have been a perfect patsy. Lopez was reported to be in
Dallas on November 22, 1963. It is speculated that if the Oswald as assassin ploy didn’t
sell, Lopez could fill the bill. [97] Waldron & Hartmann stated that their publication was
the first to expose the Tampa assassination threat. [98] They connected it to another
attempt to remove Castro from office, and termed C-Day, apparently scheduled for
December 1, 1963. President Kennedy spoke in Tampa on November 18, 1963, and
apparently signified the words the Cuban rebels were hoping to hear. Some newspapers
reported that Kennedy was inviting a coup in Cuba, notably The Dallas Times Herald,
whose November 19, 1963 headline read, “Kennedy Virtually Invites Cuban Coup.’ [99]
Details are lacking for the Tampa attempt on JFK; it likely followed the scenario in
Chicago, except that there was no cancellation of President Kennedy’s participation. Files
held by the Secret Service and the Tampa Police Department were apparently destroyed.
In the case of the Tampa Police Department, the destruction was to keep them from any
JFK investigating committee. [100] The Tampa police kept several persons of interest
during President Kennedy’s time in Tampa. The overall police presence providing
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protection for the President in Tampa included 200 of the 270 uniformed police force
plus 400 federal officers, including Air Force personnel. [101]

The Interesting Story of Adele Edisen
Adele Edisen decided to get back into scientific work in the summer of 1962; her
husband, a psychiatrist, had become ill, and it made sense for her to get back into her
field of neurophysiology. She had held a postdoctoral fellowship in that field with the
National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Blindness (NINDB) from 1954-1956, and
applied for a third year postdoctoral fellowship in 1962, working at the Department of
Physiology and the Louisiana State University School of Medicine. Edisen was told that
she would receive a fellowship beginning January 1, 1963. Edisen was told by her
chairman, Dr. Sidney Harris, that he was relaying this information from Dr. Jose Rivera
of the NINDB. She would be doing research on synaptic inhibition and excitation in the
cat spinal cord. Edisen had been collecting data that was presented at the April, 1963
meetings of the Federation of the American Societies of Experimental Biology. After her
presentation she visited the exhibits at the convention. She had heard of a five year award
to be given by the National Institutes of Health and inquired about that award. She was
told to go to the NINDB booth. At the booth, she met Dr. Rivera for the first time. He
offered her a Lifesaver candy, which Riveria insisted she eat in his presence. The
Lifesaver incident would re-occur several times over the next few days. Only later would
she conclude that the Lifesavers were probably laced with LSD. [102]
She made arrangements to visit the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda,
Maryland. Of the persons she wished to contact, only Dr. Rivera was available. They
went to dinner, and Dr. Rivera started speaking of his travels and of Dallas. Rivera
recommended a “nice’ nightclub in Dallas, the Carousel Club. Rivera then asked if she
knew Lee Oswald. She did not. Rivera explained that Oswald had lived in Russia, had a
Russian wife, a child, and that they would soon be moving to New Orleans. Rivera said
the Oswalds were a lovely couple, and that Edisen should get to know them. Edisen
thought Oswald was a scientific friend of Rivera. Rivera also mentioned that the recent
shooting aimed at General Walker might be blamed on Oswald. The first public mention
of an Oswald connection with the attempt on General Walker would occur only after
President Kennedy was assassinated. [103]
The next day, Edisen and Rivera went to the Library of Congress. On the way
there, Rivera asked if she had heard of John Abt of New York City. She had not, and
inquired as to who Abt was. Rivera replied that Abt was a lawyer who defended
communists. Edisen thought these were strange questions to be asking her. After going to
the Library of Congress, they went by the White House three times. Rivera commented,
“I wonder what Jackie will do when her husband dies.” Rivera then claimed he meant
when the baby dies. [104]
Rivera then asked Edisen to write a telephone number down: 899-4244. Then he
said, “Write down this name: Lee Harvey Oswald. Tell him to kill the chief.” This was
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supposed to be joke for Oswald. Rivera then became agitated and said, “I’ll show you
where it will happen. Rivera drew a diagram and said that it would be on the fifth floor.
Later, Rivera told Edisen to destroy the note she had written. Rivera threatened her with,
“I really don’t want to hurt you.” Rivera briefly tried to find the note in her purse before
she pulled the purse away. [105] It is important to recognize these interactions between
Dr. Rivera and Adele Edisen took place in April, 1963, before Oswald was a public
figure.
Shortly after Edisen returned to New Orleans, she tried to call Lee Harvey Oswald.
On her first attempt, she contacted Jesse Garner, manager of the apartments Oswald
would soon occupy. Garner said there was no one there by that name. The apartments
were owned by William McLaney, who also owned the land where the Cuban ex-patriots
were training for an invasion of Cuba. Oswald actually moved into the apartment May
10, 1963. The second time Edisen called, she spoke to Marina Oswald. On her third call,
she finally spoke to Oswald. Oswald said he had never heard of either a Colonel Rivera
or a Dr. Rivera. Edisen had identified herself in each call. She did not convey any
message to Oswald. [106]
So who was Dr. Rivera? He was a naturalized citizen, born in either Lima, Peru, or
San Juan, Puerto Rico between 1905 and 1911. He was in the US Army, 1943-1957, and
had done “Top Secret” work under a Dr. Carl Lamanna before he became a science
administrator from 1961-1973 at the NINDB. His actual retirement is not documented.
He died in 1989. [107]
Legacy of Secrecy
Waldron and Hartmann’s newest book, Legacy of Secrecy [108] seems to sum up
in a phrase a major outcome of the assassination of President Kennedy. Government
secrecy surely didn’t start then—it just became institutionalized on a continuing and
increasing basis. If the facts that have been drawn out by critical researchers were known
much earlier, many political careers would have been shortened. But keeping the secrets
of the assassination continued. But most future administrations added their own travesties
to the legacy of secrecy. In the extreme apologist sense, perhaps Lyndon Johnson might
be forgiven for his pushing through the idea that Oswald acted alone, in order to avoid
war with Cuba, and by inference, with the USSR (were it not for his own culpability
[109, 110]). In that apologist sense, only Lee Harvey Oswald and his family would have
been defamed. Perhaps the defamation of Oswald might have been rectified at a later
date. (So far, it has not been.) During the George W. Bush presidency, trying to keep
information on the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, along with other secretive
misdeeds, presumably left little positive legacy for his eight years as president. [111] It is
interesting to note that the author of the single bullet theory, Arlen Specter, may have
recently seen his career in the US Senate start to unravel. Specter, first elected to the
Senate in 1980 as a Republican, switched to become a Democrat in late April 2009. How
well this plays for him remains to be seen.
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Chapter 29

The Workings of the Assassination Records
Review Board [1]
John R. Tunheim
Good afternoon, everyone. I’m going to stick to my time limits today. I want
to leave time for your questions. That is one of the most important parts of these events.
Although I am a federal judge right now, four years in the 1990’s, for four years, I served
as chairman of the federal agency that was charged with finding what were then still
secret records from the Kennedy assassination and getting as many of them released as
quickly as possible to the public. The law that Congress passed, The President John F.
Kennedy Records Collection Act of 1992, was a reaction not only to the movie by Oliver
Stone which brought the issue to the fore, but also due to the years of dedicated work
done by researchers who felt they were trying to research this important subject with one
arm tied behind their back, because so many government records from the 1960’s were
still classified. It doesn’t take much to classify a record. That is still a problem that exists
in Washington today. You put “Top Secret” on a document and perhaps 30 or 40 years
later it might get released. The bill was passed in 1992 by Congress, President Bush was
empowered to make the appointment; he did not make an appointment. He opposed the
bill, thinking it was unconstitutional, and therefore he ignored the impact of the law and it
fell to President Clinton to make the appointment.
I was nominated by President Clinton in September of 1993, and we were all
confirmed, a five member board, consisting of myself, the one required lawyer on the
board, and four academics, one of whom was a professional archivist, and three who
were presidential historians. This Act put control of declassification of federal records,
albeit in a single category, in the hands of an outside independent body for the first time.
We were an independent agency within the executive branch which meant that we were
handling executive branch records, which got around the constitutional issue. We were
independent and couldn’t be simply fired by the president. All government records on the
Kennedy assassination were to carry a presumption of openness, and agencies were
required to organize their files and present them to us, along with any argument as to why
a particular record should remain sealed. When we made our decision about releasing a
document, the agency could appeal our decision to the president. There was no part of
this effort that was to go before the courts, the president being ultimately in control of
executive branch records.
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We were also to do our best to search for state, local, and private records to be
part of the collection, and we were empowered to try to clear up, as best we could, some
of the evidence. What we were not supposed to do, and we did not do, was to try to
decide what happened. The whole goal of this effort was to find all of the records and
release them to the extent possible. We released just about everything that we got our
hands on; then let the public decide: open the records to researchers, let them look
through them, and let the public decide what happened. We made several important
decisions at the beginning. All of the documents were considered on a word-by-word
basis, which means that no entire document was ever sealed or kept under wraps by our
efforts. We occasionally would redact information—not very much. We did not redact
any information that was central to the assassination story. We did redact names of
certain intelligence agents who were still alive; we felt that their lives might be
endangered if it was known that they were CIA agents. We used their pseudonyms
instead. But for every piece of information we redacted, we set a release date. All of
those release dates have now passed. The only records that have not been released are
records that will be released in 2017. These non-released documents were not considered
central to the assassination story, but they contain national security information.
The standard we applied was very interesting. We had to weigh interests. We
weighed interests such as public interests and interests like national security, intelligence
gathering methods, personal privacy, and presidential security. But with the great interest
in the Kennedy assassination records, we released just about everything. We found that
just about everything satisfied that standard. We had a staff of about 30 people; we held
hearings around the country. We defined expansively what an assassination record was.
There are those who would argue that President Kennedy was killed, for example,
because he was going to withdraw advisors from Vietnam. That’s a theory that some
people expressed. We didn’t take a position on that, but we went and found all of
President Kennedy’s administration’s records on Vietnam policies, and released them.
That’s the way we did our work—not taking sides on any particular place, but just getting
everything out. We issued in the four years over 27,000 decisions. There were an
additional 33,000 decisions that were called “consent releases:, which is a fancy way of
saying the agency wanted the information protected, but the agency knew we weren’t
going to protect the information, so the agency just gave up. There were no successful
agency appeals at the White House, President Clinton signaled early on that we were
going to do this work and he wasn’t going to interfere with it.
The collection includes all the evidentiary material from the Warren
Commission, and includes the voluminous collection of The House Committee on
Assassinations. We have about 1.6 million pages of material from the Central Intelligence
Agency that was shipped over and declassified and archived. The total collection today is
over 6 million pages. It is the largest single collection at the National Archives. [2] It has
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an index at www.nara.gov . We had very interesting relationships with the federal
agencies who were involved, and in the end we knew their files better than they did,
because we were looking at their files and we were examining everything.
Now, one question that people ask is: “Weren’t there records that were
destroyed over the years?” Well yes there were. I’m sure there were records that were
destroyed before we got into the action, 30 years after the assassination. The voluminous
collection maintained by James Angleton at the CIA was largely destroyed when he was
fired from his job as Chief of Counterintelligence in 1975. The files of J. Edgar Hoover
were burned upon his death. So there are records that disappeared. But if a record was
destroyed at the CIA, the State Department likely may have a copy of the record, or it
may be at the FBI, or at the National Security Agency. There are copies of records galore
throughout the federal government, so when the Secret Service destroyed a group of
records that we were seeking, which they said were destroyed inadvertently—they were
the threat assessment records before the November 1963 period, we found copies of those
records in the FBI files. The FBI, fortunately, kept all their records in a very organized
fashion. The CIA, on the other hand had no clue where records were with their filing
systems. They were off in warehouses, they were misfiled; we had a hard time finding
records within the CIA.
Just to inform you of some of the efforts we made, we hunted for a lot of extra
records, such as in New Orleans. Professor Fetzer mentioned the Garrison investigation
and prosecution of Clay Shaw. [3] We went to New Orleans to get as many records as we
could. A cousin of one of Clay Shaw’s former partners came forward with the diary that
Clay Shaw had written during the trial, which is now a pretty interesting part of the
collection. We held a public hearing in New Orleans, and the District Attorney said, “I
will help you with whatever you want. All of our records are yours. Nothing’s been
destroyed.” Watching that hearing at the time was an investigator that the District
Attorney had fired. This man was fired shortly after the new District Attorney came on
board. The investigator was fired because he refused to destroy the Grand Jury records
that Garrison had used in the prosecution of Clay Shaw. About three or four days later, he
showed up in Washington with all the Grand Jury records from the investigation by Jim
Garrison on Clay Shaw. They were wonderful records, including testimony by Marina
Oswald and others. The District Attorney fought us on that all the way to the Supreme
Court, on the basis of whether our power or the states secrecy law trumped the other side.
So that is an example of some of the fights we had.
Professor Fetzer [4] discussed some of the changes Gerald Ford made in the
Warren Commission narrative. This was a significant change even though he denied it
was significant. We found that because the chief counsel of the Warren Commission had
taken all of the edited early versions of the Warren Report home with him. His son came
to us and said that they had been in his dad’s basement for years. He’s dead now, and the
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son didn’t know what to do with them and asked if we wanted them. Of course we
wanted them. Of course we did. All 18 early versions of the Warren Report were
included in our records. Gerald Ford’s was right there in plain sight, so we had to address
that.
We tried to do our best with the photographic record. We were 30 years after
the fact. We established there were probably between 80-100 photographs taken in the
autopsy room in the Bethesda Naval facility. There are 15 of these photographs that exist
today. They have passed through Kennedy’s physician, George Burkley’s hands, through
Robert Kennedy’s hands, eventually back to the National Archives, where they are held
through a deed of gift, where permission needs to be received from the Kennedy family
to view them. Many photographs were destroyed. That raises the question as to why the
photographs were destroyed, and why other photographs were not destroyed. We had
these 15 original photographs from the 60’s that were fading. We had them digitalized.
They’re very precise now; they will be preserved for history in this precise way. We
brought in experts one day to look at them and look at the x-rays. They looked at
everything we had. Now, some have argued that some of these photographs are
fraudulent documents, but we took what we had. We brought in a group of experts,
pathologists who had a great deal of experience, and we asked them to tell us what they
thought. They spent a lot of time looking at these documents, and they came to a
conclusion that the shot was a head shot that hit in the top of the back of the skull in what
they called a trenching wound, meaning that it trenched along, breaking open the flap that
is visible in the pictures. In their view, at least in the pictures we had, we collected
everything that was available at this time;-- they didn’t think that the bullet hit brain
tissue, but the shock waves was enough to kill him instantly when the bullet hit.
The Zapruder film was something we spent time on. This film has an
interesting history. It was taken the day of the assassination and made into the film. It was
processed right away. Three first day copies were made. The government kept each of the
first day copies; one of them went to the secret service. The original was sold almost
immediately to the Time/Life Corporation. They had exclusive control over the images.
These are things that would not happen today. These things happened in 1963. Part of the
original film had some damage to it while Time/Life held it. As a result, they became
increasingly concerned about holding this important piece of evidence. They sold it back
to Henry Zapruder, who was the son of Abraham Zapruder. Henry was a Washington
lawyer who died several years ago. The film then went directly to the National Archives.
Whatever you think of the Zapruder film, we had the film, and it should be maintained.
We had it analyzed by experts at Kodak. They did not feel it had been altered [5], at least
that particular copy that they had tested. And we took it, in the Constitutional sense, from
the Zapruder family. So the original film is maintained under perfect conditions, at the
National Archives, where it is stored. And it has been digitalized, which of course means
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it is much easier to see. So we did what we could with the Zapruder film. We had some
issues dealing with the Zapruder family. We tried to get them to donate the original film
to the United States. We came close at times, but in the end, there was a lawsuit trying to
establish the value of the film.
We spent a lot of time trying to get records out of the former Soviet Union.
Oswald spent two and a half years there under very close supervision and observation by
the KGB. There is a file about eight feet high in Minsk, which includes everything he
said and did. It is in remarkable detail; the KGB did its job very well. They kept tabs on
him at all times; they were very concerned about him. I’ve seen a lot of the files out of
that series of documents, but we haven’t been able to get more than 400-500 pages of that
file. We have a horrible relationship with the government of Belarus. It just keeps getting
worse over time. In Soviet files in Moscow, there are also files that we haven’t got access
to yet. The KGB did an investigation into the assassination. It is an important set of
documents. For the future, will we get them? I don’t know. Things don’t seem to be
going too well with Russia these days, so at some point in time, if they need something
from us, if we are smart enough, we’ll ask them to share their archives on the
assassination of President Kennedy with us. Maybe we’ll get something out of them then.
So there is more work to be done, there are files in Mexico City that still haven’t seen the
light of day; those files are important because Oswald spent some crucial time there.
These are just some of the projects that should be pursued.
It was a remarkable experience to work with all of these documents; we tried
very hard to review everything that someone might have seen as relevant. This was a one
time opportunity to open up classified documents and government files. There are
upward of 100-150 researchers a day looking at these files. That was the whole idea
behind this effort; it was to open it up and finally trust the people to review the records
themselves and decide what happened, rather than have the government tell them what to
do.
I want to recall, in closing, this was 1963—it was a very different world then.
The Dallas police force was a relatively small town police force, and, in my opinion, a
corrupt police force. They were corrupt in a small sort of way, in accordance with the
standards of that era. A person like Jack Ruby could spend a weekend in the police
station, probably carrying a gun the whole time, and not attract any attention. That is why
Lee Harvey Oswald was paraded out twice for press conferences during the 44 hours he
was held by the Dallas Police. But security standards were very different in that day and
age. The Secret Service, on the day of the assassination, the blackest day in the history of
that organization, which dates back to within months of Lincoln’s assassination, their
procedures and practices were completely changed because of that day in Dallas. A lot of
the things we look at today looks like almost criminal negligence on their part and the
part of the other agencies that were following Oswald at the time. But the fact of the
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matter is, it was standard practice in 1963.We didn’t protect our presidents very well. We
had a remarkably lax set of standards at that time. Just go forward another 30 years and
look at Timothy McVey. Imagine when Timothy McVey was arrested in the Oklahoma
City bombing in 1965. Did the authorities parade him out to two press conferences? Did
they attempt to transfer him in an unsecured facility? Absolutely not. Those things never
happen today. When you think back to 1963, and look at these investigations that were
poorly done—they were poorly done, partly because they were done by the standard of
the times. The Warren Commission reflected that as well. I’ll quit now, so we’ll have
time to talk.

Question from the audience: Can we find the Zapruder film on the internet , or
anything?
Judge Tunheim: The actual original is at the National Archives, but there are
many versions that you can see. [6]

Notes:
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

The presentation by Judge Tunheim was recorded by Sean Windingland and
along with many of the other presentations, placed on youTube. Using the
recording preserved by Windingland on YouTube, John Delane Williams
transcribed Judge Tunheim’s presentation.
Tunheim, J.R., (Chair) and others (1998). Final report of the Assassination
Records Review Board. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
Fetzer, J.H. (September 28, 2008).The JFK assassination: Photographic
Evidence. Presented at the John F. Kennedy: History, Memory, Legacy
Conference at The University of North Dakota, Grand Forks.
Ibid.
Fetzer,J.H. (Ed.) (2003). The Great Zapruder Film Hoax. Peru, IL: Catfeet
Press.
One of the better versions, Images of an assassination: A new look at the
Zapruder film is available through a variety of sources, including half.com,
Amazon.com and barnesandnoble.com.
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Chapter 30
Dealey Plaza Revisited: What Happened to JFK?
James H. Fetzer
The application of principles of scientific reasoning to the assassination of JFK can contribute to
resolving any lingering questions over whether or not he was murdered as the result of a
conspiracy. The likelihood L of an hypothesis h, if evidence e were true, is equal to the
probability of e, if h were true. The hypotheses are viewed as possible causes of the evidence as
effects. This assumes that evidence e includes all of the available relevant data, which may
include findings that specific items of evidence have been planted, altered, or fabricated,
discoveries that lend weight of their own. This chapter cannot exhaust the evidence in this case,
but presents a sample sufficient to demonstrate that the conspiracy hypothesis has high
likelihood and the lone assassin low. It should not have been necessary to frame a guilty man.

Stewart Galanor, Cover-Up (1968), Expanded
According to The Warren Report (1964), a lone gunman fired three shots from the
sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository Building, scoring two hits and one
miss, which injured a distant bystander, James Tague, who was observing from
location #6. Prior to this discovery of a shot that had missed, even the commission
supposed all three had hit--the first hit JFK in the back, the second hit Governor
John Connally in the back, and the third hit JFK in the head, killing him.
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The backyard photograph,
which was published in
LIFE, was a fake. His
finger tips were cut off; the
shadows from his nose and
eyebrows were inconsistent
with the shadow cast by his
figure; the chin was not
Oswald’s pointed chin with
a cleft but a block chin with
an insert line. Jack White
used the newspapers as an
internal yardstick and
discovered that either the
person shown was only 5’6”
tall--too short to be Oswald,
who was 5’10”--or the
image of the newspapers
was too large.

Two shots were widely
reported on radio and
television that day, one to
the throat, the other to the
right temple, which blew
his brains out the back of
his head. Nevertheless,
when the Warren
Commission would
release its report nine
months later, those
trajectories had been
reversed and JFK had only
been hit at the base of the
neck and the back of his
head, thereby reducing as
many as four or more hits
to just these two.
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The arrest report for Lee
Oswald stated, “This
man shot and killed
President John F.
Kennedy and Police
Officer J. D. Tippit. He
also shot and wounded
Governor John
Connally.” The time
was 1:40 PM. That was
very fast work. The
assassination had taken
place at 12:30 PM and
virtually no
investigation had yet
taken place.

Jesse Curry, JFK Assassination File (1969)

The alleged assassination weapon--a Mannlicher-Carcano carbine--was photographed in
Dallas by the Dallas Police and in Washington, D.C., by the FBI. Remarkably, they are not
the same. With a muzzle velocity of only 2,000 fps, the Mannlicher-Carcano is not a high
velocity weapon. According to the official account, the President was killed by high
velocity bullets, which means Oswald cannot have fired the bullets that killed JFK.
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A nitrate test revealed
traces on his hands but
not on his cheek.
While he might have
fired a revolver, he
had not fired a carbine.
Washing his face
would have washed
his hands, too. He
worked in a depository
with books printed in
ink, which contains
nitrates. So this test
exonerated him of the
commission of the
crime in two ways.

Jesse Curry, JFK Assassination File (1969)

11:50 AM: William Shelley saw him near the lunchroom when he (Shelley) came down to eat lunch

Noon: Eddie Piper saw him on the first floor when he (Oswald) told him he was going up to
eat.

12:15 PM: Carolyn Arnold observed him sitting in the lunchroom.

12:25 PM: She saw him again, but on the first floor near the front door.

Gerald Posner, Case Closed (1993), Expanded
Oswald appears to have been in a lunchroom on the second floor when the assassination took place.
He was confronted there within 90 seconds of the shooting by Motorcycle Patrolman Marrion Baker,
who held him in his sights until Roy Truly, Lee’s supervisor, assured Baker he was an employee who
belonged in the building. Both described him as acting perfectly normal, neither agitated nor out of
breath, but--Truly added--somewhat startled to find an officer pointing his revolver at him.
346

Two Secret Service
agents, who would have
accompanied the
limousine, were left
behind at Love Field by
Emory Roberts, the
Agent-in-Charge of the
Presidential Protection
Detail. Here one of
them, Henry Rybka,
expresses dismay at
being called off.

The motorcycle
escort was reduced
to four, who were
instructed not to ride
forward of the rear
wheels of the
Presidential
limousine. One of
them observed that it
was “the damnedest
formation” he’d ever
seen. JFK’s military
aide, who normally
sat between the
driver and the agentin-charge, was
moved to the last
vehicle along with
the President’s
personal physician.

Richard Trask, Pictures of the Pain (1994)
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There are more than
fifteen indications of
Secret Service
complicity in setting
JFK up for the hit. In
addition to the agents
being left behind at
Love Field, the
manhole covers were
not welded, open
windows were not
covered, and the
crowd was allowed to
spill into the street.

Governor Connally
was instrumental in
making a change to
the motorcade route
on November 18,
1963, four days
before the event.
Normally, a
motorcade route,
once fixed, is never
changed, so the
Secret Service can
check every building
and screen its
occupants. This
change brought the
President past the
Texas School Book
Depository Building.
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Most tellingly, the
vehicles were in an
improper sequence.
The Presidential
limousine was
placed first. Lower
ranking dignitaries,
such as the Mayor
and the Vice
President, should
have preceded him.
Reporters were
moved to the rear
and the President’s
personal physician to
the last car, which
put him in the worst
location should his
patient require
emergency medical
treatment.
Richard Sprague, Computers and Automation (May 1970)

At Parkland Hospital,
where the moribund
President was taken, a
Secret Service agent
took a bucket and
sponge and began
cleaning up the blood
and brains from the
limousine. When
onlookers noticed a
through-and-through
hole in the windshield,
the vehicle was
moved.
Richard Trask, Pictures of the Pain
(1994)
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By Monday, November 25, 1963, the day of the formal state funeral, the vehicle had been sent back
to Ford to be completely stripped down to bare metal and rebuilt, including replacing the
windshield, which had a bullet hole (the black spot at the center of the small, white spiral nebula)
close to the right-center (facing the vehicle from the front). The Secret Service would produce
yet a third, different windshield (with cracks) in its place to misrepresent the original damage.

During a press conference at 3:15 PM, Malcolm Perry, M.D., who had performed a
tracheotomy through a small wound in the President’s throat, explained three times that the
wound was a wound of entry. A transcript of this event would not be provided to the
Warren Commission, but would be published in Assassination Science (1998).
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Charles Crenshaw, M.D., who was present during the efforts to revive JFK at Parkland, drew
these diagrams of the appearance of the throat wound before and after the tracheotomy incision,
which are consistent with Dr. Perry’s description of it as a wound of entry.

Officially, one shot hit
the President in the
back of his neck,
passed through his
neck without hitting
any bony structures,
and entered the back
of Governor John
Connally, inflicting
multiple wounds. It
shattered a rib, exited
his chest, damaged his
right wrist, and entered
his left thigh. Since
this trajectory is so
implausible and the
alleged missile
virtually pristine, it has
come to be known as
“the magic bullet”.
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The jacket JFK was
wearing shows a hole
about 5 1/2 inches below
the collar, which
contradicts the official
location of the wound. If
the bullet entered here,
especially at a downward
angle, it is difficult to
imagine how it could have
passed through his neck
and exited at his throat.

A bullet hole in the shirt
turns out be about 5 1/2
inches below the collar,
too low to correspond to
the official location at
the base of the back of
the neck. Neither the
shirt nor the jacket were
sent forward to Bethesda
for the autopsy, a
violation of autopsy
protocol.
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The Bethesda autopsy was conducted by James Humes, who was assisted by J. Thornton Boswell.
Neither of them had ever performed an autopsy on a gunshot victim before. Boswell’s diagram of
the wounds shows a wound to the back about 5 1/2 inches below the collar. It was verified by
Admiral George Burkley, the President’s personal physician.

One of two FBI agents
who witnessed the
autopsy, James Sibert,
drew a diagram showing
the relative location of the
wounds, where the back
wound is lower than the
throat wound, making it
most unlikely that they
were connected by a shot
that had been fired from
above and behind.

Noel Twyman, Bloody Treason (1997)
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Admiral Burkley
composed a death
certificate on JFK,
which said he had been
“struck in the head” by
one shot and that “a
second wound occurred
at the posterior back at
about the level of the
third thoracic vertebra.”
He added that the head
wound involved
“evisceration of the right
hemisphere of the
brain.”
James H. Fetzer, ed., Assassination Science (1998)

Gary Shaw, Cover-Up (1976)
The third thoracic vertebra turns out to be approximately 5 1/2 inches below the collar to the
right of the spinal column. Some apologists for the official account suggest that his jacket
was “bunched up”, which made the hole lower than the wound. But that would not explain
the diagrams of the wound showing it at the same location on the body itself.
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Even the Warren Commission staff concluded that the back shot had been at that location, as
this reenactment photograph displays. The larger circular patch on the back of the stand-in’s
jacket represents the back wound, the smaller above it the official entry wound to the head.

Newsweek (November 22, 1993)
Arlen Specter, then a junior counselor to the Warren Commission, uses a pointer here to exhibit
the path the “magic bullet” would have had to have taken in order to account for all the wounds
with only two shots. Since the larger circular patch visible below his left hand indicates the
back shot, a photo intended to illustrate the theory actually refutes it.
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An early document
released by the
Assassination Records
Review Board (ARRB)
showed that Gerald Ford
(R-MI), then a
commission member, had
had the back wound redescribed from “his
uppermost back,” already
an exaggeration, to “the
base of the back of his
neck” in an effort to make
“the magic bullet”
hypothesis appear more
plausible.

The New York Times (July 3, 1997)

David W. Mantik, M.D.,
Ph.D., who is board
certified in radiation
oncology, took a CAT
scan of a patient with
chest and neck dimensions
similar to those of JFK.
When he plotted the
official trajectory, it
turned out to be
anatomically impossible.
Cervical vertebrae
intervene.
Stewart Galanor, Cover-Up (1998)

356

Charles Crenshaw, Assassination Science (1998)
Dr. Crenshaw also drew the massive blow-out to the back of the head, which he
described as the size of a baseball or of your fist when you double it up. During an
interview broadcast on television, he also described an entry wound at the right temple,
consistent with the mortician’s description.

When the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) re-investigated the case in 1977-78,
its medical panel concluded that the entry wound was actually four inches above the entry location
previously specified. It was depicted in diagrams (right) but not visible in photographs (left).
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According to the
autopsy report, the
fatal head shot entered
at the back of his head
and blew out the top of
his skull. The Navy
artist who was
instructed to prepare
these sketches was not
allowed to observe the
body and drew what
he was told to draw.

Robert Groden, The Killing of a President (1994), Expanded
Some forty witnesses from Dealey Plaza, from Parkland and from Bethesda--including bystanders,
physicians, medical technicians, and agents of the FBI--reported that JFK had a massive blow-out
to the back of the head, the location of which they demonstrated with their hands.
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Another diagram of
the head wound by
Robert McClelland,
M.D., who was also
present at Parkland,
depicts a massive
blow-out that fits Dr.
Crenshaw’s
description. It was a
terrible wound.

David W. Mantik, Assassination Science (1998)
These reports were discounted on the grounds that the autopsy X-rays don’t show it.
Mantik, a Ph.D. in physics, used the simple technique of optical densitometry to prove
that an area--identified here as “Area P”--had been “patched” using material
far too dense to be human bone.
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It was my suspicion
that those who were
involved in
reconstructing home
movies of the
assassination,
including the
Zapruder film, might
have overlooked
frames past 313-316
that display the
wound to the back of
the head. I found this
image of the blowout in frame 374.
Zapruder Frame 374

Multiple competent
physicians who were
experienced with
gunshot wounds
observed both
cerebral and
cerebellar tissue
extruding from the
massive blow-out to
the back of the head.
These observations
were inconsistent
with a blow-out to
the top of the head
that blew his brains
to the right-front,
which therefore
also impeach
the Zapruder film.
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David Lifton, Best Evidence (1980)
The cerebellum is situated at the base of the skull. The cerebrum is a larger mass that
comprises the upper portions of the brain. Blown-out tissue of these kinds would look very
different in their appearance. Even first year medical students would not confuse them.

Robert B.
Livingston, M.D., a
world authority on
the human brain and
an expert on wound
ballistics, studied
reports of cerebral
and cerebellar
damage from
Parkland. He
concluded that the
brain in diagrams
and photographs at
the National
Archives cannot be
that of JFK.
Robert B. Livingston, Assassination Science (1998)
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Mantik also
discovered that a
6.5mm metallic slice
had been added to
other cranial X-rays
in an evident attempt
to implicate the
obscure MannlicherCarcano carbine
Oswald is alleged to
have used. But the
weapon is not highvelocity and cannot
have fired the bullets
that killed JFK,
which means that
mistakes were made
by using the wrong
weapon to frame
him.

David W. Mantik, Assassination Science (1998)

At 1 PM, November
22, 1963, Malcolm
Kilduff, acting press
secretary, announced
that the President was
dead, explaining it was
a simple matter of a
bullet through the head
while pointing to his
right temple,
attributing that finding
to his personal
physician, Admiral
George Burkley.
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The mortician who
prepared the body
for burial told an
investigator that, in
addition to a large
gaping hold in the
back of the head,
there was a small
wound in the right
temple, and a
wound on the
back, 5 to 6 inches
below the shoulder
to the right of the
spinal column.

When the actual
entry location is
combined with the
rest of the “magic”
trajectory, the theory
lends itself to
ridicule as in
Oliver’s Stone’s
“JFK.” The bullet
alleged to have
performed these
feats was
nevertheless
virtually pristine
with only slight
longitudinal
distortion.
Gary Shaw, Cover-Up (1976)
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James H. Fetzer, ed., Murder in Dealey Plaza (2000)
Taken by James Altgens, this famous photograph shows (1) the through-and-through hole in the
windshield, (2) an Oswald look-alike--probably a co-worker named Billy Lovelady--in the
doorway of the building; (3) the open window of a closet belonging to a uranium mining
company that was a CIA asset, from which three shots appear to have been fired; and (4) the
Secret Service assigned to Vice President Johnson responding, even while the Presidential
detail still seems to be unaware what’s going on.

JFK appears to have
been hit four times:
once in the throat (from
in front); once in the
back (from behind); and
twice in the head (once
from behind and once
from in front). The
shots to his throat and to
his right temple appear
to have been fired from
above-ground-level
sewer openings on the
south and north sides of
the Triple Underpass.
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The most probable sequence: A shot fired from the Country Records Building struck the President’s back shortly before the shot to
the throat from the south end of the Triple Underpass. Then a shot from the Dal-Tex missed and injured Tague. A shot from the
Book Depository hit John Connally. The driver pulled the limo to the left and stopped. A second shot from the Dal-Tex hit JFK in
the back of the head. He fell forward and Jackie eased him up. She was looking him in the face when a shot from the north end of
the Triple Underpass hit his right temple with an exploding bullet. A third shot fired from the Dal-Tex missed and hit the chrome
strip. Other shots probably hit John Connally or missed and were found in the grass. No shots were fired from the “assassin’s lair”.

Richard Sprague, Computers and Automation (May 1970), Expanded

The first frames from the Zapruder
film to which the public had access
were published in LIFE. Most were
unremarkable, but this one--frame
313--posed special problems. The
plate was broken twice to revise
description (6), which appears to be
unique in the history of publishing.
There are many indications this and
other films have been edited,
including the all-but-motionless
spectators, the driver’s head turns
(twice as fast as humanly possible),
and the “blob” and blood spray,
which appear to have been painted
in. Blood and brains across the trunk
and the driver’s pulling to the left
and bringing the vehicle to a halt had
to be removed, because it was such
an obvious indication of Secret
Service complicity in setting up JFK
for the hit.

LIFE (October 2, 1964)

When the frames were
published in the 26 volumes
of supporting evidence, they
were in the wrong sequence,
greatly mitigating the backand-to-the-left motion of
JFK’s head in the extant film.
David S. Lifton had a friend
write to J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the FBI, and
Hoover acknowledged they
were in the wrong order.
Michael Baden, M.D., head of
the medical panel for the
HSCA, has observed that, if
the “magic bullet” theory is
false, there had to have been
at least six shots from three
directions. That turns out to be
correct.
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Noel Twyman, Bloody Treason (1997)

The claim has often been made that
the strongest proof against any
conspiracy is that no one has talked.
That is false. As Noel Twyman,
Bloody Treason (1997), observed,
at least eight prominent figures
talked about it before or after the
event. Others include Chauncey
Holt, Charles Harrelson, Jim Hicks,
and Jack Ruby. Reinforcing the
conclusions of Lyndon’s mistress,
Madeleine Duncan Brown, Texas in
the Morning (1997), and of Barr
McClelland, Blood, Money &
Power (2003), Billy Sole Estes, A
Texas Legend (2005), implicates
LBJ in the assassination, as has E.
Howard Hunt in his Rolling Stone
“Confession” (2007).

The Mafia could not have
extended its reach into
Bethesda to alter X-rays under
the control of medical officers
of the US Navy, agents of the
Secret Service, and the
President’s personal
physician. Neither pro- nor
anti-Castro Cubans could
have substituted another brain
for the original. Even if the
KGB has the same abilities as
the CIA to recreate films, it
could not have gained access
to the Zapruder. Nor could
any of these things have been
done by Oswald, who was
incarcerated or already dead.
Newsweek (November 22, 1993)
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Among the photographs
of onlookers in Dealey
Plaza discovered by
James Richards and
Allan Eaglesham, some
include persons who
appear to be high CIA
officials, such as this
one. Lucien Conein was
among the most
notorious of CIA
assassins. His presence
in Dealey Plaza thus
lends further weight to
the inference that the
CIA played a leading
role in the assassination.

Allan Eaglesham, “Familiar Faces in Dealey Plaza “
Officials of the CIA
apparently gathered at
Houston and Main to
pay their “last
respects” to JFK. The
findings presented
here would be highly
probable on a
conspiracy hypothesis
and have a very low-even zero--probability
on its lone-assassin
alternative. The
strength of the
evidence of conspiracy
is overwhelmingly
greater than that of a
lone-assassin.

James Richards, “Familiar Faces in Dealey Plaza II”
For more on the principles of scientific reasoning, see James H. Fetzer, Scientific Knowledge
(1981), Philosophy of Science (1993), and “Propensities and Frequencies: Inference to the Best
Explanation”, Synthese 132/1-2 (July-August 2002). On the specifics of the assassination, see
James H. Fetzer, ed., Assassination Science (1998), Murder in Dealey Plaza (2000), and The Great
Zapruder Film Hoax (2003). Visit assassinationresearch.com, which I edit with John P. Costella.
© 2009 James H. Fetzer
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